The power granted to the military - in exchange for which the latter allow Fujimori to remain in government — is not translated by any greater efficiency in the struggle against the Sendero Luminoso or the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement armed groups. In practice, Sendero has extended its influence to the town of Lima itself, thus attaining what might be called a "strategic equilibrium", the threshold of what is characterized as the "strategic offensive for the taking of power".
On the other hand, the demoralization of the police and the military is increasing -hetween October 1991 and March 1992 between October 1991 and March 1992 more than 2,500 police have deserted.
Aim is to destroy all opposition
In this context, it is obvious that behind the state of emergency decreed on the very day of the putsch, we are witnessing a growth of military and police operations aimed at decapitating the leadership of the social movements, the trade unions and the political parties opposed to Fujimori. While the Peruvian mass movement has, for several years now, suffered from a crisis of leadership, the exhaustion of its forms of organization and a demobilization of its base because of the mistakes of its leaders, and even if it finds itself on the defensive, it has never ceased to mobilize against the decrees and policies of the government.
Finally, it is necessary to see what will be the real response of imperialism, the
Latin American governments and the regime's international financial backers. Until now, with the exception of the Japanese, the other governments have, at least in words, condemned the putsch.
The events of April 6 in Peru, coming after those in Haiti or Venezuela (see article p. 26), discredit the talk about the
"defence of democracy " from the United
States government, which was surely aware of these coups before they happened. With this putsch, Fujimori is risking everything. Either he is capable of immediately regaining control of the situation, rebuilding a consensus and recovering his social legitimacy, or he will have signed his own political death warrant, thus opening the door to a complete power vacuum in Peru. *
1. From "Patria Nueva" (1919), in Invitación a la
Vida Heroica, by José Carlos Mariategui, Institute of Agrarian Support, Lima, 1989.
Alberto Fujimori and the high forces.
ALFONSO MORO
ISTORY has unvei-
H led the true interests of an indiviafter dual who, having promised democracy and growth, now seeks the support of jackboots and rifles to implement an economic programme of unrestrained capitalism and a political programme of outright authoritarianism.
Twenty months after his accession to government, Fujimori has not succeeded in overcoming the power vacuum affecting all the economic, political and social structures of the coun try, which has existed for several years now. The aggravation of the crisis is demonstrated by, amongst other things, the incessant procession of prime ministers and the extension of the internal war against the Sendero Luminoso guerillas.
For the single year of 1991, there were more than 3,000 civilian deaths.
The country's lack of stability is a big problem for the government's neo-liberal economic programme which involves trying to attract foreign investment at all costs by the sale of the nation's wealth and cut-price labour.
All this has led to a collapse of the structure of the Peruvian state and stripped all popular legitimacy from the president: this is the tendency which the coup is intended to reverse.
When he came to power in July 1990,
Fujimori adopted a programme of economic adjustment of a rigor unprecedented in
• Latin America, with bitter results: the eco-
International Viewpoint # 227 command of the armed nomy is still plunged in the morass of recession without any short term perspective of escape, while millions of Peruvians are in the street after uvians are in the street atter losing their jobs and without any aid or benefits from the state. More than half of the industrial establishments are informal; the informal sector represented 46% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1990. The social costs of this policy are reflected both by the millions of workers forced to survive in the informal sector who daily flood the streets of Peru, as by the uncontrollable spread of cholera and the generalization of violence throughout the country. On the other hand, the government has, after endless bargaining, obtained some concessions from the international banks and other creditors on its debt servicing payments.
Build-up of militarization
This economic policy is carried out in the shadow of the military and the presidential decrees, which are far removed from the official speeches about democratic aspirations or modernizing political life.
Before the April coup, 40% of Peruvian territory was already under military control or administration. The armed forces bear the principal responsibility for the infernal cycle of human rights violations from which the population suffers: they are also responsible for assuring the flow and the networks of a substantial part of the drugs
April 27, 1992