Here we publish extracts from a working paper from the central committee of the Party of Mariateguist Unity (PUM), which provides this party's analysis of the situation in the country. It Tirst appeared in the PUM's first appeared in the PUM's magazine, Amauta, in February 1991. DOCUMENT
HE profound polarization in Peru made Alberto Fujimori the candidate of all those forces opposed to the "shock therapy" proposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The fragile and precarious social base of Cambio 90 [the coalition that supported Fujimori's candidacy], as well as the unstable character of the majority that carried him to power, accentuated the caudillist [caudillo — a charismatic leader] and authoritarian tendencies of the new president.
His entourage was dominated by a sector of the army tied to the National Intelligence Service (SIN) and men in the pocket of imperialism. The more pragmatic sectors of the right, clearly in the majority in Cambio 90, have been putting pressure on the government without taking open positions.
The American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA - the party of the outgoing president Alan Garcia), despite its 21 surprising result in the elections!, found July 8, 1991 • #210 International Viewpoint ballots — with little success. Now the Torles are cashing in on the traditional corruption in the unions for their own ends. * lar sector and in productive industry. Previously a challenge would have come from one of the powerful and well-placed sectors and opened the situation up. This is less likely to happen now since there are far less such sectors.
This does not mean that the working class has lost its will to fight. It means that there is a feeling that, under present conditions, the odds are too great.
The problem is that the trade union laws are now routinely complied with, and it is this which has to be changed. This can be codified in the slogan: "defiance not compliance". The laws have to be defied wherever possible and the employers made to pay a price for using the law against unions. Until this starts to be done, the straitjacket will remain.
The spectacular victory of the mass non-payment movement against the poll tax shows that non-compliance is perfectly possible. Some 14 million people defied the law and the government was forced to retreat. What was possible with the poll tax is also possible with the anti-union laws. However, it must be remembered that the anti-poll tax movement was completely outside the organized labour movement; indeed. the TUC was urging people to pay.
A campaign has to be built up now so that a serious challenge to the law can be government would not resolve the matter of the anti-union laws - far from it. In fact, the Labour government would probably soon be using the Tory laws against a more militant working class. The struggle inside the labour movement to commit Labour to repeal of the anti-union legislation is thus of The campaign which has thus far done Last year this campaign organized a Such work is crucial if militants in the
1. "New realism": the name given to the formal renunciation of class struggle by Labour and union leaders and attendant ideologues. 2. Formally speaking, the unions' political funds can be used to support any party or cause, but in fact they are the main financial resource of the Labour Party -a fact of which everyone is well aware. Government ordered ballots of union members in the early 1980s produced overwhelming majorities in favour of retaining the funds. 3. Closed shop: automatic and compulsory union membership. 4. Shop stewards are directly elected workplace representatives. In the 1960s and 70s shop stewards' networks formed an important alternative power centre in the unions to that of the bureaucracies.
crucial importance. the most in Britain to keep the issue of the anti-union laws at the front of the political agenda has been mounted through the trade union committee of the Socialist Movement, which has developed an initiative called the "Unshackle the Unions Campaign". lobby of Labour Party conference on the matter, and it held a highly successful conference this April bringing together some 250 trade union militants to discuss the impact of the anti-union laws and how to fight them. unions are going to be able to prepare the ground to reverse the situation.
PERU DCOI itself from the start on the defensive, and unable to develop an opposition policy. Two different positions have appeared within it: the supporters of outright oppo sition (Alan Garcia) and those that want to negotiate with Fujimori (APRA's presidential candidate, Alva Castro).
Owing to its electoral defeat in April, and the confusions caused by the call to vote for Fujimori, the left has found itself trapped?: internal divisions and a weakening of links with the masses have been the order or the day. In practise, most of the left gave the new government a blank cheque. The crisis of the left has gone onto a new stage since some sections, like the Socialist Left, a split from the United Left (IU), and IU itself, have taken ministerial posts, after the break up of the coalition at the time of the formation of regional governments.3
Between June and August 1990, the Party of Mariateguist Unity (PUM) ran a campaign around an alternative proposition to the government's, with the help of left wing cconomists, with the aim of uniting the forces opposed to the government's policies. While the campaign caught the attention of the media, it did not really mobilize the PUM's forces or significantly affect the organized popular movement. The idea that the only option for Peru is Fujimori's "shock" was widespread among the population.
Majority of population live in poverty
On August 8, 1990, a very sharp price rise, which led to an inflation rate of
392% in one month, speeded up the economic crisis; we have been subjected to the most violent adjustment in recent Latin American history. Production fell by
20% in the second half of 1990, pushing the Gross Domestic Product back 30 years. The majority of the population finds itself in a situation of absolute poverty: today, only 6% of the economically active population of Lima are earning the equivalent of the minimum wage of 1970.
Millions of Peruvians were eligible for official aid, even on official figures, after this catastrophe. Faced with the threat of a popular explosion, the government has stepped up the militarization of the coun try, while creating a broad front around itself with the bosses and the Church to organize the Social Emergency Programme. The responses of the left have been limited, unstructured, unequal and without any political or profession-based centralization. The national strike [of
October 1990] had a limited impact — indeed, given the gravity of the situation, it could be considered a failure.
