International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

Polish Solidarity in France Reflects Rise of Worker Militancy

· International Viewpoint No. 2, 15 March 1982 · pp 7-9 · 2,960 words

Eastern Europe France Trade unions Soviet Union

Polish Solidarity in France

Reflects Rise of Worker Militancy

What basically explains the massiveness and dynamism of the movement of solidarity with Solidarnos in France is the sort of relationship of forces between the classes that emerged after the defeat of the bourgeois parties in the May and June 1981 elections.

France is also the only country in Western Europe where the workers are confident and where there is talk in public life about advancing toward socialism, where this seems a concrete thing for many people.

The right has not recovered from its defeats and has not been able to make any serious effort to take advantage of the bureaucracy's outrages in Poland to whip up an anti-Communist campaign, as was in fact done in 1956 over the Soviet military intervention in Hungary.

When one of the bourgeois parties, the RPR, tried to lead a cortege of about 500 persons into a united-front demonstration called by the workers organizations on December 14, and which drew many tens of thousands of participants, the rightists were forcibly expelled.

This is the first time that we have seen massive mobilization by workers in France against repression in the East European countries. In 1968, when the French CP also "disapproved" of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, most of the French workers condemned it. But the loday most French workers teel an active solidarity with Solidarnosc, despite the fact that the CP, the main workers party. and the union confederation it controls, the CGT, the country's strongest union, are deadset against support developing for the Polish workers.

One important factor in this working-class sympathy is the direct contacts that were established between Polish and French trade-unionists. Lech Walesa visited France and was popular among French workers. They particularly appreciated his tenacity and his confidence in dealing with the bureaucrats.

When Walesa came to this country in October 1981, he was received not only by the CFDT (the confederation close to the SP) and the Federation de l'Education Nationale (the teachers union in which the left is strong) and Force Ouvriere (the old Social Democrat union). He was also received by the CGT.

For many "class struggle" union activists who have been looking for a political alternative since the May I0, 1981, victory of the left in the presidential elec-

6 tions, the fight waged by Solidarnosc embodied their hopes for a democratic socialism. Many of these people today make a point of wearing Solidarnosc badges on the job.

The CFDT for example sent representatives to Poland back at the time of the August 1980 strikes.

In France also there is a serious mass press, papers such as Le Monde and Liberation. Therefore, there has been a fairly broad understanding of the sort of movement Solidarnosc was.

There are also certain contrary currents in the working class. In some backward layers, there has been a feeling that the Solidarity activists were responsible for the crackdown because they wanted to "go too far."

Also, in some more militant sectors, especially immigrant workers, you find the idea that there is "too much talk" about the repression in Poland and not enough about repression in third world countries. These sectors will oppose the union bureaucracy on methods of struggle but not Poland.

Obviously, if paradoxically, the CP is trying to build on both currents to stop the movement of solidarity with Poland.

There is now another problem. It is two months since the crackdown in Poland, and the interest among workers Evervdav concerns are taking over aggin. Everyday concerns are taking over again. The CP is also trying to take advantage of that by arguing that "you can't go on discussing Poland forever. "

Nonetheless, here unlike in Italy and Spain, workers reacting against the betrayals of the "liberal" bureaucrat leaders have not fallen to the tough sounding mythology of Stalinism. Even the most Stalinist im the French CP talk in somewhat muted tones about Poland. This time the tough talk is being left to tiny sects whose purpose in life is posturing, such as the Spartacists.

The attitude of the SP here helped assure the development of a mass movement for Solidarosc. It did not throw its weight against mobilizations for Poland as did the SPs in Germany and Austria. In fact, in view of the relationship of class forces in France, that would not have been possible. Nonetheless, the SP, like its sister parties, does not want and is unable to build a mass solidarity movement.

In the case of Poland, we saw a division of labor between the SP in government and the party.

The government's first response to the crackdown came from Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson: "We note that this is a Polish internal affair. For the moment we see no threat of foreign intervention and that reassures us....Of course, we will not do anything."

Cheysson's statement made quite a bad impression on the left and working-class public opinion that is important to the SP. Pierre Mauroy, the premier, tried to rectify that. He went so far as to voice his "protest. " But immediately he added: "The present events remain internal to Poland. We want them to stay that way."

The SP leaders who are not in the government did not hide so deeply in diplomatic language. At a united-front meeting called in support of Solidarnosc, the new party first secretary, Lionel Jospin, demanded the lifting of the state of siege and release of those imprisoned. He even denounced the offensive of U.S. imperialism in Central America.

Given the fact that the SP's main rival lined up this time with Jaruzelski and Moscow, the Social Democrats recognized that a few gestures that would not cost them very much would do the CP real harm.

Despite the enormous means at its disposal, the SP made only a token effort for Poland. At no time did it seek to build a mass movement in support of the Polish workers.

