Bombay textile workers strike senting as the primary contradiction a an increased work-load for the workers. A increase profits. In view of the experi- ments and the ways the state has tried to
The stakes
Amar JESANI ence that it had with the state of emerKunal CHATTOPADHYAY gency, the bourgeoisie pushed this strategy through in a piece-meal fashion. Between two and three million workers in Repression was increasingly legalised Bombay's textile industry have been out through the National Security Act (NSA) on strike since January 18, 1982. Work- the Essential Services Maintenance Ast ers at seven enterprises began their strike (ESMA), the Disturbed Areas Act (DAA), early in October 1982. The number of and so on. More and more workers began workers and the duration of the strike by themselves make this one of the greatest struggles ever waged by any sector of the inflation sharply reduced the standard of Indian proletariat. But the importance workers. Working-class of this strike goes far beyond that. In struggles began taking on a defensive order to understand its implications, we character. have to look at the recent pattern of The state, however, intervened actively class stuggle in India. to defeat the workers.
The state of emergency declared by struggles (involving 78 days on strike) of Indira Gandhi's regime in 1975 was more than 100,000 public-sector workers part of an effort by the Indian bourgeoi- in Bangalore and Hyderabad, of the Loco sie to take a political counter-offensive Running Staff (50,000 to 75,000 workers against the working-class struggles and on strike for more than forty days) of mass movements and to facilitate the re- the Railways, and of the employees of stucturing of Indian industry. However, the Life Insurance Corporation. the emergency narrowed the base of the That is the context in which the texbourgeois politicans, and contradictions tile-workers strike developed. The ownappeared between the industrial, commer- ers of the textile plants, particularly in cial, and agrarian capitalists. The working Bombay, are trying to restructure the class, too, in spite of the efforts of its To a large extent, they are mis-leaders, refused to take economic cut- trying to shift to the production of yarn backs passively. By the last phase of the than cotton cloth. They are also emergency, working-class struggles were trying to introduce a new wave of mechrapidly picking up anization and automation. Finally, the
With the March 1977 Parliamentary top twenty textile barons are trying to elections, a two-sided situation emerged. take-over many of the less profitable On the political plane, the bourgeoisie, ably assisted by the Stalinists (and also The accomplishment of all these aims many far-left groups) succeeded in pre- would involve massive retrenchment and pseudo confliet between "democracy" in defeat in the present strike would almost the abstract and authoritarianism, certainly leave them helpless in the face in the abstract. But at the same time, on of such an offensive from the employers. the economic plane, the number of work- On the other hand, at present, with the ing-class struggles, including strikes, rose prolongation of the strike beyond all sharply. In the face of this, the the expectations of the government, the central governments •(the first one mill owners, the liberal and radical comheaded by Morarji Desai and the second mentators, and the reformist left, this one by Charan Singh) totally failed to struggle is inspiring an ever widening impose new laws that were designed to circle of workers and other oppressed severely restrict the rights of the common people (Untouchables, people, especially the organised working and the rural proletariat). class. This led to a new rallying of the in this strike bourgeois forces around the Congress major proletarian fight-back on the polParty (Indira). itical as well as on the economic level.
In January 1980, the Congress (I) was returned to power. This coincided with THE TEXTILE WORKERS MOVEMENT the beginning of the world capitalist recession. In the face of increasing econo- The textile strike has challenged the mic difficulties, the Indian bourgeoisie bourgeoisie sharply on the political level. had to speed up its restructuring of the To understand how, we have to look at industrial sector as part of its strategy to the history of the textile-workers move20 suppress them.
The Bombay textile industry is one of the oldest in India. Likewise, workers there have been among the vanguard of the Indian working class. In 1918, they held their first general strike. In 1924-25, over 1,500,000 workers struck work for several months. Among other things, this strike gained them their first industry- wide union. The rank-and-file initiative was given formal shape by Mill-Committees at the plant level.
This strike wave of the 1920s, and the gains it made, alarmed the colonial rulers of India, as well as the Indian bourgeoisie. To counter the militancy of the textile workers and the increasing hold of communists over the textile union, the colonialists and the bourgeoisie adopted the strategy of setting up legal negotiating machinery along lines favourable to them and suppressing strike actions.
