An opaque congress THE 7th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) took place from June 24-27, 1991. In August, the National Assembly implemented Its decisions. The Political Bureau and the government underwent big shake-ups. But there has been no change in the official line. The leadership of the country has stated its intention to press ahead with the liberalization of the economy, reinforce the autonomy of the state organs in relation to the party structures and reduce the weight of the administrative apparatus. At the same time, however, the VCP's monopoly on political power is to be maintained and any talk of pluralism was denounced.
up in the pre-Congress discussion have not led to any overall debate. While the final versions of the resolutions are not available, it seems clear that the disagreements within the apparatus and the pressure of discontented militants have only led to formal changes. Thus, for example, the name of the political platform was changed from "The Platform for the Construction of Socialism in the Transition Period" to "The Platform for National Construction in the Period of Transition to Socialism" Apparently this change required "hard negotiations" between the "orthodox" who want more state direction and the "pragmatists" who are demanding more economic liberalism.4 However its real importance remains unclear since the debate on economic policy remained on a very general level.
Nobody pretends that there is an easy solution to the problems of development
PIERRE ROUSSET
V IETNAM's international isolation has further increased with the developments in the Soviet Union, and this has led Vietnam to draw closer to China both diplomatically and ideologically. However, none of these mighty problems has been openly discussed, either at the CP Congress or in the Assembly. The 7th Congress expressed neither the party's internal tensions nor the changes taking place in civil society.
By stifling debate a year ago, the VCP leadership obtained a docile Congress. While the façade of unity will not have resolved the differences, it has postponed their expression for a period. From the outside, it is very difficult to estimate the real balance of forces, the state of the internal contradictions or the political dynamic that they give rise to. Nonetheless a certain number of basic questions can be posed
The 1,176 delegates at the Congress adopted two Central Committee Reports, some amended statutes and the documents submitted for the preparatory discussion: "The Platform for National Construction in the Period of Transition to Socialism" and "The Strategy of Socio-Economic Stabilization and Development up to the year 2000"1
These documents contain some passages of self-criticism. The leadership recognizes once again that after the 1975 victory the "party committed serious mistakes in its strategic choices and in its choice of means for arriving at socialism." It also notes that the crisis gripping Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is the result of the accumulation of similar errors on the part of the "fraternal parties" The platform on development strategy paints a sombre picture of the situation in the country: "the country remains in a state of under-development... there is significant inflation... cultural, spiritual and moral life is less healthy... corruption is growing along with other social ills and social justice is not respected; confidence in the party leadership and its ability to manage the state has been weakened. This reality in part results from the many years of war; however, the main reason is that we have constructed socialism according to a model mainly characterized by dogmatism, a lack of creativity and voluntarist subjectivism."3
Critical notes
But these critical and self-critical notes have not been the occasion for any profound critique of the leadership's orientation or the party's place in society. There is, for example, no discussion on the "leading role" of the VCP. As the Political Programme notes this role was essential in the victory in the wars of liberation. But a whole number of questions that flow from the documents' own account of the situation are not addressed, including; what has the party become after 15 years? What is its real relation with the population? What is the weight of the bureaucracy within it?
The multitude of amendments that came 1. These documents have still to be respectively "altered", "amended", "perfected", ed" by the new Central Committee (Nouvelles du Viet- : indeed "completNam, number 199-200, July 17, 1991, p. 5). The quotations contained in this article are taken from the documents as they stood before the introduction of the amendments during the Congress and by the CC. The Vietnamese CP claims a membership of 2.1 million, in a country with a population of 68 million. 2. Quoted by Hoang Giang, Chroniques Vietnamiennes number 10-11, Spring-Summer 1991, p. 19. 3. Quoted by Lê Hung, Doàn Kêt, number 433, April 1991, p. 39 4. Jean-Claude Pomonti, Le Monde, June 25, 1991.
in Vietnam. But this is the very reason why basic questions have to be raised. In fact, however, there is a yawning gap between the gravity of the national and international situation as reflected in the texts and the nature of the discussions on orientation.