What is more, the SP statements did What is more, the SP statements did not go beyond the framework of defending civil liberties. At no time did this party--which declares its support for workers self-management at all of its congresses--ever talk about the living movement for self-management that developed in Poland. Obviously that would not have fitted in very well with Francois Mitterrand's continuing his policy of collaborating with the bosses.

Unlike the SP, the CFDT did mobilize in a significant way to defend Solidarnosc against the repression. It organized a number of rallies, often in a united front with the FEN teachers union, FO, the Catholic trade-union confederation, and the professionals union. It has published the statements of Solidarnosc representatives in its periodical Syndicalisme Hebdo.

The CFDT is under more direct pressure than the SP and has more to gain by identifying itself with Solidarity. It has to attract the layer of workers who have • identified their hopes for a democratic socialism with Solidarnosc.

Nonetheless, CFDT General Secretary Edmond Maire has remained distinctly disprotests came essentially from intellectuals. naturally is not as sharp as it was.

Today most French workers feel an protests came essentially from intellectuals. naturally is not as sharp as it was.

creet about the real activity of Solidarnosc, which in many respects was the diametrical opposite of the confederation he heads.

The CFDT press does not talk about the firmness of the Solidarnosc leaders in pushing the workers demands, nor the sort of workers democracy that existed in this struggle, nor about the real movement for self-management in Poland. This is all quite unlike the CDT's practice of gentlemanly negotiations with the bosses and the scaling down of the workers demands.

While the CFDT clearly hopes to gain from the Polish issue at the expense of the CP-controlled CGT, it does not carry this to the point of enthusiasm about cooperating with the "CGT With Solidarnosc" committees built by oppositionists in that union confederation. Far leftists play an important role in many of these committees, and the CFDT does not like either the militant policies they favor for France or the example they point to in Solidarnosc's work.

The SP's fellow-traveling union confederation hopes to encourage the moderates in Solidarnose to move closer to where it stands. It has called on the Polish union to "seek negotiated solutions and compromises with the state. " At the same time, it says that the question of power" must not be posed because of ""Poland's geopolitical position. " (Syndicalisme Hebdo, January 7, 1982.)

At the same time that the Italian and Spanish CPs felt compelled to take a greater distance from the "Soviet model, " the French CP was distributing hundreds of thousands of leaflets with General Jaruzelski's statement justifying the state of siege on one side, and a communique by party leader Georges Marchais on the other.

A few years ago, the French CP identified itself with Eurocommunism. At its Twenty-Second Congress in February 1976, it advanced a muted criticism of the East European countries.

The position it has taken now on Poland, however, follows from the one that it took on Afghanistan and the declaratior it made at its Twenty-Third Congress in May 1979 about a "positive overall balance sheet of the socialist countries."

The party daily, 'Humanite, has shut its eyes to the antiworking-class measures of the military regime, the suspension of the right to strike, and the arrests.

Pierre Juquin, member of the CP Political Bureau even found the nerve to say: "The principles that General Jaruzelski "The wincinles that General Jaruzelski has proclaimed and the commitments he has assumed reflect what we consider to be priceless human values."

The Polish events came at a time when the CP was going through one of the gravest crises in its history. In the May and June 1981 elections, it lost a quarter of its vote. While it continues to claim officially that it has 710,000 members, the real figure is probably between 200,000 and 300,000 (including 50,000 full timers).

The leadership admits that the party has lost a thousand of its plant cells (10% of the total). In the past three years, sales of l'Humanite have dropped from 150,000 to 75,000.

Nonetheless, the CP leadership managed to get almost unanimous support for its positions at its Twenty-Fourth Congress in January 1982. Out of 1,685 delegates, only two abstained, and none voted against the draft resolution presented by Georges Marchais.

The main reason for this was the party's ultrabureaucratic internal regime. Discussion was systematically smothered. Several batches of oppositionists were expelled on the eve of the congress. There was an elaborate filtering-out mechanism for delegates. They had to get a majority vote on four levels (the cell, the section, federation, and regional congress).

Another factor is the general political anemia afflicting a party where only the apparatus and the hacks remain active.

The opposition also did not show determination. The only credible pole was Henri Fiszbin. A former member of the Central Committee and former leader of the Paris federation, he controls a weekly magazine, Rencontres Communistes Hebdo and an extensive network inside the party and its apparatus. Several thousand CP members have signed a public petition against the expulsion of the founders of this magazine.

Paradoxically, the Soviet CP chiefs helped to increase the credibility of the Fiszbin opposition by proposing through the Paris TASS bureau that Rencontres Communistes publish their statement attacking the Italian CP for the stand it took in connection with Poland. L'Humanite had not.

However, all the Fiszbin opposition did was issue a few press releases and hold one public meeting in Paris a month after the putsch.