This policy was carried a step further in 1938 when the British rulers authorised an experiment in "self-government," which was confined to the provincial level. The local government dominated by the Indian National Congress drafted by Bombay Industrial Disputes Act of 1938. This act covered not only textiles (cottons, silk, woolens, and hosiery) but also the banking, transport, and electricity supply industries.
Under this act, a union could be it recognised as the representative of workers in the entire industry in collective bargaining, if it could demonstrate through complicated legal procedures that 25% of the workers in the industry tl were affiliated to it. This act made it virtually impossible for a militant trade union to become a representative union because of the legal hurdles it included ti and the state patronage to the mill-own- d ers and the government-sponsored union that it provided for. Thus, it restricted the scope of legal militant working-class T actions such as strikes.
After independence, the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act of 1938 was given a more rounded shape in the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, (BIR), which came into force on September 29, 1947. This new act increased the percentage of members from the total work force in the industry, necessary to get the status of representative union from 25% to 30%. This new act also kept all the barriers to workers getting represented by the union of their choice. Later on, the new law was also applied to the developing
fore the National Carpaign Committee, ed, the Workers Will Win".
sugar industry. It covers two provinces, Maharashtra and Gujarat.
The struggle against this black law was started by the textile workers as early as 1938, when the first version of the present law was originally put into effect. However, by the time the transfer of power to an independent government was effected and the present law introduced, the Congress-led Mill Mazdoor Sangh union (RMMS) had been installed as the sole bargaining agent in the textile indu-
Since then it has regularly signed agreements unfavourable to the workers workers' hands and left the textile barons an open field to transfer their profits from textiles to other industries, such as engineering and chemicals.
Since the 1950s, workers have consistently fought to get rid of the RMMS. When their strikes in the early 1950s failed to dislodge it, in the late 1950s, they decided to experiment with legal forms of struggle. Several opposition unions came together, and a membership drive was started. Early gains were made in the Labour Court, but the RMMS appealed to the higher courts, and the proceedings were dragged on for a few yeas. As a legal 'representative' RMMS was able to use strong-arm and pressure tactics to smash the opposition union. Thus, the workers realised the futility of legal struggles to get recognition for a union of their choice.
One result of this was the extension of the practice of forming mill mittees and working through them. In 1969, the mittees and fought strongly against the RMMS leadership. carried on a 42-day strike against a wage agreement signed by the RMMS. Eventually, this resulted in a wage hike of between Rs.22 and Rs.40. In 1976, in spite state of emergency, the fought against the government order lim-
The workers involved in the present of the earlier struggles.
The workers realised from the first that all attempts to have the RMMS derecognised through the legal process would be foiled by the provisions of the BIR Act. At the same time, all other traditional left unions were losing the confidence of workers because of their emphasis on legalism. These were the main reasons behind their choice of leadership. The workers of the seven enterprises who began their strike in October 1981 were not affiliated to any big union. But by the end of the year, Datta Samant had emerged as the undisputed leader of the textile workers. NEW LEADERSHIP - THE ROLE OF
DATTA SAMANT
After the start of the first phase of the strike in October 1981, hot debates started up at the meetings of the Mill Committees over such issues as the demand for wage parity for textile workers with workers in other industries (e.g. enpermanent status the 100,000 substitute workers who constitute about 40% of the total work force in the Bombay textile industry. The Mill Committees decided to make a strong attempt to dislodge the RMMS. seemed to. require an alternative leadership. At the time, Datta Samant, who led the struggles of the engineering workers for higher wages in 1977-80 was at the peak of his popularity, owing to his arrest under the National Security Act. He
Datta Samant is a former Congress
As far as his trade-union practices go, he has not been averse to agreements accepting retrenchment and workload increases. methods of leading struggles are militant. He prefers direct action to legal battles, and he has led a number of strike actions in other industries besides engineering.
