USSR / POLAND Polish elections reveal scepticism and fragmentation THE LEGISLATIVE elections of October 27 1991 forcefully confirmed the disillusionment felt by the Polish people with the current political scene. The policy of the "construction of capitalism", followed for two years by the political elites originating from Solidarnosc under the surveillance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), has been massively rejected. But in the absence of a credible alternative, this negative consensus has not produced a consensus in favour of another policy. In fact, the extreme fragmentation of the voting meant that no formation got the votes of more than 6% of registered electors. CYRIL SMUGA •TAIL OMUGA
ALL the parties, without exception, have received a lesson in humility". . One cannot but agree with this judgement made by the editorialists of the daily Polityka , for only the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN, a nationalist formation), which lays claim to the tradition of Pilsudski?, and which could pride itself on a record of 12 years of opposition, increased its number of votes in comparison with the presidential election of November 19903.
The continuing rise in the number of abstentions — 39.37% in the first round of the presidential elections of 1990 and 46.6 % during its second round, 56.8% this time — indicates the disillusionment with the political process felt by a growing number of Poles.
The rejection of the neo-liberal policy, known as the "Balcerowicz plan" imposed by the two successive governments of the new regime, is patent. The parties of the two successive prime ministers — Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Jan Krzysztof Bielecki - scored a total of only 8.07% of registered votes, and the Democratic Union lost more than 1.5 million votes, in comparison with the score for its candidate in the presidential election of November 1990, and this despite having been in opposition for nearly a year.
A new feature is the collapse of the electorate of the parties which carried Lech Walesa to the presidency: whereas the latter had scored more than 6.5 million votes in November 1990, the organizations which supported him then together obtained less than 4 million votes this time. Lech Walesa, whose presidential function will be reinforced by these elections, given a parliament deprived both of legitimacy and a majority, would be wise to take account of the attrition of which he is the first victim, after only eleven months as president.
If the Catholic hierarchy refrained from giving precise instructions on how to vote, Catholic Action, and, to a lesser extent, the Centre Alliance, as well as some candidates from Trade Union Solidarnosc, benefited from the widespread support of the priests, a great number of whom did not hesitate to indicate the correct choice to their flocks at Mass on Sunday, October 27. The relative modesty of the scores of these formations, which have used and 1. Polityka, no. 44, November 2, 1991. Polityka is one of the principal Polish daily newspapers. It is close to the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (exCommunist Party). 2. Polish statesman of the inter-war period, originating from the nationalist tradition of the Polish Socialist Party, and the instigator, in May 1926, of a coup d'état which inaugurated a dictatorial regime. 3. Its candidate, Leszek Moczulski, received around 411,516 votes, or 1.49% of registered voters. 4. Trade Union Solidamosc, Centre Alliance, Peasant Movement, Catholic Action and Liberal Democratic Congress. 5. We should note also that the most openly reactionary and anti-Semitic groupings did not succeed in having anybody elected to parliament. 6. "Solidamosc 80" originated from a split inside the clandestine movement at the time of the round table negotiations in 1989. It comprises a small fringe of radical workers (of the right, but also of the left in certain areas — notably in Warsaw where the organizer for this union in the carmaking enterprise FSO is a member of the Fourth International). "Solidamose 80" enjoys a significant implantation in the region of Stricin here it obtained is only parliamentary seal 1 1 during these elections
POLAND
RESULTS OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, OCTOBER 27, 1991
SEATS
NUMBER % OF REGISTERED VOTERS %OF POSITIVE VOTES
(460)
100
27 516 166
Registered voters
43,20
11 887 949
Total votes cast
100
40,77
11 218 602
Positive votes cast
"Left"
Democratic Left Alliance
60
11,98
4,88
1 343 989
(SDRP)
4
2,05
0,84
229 981
Labour Solidarity (SP)
Social Democratic Movement
1
0,46
0,19
51 606
(RDS)
"Peasants"
PSL
48
8,67
3,53
(Polish Peasants Party, ex-ZSL) 972 653
Agrarian Peasant Movement
28
2,23
5,46
612 536
(formerly Rural Solidarnosc)
"Liberals"
Democratic Union
62
12,31
5,02
1 381 010
(Mazowiecki)
Liberal Democratic Congress
37
7,48
3,05
839 151
(Bielecki)
Union of Real Politics
3
2,25
0,92
252 419
(ultra-liberal)
"Christian Democrats"
2,36
0,96
264 759
Christian Democracy
1,11
0,45
124 526
Party of Christian Democrats
"Right"
5,05
2,05
566 539
Trade Union Solidarnosc
8,71
44
3,55
977 140
Centre Alliance
Catholic Action
49
8,73
3,56
979 384
(National Christian Union)
Confederation for an
46
7,50
3,06
841 395
Independent Poland (KPN)
National Minorities
1,17
0,48
131 258
German Minority
0,23
0,09
25 803
Western Polish Union
0,35
0,14
Silesian Autonomy Movement
39 265
Others
16
3,27
366 848
1,33
Beer-Lovers Party
0,47
0,19
52 727
Party "X" (Tyminski)
10,39
10
4,24
1 165
613
Others and local lists
12
International Viewpoint #217 • November 25, 1991
POLAND
Learn to
Steal in
10 lessons
1 lesson
200 cm manipulation. In 1990, he had already had recourse, with a certain success, to the theme of the "acceleration" of the reforms, launching an attack on the conservative role supposedly played by the state and economic apparatus inherited from the old regime. On the eve of the elections, he once again attempted an operation of this kind; interviewed on television on Wednesday, October 23, he said that "a left development is contrary to the soul of the nation" and made it understood that he "knew where the bridgeheads of treason could be found".
