forces in ex-Yugoslavia and the European workers' movement. And the European peace movement has hardly uttered a word on the question. As a result, the political terrain has been occupied by the various machineries of state - and by demagogues.
This situation can be explained by two factors: that of the overwhelming weakness of pacifist and internationalist forces in ex-Yugoslavia; and that of the chauvinist confusion of the West European workers' movement about everything related to the future of Europe. Thus, one side is not able and the other not willing to seek partners for a dialogue which could take us beyond the present state of meekly accepting initiatives launched by the governments of the day. For this to occur, the West European workers movement would have to put forward a radical social alternative to the liberal, free-market Maastricht project — thereby offering the Balkan peoples a different conception of Europe. We are far from that.
The deafening silence, the absence of even the smallest sign of an independent position from the organizations of the European left, clearly highlights the weakening of even the most elementary class consciousness. Without a doubt, this is a state of affairs without precedent in the last forty years in a conflict of such magnitude.
Too isolated in its internationalist and anti-militarist outlook, the European far-left has also been too weak to take meaningful initiatives. Our aim must be to nurture active solidarity with all forms of resistance against ethnic nationalism, against racism and war-mongering. There must be no concessions to "realism" and no compromises with institutional manoeuvres.
Planning for the long term
This crisis is going to continue, and it will be possible to patiently build support networks for those who refuse to give into chauvinism and racism and build active solidarity with independent antiwar media and with pacifist groups. In the end, the progressive strengthening of an internationalist option is the only way forward - in the Balkans as in the whole of Europe. *
International Viewpoint # 234 • September 14, 1992
The forces of disorder AS peace talks inaugurated in London at the end of August moved to Geneva in early September, vicious fighting continued in the ex-Yugoslav province of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH). International Viewpoint spoke to Catherine Samary, who has written extensively on Yugoslavia, on the background to the conflict and the prospects after the London conference. W HAT do you make of the results of the London conference? An end to the bombardment, control of heavy weapons, reciprocal recognition of the republics, the closing of the prison camps; a lot of good things are promised, but I am sceptical about what will happen in reality.
Furthermore, even if these commitments were met, essential questions would remain unresolved. There is a danger of a peace that simply ratifies what has been accomplished by force and terror. • Who is responsible for the climate of force and terror?
The main responsibility lies with the Serbian government and its allies. But Croatia also bears some responsibility; there is a Serb/Croat understanding about sharing out Bosnia-Herzegovina to the detriment of the Muslims. • Have the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina been recognized?
The border question is secondary to that of rights inside the countries concerned. In the present situation, there is nothing to stop the Kosovo Albanians or the Vojvodina Hungarians from rising in revolt. Recognition of frontiers only shows the way to a solution if it is tied to a substantial change
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with regard to the recognition of minority national rights inside the different states.
At present the formation of a sovereign Serbia has for some months gone along with the establishment of apartheid inside that state's Kosovo and Vojvodina provinces, where Serb refugees, encouraged by Great Serb nationalism, have occupied housing belonging to other nationalities.
In Croatia, there is a gap between the laws adopted as a part of the drive for independence and the real practice as far as citizenship is concerned. In fact, the latter is being granted only to "good Croats" Croats living in Australia are getting citizenship while Serbs who have lived there for centuries are being deprived of it. Since the centre of the war moved to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatian regime has become increasingly authoritarian and, behind the scenes, the mood in ruling circles is in favour of ethnic purification in practice.
For the frontiers of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be respected, the Great Serb and Great Croat logics of a division of BH between armed groups from the two sides have to be fought. But it is also essential that BH's Croat, Serb and Muslim populations feel secure. The country has a tradition of cohabitation. The basis for cohabitation is to be found in the constitution which recognizes that the republic has three peoples who have both common rights as citizens and national rights as peoples. These constitutional provisions need to be respected. But recognition of the rights of peoples also necessarily implies links with the other republics, in particular with Serbia and ex-YUGOSLAVIA
Croatia and reciprocal guarantees for the rights of peoples dispersed among several states. The same considerations apply to Macedonia which has an extremely mixed population. • How is this different from the proposal for dividing BH into ethnic cantons?
The problem is the way that Serb and Croat nationalists interpret cantonization. They see it not in terms not of territorial decentralization but of ethnic division. However BH, for historical reasons, does not have ethnically homogeneous regions. Thus ethnic cantonization means that people have to be forced out so that a region becomes ethnically pure.
Furthermore, the Muslims are sure to lose out. They were only recognized as a people at the end of the 1960s. Being the descendants of the privileged of the Ottoman Empire, they are concentrated in the towns. The ease with which Serb and Croatian forces have occupied the bulk of Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory stems from their support in the countryside. Thus the Serbs, who make up a third of the population, occupy two thirds of the territory, while most of the remaining third is in Croat hands, although Croats are only a sixth of the republic's population. That leaves nothing for the Muslims. This is why the capital Sarajevo has become the key to the fighting and why Croat forces have not come to Sarajevo's aid.