It was characteristic of Datta Samant's style that the initial demand was for a wage raise of Rs.300-500 to bring the pay of textile workers to par with that in modern engineering and other industries. Unlike other union leaders, he begins by refusing to pay heed to the bosses' statistical manipulation. Other demands included provisions regarding Leave Travel
Rent Allowance, making all substitute workers permanent. More far-reaching demands recognition of Datta Samant's Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union (MEKU), and for standardisation of work-loads working conditions throughout the indus-
However, it was not Datta Samant who led the workers to strike; the workers through their Mill Committees forced him to announce the date of the strike. When the workers found that Samant was not building decisively for the strike but was waiting for some positive response from the government, they gathered at his office in the second week of January 1982 and gave him an ultimatum. That left Samant with no alternative but to announce that the strike would begin on January 18, 1982. This was one day beformed by several traditional central trade unions, called for an all-India general strike against promulgation of the NSA, ESMA, and for several economic
From the beginning, therefore, several forces were operating. The provincial government, the central government, and the RMMS were determined to crush the
The trade-union confederations and the National Campaign Committee formed by them did not take the strike too seriously. They were also very hostile Samant in 1977, they had been suffering
They knew that if Samant were successful in textiles, that would nearly wipe out their base in Bombay, and would pave the way for his influence spreading to other parts of India. They had no political perspective for carrying such direct working-class action forward. Instead they saw it, and still do see it, as a threat to their line of maintaining the
NEW EXPERIENCES FOR INDIAN WORKERS
Over the last ten months, the strike has passed through a series of tests. The outstanding results are the following:
Strengthening and extension of the
Immediately start of the strike, the employers obtained court orders prohibiting workers from going within a 100-meter radius of the mill gates. So, the workers began to organise Mill Committee meetings in areas; and, thus, workers of several mills started gathering for rallies at different places in Bombay. Strong centres were set up, and served as places to hold daily meetings and discussions, and for preparing various programmes of actions, as well as for caring for needy workers and their families. of this was organised by the workers
Samant had no trade-union structure based on organised bureaucracy, a grass-roots leadership arose from the workers themselves. It is this leadership from the working-class activists that is spearheading the strike and is promoting a growing radicalisation amongst broader and broader layers of the working class.
Increasing emphasis on political de-
Usually in strikes led by Datta Samant, wage demands have remained the central ones. But in the textile-workers strike, very beginning, the wage demand was not the primary issue. driving force for the textile workers was their hatred of the R.MMS, and so success means getting rid of the RMMS. This has pitted them against the state power They have also learned from their past experiences that such political demands cannot be achieved without wider support from amongst all sectors of workers. That is why their central slogan is "Unit-
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Growing sense of solidarity amongst other workers of the Western Zone of India.
Solidarity actions have included meetings, demonstrations, strikes, and financial help to the striking workers and their families. The extent of mobilization of industrial workers in Bombay and elsewhere has been really spectacular, given the fact that Datta Samant has no organised trade-union structure and also the fact that all other trade unions supporting the strike are only half-heartedly doing solidarity work. Since 18 January 1982, no public rally or meeting has drawn less than 50,000 workers.
A public rally in Shivaji Park around the middle of March drew between 300, 000 and 400,000 workers. In May, about 500,000 workers joined a long organised by the MGKU. Recently, on 2 October, a rally in Shivaji Park was attended by more than 300,000 workers. Not only that, about 1.5 million workers in different industries all over Maharashtra, affiliated to the unions led by Datta Samant and Serva Shranik Sangh, went on a three-day solidarity from 11 to 13 October 1982. joining centrist-led trade unions exposed their political bankrupcy. The pressure created by this working-class solidarity action was so great that the Cito, Which is led by the CPI (M) was obliged abruptly to join Industrial workers in India (DR) 22 in the strike on 13 October. Throughout these three days, to protest against the government's attitude, thousands of workers deliberately courted arrest, and all of them, including Datta Samant, were imprisoned for 14 days.
A strong worker-poor peasant alliance.