The apprentice inquisitors abused the equation "Polish = Catholic" indicates that even the grip of the Church on society has also entered into crisis.
The respective scores obtained by the lists of the Trade Union "Solidarnosc" the Trade Union "Solidarnosc 80"6 , and of the Union of the Democratic Left (comprising the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland - SDRP, former Communist Party — and the former official OPZZ. trade unions'), while they should be interpreted with prudence, bear witness to a shift in the relationship of forces inside the working class to the detriment of the trade unions originating from the anti-Communist underground.
The score obtained by the Social Democracy (former CP), which came second in terms of votes and will have a parliamentary group of 60 deputies, tends to mask the fact that the Polish left, all tendencies included, is the big loser of these elections. With less than 6% of the registered voters and hardly 14.5% of those who bothered to vote, it did not succeed in gathering around its candidates the protest vote of all those who do not support the social regression orchestrated by the new regime.
The post-Stalinist left (SDRP) lost nearly 170,000 votes in comparison with the score of its candidate Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz during the presidential election of 1990. The post-Solidarnose left, with less than 300,000 votes, meanwhile, remains marginal®.
The left organizations centred their campaign on the necessity of preserving a state social policy and on criticism of the neo-liberal extremism of the right. However, they did not break in any significant manner with the idea that politics is the business of specialists, taking place in decision-making centres from which the majority of the population are a priori excluded. The concept of workers' selforganization — a value that was fundamental to Solidarnosc in the years 198081 — was absent from the pre-electoral jousts. The Polish left has thus paid for its submission to the dominant statism and to the conception of democracy as nothing more than parliamentary combat.
The traditional division of the Polish political spectrum — the division between the old regime and the old opposition - is blurring. Thus, all the groups emerging from the tradition of the anti-bureaucratic opposition together did not succeed in mobilizing a quarter of the registered voters, whereas the parties originating from the old regimel - who centred their agitation on the disastrous balance sheet!! of the two years of transition towards capitalism - have not succeeded in profiting from the popular disarray.
At the same time, the new lines of divide between an anti-capitalist left, bearer of the values of individual liberty and of equality, and a restorationist right, increasingly tempted by authoritarianism and a Catholicism tainted with fundamentalism, are still too unformed and too affected by the divisions originating from the past to be clearly affirmed as yet.
The electoral results indicate, in their fashion, that the structure of Polish society is collapsing under the blows of the economic and social policy implemented by those who have appropriated the traditions of the anti-bureaucratic combat. But these elections also show that this collapse has not been accompanied - at least in a form which is reflected in the popular consciousness — by the birth of a new structure. They underline the extreme weakness of the new political institutions and the absence, even potentially, of an alternative option.
Already it is clear that the new parlia ment lacks legitimacy. Moreover, none of the potential blocs dispose of a majority allowing them to form a government. Although the majority of parliamentarians approve of the pro-capitalist option being implemented, it is hardly likely that the simple pursuit of the neo-liberal policy, so clearly rejected by the people, can contribute to the stabilization of the institutions. The growing social discontent could, in these circumstances, express itself on the streets.
The president can still resort to social
The members of his inner circle, ministers of state linked to the parties of the right, did not wait for this green light to launch the idea of an accelerated "deCommunization". This amounts to nothing less than an attack on the civil rights of those who, right or wrong, are assimilated by Walesa's cronies with the old regime. All talk with vaguely social connotations is, in the opinion of these apprentice inquisitors, to be blacklisted.
Walesa makes no secret of the fact that he hopes that the new parliament will leave his hands freer: "I am not a dictator, but I ask; how many centres of power do we have in this state? It is necessary that somebody leads. I say it; two forces have made a bloc. On the one hand the majority originating from Solidarnosc, which fears dictatorship and a strong regime - and one can understand these people]. On the other, the post-Communist forces, which see in the excess of democracy the possibility of hiding the old sins, of new schemes and anarchy.
"To change the laws, some time is required and [these post-Communist forces] are swift moving and know how to profit from mistakes. They have the same slogans — more democracy, no decrees which will protect against excess. But during this time Poland will be sliced up, sold, and carried away in suitcases....
Although his popularity is at an all time low, Walesa appears as the last guarantee for the policy demanded by the IMF. And if his design demands the taking of some liberties with regard to democracy and human rights, the IMF will be the last to be offended. * 7. The OPZZ. (National Agreement of Trade Unions) is the trade union organization originating from the old regime. 8. At Wroclaw, the list of Labour Solidamosc, which included some militants identifying themselves with the Fourth International, obtained 10,299 votes, or around 2,000 less than the minimum necessary to obtain a deputy. 9. Labour Solidamosc, Social Democratic Movement, Peasant Movement, Democratic Union, Liberal Democratic Congress, Trade Union Solidarosc, Centre Agreement, Catholic Action and KPN. 10. The Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SDRP, former Polish United Workers Party [PZPR ]) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL, formerly ZSL) gained the support of less than 10% of registered voters. 13 11. See /V 215. 12. Polityka no. 43, October 26, 1991.