The new political bureau 1. Dô Muoi (general secretary)* 2. Lê Duc Anh (army general, Central
Committee member responsible for foreign affairs)* 3. Vo Van Kiêt (president of the council of ministers) 4. Dào Duy Tùng (CC member responsible for ideology)* 5. Doàn Khuê (army general, minister of defence) 6. Vu Oanh (CC member responsible for mass organizations)# 7. Lê Phuoc Tho (CC member responsible for agriculture)*# 8. Phan Van Khai (deputy prime minister)# 9. Bùi Thiên Ngô (divisional general, minister of the interior)# 10. Nông Duc Manh (of tay stock, president of the CC's nationalities commission)# 11. Pham The Duyêt (secretary of the Hanoi federation)# 12. Nguyên Duc Binh (director of the
Nguyên Ai Quoc Institute)# 13. Vo Trân Chi (secretary of the Ho Chi Minh City federation) * Also members of the Central Committee Secretariat. # New members of the Political Bureau. Members of the outgoing PB not reelected: Nguyên Van Linh (former general secretary). Vo Chí Công, Nguyên Duc Tâm, Nguyên Co Tach, Dong Sy Nguyên, Nguyen Thanh , Binh, Mai Chí Tho. Trân Xuân Bach was expelled from the PB in March 1990. 25
VIETNAM
The outstanding feature of the congress was silence.
In the main the documents limit themselves to repeating the line in force since the VP's 4th Congress in 1976 in the form of pious wishes: it is necessary to set all the resources to work, harmoniously develop all the regions and components of the economy (that is to say the five forms of property: state, collective, private, individual and family), and to industrialize the country while improving living standards..3
It seems that the Vietnamese leadership hopes to draw inspiration from the experience of the four Asian "dragons" notably South Korea and Taiwan. This is a model of development which combines a strong state and authoritarian government with a closely supervised expansion of the market economy. This raises questions about how to transfer such a "model" to a non-capitalist society and, in the prevailing international conditions, how to inject a big dose of capitalism into a non-capitalist
Laos LAOS' National Assembly met in mid-August, It adopted the People's Democratic Repubile's first constitution. Kaysone Phomvihane was elected head of state. He replaces Prince Souphanouvong, who has resigned, and the Interim head of state, 82 year old Phouml Vongvichit. Kaysone was formerly prime minister, a post now to be filled by Khamtay Siphandone
Kaysone Phomvihane is also the president of the Revolutionary People's Party (the Communist Party), a function to which he was elected in March 1991 at the party's 5th Congress, having been its general secretary since 1955.
The constitution talks only of "people's democracy". Kaysone declared to the National Assembly that, "If socialism remains our objective, if is a distant, very distant, objective." In this country of some 3.5 million people the regime has entered on economic reforms far more radical than those in Vietnam, in the name of "restructuring". Its main partner in this is Thai. land via whom most of Laos' trade takes place - a chain of mountains makes communication with the Vietnamese ports difficult.
However, despite its display of political flexibility, Laos remains a part of the Indochinese bloc (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) and a one party stale. Indeed, during the 5th Congress, Kaysone called for "a growth in the leading role of the party throughout soclety" (Le Monde, Auguet 16, 1991society and how to do it while avoiding some of the constitutive elements of the model such as the denial of human rights, political and anti-union repression and rampant growth in social inequality.
### Cynical souls
The realism of such perspectives is questionable. They would require an exceptional rate of growth throughout the 1990s for which there is no evidence. According to Phong Quang: "Cynical souls in Vietnam have summed up the strategy adopted Bratime for the constion of primite by the 7th VCP Congress capitalism under the dictatorship of the proletariat.' While the primitiveness of this capitalism is already visible, its efficiency is less obvious.
The leading bodies of the VCP have been re-elected: a Central Committee of 146 members, a Political Bureau of 13, a CC Secretariat of 9 members and a Control Commission of 9 members. This is where the Congress' decisions have most significance, since it is these bodies that will define the real content of the decisions taken. In fact, the delegates allowed themselves to reject three CC candidacies proposed by the leadership, including those of the Ministers of Trade and Finance.
The turnover of CC members was relatively low - 29% compared to more than
50% in 1986. On the other hand there were very important changes in the Political
Bureau (PB); eight of its 13 members are newcomers, with seven of that body's previous members failing to be re-elected.
Among them
• Nguyên Co Thach, former Minister of
Foreign Affairs. He is paying for his independent attitude, for the failure of the opening to the West (the USA is maintaining its embargo and blocking lines of credit) and for the hostility felt for him by the 26 • Chinese leadership now that normala- Chinese leadership now that normalization of relations between Hanoi and Beijing is underway. • Mai Chí Tho, former interior minister, who is compromised by too many scandals. His departure and that of Nguyên Duc Thàm, responsible for organization, seems to mark the decline of the group around Lê Duc Tho, who died in October 1990 and who controlled the mechanisms for nominations in the apparatus for many years.
