Crisis in the
Balkans "THE federation-confederation conflict is irrational" declared Yugoslav prime minister Ante Markovic in Le Monde (May 23) during his visit to Paris. "I do no think that it will last long, for economic and social problems will not permit that." CATHERINE SAMARY W HILE this assessment made some economic sense, it was unrealistic from the political point of view. In any case, the army intervention, far from assisting any possible variant of a redefinition of the Yugoslav union, is a big step towards its break up. It is an aggression against the right of the Yugoslav republics to independence, a right which must be unconditionally defended.
Of the six Yugoslav republics, four -Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina — have expressed their desire for a union of sovereign republics, thus accentuating the dynamic towards a confederal system which has existed since the 1970s. The 1974-76 constitution (the last before Tito's death in 1980) had established the collegial presidency with six representatives from the republics and two from the autonomous provinces within Serbia (Kosovo and Vojvodina).
### Veto rights
Each of these eight representatives enjoyed veto rights, greatly limiting the real powers of the centre and leading to an increased weight of the party/ state apparatuses in each of the republics. The annual rotation of the Federal Presidency amongst the eight functioned automatically until May 15 this year. Then, for the first time, a formal vote and the absence of a majority blocked the nomination of the Croat Stipe Mesic, with Serbia, supported by Montenegro and the votes from the two autonomous provinces, voting down Mesic.
Behind this paralysis lurked Serbia leader Slobodan Milosevic's efforts at recentralization, strengthened by his election last year to the Serbian presidency, with 60% of the vote. His popularity
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ITALY drew on the clear and strong feeling among Serbs that they had been the main losers from the evolution of the system. Equality of representation regardless of the size of the units evidently meant a relative under-representation of the largest republic, Serbia. Furthermore, Serbia was the only republic where the regime was not sovereign over the whole of its territory, owing to the veto powers of the two provinces. Finally, Serbs are scattered across three republics — outside Serbia they make up about 12% of the population of Croatia and a third of that of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
These states, which were created as parts of the federation with the idea of creating an equality of weight among the republics, have been until now constiutionally defined as multinational states so far as language, alphabet and official religion are concerned. The new Croat constitution of December 1990 did away
New trontiers? New frontiore?
MONTENEGRO
BULGARIA KOSOVO, MACEDONIA ALBANIA GREECE with this pluralism and transformed the Serbs in Croatia into a national minority.
The Serbs have protested against this treatment, although they have followed a similar or worse policy towards the Albanians in their own territory. The difference is that the Serbs feel "at home" in Yugoslavia; the scattering of Serbs throughout the federation makes them federalists. However the affirmation of the Serb nation means challenging Yugoslavia's internal frontiers, with the recentralization of Serbia and the annexation of Serb inhabited areas in other republics.
Serbian nationalism also tends to deny the identity of those other nations and nationalities which are ethnically the closest to the Serbs — that is, the Montenegrins, distinguished only by their history; the Macedonians, who were elevated to the status of a nation by Tito's regime; and the Muslims of Bos-
TALKS have been taking place between Croat and Serb leaders on the redrawing of the frontiers between their two republics, according to The Financial Times of July 10, 1991. Croat president Franjo Tudjman sees this as the way towards the "rational resolution [of] these issues of intra-national Croatia-Serbian relations". Any redrawing of the frontiers would open a whole series of analogous questions, both within Yugoslavia and between that country and its neighbours.
For example: Bulgaria has claims on Macedonia, as does Greece, there is a half million strong Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, and the Kosovo Albanians may well look towards Tirana insofar as the regime there changes.
The Western authorities and their media view such prospects with a mixture of acute anxiety and condescension. They see themselves being inexorably sucked into situations which they cannot control, and which will stretch the institutions of the Old/New World Order, designed to uphold existing borders, not to oversee their modification, to breaking point.
The independent left, which has never been taken in by the fashionable nonsense about the "end of history", can afford a more rational approach, insisting on the need for any such changes to take place on the basis of the fullest internal democracy, respect for the rights of all national groups and without outside interference. New regional confederations can be envisaged to replace the crumbling post-First World War nation states — the notion of a Balkan Federation was in the air in Balkan Communist circles at the end of the Second World War, before being vetoed by Stalin. - C.M. *
YUGOSLAVIA / ALGERIA Recognize independence of Slovenia and Croatia THE following statement was issued on July 3, 1991 by Sozialistische Alternative (SOAL), the Austrian section of the Fourth International. IN recent days, the Yugoslav People's Army has employed brute force in Slovenia. Tanks, artillery and the airforce have been called in and airports and border posts bombed. Cars which have been used as roadblocks have been flattened. Deaths, injuries and immense material losses have been the result.
* The independence of Slovenia and Croatia has been suspended, but not withdrawn. It remains to be seen what role economic and political pressure from the USA and the EC, who have decided to defend the bureaucratic dictatorship of the central government, have played in this retreat. * Every nation has the right to decide its own fate. If Slovenes and Croats have decided in a democratic fashion in favour of sovereignty for their states, the issue is clear-cut.
* An end to the aggression against Slovenia and Croatia. * We demand:
* Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as sovereign states by the Austrian feder- * A peaceful solution to the conflict. al government. * While fully supporting the right to national self-determination, we also believe that the creation of small states and nationalism cannot solve the problems of the peoples of Yugoslavia. What is needed are moves towards a free union of sovereign states in the form of a confederation and the organization of society on the basis of workers' power. * We oppose all attempts to exploit the events in Yugoslavia as a justification for whipping up militarist hysteria and steps towards strengthening the armed forces in Austria. At the same time, we demand the opening of the borders for people flee-