A new face for the king
LTHOUGH the area covered by the Kingdom of Jordan never represented a source of natural wealth for imperialism, between 1921 and 1957 British colonialism provided the finance and training for the setting up a central government.? From 1958 to 1967, London was replaced in this role by US imperialism, and after the 1967 defeat by the Gulf oil states. In 1971-74, the isolation of the Jordanian regime in the region which resulted from its crushing of the Palestinian movement on its territory brought an increase in aid from the United States.
This "capacity" of the regime to find new paymasters in accordance with the circumstances cannot cover up its underlying integration into imperialist policy, whatever margin for maneuver it may have. This dependence influences the Jordanian social formation. Chronic deficits in the budget and trade balance are financed by foreign aid and subsidies, which make possible a hypertrophy of the state bureaucracy in relation to the productive sectors.
Thus, a third of all jobs are accounted for by the state, military and administrative apparatuses. Industry accounts for only 8 percent. The majority of workers and technicians emigrate to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. In 1979, 15 percent of the economically active population were unemployed. From the standpoint of its imperialist and Arab pro-Western paymasters, Jordan is an important "producer" and "exporter" of military-political serviecs.
The special character of Jordan's integration into imperialist policy rests on the need to produce such services, in order to gain foreign financing of the state apparatuses, whose size increases at the expense of investments in the productive sectors. The lack of commodity production in turn engenders a chronic economic crisis, with the deficit being made up by foreign aid.
The recession that has prevailed since 1982 is linked to a decline in aid from the pro-Western oil states. 3 The regime could have avoided this, if it had managed to replace ruined Lebanon as the commercial and technical intermediary between the imperialist countries and the Arab oil states.* In line with falling oil revenues, the drop in the second half of the 1980s in emigrant remittances from Jordanian workers in the Gulf states led to a shrinking of the state's foreign currency resources, which are essential for imports and for making up the deficit in the bal24 ance of trade (which amounts to more • than half of the GNP).5 Two-thirds of
WHEN Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Jordanian regime, already in a sharp political and economic crisis aggravated by the intifada, was trying to reorganize political life in the kingdom.
Through a national pact, it was trying to assure the opposition's collaboration in getting the masses to pay the bill for the crisis. The Gulf events offered King Hussein the opportunity to regain some credibility by taking advantage of his special relationship with Saddam Hussein. He set himself up as "mediator" between Iraq and the imperialist powers, pleading energetically for a settlement of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict within an Arab framework!. The following article is based on one in Arabic by Omar Salem, which is to be published in the upcoming issue of
Al-Mitraqa, a journal of Fourth Internationalists in the
Arab region.
### LUIZA MARIA
GNP is accounted for by the government apparatus, as against 24 per cent for industry and 2 per cent for agriculture. In 1988, foreign debt rose to $11.5 billion and interest on it exceeded a third of the annual state budget. This crisis, along with the breaking of links with the West Bank, brought on a drop in the value of the Jordanian dinar and inflation. So, jittery businessmen changed their dinars for foreign currency (especially dollars). The emigrant workers stopped their remittances of dollars and Saudi rials, and figures in the regime plunged into black market currency speculation.
Following the cessation of payments on the debt, the ending of imperialist financing brought a halt to the ongoing projects. Foreign currency reserves fell to the point that the government, headed by
Rifai, was forced to sell off a third of the country's gold holdings.
Aware of the link between the crisis and the practices of the regime's dignitaries, Jordanians started to make fun of the king and his courtiers, starting with the premier, Rifai. They became distrustful of the whole top echelon of the state apparatus.
On April 17, the press reported a program of structural reforms decided on jointly by the government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as a rise of 30% in the prices of petroleum products. On a stop off in London on the way to Washington, the king and Rifai announced that legislative elections would be held.
A clash between truck drivers and police in the south of the country gave the signal for an explosion of anger by the population. Armed confrontations took place, as the uprising spread to the center and north of the country. The army arrested dozens of demonstrators in Amman, Zarqa, Irbid and other cities.
Government undertakes political reorganization
Fourteen demonstrators were killed. But the uprising forced the king to return precipitously from the United States to respond to the crowds that were demanding the ouster of the Rifai government. It was dismissed. Aware of the crosion of its social base, the regime undertook a political reorganization. A transitional government was formed by Zeid Ben Shaker, with the task of preparing the legislative elections. It was this leadership that . See the two interviews with King Hussein by British nd US TV, wnich were published in the Jordaniar press on August 5 and 6. 2. British aid to Jordan represented 33% of the latter's budget in 1922, and rose to 73% in 1946. 3. The resolutions of the Baghdad summit in 1987 included aid for the Jordanian regime to the tune of $1.2 billion a year for a duration of 10 years. Since 1982, the regime has got less than half that. 4. This explains the concentration of capitalist investment in the equipment and service sectors. This amounts to nearly three quarters of total investment, while in 1986 and 1987 13% of investment was in industry and 1% in agriculture. 5. Remittances from emigrant workers were successively 475, 400, 400 and 317 million Jordanian dinars from 1984 to 1987. 6. The payment of interest on the debt declined after the rescheduling decided on in 1989 in agreement with the IMF. In 1992, when payments are to resume, interest on the debt will amount to more than half of GNP. 7. There was a popular outcry against the bribes paid to the king and the chief of the army in the ams deals with France and Great Britain; the involvement of the king and his head of cabinet, also director of Royal Air Jordan, in pillaging this company; and the "gifts" received by the crown prince, who is director of the national bank.
