Aristide's gamble
Aristide was going to govern alongside coup leader Cédras, his nomination as head of the army being one of the "acts ratified by parliament" since the coup d'état. Urged to give his interpretation of the agreement, Aristide said that, for him, Cédras is a "common criminal" and
WAS Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti's deposed president, seeking to divide the perpetrators of the coup d'état which overthrew him when, on February 23, 1992, in Washington, he signed an agreement with a delegation from the Haitian parliament? In any case, that has been the result. But, among the partisans of Aristide also, the signature of the agreement has enjoyed far from unanimous support. ARTHUR MAHON disappointment was already great in December, when it was learnt that, after all his other proposals had been rejected, Aristide had accepted René Théodore's appointment as is thus not covered by the amnesty. He must go "to prison or into exile".
But even if the accords are applied, who will decide on this point, except for the judicial tribunals which, as is well-known, are rotten to the core? (At least unless a popular mobilization can force them to change their opinion.)
And this seems to be Aristide's gamble. He knows that the agreement he has signed is exactly what the United States wants. But, on the evidence of his declarations in the newspaper Haiti Progrès (March 4-10, 1992), he believes that his return to the national palace will expand the area of liberty, and that the
N MARCH 6, judge Néret- N MARCH 6 indoe Nárat. te, who has occupied Aristide's position since the coup, appeared on television surrounded by the chiefs of the army. "They will place themselves on the perilous road of unconstitutionality" he declared in an inflammatory speech aimed at those parliamentarians prepared to ratify the Washington agreement. He was attacking not just Aristide's parliamentary supporters but also those, much more numerous, who, complicit in the September 30, 1991 coup, are now seeking a negotiated solution.
What is it about the Washington agreement that has scandalized Nérette and his cronies? According to the agreement, parliament must "restore JeanBertrand Aristide in the exercise of his functions as elected constitutional president" and prepare "the conditions for the return of Jean-Bertrand Aristide to Haiti" . Beyond this, parliament must ratify the demand made by Aristide and the OAS (Organization of American States) to send a civil mission to Haiti. This already prepared 500-strong body has been described by Nérette as an "occupation force"
During the initial negotiations held in Carthagena in November 1991, the parliamentary delegation had refused to allow the name of President Aristide to be mentioned in the text of the resolution. The fact that they have now conceded on this point bears witness to the impasse in which the putschists, incapable of normalizing the situation, find themselves.
And yet the announcement of the agreement was greeted with consternation in the popular circles of Haiti. The prime minister in the event of a successful expana ine area of liberty, and that the popular movement will be able to progressively transform the relation of outcome to the negotiations. The author of this proposal was Alvin Adams, the United States ambassador. He also put forward the name of Marc Bazin, the candidate he had supported during the presidential election. Théodore, general secretary of the PUCH (Unified Party of Haitian Communists), who got 1.8% of the votes in this election, has supported the overthrow of Aristide from the beginning and has been liaising with Alvin Adams for several months.
More surprising is the disappointment at the announcement of an agreement which at least envisages the return of Aristide. The explanation for this is that Aristide had made a number of sizeable concessions, including pledges "to respect the acts passed or ratified by the Haitian parliament" and "a general amnesty, except for common criminals".
No date set for Aristide's return
Furthermore, the agreement provides no specific date for Aristide's return to Haiti. A second agreement, signed on February 25 with Théodore, envisages that a month after the ratification of the agreement by parliament, Aristide, Théodore and the general secretary of the OAS "will meet to prepare the ground for the return of the President of the Republic". But this is no guarantee that Aristide will not have to remain outside Haiti until the end of his presidential mandate. The Haitian people, who have paid heavily for their opposition to the coup d'état, find these concessions difficult to accept, especially since the international press agencies have been claiming that forces. Perhaps he also believes that the contradictions of the agreement and the diverse interpretations to which it is open will be the occasion for mobilizations around concrete objectives. It seems then that, for Aristide, the concessions that he has made are complementary to the appeal that he launched some weeks earlier to the Haitian people: "I ask you to hoist the flag of resistance higher, higher and ever higher"
Disorientation and consensus
Is this tactic, whose first effect was the disorientation of numerous partisans of Aristide, realistic? This disorientation may well deepen in the face of a government of "national consensus " directed by Théodore and presided over by Aristide. It might be feared that once more he is overestimating his own capacities of initiative and underestimating the obstacle represented by the army. Aristide has committed the error of polarizing the debate around the question of the fate of Cédras, saying that "even if God was the president of Haiti, with Cédras there would be no democracy".
The truth is that, even without Cédras, even with some changes at its head, even if efforts are made to "professionalize" it, as the agreement states, or else divide it, this army of murderers will still remain determined to defend the same interests.
There will be no democracy in Haiti unless this army is opposed by an organized people disposing of the means to defend itself. It is a lesson that the September 30 coup d'état has written in let- 9 ters of blood. *