Finally, tens of thousands of CP members with critical views on Poland voted "with their feet." Left without perspectives in a party where the air was becoming unbreathable, they stopped going to their cell and branch meetings, and many left the party altogether.

It is significant that the average age of delegates at the recent CP congresses c.. wil levels was ten to fifteen years older than in the past.

The Marchais leadership may think that it cut its losses. But the slow loss of membership represents a serious hemorrhage. Moreover, never has the authority A L to authority of the leadership been so weak, and this at a time when decisive tests are ahead for France.

Most importantly, in the CGT, the party's main instrument for maintaining control of the working class, a mass opposition has appeared for the first time, grouped around the question of Poland.

On December 14, CGT leader Georges Seguy announced that Solidarnosc's last actions before the putsch "went beyond trade unionism" and posed the danger of

"chaos and anarchy."

The CGT condemned the December 14 united-front demonstration as "a display of anti-Communism...." It denounced the December 21 solidarity strike with Poland called by the CFDT, the FEN, and FO, as a maneuver by the rightist Paris mayor Jacques Chirac that was "openly backed by many bosses. " It even even went so far in an internal circular to compare Solidarnosc with a French yellow union financed by the bosses and and the far right.

The CGT's position was in flagrant contradiction to statements it made in defense of liberties in the East European countries at its congress in 1978.

Many members had not forgotten these statements, just as they had not forgotten that only two months before the putsch Georges Seguy had received Lech Walesa and officially invited him to the CGT congress in June 1982. All this helps explain why Seguy's scandalous behavior after the December coup provoked such an enormous movement of protest inside the CGT.

Five days after the putsch, a number of CGT unions called a press conference at the Bourse du Travail in Paris. They issued a statement saying: "The CGT must be on the side of the Polish workers and Solidarity." They demanded that the national leadership condemn the state of siege, demand its immediate lifting, and demand the release of all imprisoned trade unionists.

The statement called on CGT members to build solidarity actions "as massive and united as possible." At the same time, they appealed to the CGT unions to "denounce the campaign of the right which never shows any interest in a workers movement except in East Europe. ". Finally they announced the formation of a CGT Trade Union Coordinating Committee with a public address.

On January 12, at the Bourse du Travail, 2,000 CGT members assembled to express their solidarity with the Polish workers. The balance sheet of the first three weeks was impressive. Five thousand CT members had signed the petition. About 45,000 francs had been collected for Solidarnosc. Twenty-four regional coordinating committees had been set up and fifteen more were being formed.

Six federations; twenty-three national, regional, and departmental unions; seven local unions; and 486 union sections had come out in sport of at least the three come out in support of at least the three basic demands of the movement.

Never since the second world war has such an opposition movement developed in the CGT. This development was prepared by the emergence of oppositions fighting the fragmentation of struggles, as well as the divisionist policy and the refusal to mobilize the workers to defeat Giscard d'Estaing. The opposition that has emerged around Poland is the continvation of this, but on a qualitatively higher level.

For the first time, important opposition voices have been raised in the industrial unions, such as the Iron and Salt Miners Federation of Lorraine, the Angers steelworkers, and the Saint Nazaire stevedores

In the unions at a series of big factories owned by the Renault, Shell, Tomas, Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlman, Elf-France, and SNEMA, resolutions of solidarity got majorities or large minority votes. In Longwy in Lorraine, the leaders of the unions in about twenty engineering factories jointly signed a public statement.

The opposition on Poland will inevitably carry over into other areas, into struggles.

The issue of Poland will have a considerable effect on the recomposition of the workers movement. It is accentuating Dierre Dèmo the crisis of Stalinism. Obviously the SP is in the best situation today to benefit. It already has made big gains electorally.

In the CGT, the current aligned with the SP is gaining. The CFDT has just won successes in various representation elections at the CT's expense. A number of CT activists, repelled by their national leadership's position, have gone into the CFDT. However, it would be wrong to see this process as a similar linear shift from the CP to the SP.

It is primarily on the basis of the problems that touch their daily lives that workers make their decisions. On this level, the CT leadership has room for maneuver. For example, it has adopted a a more militant position than the CFDT on the strikes that began only a few weeks after December 13 on the government's ordonances on cutting the workweek. The confederation close to the SP accepted wage cuts in return for a small cut in worktime.

Most importantly, the game is not being played just between Stalinist and SP leaderships. Through their experience on Poland but also with the government's austerity policy and bureaucratic sell-outs, tens of thousands of union members are radicalizing and looking for a different way from that offered by the old leaderships. Class struggle oppositions are developing in both the CGT and CFDT. It is the task of the LCR, French section of the Fourth International, to offer them a political alternative both to Stalinism and Social Democracy.

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French Workers Strike

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