The only solution for BH is a far-reaching administrative decentralization with protection for minorities, which is not worked out on a purely ethnic basis. • How would you characterize the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
The Yugoslav crisis in IV OVER the past few years IV has published many background articles, comments, interviews and documents concerning the Yugoslav crisis and its regional implications, among them:
* Deaths in Kosovo; the morbid anatomy of a regime — Catherine Verla (no. 161, April 17, 1989)
* Last straw for Albanian people — Nina Jerkic (Ibid)
* The slide towards civil war — Michele Lee (no. 191, October 1, 1990)
* Kosovo workers fight back - Document (no. 192, October 15, 1990)
* Youth rebel against Milosevic — Michele Lee (no. 204, April 15, 1991)
* Crisis in the Balkans - Catherine Samary (no. 211, July 22, 1991)
* War in Europe - Michele Lee (no. 212, September 16, 1991)
* The Macedonian temptation - N. Champi (no. 215, October 28, 1991)
* A house beset by demons (Document - interview with former Mayor of Belgrade) (ibid)
* The antiwar movement in Yugoslavia - Catherine Samary (no. 216, November 11, 1991)
* A militarized society and its critics - Marko Hren (Ibid)
* Next year, Sarajevo? — Slavko Mihaljcek (Ibid)
* Antiwar rebellion in Vojvodina — Document (no. 218, December 9, 1991)
* The Yugoslav trade unions and the war - Catherine Samary (bid An army in search of a state — Cathertne Verta (no. 219,
* An army in search of a state — Catherine Verla (no. 219, December 23, 1991)
* Canton; rhymes with Lebanon? — Slavko Mihaljcek (no. 223, March 30, 1992)
* Repression of Kosovo Albanians continues - Interview with Muhamedim Kullashi (no. 226, April 27, 1992)
* The forced cantonization of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Christian Pomitzer (no. 229, May 25, 1992)
* What comes after sanctions? — Christian Pomitzer (no. 232, July 6, 1992) * 5
ex-YUGOSLAVIA
What forces are at work there?
We should be aware that there are other forces than those involved in the war. The media do not attach sufficient importance to the multi-ethnic popular forces, which are in fact quite strong. Last summer they organized "the insurrection for peace". Today they have been pushed into a corner by the war but they remain active and structured, even if they do not have prominent figureheads. The media silence about them is no accident. Many of those involved in this movement are former Communists.
The non-nationalist opposition got some 25% of the votes at the December 1990 elections. It could thus be said that nationalism won. It is true that the presidency headed by Alija Izetbegovic comprises two Serbs, two Croats, two Muslims and a Yugoslav. But it is made up of ethnic parties. The ethnic principle rules.
There are a number of parties and groupings in the Serb camp. The dominant one is that around Karadzic, an ultra-nationalist maniac brought up in the Great Serb tradition. Karadzic traces his political roots to the anti-Communist Chetnik resistance movement of World War II.
Serbs are represented in other political formations, but only in small numbers. However Karadzic has imposed his line by terror. Bosnian Serbs who stand up for BH are under considerable pressure. The alliance between Serbia's president Milosevic and Karadzic is obvious. The war in BH is not an affair internal to that republic; the Serb militia there has use of federal army equipment left behind when the latter withdrew and there has been logistical support from Serbia. But the Milosevic-Karadzic alliance is not a smooth one. Under international pressure, Milosevic, the sorcerer's apprentice, may tone down his support.
The main force among BH's Croats is the Croat Democratic Forum (HDZ) of Croatia's president Franjo Tudjman. At first the HDZ in BH was represented by a moderate wing which wanted BH to continue to exist. But the HDZ in the Croat-controlled part of BH has been purged and the militarist far right has imposed what is in effect its own statelet on BH's territory. The Croat far right armed gangs have been responsible for massacres of Muslims, and, despite official agreements, have failed to submit themselves to the Bosnian territorial defence forces.
The Muslim camp is heterogeneous. In the 1970s Izetbegovic was convicted for writing a text considered "fundamentalist" in which he called for an Islamic state. He represents the religious nationalist current in his community, but he is also a pragmatist and a prisoner of the balance of forces. He has made the mistake of chopping and 6 ciples. First he accepted cantonization then changing his alliances and stated prinrejected it. He has called for a multi-ethnic BH but the nationalist Serbs say that there are not sufficient guarantees against an Islamic state.