• The former general secretary Nguyên Van Linh has been named adviser to the Central Committee along with Vo Chí Công (and Pham Van Dong who did not previously belong to the PB).&
• Also worth a mention is Tràn Xuân Bach, who was thrown off in March 1990 for criticizing the leadership's immobility too openly.
The new general secretary of the VCP is 74 year old Dô Muoi. According to his official biography, he was born in 1917, was active from 1937 and became a member of the Indochinese CP in 1939. After taking on responsibilities in a series of provinces he became a candidate PB member in 1955 and a member in 1960. He became vice-prime minister, once more becoming a PB candidate in 1976 and a member in 1982. Four years later he entered the secretariat before becoming president of the Council of Ministers?
As ever, there are no women on the PB.
On the other hand, for the first time, there is a woman on the CC secretariat: Truong
My Hoa. This led the new general secretary to commit a blunder by effectively naming Truong My Hoa as head of the
Union of Vietnamese Women. A national assembly deputy from Ho Chi Minh City,
Ngo Ba Thanh publicly took Do Muoi to task, insisting that the Union could choose its own leader. Muoi made a partial retreat: Hoa became the candidate rec ommended by the party for this post. 1° The new PB appears to be dominated by conservative ideologues such as Lê Duc Anh and Dao Duy Tùng with a minority of economic liberals such as Vo Van Kiêt and Phan Van Khai. The CC Secretariat is also dominated by conservatives." The departure of Mai Chí Tho does not mean a loosening up of the PB's policy. Several of the new members - including Nguyên Duc Binh, Nông Duc Manh (and Nguyên Hà Phan from the secretariat) made notably hardline speeches in which they denounced democratization in the name of security. 12
The most interesting development is the promotion of general Lê Duc Anh to the number two spot. Like Doàn Khuê, he is a serving general and directly represents the armed forces in the PB. 13 Both are considered to be conservatives; the army has been taken in hand and the less "orthodox" high-ranking officers removed.
The political rise of Lê Duc Anh is all the more significant in that from now until the end of the year he will be the president of the state council, that is, head of state. The National Assembly is preparing a con5. See Lê Hung, Doàn Kêt, number 434, April 1991. 6. Phong Quang. Doàn Kêt, number 434, dated May 1991 (but published in July 1991, after the holding of the Congress), page 35. 7. A total of 68 candidates were directly proposed by the delegates, but of these, only the minister for health was elected. Murray Hiebert, Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), July 11, 1991.
8. A member of the Political Bureau elected in 1986,
Pham Hùng died in 1988.
9. Nouvelles du Vietnam, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
10. FEER, August 22, 1991, p. 7. Truong My Hoa, already vice-president of the Union of Women, was previously on the Control Committee.
11. Nayan Chanda, Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly
(AWSJ), July 8, 1991.
12. Nong Duc Manh, of tay origin, is the first leader originating from an ethnic minority to be a member of the PB as such. 13. The members of the leading bodies are all classed according to a hierarchical rank.
International Viewpoint #213 • September 30, 1991
VIETNAM stitutional reform aimed at centralizing authority with a more compact government which can exercise more effective control over the provinces. The position of head of state, which is presently largely symbolic, will become the main centre of authority.
It seems that the armed forces are today less discredited and unpopular than the other branches of the state and certainly much better regarded than the political police. As the spearhead of the liberation wars of 1945-75 and then of the SinoIndochinese conflicts which broke out in 1978-79, there is a risk that the army will be turned by the PB into an instrument of internal repression. How far such a transformation, if attempted, can succeed is one of the most serious questions raised by the present direction of the VCP. It is a question whose answer cannot be known in advance.
The Vietnamese armed forces today find themselves in a very difficult situation. Taking into account the economic crisis and the abrupt ending of most Soviet aid, the defence budget has had to be considerably reduced. Some 70% of this budget is to be devoted to feeding and housing of personnel and only 30% to the purchase and maintenance of arms.14 Despite this, soldiers endure miserable conditions. According to Lieutenant General Dam Van Nguy last January: "the living standard of our soldiers everywhere in Vietnam is too bad, too terrible, and has produced a negative impact on work, study, training and combat preparedness." This had led to a growth of corruption, the stealing of equipment, desertions and the involvement of the ranks of the armed forces in smuggling. 'S
The number of service personnel has been cut from 1.2 million in 1979 to 600,000 now; the former soldiers are often now unemployed. Military units have been partially reconverted to economic production. The reserve corps has 3.5 million members and there is also a significant militia force.