In the aftermath of the announcement of the economic shock, the PUM made a self-criticism of its call for a vote for Fujimor in the second round, explaining that this had contributed to causing confusion • among the masses and disarming them. International Viewpoint #210 • July 8, 1991
The PUM was equally wrong in believing that these measures would be met with an explosion; it had under-estimated the crisis of leadership [of the workers' movement and the ımpact of the neo-liberal offensive on people's thinking. It was soon obvious that the Social Emergency Programme was a failure. In recent months, women (and above all women militants of the PUM) have been one of the most dynamic sectors, with campaigns for milk for their children and for people's canteens, especially in Lima.
Nonetheless, the government retains the political initiative. Fujimori has launched direct attacks on various political institutions, including the judiciary, parliament, the regional governments and finally the town halls, and on some sectors of the mass organizations.
In each case the goverment has been able to set the terms of the confrontation, discrediting the institutions in the eyes of public opinion.
The caudillo without charisma
However these tactics have not definitively changed the balance of forces or the nature of the economy and state. This is Fujimori's main weakness, threatening to expose the fragility of his government.
In recent weeks, the popularity of the president and his prime minister has been falling. Fujimori's "caudillismo without charisma" could casily turn into pure and simple dictatorship. In fact, Peru today is run by a civilian/military government with the main centres of decision making being the SIN and US officials.
The PUM lost this first battle by surrendering on the most important thing for the masses: the president's economic policy.
The establishment of regional governments has been important for the left, but the balance sheet is on the whole negative. The left has not shown an ability to govern in a new way, and has fallen into the trap of chasing after official positions.
The government has thus been able to manipulate discontented municipalities to undermine the image and strength of the left, by reducing municipal budgets, halting the transfer of control of public enterprises and so on.
The PUM runs the local government in
Puno. It has been trying to resist the centre on problems such as land, mining and energy problems. Positive initiatives, including a regional meeting, have been taken in favour of the peasants.
Throughout the second half of 1990, the mass movement has met many problems in resisting and confronting the "Fujishock" . This is due to the devastating effects of the national crisis, the withdrawal caused by the growth of violence, the obsolescence of old forms of struggle and the crisis of the vanguard.
Broadly, one can say that the popular movement is on the defensive and is itself to defeats of some significance. However, important experiences, of varying form and content, have taken place. City-dwellers fighting to get land and women defending basic subsistence programmes have been in the front rank.
Nonetheless, globally, the ability of the urban and industrial working class to fight has been weakened, owing to the recession caused by the government's economic programme.
The PUM has been encouraging the establishment of stable links between the union confederations in the nationalized sector, in mining and energy; something all the more necessary given the advance of the privatization programme. The coordination between the miners and power workers organized a joint strike in January 1991, which was a reasonable success.
Workers in the nationalized sector, hard hit by the budget reductions, have responded with long sectoral struggles which converged towards the end of 1990. The results were limited and fragile, but the will to fight was made clear, and very few took voluntary redundancy.
To deal with the union movement, the government has used a strong hand, combined with minor concessions over, for example, the cleaning up of the social security system. There has also been an offensive over so-called "democratization" of the unions.
Peasant struggles break out in many places
Pcasant struggles have broken out widely. There have been stoppages and strikes in a number of places — Piura, Loreto,
Cusco, Costa Sur and elsewhere — with, in some cases, the development of self- defence. The reappearance of the peasant movement in Ayacucho, which broke the military encirclement, is significant. But there has been an absence of centralized initiatives and it has been impossible to coordinate the local struggles.
The struggle between the military forces in the interior of the country has stepped up, but without either side being able to change the relation of forces, a sign of the limitation and problems of their strategies
[the military have 50,000 soldiers, Sendero Luminoso, 5,000 and the Tupac Amaru
Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)
1. APRA got 20% in the first round, and thus found itself in a pivotal position in parliament — Fujimori got 61% of the vote in the second round against 38% for Vargas Llosa's Democratic Front (FREDEMO), despite the fact that the latter had come out ahead in the first round, with 33%.
2. Both the PUM and the United Left called for a vote for Fujimori, on the grounds that it was necessary to do whatever was needed to defeat Vargas Llosa.
3. The United Left (IU) coalition brings together the
Communist party, the PUM and the National Union of the Revolutionary Left (of Maoist origin). After the left was offered ministerial posts in the incoming Fujimori administration, the IU broke up; the elements wanting to take the posts formed the Socialist Left.
Achievements of the Fujimori government
ALBERTO Fujimori was elected a year ago when he ran against the free market enthusiast Mario Vargas Llosa.
However, as soon as he got back from Washington, Fujimori adopted his adversary's policies. On August 8, 12 days after his investiture, the "Fujishock"
was set in motion, including 100% plus price rises on basic necessities, with the promise of reduced inflation.
