The summit meeting between Yon Hyong Muk and Kang Young Hoon, the prime ministers of North and South Korea respectively, has been greeted in the international press as proof of a change of climate, without any evidence of real change in inter-Korean relations. These meetings might perhaps lead to a certain relaxation, which in itself would be a step forward, given the current total absence of dialogue and communication between the two countries. The re-establishment of postal relations and even a limited exchange of relations and even a limited exchange of visits between citizens of the two states would be an enormous relief for the thousands of Korean families torn apart by the war. The last meeting between a few divided families took place in 1985 at the frontier post of Pan Moun Jon, under Red Cross auspices, after which all relations were broken off. When, last September, the idea of a temporary opening of the frontiers was floated for a few days, 61,355 South Korean citizens immediately put their names down for a trip to the North (Newsweek, August 27, 1990). Pressure of public opinion in the South Pyongyang has been confronted by an imperative need to break out of its international isolation, while Seoul has to deal with growing pressure from public opinion, which has never ceased to consider reunification as a fundamental and unavoidable issue. The unification of Germany has put the Korean national question back on the agenda. Certainly, the South Korean leadership is dreaming of a German-style annexation of the North. But the political conditions for such an opcration do not (at least as yet) exist. Despite its difficulties, Kim Il Sung's regime has not reached the level of disintegration of the twilight years of Honecker's GDR. The country's isolation and the grip of the regime's Stalinist structures have effectively sealed the country off from external influences. Unlike the GDR, where most of the population was able to watch West German television, North Korean citizens are not affected by South Korean media and no intellectual dissidence has been able to appear. Kim Il Sung's regime, despite its extreme personality cult, remains the inheritor of a national liberation struggle, with its sufferings and sacrifices that remain alive in the population's memory.
autumn 1989 there. ENZO TRAVERSO T HE FACT THAT this announcement was made in New York indicates the role played by the US in the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and South Korea. Since the meeting between the South Korean president Roh Tae Woo and Gorbachev in San Francisco during the Soviet leaders' visit to the US last April, the news had been awaited. It comes at the end of a period of increasing trade and other contacts which started with the onset of perestroika and accelerated after the fall of Chun Do Wan's military dictatorship in 1987.
The economic reforms in the USSR open up an enormous market for South Korean industry, which, at the end of three decades of spectacular and uninterrupted growth, is beginning to encounter scrious difficulties. The Soviet market offers the possibility of reviving South Korean exports, notably of cars, televisions and word processors. South Korea's commercial offensive is not only aimed towards the USSR and Eastern Europe. China, with which Seoul has long had significant trade, is also a target.
Evidently all this is very worrying for North Korea, which is increasingly isolated and facing growing economic problems. After the fall of Romania's Ceausescu and East Germany's Honecker, North Korea's "great leader" Kim II Sung — who had announced a few years previously his intention of abdicating in favour of his son, Kim Jong Il — must have felt nervous. But this has only made the tension between North Korea and its ex-allies in Eastern Europe more intense.
After the announcement of the reestablishment of relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union, the Pyongyang regime reacted by issuing for the 20 first time an open and blunt condemnation of the Soviet "new course". . Accord-
Union, continues the editorial, is not that of the past. It has degenerated and changed its nature. "For this reason it seeks new friends, more in tune with its changed nature." Gorbachev has thus "sold the dignity and honour of a socialist power" and betrayed "the interests and trust of an ally" in exchange for a few million dollars.
Economic dependence on
Soviet trade
It is not yet possible to say whether such talk is simply momentary anger or the signal of a break between Pyongyang and its historic ally. Certainly a break with the USSR would carry a high cost for the North Korean economy. In 1986 the Soviet Union took in 51.4% of North Korean exports and provided 60.5% of its imports. However, even if there is no formal diplomatic break, it is clear that the terms of Soviet-North Korean economic relations are fundamentally changing. The Soviet Union has already announced its intention of ceasing cheap oil sales to North Korea and trading only on the basis of world market prices.
Meanwhile the countries of the ex-Soviet bloc no longer intend to have "privileged relations" with Pyongyang. This means a 20% fall in North Korean exports this year (see The Economist, August 25, 1990). The risk of ending up in a situation of almost total international isolation — with the support of China, Vietnam and Cuba — must be worrying for Kim Il Sung. The problem of isolation is compounded by a growing gap between the economic performance of the two parts of Korea. With twice the population, the South has a gross national product three times that of the North. Pyongyang faces complete marginalization.
This is the context of the resumption of negotiations between the two Korean goverments on the question of reunification. In fact, the meetings are not really
International Viewpoint #195 • November 26, 1990