The behaviour of the armed forces confronted with the crisis of the Vietnamese regime and the changes in the international situation — many cadres having been educated in the USSR - is a basic issue for the future. The key political positions are in the hands of high-ranking officers from the first revolutionary generation, often today become "conservatives." But what about the younger generation? There have already been challenges, albeit muffled, notably from the south of the country.
It is hard to evaluate the ultimate impact of the Soviet crisis on the Vietnamese regime. At the time of the Moscow coup, the PB preferred discretion, although it is certain that some leaders welcomed Gorbachev's overthrow and the attempted seizure of power by those they consider their close "friends". . In the immediate term in any case the failure of the coup d'etat will mean a further hardening in Hanoi and a deepening of the rapprochement with China.
Everything about the world situation -from the Gulf war to the Soviet crisis — must be worrying for the Vietnamese leadership and increase its security paranoia. The list of invitations to the 7th Congress shows the extent of Hanoi's isolation. There were only four "fraternal delegations" present: the CPSU (before its quasidissolution after the failed coup), the Lao Revolutionary People's Party (see box) the Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea and the Cuban CP.
The turning inwardness is all the more pronounced since Washington has made it clear that Hanoi will have to pay a high price for the normalization of relations. Despite US promises, the embargo has been maintained after the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia.
Rapprochement with China
It seems probable that an agreement on Cambodia will be signed soon under United Nations auspices and that in consequence the relations between the two governments will relax. Vietnam would then be able to negotiate with financial organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and trade more easily with countries such as Japan, Australia and France. But the lesson will not be forgot-
From Doàn Kêt to Diên Dàn
THE editors of Doàn Két have announced that they can no longer continue the "pluralist" editorial policy embarked on a year ago. In 1990, the Permanent Bureau of the General Union of Vietnamese in France (UGVF) decided to hand its journal, Doàn Kêt, over to its editorial team. It recognized that the problems confronting this publication could "only find an answer in the framework of the reorganization of the Union into an assembly that respects its pluralist character."
Since then the magazine has provided high quality coverage of Indochina, published many critical documents both in Vietnamese and French and denounced the repression meted out to their authors.
However the run-up to the 6th UGVF Congress has seen a tightening of the reins. The published documents outlaw all "pluralism" from the Union's internal life and states the aim of the organization as being to "develop good relations with the Vietnamese state". . This is a retreat from the resolution adopted by the UGVF's previous congress in 1988 which called on the Union to "be a part of the movement for democratization of political life and for more social justice."
According to the editors of Doàn Kêt, intolerance inside the UGVF has grown to the point that they have decided to "surrender the title to the Union" and start a new publication, the Diên Dàn (Forum), which will continue on with the whole of the editorial team of Doàn Kêt. The Diên Dàn "defines itself as an independent journal in the sense that it does not speak for any political organization." The team in charge "brings together various sensibilities and aims to preserve that plurality as part of its wealth. Diên Dàn wants to be an open place, a meeting point, a forum..for democracy and development." It will notably address
"the basic problems of Vietnamese society."
Most of the new monthly will be in Vietnamese, but the editorial team envisages at the same time the distribution of an French-language informational letter. For information write to: Diên Dàn, 193 rue de Bercy, 75582 Paris, Cedex 12,
France. * ten by the conservatives, who had reproached Nguyên Co Thach for the illusions he had fostered on the speed with which an opening to the West could be carried through.
Seen from Hanoi the present evolution of the international scene must be hard to understand. Most of the members of the PB are not familiar with the West. Nayan Chanda has noted that "the party's leadership is conservative as well as inwardlooking, judging from the fact that only three of its members - the reformers — have travelled to non-socialist countries. "16 This striking provincialism is a serious political handicap; a Vietnamese official confided to journalist Murray Hiebert: "None of the top leaders understands the international situation. Not only is this a weakness, it is a real danger."'7
To escape from its isolation, Hanoi has turned towards China, 13 years since the break of relations. At the end of July, Lê Duc Anh made a secret journey to Beijing to present the results of the 7th Congress with which the Chinese leadership has 14. According to general Lê Duc Anh, then Minister of Defence, in December 1989. Cited by Murray Hiebert, FEER, June 13, 1991. 15. Ibid. 16. AWS/W, op. cit. p. 2. The three "reformers" mentioned are Vo Van Kiet, Phan Van Khai and Vo Tran Chi. 17. FEER, July 11, p. 10.
27 18. Murray Hieben, Tai Ming Cheung, FEER, August 22, 1991, p. 8.