But it is the Muslim community which has the best positions and is the big loser in the current state of affairs. However, we should be aware that a fundamentalist far right does exist, especially in the rural areas in the Sandjak, and can only gain strength in reaction to Serb and Croat policies. • In BH we find people who have lived side-by-side for centuries turning on one another. Why? What should be the reply to people who argue that this is a sign of historic atavism and who claim that Tito's Yugoslavia was a "prison house of peoples?"
We have to get rid of these clichés about ancient hatreds. History leaves its traces, of course. The Ustashe regime set up in Croatia in 1941 was the bloodiest of all fascist Europe. Apart from Jews and Gypsies, 300-500,000 Serbs were massacred. The Bosnian Muslims, however, were spared (they were considered to be Croats). However, if we look at the longer term view, Muslims and Albanians also struggled against the Ottoman Empire and there were Croat anti-fascists. Hatred and the logic of genocide are not the product of some innate characteristics but of political lines to which other political lines can be opposed. Against the Ustashe and the Chetniks the Partisans fought for a Yugoslavia that brought together the various communities in a federation.
The present crisis is a product of the failure of Titoism. Nonetheless, that does not mean that Yugoslavia was an artificial project. In any case, since the war there have been several decades of peace, of inter-ethnic marriages and rising living standards. While it was certainly led by a single party, it was not true that Yugoslavia was a "prison house of peoples". The confederal system provided an adequate solution to the national question. The problem was that to genuinely overcome national antagonism more democracy was needed. The absence of openness meant that democratic national rights took on a perverted form. It also plunged the country into economic crisis; a non-capitalist economy can only function if the profit motive is replaced by the democratic motive.
Even so, the crisis of Titoism need not have led to war. For this to break out a break with the Titoist heritage on the national question in a negative direction was needed. This was the result of a combination of a number of factors: the crisis of the regime, the world economic crisis, the growth of regional inequalities, the resulting disintegration of the federation, the rise of nationalist currents to domination
International Viewpoint # 234 • September 14, 1992 over political life and finally the formation of new nation-states.
Serb nationalism inaugurated the festivities with the suppression of the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. At that moment, a political battle could still have been waged; the Serbs were less than 50% of the population of the Serb republic, Croatia and Slovenia could have sought support in Macedonia and BH and won over the Serbs in Croatia to a line of multi-ethnic conciliation and against Great Serb nationalism. But currents in Croatia and Slovenia were already dreaming of integration into a prosperous (and Catholic) Europe.
They proposed to shed "the Turks" to the south and privatize their economiesafter having brought it under state control. For these reasons, Slovenia and Croatia considered Vojvodina and Kosovo as Serb internal affairs. As a result, instead of going beyond Titoism in a positive direction, new regimes were set up that were no more democratic than the former regime. On the contrary, the nation states in ex-Yugoslavia can only be formed by leaning on a type of proto-fascism. • The West has only added fuel to the fire it has claimed to be putting out.
Yes. The West's responsibility can be looked at in three stages.
Firstly, until 1991 the West supported the line of a re-centralized "free market" Yugoslavia, as proposed by Markovic. At the start of the 1980s the Yugoslav state had a $20bn foreign debt and the creditors wanted a strong and centralized state to ensure repayment. On top of this there was the fear of "disorder" in the Balkans. This line certainly added fuel to the fire since the push for the "free market" could only lead to the break-up of the federation by sharpening regional differences, as has also happened in Czechoslovakia. This was particularly true in Yugoslavia where the confederal arrangement was the result not only of pressure from ruling elites but of the need for democratic and efficient management of the common space, since such management must respect national sovereignties.
Secondly, the West went from support for free market recentralization to a disorderly recognition of independence of various republics. Germany encouraged independence declarations from Slovenian and Croatia. This was especially serious in ethnically mixed Croatia. The recognition of independence took place without coherent principles; the label "democratic" was attached to highly suspect regimes. Macedonia has not been recognized, owing to Greek pressure.
Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognized amid claims that this would prevent war. In fact, the opposite happened. This process of recognition did not take account of the
ex-YUGOSLAVIA
THE following is a list of anti-war organizations active in the different parts of the ex-Yugoslav Confederation.; it first appeared in Babel, no. 5/6, June 1992, a publication of the Helsinki Citzens Assembly published in France.
SLOVENIA
* Center za kulturo miru in nenasilja — Centre for a peaceful and non-violent culture. Mestni trg 13 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia. Telephone: 38-61-210-374.