Many of the textile workers have strong roots in the countryside. As the strike dragged on, over 70% of them went home. This is a common practice in India. But this time there was a marked difference. The workers who went back to villages became propagandists, formed support committees, and sent material aid for the 70,000 workers and their families who have stayed in Bombay. Not only that, they have spread their fighting spirit in the rural areas by participating in, and organising the struggles of the rural proletariat for higher wages and against corruption in the Employment Guarantee scheme of the Maharashtra government Thus, for the first time in the recent history of the working-class movement in this province, a concrete bond of unity was established between striking workers in the urban area and the rural proletariat and poor peasants.
Blunting of the repressive apparatus.
Despite the fact that the strike has lasted so long and despite the fact that the textile industry is classed as an "essential service," the government has not been able to implement the draconian provisions of the Essential Services Maintenance Act. The repression seems to have had almost no effect on the striking workers. Twenty-two worker activists were arrested under the National Security Act in August, but their places were immediately filled by natural leaders of the working class that have been emerging in greater and greater numbers.
REACTIONS TO THE TEXTILE-WORKERS STRIKE
In previous issues of International Viewpoint we have described the development of the strike from the time of the fall 1982 Bombay police strike, and the solidarity strikes and other actions that took place then, to the brutal repression that followed.
These strikes involved over 1.5 million workers in a massive show of solidarity with the textile workers.
The strike has been a test for the left groups. The Stalinist and the centrist left were, to say the least, scared of this mighty show of strength by the workers. They did not expect this strike to continue for such a long time. Taking up a stance of passive moral support, they waited, and are still waiting, for the col lapse of the strike and a corresponding downfall of Datta Samant himself. But the workers' militancy has upset their expectations. They thus stand exposed before the striking workers. Only the Lal Nishan Party, and its trade union, the Sarva Shramik Sangh, have consistently and actively supported the striking workers. These are the only groups that have further consolidated their position.
At the all-India level, the National Campaign Committee, founded on 4 June 1981 in Bombay by several central trade unions, has taken a totally passive attitude towards the strike. Like their comrades in Bombay, they have failed to understand the political implications of the B strike.
So far they have not mapped out a concrete plan for solidarity action. In West Bengal, where a left front headed by the CPI(I) is in power, very little was done to mobilise the working class in support of the Bombay textile workers.
While the strike was on, bye-elections were held in the Thane Parliamentary constutuency of Bombay. Datta Samant formed a Kamgar Aghadi' (Workers B Front) and announced his candidature. His election campaign centered around defence of the textile strike. But the CPI and the CPI(M) decided to back a candidate of the bourgeois Janata Party against him in the name of 'Left and Democratic is Unity', which is the major current variant of popular frontism in India.
A similar role was played by the leaders of the various components of the National Campaign during the presidential elections. Given the indirect method of electing the President in India, it offers little possibility for waging propaganda ti campaigns. But the NCC got bogged
down in parliamentary bloc making and in a much touted operation to get a 'consensus' candidate instead of concentrating on the actual class struggle in the country.
The effect of all this has been that the solidarity movement that has grown up in Maharashtra has not been duplicated in the rest of India. Even among the far left, the response to this struggle has been very poor outside Maharashtra. THE FAR LEFT IN MAHARASHTRA
The far left in this province has seriously undertaken the task of building solidarity with the textile workers. After working separately for some time, in September 1982, several of these groups formed a united front on this issue. The components included the Navjavan Bharat Jabha, a Maoist organisation; and its
Pragati Janghatna; the Lok Adhikar Ghavalval, independent Marxist group; the UTUC, the Maharashtra branch of the trade-union comfederation dominated by the Revolutionary Socialist Party; the Bolshevik-Leninist Group, a Trotskyist group; and the Communist League, Indian section of the Fourth International.
On 10 September, these organisations began a campaign centering around opposition to the National Security Act, which had been used to arrest textileworker activists. They distributed 25,000 copies of a leaflet and held numerous street-corner meetings and demonstrations in various parts of Bombay. On 22 September, a huge public meeting was organised by them in a hall in Bombay. It was addressed by the secretary of the MGKU and representatives of the organisations in the front. The popular response to these solidarity actions showed clearly that the industrial workers, white-collar employees, and the urban petty bourgeoisie were looking for a leadership to channel their solidarity. But it should be noted that the UTUC withdrew from the front after this 22 September meeting.
