Changing landscape of
Portuguese society cratic and non-violent manner. But BIA S outlook is so deeply rooted in armed struggle, exemplified recently by the use of car bombs in particular, that it takes on the character of a break with the norms of the system, albeit placing the confrontation solely on the military plane. This allows the state to solidify its rejection of any dialogue with them.
How long will this situation last? Nobody can tell, but the balance of forces at the level of the Spanish state as well as internationally favors Madrid. The bourgeoisie and rightist nationalists not long ago promoted independence with different arguments (even if they defended independence by stages and by peaceful means). One of the arguments they advanced was economic; Spanish centralism takes more than it gives. This argument was turned around and used against independence. Isolation ruins us. The Spanish state affirmed more or less the same thing, adding that in order to enter the EEC, Euskadi had to remain within the framework of the Spanish state which alone is recognized by the European community. At the center of all these arguments is attachment to the capitalist system, and the desire for a little place in the reorganization of Europe and the avoidance of destabilizing traumas.
The bourgeois nationalists take advantage of the crisis of the Eastern European countries to justify their "toothless" nationalism and their attachment to the system. They hold that the Lithuanian road stems from the fact that communism was profoundly undemocratic and that it prevented the peoples from coexisting under the same roof. Under these conditions, according to the PNV, it is logical that these nations want to separate and also to move towards the West. Although they, the Basques or the Catalans, enjoy freedoms, they also aspire to have their own governments without being deprived of the benefits Europe has to offer. These arguments can be turned around when the nationalists of the right need to make the opposite point®.
This counter weight to radical nationalism, registered by bourgeois nationalism, helps it to justify the new PSOEPNV government (with EE as a junior partner which, in both its image and its objectives, is the opposite of a nationalist government. 12 ful resistance movement (possibly one- There still exists in Euskadi a power-
THE Social Democratic Party (PSD) of Prime Minister Cavaco Silva won the Portuguese elections of October 6, 1991 with more than 50% of the votes. The Socialist Party (PS) of President Marlo Soares struggled to reach 29.25% while the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) scored less than 9%. FRANCISCO LOUÇA
HE right wing government's most significant success, and one which has astonished all observers, has been its ability to survive its four-year term. The PSD has been able not only to stabilize the political regime but also to bring together the whole right — both the more traditional and the more "European" wings -the strongest in capitalist Europe composed of diverse elements, even if the nationalist factor is dominant. This manifests itself in the existence of a current with an electoral expression (Herri Batasuna) and an armed wing (ETA) as well as organizations like the EMK-LKI which have a certain implantation in social movements — not to mention the existence of numerous organizations that lead ecological, antimilitarist, feminist and workers struggles? . These forces have not been crushed, but they are undergoing a process of change and are experiencing many problems of orientation; they need profound changes in their ideological and political discourse. The crisis in the East has created identity problems and some of these movements need new tactical objectives and new and more original ways of doing politics!°
The mass struggle against the Leizaran highway is a case in point; the route of this highway has been challenged as much by the ecologists as by the radical leftist parties, and has succeeded in leading to a broad coordinating committee which has organized mass demonstra-
Besse, support for social lobbies and behind its system of distributing larmanagement by the dominant interests.
The PSD's victory in these elections rests on three main factors. Firstly, the end of the division of the right between the more pragmatic sectors (the PSD) and the more traditional elements in the Democratic Social Centre (CDS), which brings together Catholic conservatives and those nostalgic for the times of former dictator Salazar. When the PDS came to power many CDS notables and local officials joined the victors. Now, the CDS only retains five deputies to the PDS' 135 and the CDS' leaders! sis is shown by the resignation o toric leader, Freitas do Am third party of the Portugues
Democratic Renewal Party which got 20% at the previous e and had seven deputies) has simply peared from the political scene.