Fax. 224 666
* Womens' Movement, Citizens Assembly (HCA). Sonja Lokar, Tomsiceva
5 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia. Telephone: 38-61-161 140. Fax. 215 855
CROATIA
* Anti-ratne Kampanja (ARK) — Zagreb anti-war committee. Tkalciceva 38
41000 Zagreb, Croatia. Telephone: 38-41-422 495. Fax: 38-41-271 143
* Democratski forum - Rijeka Democratic Forum c/o Sura Dumanic Telephone and Fax: 38-51-713 291
BOSNIA - HERZEGOVNIA
* Centar za mir — Saravejo Peace Center. Dobrovoljacka 11 71000 Sarajevo B.H. Telephone: 38-71-214- 884. Fax: 646 455 - 663 730
* Anti-war Action : U1 Hasana Kikica BR 8 71000 Saravejo, B.H. Fax. 38-
71-219 866
SERBIA
* Center za antiratnu akciju — Belgrade anti-war committee. Prote Mateje
6 YU 11000 Belgrade, Serbia. Telephone: 38-11-431 298. Fax: 38-11-681 989
* Helsinki Citizen Assembly c/o Sonja Licht, Omladinskih brigada 216 YU
11070 Belgrade, Serbia. Fax. 38-11-332 940
* Civil Resistance Movement. Mladena Stojanovica 4, YU 11040 Belgrade,
Serbia. Telephone: 38-11-668 324; Fax. 38-11-402 915
VOJVODINA
* European civic center for the resolution of conflicts. Trg. Cara Jovana
Nenada 15 YU 24000 Subotica. Vojvodina, Serbia. Telephone: 38-24-246000;
Fax: 38-24-37116
MONTENEGRO
* Citizens Committee for Peace. Hercegoyarcka 15 YU 81000 Podgorica,
Montenegro. Telephone/Fax 38-81-41914
Some publications that have resisted chauvinism and war:
* VREME. Narodnog Fronta 45/VII Postanski fah 257, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia
* MONITOR. Dalmatinska 52, 81000 Podgorica, Montenegro
* DANAS. 41000 Zagreb, Croatia. Telephone 38-41-435846
* OSLOBODENJE. Dzemela Bijedica 185, 71000 Sarajevo P.O. Box 663
Bosnia. Telex 44 OSLOB 5/44 60 82, FAX 71 467 286 *
• But the alternative seems very weak.
Antiwar forces exist in all the republics. They are based on citizens' movements, and ecologist, anti-militarist and women's organizations, who are calling for the demilitarization of the Balkans.
There are a number of small political parties who are trying to resist. At the end of the 1980s, when the miners of Kosovo were crushed by repression, the Croat B. Horvat founded the Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI). Horvat is a well-known socialist economist.
His protests in the Serb press against the Great Serb repression of the Albanians were courageous. The UJDI was rapidly marginalized by the break-up of Yugoslavia and the nationalist tidal wave, but elements of it still exist.
Forces in a number of republics have adopted an antiwar position, including small Social Democratic parties. This is true of the USD in Croatia and autonomist formations in Dalmatia and Istria. It is also true of Milorad Pupovac, the leader of the Serb Forum in Croatia. The leader of the Croat Peasant Party, V. Cicak, has written virulent attacks on the Great Serb policy and Tudjman's policy in the Croat journal, Danas.
There is a battle underway on the information front. The Belgrade journal Vreme is at the centre of the anti-war movement in Serbia, in liaison with free radios and popular rock groups among Serb student youth. The journal Danas played a similar role in Croatia, but has been shut down on economic pretexts.
The YUTEL TV station, broadcasting from Sarajevo, has been prohibited in Zagreb and Belgrade, but it was very popular owing to its demarcation from the nationalist hysteria.
Even if it is not easy we must:
• Help the refugees;
• Support the amnesty law for deserters proposed by the Serb opposition;
• Make contact with independent journalists and give them material support;
fact that the region needs some kind of confederal arrangement. The links need to be redefined, but in the framework of an overall political agreement which recognizes all the republics and provinces as sovereign elements.
Finally, the West supported the cantonization plan, as mentioned above. • The events in the former Yugoslavia give a taste of the possible results of the social crisis elsewhere in Europe, including in the West.
The basic problems posed in Yugoslavia are posed everywhere and remain unresolved everywhere, including in the "Maastricht" Europe.
The first problem is: how to pool our common economic and social resources? Instead of that, economic liberalism means the widening of every kind of division.
The second problem: how should rights — human rights, civil rights and the collective rights of different national entities, and particularly of minorities -- be assured in a complex, multi-ethnic community? Instead of addressing this problem, liberalism demands ever stronger states.
And this is why the West throws fuel on the fire it claims to be putting out. Its impotence has deep economic and political roots.
• Give a platform to the suppressed minority of "traitors" to the national cause;
• Oppose military intervention. The Serb opposition to Milosevic is against it; they say it would strengthen the dictator's position among the Serb population and lead to an increase in repression.
Finally, there is the problem of support for the Bosnian territorial defence. If this force retains its multi-ethnic character and presents a programme that offers guarantees for the different nationalities, and if, as Tito's Partisans did, it offers an alternative to both the Ustashe and the Chetniks, an orientation towards military support for such a multi-ethnic defence could be 7 seriously considered. *