This front also actively worked for the success of the October 11-13 solidarity strike. In protest against the police re pression of the workers who exposec themselves to arrest at the time, these organisations issued a call for a big procession and demonstration in front of the office of the commissioner of police in Bombay on 16 October 1982. Byculla station in Bombay, where the procession was to start, was surrounded by the police. And those who came to participate in this protest march were driven away by force. Despite this, about 150 activists from the organisations in the front traveled by train instead of by road and reached a station near the commissioner's office. But that station was also surrounded by the police forces before they reached there, and so they were forced to disperse.
Then a delegation was chosen, consisting of a representative from each organisation in the front, and it submitted a memorandum condemning the police from these far-left organisations in Maharashtra, women's organisaalso mobilised in solidarity with the textile workers. Since women textile workers and the women members of the families of textile workers are also in struggle, such women are also a target of repression by the authorities. example, a daughter of a textile worker was raped in a police station. organisations built up a strong protest movement against such sexual oppression.
In Bombay, various feminist groups and organisations have supported the strike by collecting grain, raising funds, and holding demonstrations against the
UNHELPFUL CRITICS
Outside Maharashtra, most of the far-left groups have not played a use-
Several of them seem to think that carping criticism of Datta Samant is the only way that they can express solthe strikers. effectively down-grading the struggle by explaining that it is primarily an economic struggle around wage issues. are exceptions to this, minority even within the far left. These problems were illustrated when some ex-Maoists called for a solidarity meeting in Calcutta. They booked a small hall, but even that was less than half filled. Of those who attended, only two or three were trade unionists with any real base.* All the far-left groups active within the working class of West Bengal stayed away from the meeting.
The Communist League, Indian section of the Fourth International, has undertaken a campaign to build solidarity with the textile workers on an all-India level. Apart from the work being done comrades in Maharashtra, extensive propaganda activity is being carried out
In Bihar and West Bengal, along with propaganda work, the CL is financial aid for the striking The congress of the CL, held this fall, passed a resolution on solidarity with the textile strike. And building support for the striking workers was made one of the main priorities for the
Indian textile workers (DR) Indian Trotskyists in the coming period.
THE IMPACT OF THE TEXTILE
The textile strike has inspired various oppressed strata such as the dalits (untouchables), Maharashtra. It has deepened the radicalof the activists in these layers. the passivity union confederations and the Stalinist and centrist left parties, workers in different parts of the country are becoming aware of the true significance of the tex-
The strike is not over yet. It has now gone on a year, and for some of the workers involved well over a year. This is the strike of the century for the Indian workers, and it is an international landmark as well. But unless a strong solidarity movement is built up in India and internationally, it will be difficult for the textile workers to win their central demands. And a defeat would mean a tremendous blow to the Indian proletariat. Since the government has been out to illegalise all strikes and to push through the bourgeois strategy of restructuring industry at the expense of the workers, a defeat here will mean a crucial political defeat of the In-
Thus, India-wide solidarity actions are urgently needed, as well as international
Working class organisations in countries can show solidarity workers and sending them to the union sending financial and by publicizing the strike and building Messages of Solidarity should be sent to: International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 37-41 Rue Montagne-aux-Herbes Potageres Brussels Belgium asking them to forward messages to India. Please send copies to ! Proletarian Polities K-8 Nensy Colony Express Highway Borivli (East) Bombay 400.066
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Ceylonese bourgeoisie moves toward dictatorial rules in response to IMF pressure
The Sri Lankan government is instigating a massive wave of re- Provisions that were brought into effect on October 20, pression against all opposition forces in the country. Not only allegedly to stop 'post-election violence' after the presidential is this directed against the Tamil nationalists, who have been a consistent target of repression, but against worker and peasant International Viewpoint correspondent Mikael Ernwik asked activists, and even members of the Buddhist and Christian