Secondly — and this is somethin cific to Portugal — the gathering in right by the PDS corresponds to a pe of strong economic development and a strengthening of the governm capacity to redistribute wealth. tions. With the entry of ETA into thi struggle the question has polarized the political life of Guipuzkoa and all of Euz kadi. Other problems remain, like the dramatic situation of the more than 500 political prisoners and numerous refugees, or the latest phase in industrial reconversion. The winds of neoliberalism and strident individualism are obstacles (as throughout Europe) confronting a left which remains determined but which also needs to prepare itself for the challenges to come. * 8. The nationalist right and the social democracy often blame terrorism for the economic crises, the lack of investment and so on. Without minimizing the imporLance of the climate of violence, it is difficult to believe that this, rather than economic motives, explains the lack of investment in the Basque country. 9. The Revolutionary Communist League (LKI) was the Fourth International organization in Euskadi; for reasons connected to its fusion with the Communist Movement of Euskadi (EMK) (see International Viewpoint #205, April 29, 1991), the L.KI has ceased to be affiliated with the Fourth International. The new party maintains regular and fratemal links with the Fourth International. 10. The resistor movement exists throughout the Spanish state, but it is particularly strong in Euskadi. More than 55% of the resistors are Basque.
International Viewpoint #216 • November 11, 1991
joining the European Economic Commu- ininin the Buronean Feonomic Comm nity (EEC) at the start of 1986, Portugal has benefited from a significant inflow of funds - the "structural funds" which now make up a third of the annual state budget. At the same time national industry and finance have been artificially protected from foreign competition by short-term regulations.
Over the past five years Portugal has seen strong economic growth, well above the EEC average. Among the reasons for this are the EEC funds, the opening up of new markets, the low oil price (in an economy which largely depends on imports for its energy) and the low exchange rate of the dollar (for an economy which imports from the USA and exports to Europe and has a large foreign debt to manage). This growth has provided the government with significant resources allowing it to undertake large-scale programmes such as the modernization of the tax system, softening the blow of its anti-egalitarian policies and restructuring some big economic groups with the help of generous terms for privatization.
Memories of "leftwing" austerity
The relation of forces in favour of the right is also strengthened by memories of the disastrous austerity programmes of the "left" government led by Mario Soares and by his hostility to the popular and workers' movements.
Finally, the government has made skillful use of the media. It controls the television - despite repeated pledges about democratization or privatization - and organizes a permanent campaign glorifying the activities of the prime minister.
For the first time in Portugal, these elections saw the use of the campaign spectacle on the model of Spain's Felipe Gonzalez. We saw our prime minister alone on enormous platforms at his party meetings. The campaign, which was strongly centred on personality, emphasized strong ideas such as stability and economic growth. This brought good results for the right. The PSD got 50% of the votes and increased its absolute share of the vote compared to 1987. The CDS fell to 4.4%, but the total right wing vote was 55%.
The Socialist Party, which presented itself as an alternative government, also put the emphasis on stability. It only got 29%, well below the score suggested in opinion polls. These results immediately sparked off an internal struggle for the leadership of the PS; the leader of its parliamentary group has put himself forward as a replacement for the current general secretary, Jorge Sampaio, proposing to introduce an even more right wing line and be even more obedient to President Soares, who is the real inspiration behind the strategy of collaboration with and imitation of the right which has long charac-
PORTUGAL terized the PS.
The Communist Party is also in crisis. For the first time it has dropped below the symbolic 10% figure, with 8.8% -at the last elections it got 12% at the last legislative elections and 13% for its presidential candidate Carlos Cavalhas. The CP's decline shows the cumulative impact of a prolonged internal crisis in the course of which some of the party's deputies and former leaders have left, as well as some members of its central committee.
Another sign of the tensions tearing the PCP apart is the formation of minority currents, including the so-called "Third Way" which brings together the main leaders of the CGTP union confederation.
And finally there is the crisis provoked by the PCP leadership's support for the conservative coup attempt in the Soviet Union in August this year. The PCP has been losing votes to abstention, the PSD, the PS and to its left.
The response of the PCP leadership to the crisis has been to step up its sectarianism and self-proclamation, hoping thereby to gain time. The PCP is awaiting a miracle and has no real strategy.
The recent elections represented a challenge for the revolutionary currents. On the one hand these elections marked the exhaustion of the political currents born in the revolution of April 1974. Four organizations have disappeared from the political scene — the Democratic People's Union (UDP) and Revolutionary Communist Party (PCR), both of Maoist origin and previously dominant on the far left; the Democratic People's Movement (MDP), which now supports the PCP; and the United Socialist Workers Party (POUS) of Lambertist origin. These elections, furthermore, aroused the usual pressures for a "useful" vote for one of the big parties.