• The main aim of the economic programme was the repayment of the debt ($2.2bn). The idea was to build up hard currency reserves, reinforce the role of the state and reduce its expenditure. Fujimori launched into the "rationalization of public enterprises to sell them in good condition" by sackings and buying resignations (according to the calculations of the Confederation of Functionaries,
CITE, a voluntary redundancy was worth 600 million intis, or about $750, in January 1991). A lowering of customs duties brought Peruvian products into direct competition with imports.
• Immediate result: a dramatic fall in the income of wage earners, peasants and the informal sector; a drop in demand, the bankruptcy of small enterprises and the growth of unemployment. This added up to recession. 70% of Peruvi-
Dans live below the poverty line.
• Since mid-December 1990, the failure of the IMF programme, faithfully applied by Fujimori, has become apparent. Negotiations were opened in Washington; a new stabilization plan, creation of a "support group" and promises of credit to pay the debt. On December 16 came the second Fujishock, with a rise of 20% in the price of fuel, immediately followed by an across-the-board price increase. In mid-January 1991 the prime minister and the economy minister resigned. • In February 1991, the cholera epidemic (see /V 204) was announced and led to a sharp fall in exports. Here, too, the alternative is to fight against poverty and disease or pay the debt. • Some 60% of the working population is unemployed or under-employed. • Only 6% of wage earners have job security. The minimum wage on January 11, 1991, was around $45, and it has remained at that level. According to official figures, twice as much is needed to a feed a family in Lima. • 4.5% of the national budget goes on healthcare. • 30% goes on defence. Public expenditure on social needs is not generous; in 1990 it amounted to some $14 per inhabitant (as opposed to $49 in 1980). Four out of 10 get a mere $15 dollars a month. The minimum wage has lost
25% of its value since 1985.
• In April 1991 inflation was 5.8% (47% since the start of the year and
3,589% over the past 12 months). *
PERU which it considers of priority importance.
It has in particular addressed itself to the task of establishing what it calls the "new power", its support bases, with authoritarian methods, while striking against autonomous organizations and combative leaderships.
From Upper Huallafa and the bank of the river Apurimac, Sendero has advanced towards the central forest, imposing its presence and control in all the regions. It is also necessary to underline the growth of its activities in Lima, above all in the poor districts and in the universities.
But its programmatic limits are evident. It is incapable of bringing into being a broad mass movement that would enable it to make a strategic breakthrough in the war; on the contrary, the gap between it and the organized movement is vast. The counter-insurrection tries to exploit this weakness in the vast offensive launched against the Senderist leaders.
Guerillas attack imperialist symbols
The MRTA has concentrated its forces in a rural region in the north west, trying to recapture its peasant base. Its armed propaganda and its terrorism are aimed at denouncing the presence and symbols of North American imperialism in this country.
Its last central committee, in August 1990, states its desire to change its activily to develop people's power and regain ground lost as a result of the generalization of the war. But its actions do not show notable change. It continues to go in for military operations and pursue its "competition" with Sendero.
The drugs traffic is omnipresent and affects all areas of the nation's life. There are several indications of the links between drug trafficking circles and corrupt elements in the army, this being one of the main points of tension with the US.
Since 1990, the signing of an aid agreement concerning the anti-drugs struggle has been discussed, involving $160m.
But these negotiations have become bogged down owing to resistance from the armed forces against getting involved in this struggle and differences about how to use the money. Even so, collaboration between the US Drug Endowment Agency (DEA) and the Peruvian police has been intensified.
Developments in the immediate future depend on three key elements: the economic situation, the political crisis and the progress of the war.
On all these terrains it is necessary to seck to recapture the initiative by organizing the popular and national resistance. * 4. Montesinos is a placeman of the CIA. He has been 23 named head of the National Intelligence Service (SIN) by Fujimori. July 8, 1991• #210 International Viewpoint
1,000]. Thus the war will continue.
The Fujimori government has accelerated militarization. Its links with the armed forces, and in particular with the army, are one of the pillars of its immediate stability.
The militarization has been supported by a broad spectrum of forces, including sectors of the left. The terrorist actions and provocations of Sendero Luminoso have had a decisive impact in this respect.
The military have gained significant results in striking at the leadership of Sendero and the MRTA in the north-west. The government has increased the number of paramilitary groups, which are now to be found in several parts of the country and which provoke murderous clashes.
In October 1990, for the first time, a state of emergency was decreed in the north of Puno, making it clear that the social and political forces and the Church are on the defensive as far as the militarization of the country is concerned.
Fujimori has handed the interior ministry and the army to the military circles tied to Montesinos.4
This has been expressed by the pensioning off of 300 officers, above all those close to Mantilla [organizer of the right wing Rodrigo Franco paramilitaries], as well as some who have been zealous in the struggle against the drug traffic.
Fujimori himself has asked certain officers to retire - including the commanders of the navy and air force.
These contradictions have led to the eruption of various scandals, concerning phone bugging and spying, and also to the non-signature of a treaty of cooperation with the US over the anti-drugs struggle. These problems have also led the army to lose some of the initiative in the internal conflict; criminal actions have multiplied, reflecting its disarray and complicating its relations with the population.