ECONOMICS IMF: the global ball "THE IMF has been humanized" argue many waverers on the left as they try to discredit opponents of this institution, which the French economist Marie-France l'Hériteau has described as "an organ of world power." For the IMF's apologists, its critics are "doctrinaires" in whom "the IMF arouses conditioned reflexes" : Having "structurally adjusted" its mode of thinking, this "realistic left" presents the IMF's current doctrine as the expression of a metamorphosis that will turn it into an institution for cooperation and development and for freeing the Third World of debt."
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF), an international financial institution over which the United States has effective control, has been at the centre of the recent drive to open up the
Third World and Eastern Europe in the economic interests of the world's rich countries. In a series of articles the Swiss revolutionary Marxist weekly La Brèche has been looking at the real record of this institution and its twin, the
World Bank, in the context of a discussion on Switzerland's join-
Wing the IMF. We publish below a historical article on the IMF by C-A. Udry, and an analysis in two parts of the IMF's policies by the same author, as well as a case history of the impact of those policies on the West African countries of Ivo-
Try Coast by J-F. Marquis. * immediately exchanged against the hard currency of a third country. Since 1974, the SDR's value has ceased to be defined in relation to gold or the dollar, but rather against a basket of the most important currencies (the US dollar, yen, DM, pound sterling, the French franc. Thus, a member country has the right to buy quantities of a money it needs in order to settle its debts on current payments. This can be done in the framework of "drawing rights"6. The first slice of credit - 25% of its share — is granted more or less automatically. For the rest - which can go to 125% or even 150% of the share - the credit is granted on increasingly tough conditions, involving a mounting programme of financial, monetary and trade measures. The "conditionality" of IMF lending is embodied in the "letters of intent" agreed and signed between the IMF officials and the country's minister of finance and the detailed memoranda concerning access to lending and the "structural adjustment facilities" created in 1986.
A key tool for the creditor nations
While the IMF has been unable to deal with the crisis of the financial system in the central countries, it has nonetheless become a key tool in the redefinition of the roles of the industrial creditor coun tries and the rest of the world, the debtors. This role became clear at the time of Mexico's debt default in 1982, when that country stated that it could not service its debt to private banks.
Until that date the IMP had been encouraging private banks to lend to the Third World, after the recession of 1974-75 and
CHARLES-ANDRE UDRY
HE IMF originated from the desire of the United States during the Second World War to reshape international relations in a multilateralist perspective. At Bretton Woods in July 1944, a set of institutions were established to deal with international payments, financing and trade — for the first time on the basis of treaties.*
These were the IF, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the GATT (General Accord on Tariffs and Trade). The IMF officially began to function in 1945, concentrating on the financial angle in order to intervene in cases of temporary imbalances (capital movements, exchange rates) and allow compensating recourse to its resources.
The US was able to get the US dollar accepted as the easiest and most widespread means of international payment, the Gold Standard becoming the Dollar Standard at $35 to the ounce. The Americans were able to finance their outgoings, among them the reconstruction of Europe, by means of obligatory credits that they controlled; their foreign investments were thus also propped up.
US fights for privileged status
This was the context in which the IMF's statutes were formed. The sum of contributions (shares) from the Fund's members — counted in dollars, their volume determined according to a series of technical criteria (international trade, reserves and production) — gave the US a privileged status, which that country has fought to preserve even after its relative economic decline became apparent from the start of the 1970s. 14 tonal financial system began, the statutes In 1968, when the crisis of the internawere amended, requiring majorities of 85% for major decisions and 70% for day-to-day decisions. Votes are in proportion to shares, the latter being revised every five years.
In 1970, the US had 21% of the votes, in 1981 20% and in 1990 19.1%. Thus they have an effective right of veto, as do the members of the EEC, if they can agree. The 23 industrialized countries had 62.7% of the votes in 1990 as against 35.2% for the other 123 members.
As André Gunder Frank puts it, the voting principle is thus, one dollar one vote (and: no dollars, no votes!). Obviously, the IMF is not going to take decisions that go against the interests of the USA, Western Europe and Japan.
Executive Board calls the shots
The IMF's supreme body is the Council of Governors (one per member). However, the outlook and decisions of the IMF are in fact in the hands of the Executive Board, headed since 1987 by the Frenchman Michel Camdessus.
Five permanent directors are nominated by the five biggest subscribers (the USA, Britain, France, Germany and Japan). Saudi Arabia, as one of the big international creditors, has a right to a seat. Among the 15 remaining administrators, most are from countries with a positive balance of payments.
The IMF's resources are provided by the shares of members. Some 25% of these resources are in gold, or other solid money, and the remainder in national currencies. The IMF can borrow within limits to increase its resources.