In this context, the necessarily limited but nonetheless real success of the campaign launched by the Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR — Portuguese section of the Fourth International - see box) provides some grounds for hope in an otherwise depressing scenario. *
Trotskyist campaign in elections
THE Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR - Portuguese section of the Fourth International) put forward lists everywhere, which were open to independent militants. Under the title "a left for the left" it organized meetings in the country's main towns. With the help of journalists and TV technicians, the PSR organized a media campaign, which allowed it to put out high quality broadcasts with the participation of figures known to the listeners. Thus, in its electoral broadcasts on Radio Renascença, a national station controlled by the Church, the PSR used its time to transmit popular Portuguese and Brazilian music usually censored by this channel - which provoked a lot of discussion and exposed the censorship practised by this station. The head of Radio Renascença decided to suppress the PSR's radio time, but the channel finally lost its case before the National Electoral Commission. Actors and trade unionists also took part in the PSR's TV broadcasts. The support of a team of journalists allowed the production of a daily broadsheet sent by fax to all the country's newspapers.
The most significant result of the campaign was its impact amongst youth, who came in large numbers to the PR's meetings. The PSR doubled its score compared to 1987 to 1.2% at the national level; 2 to 2.5% in former PCP strongholds such as Evora Portalegre and Beja; and 2% in Lisbon.
A surprising incident prolonged the election campaign. The small community of Dona Maria in the Lisbon area decided to boycott the vote to protest against delays in installing long-promised water supplies. According to Portuguese law, in such cases, the voting is repeated as often as necessary. The PSŘ candidate was only 207 votes behind the PSD. The local left militants, both the Socialists and Communists, agreed to call for a vote for the PSR. However, the PCP Central Committee first called for a vote for their own list - which had no chance of winning — and then for a boycott. Furthermore, in a local meeting, a national PCP leader instructed local militants to support the PSD on the grounds that the election of a new right wing deputy would not change much overall, while a PSR deputy would be highly critical of the Communist Party.
Tensions reached such a point that pickets were set up outside the voting booths to prevent the inhabitants from voting. Finally the PSD won the seat. The PSR in these two weeks has formed a new branch in a place where it has had hardly any presence before and where clientelism is very strong - militants involved in the Dona Maria campaign were repeatedly threatened.
Despite the outcome the experience in Dona Maria is valuable in terms of giving us a better understanding of the political landscape and also in terms of gaining broad respect on the left, which wanted to unite in a battle against the right wing. *
13 November 11; 1991 • #216 International Viewpoint
YUGOSLAVIA
The antiwar пето movement in
Yugoslavia
LJUBLJANA, Zagreb, Belgrade,
Sarajevo: four capitals and four radically different situations in each republic as the undeclared war spreads from one ceasefire to another. A coordination of antiwar movements has begun to develop between the republics and the first joint actions have been undertaken. As is inevitable, the groups reflect the substantial differences in context and sometimes outlook of basic issues that affect them."
Ibrahim Spahic here touches on one of the leitmotifs of the activists from all the republics who meet here: their denunciation of the prowar media and the manipulation of people's understanding: "It is necrophilia. The corpses of the victims of the war are dug up; which has a powertul the war are dug up; which has a powerful political charge. Both the living and the dead are played with, while 'the others' are accused of being at the root of the crisis. Our movement is born out of a rejection of this."
### Rebuilding confidence
The function of the antiwar movement, concludes Ibrahim "is not to be a tranquillizer, but to try to rebuild confidence in ourselves and to try to reject a mad dynamic where one has to be either the 'winner' or the "loser' and where the logic of war hides the absence of answers to socio-economic questions." Whether from Sarajevo, Ljubljana, Zagreb or Belgrade, many antiwar activists have repeated the same judgement: "for the existing authorities the war is a way of consolidating the ranks of a population to which they have little otherwise to offer."
However, the "non-political" character of the movement also expresses the difficulty of establishing a platform expressing a common approach to the conflicts. Debates and differences exist over who is responsible for what in the war, on the role of the army and its nature, and on the implications of the unilateral declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia, at a time when four of the six republics were already leading a battle for the sovereignty of all in a democratic union based on the right of self-determination and for means by which this could be applied.