International Viewpoint #195 • November 26, 1990
Launched the vague notion of a "national pact."
The electoral code in force until the
1980s divided up the seats among regions, clans and tribes. Moreover, Article 18 banned candidacies by persons belonging to unrecognized parties, while the only organization recognized by the regime was the Islamic fundamentalist Muslim
Brotherhood.
Zeid Ben Shaker's government amended the code on the eve of the fall 1989 legislative elections. The number of seats was increased from 60 to 80, and the electoral districts were drawn to favor rural areas and those inhabited by people of Jordanian origin, at the expense of the urban areas and those with big concentrations of
Palestinians.
The Muslim Brothers have enjoyed considerable freedom of organization and action in Jordan for 40 years. The regime has followed this course since its inception in order to bar the way to Communism and Arab nationalism.
This orientation reached its height in 1980, when the government of Mudar
Badran (the present head of government)nearly came to blows with the
Syrian regime. Despite some frictions with the monarchy, the Muslim
Brothers have continued to use the mosques as platforms, and their press is legal.
The Muslim brothers fielded 35 candidates, won 22 seats, and helped to bring in allies belonging to other religious cur-
Their election rents.
included campaign nationalist slogans, such as "Liberate Palestine from the Mediterranean to the Jordan"
opposed to a peaceful settlement with
Israel. They also raised democratic demands that chimed in with those of the other parties — changing the constitution, abolishing the emergency laws and martial law, and so on.
The success of the Muslim Brothers
(27.5%) and the other religious currents
(12.5%) was a result also of regional considerations in the choice of their candidates. All the Palestinian deputies elected, with a single exception, came from the ranks of the fundamentalists. In all, the
Islamic constellation won 32 seats - 22 for the Muslim Brothers, eight for the independents and two for the House of the
Koran Movement. The independent
Islamics got four ministerial posts in the new Badran government.
The left parties — the Jordanian Communist Party, the Democratic People's
Party (DPP — linked to the Democratic
JORDAN
Front faction of the PLO led by Nayef Hawatmeh), George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the nationalist factions, including the various wings of the Baath (Iraqi, Syrian and left Baathists) — did not go beyond the population's immediate demands, and their slogans were often confused with those of the fundamentalists.
Left fails to agree minimum program
Incapable of rallying around a minimum program, they suffered from the redrawing of election districts, the brevity of the campaign and the population's lack of interest in the elections. Each of the three main left parties got a seat. The independent left candidates got three seats, and the nationalist movement, five.
The National Bloc, made up of candidates favorable to the regime, got the majority in parliament.
It was the Muslim Brothers' success that led to the naming of Mudar Badran, their ally in the confrontation with the Syrian government in 1980, as head of government. The installation of this former chief of intelligence (1969-1970) and former head of government (1976-1984), a well-known champion of repression, was supposed to inaugurate a phase of democratic change.
Starting immediately after its installation, the new government has introduced a series of measures in parliament widening general freedoms — a "freezing" of martial law with a view to abolishing it (the notion of a "freeze" does not appear in the constitution), the release of hundreds of political prisoners, restitution of several thousand passports confiscated under the previous Badran government and abolition of the Rifai government's decrees restricting the freedoms of trade unions and the press. Thus, getting the jump on the parliamentary left, which abstained at the time of the vote, Badran got a majority and took up the task of establishing the National Pact.
For a long time, the left parties have not for changing the constitution.
called
Adapting to the monarchy, they agreed to take part in a royal commission to draw up the Pact that was set up in April 1990. Issa
Madanant (a deputy and member of the
Political Bureau of the CP) and Dhib Murji (a deputy and member of the Popular
Front)
justified their participation by explaining that the Pact "will remove the obstacles that have blocked political action by the masses" and "cancel out the negative aspects of the regime's previous policies."8
As for Tayssir Zibri, general secretary of the DPP, he said that if there was to be any dispute, it should not be over the principle of the Pact but over its form",?
and that there was "agreement on the plan for a serious and positive course...to get out of the political and economic crisis." 10 He declared himself ready to abandon a part of his organization's program, if necessary, in order to seek a "common denominator."
This policy of compromise with the monarchy has become the common denominator of all the left parties.
The demonstrations against the massacre of Palestinians in Rishon-le-Zion in May 1990 were only supported by a few individuals on the left, in their personal capacity. The CP went so far as to organize committees to
"calm the masses," as in Zarqa. The opposition got governmental thanks where it managed to channel the mobilizations. It offered its apologies where it failed to do
SO.
Finally, the latest episode of this shameful story is that the CP, the Popular Front, and the DPP sent a telegram to the Arab heads of state meeting in June 1990 in
Baghdad, imploring them to aid the Jordanian regime financially so that it could
"stand up to Israel and support the intifada. " In these circumstances, the Gulf crisis has enabled the king to play a role on the international scene without tarnishing his new reputation as a "democrat" and his recently refurbished "nationalist" escutch-
8. Speech by Issa Madanat to the Royal Commission, published in the Jordanian newspaper Ash-Shaab, May
20, 1990.
25
9. Ash-Shaab, June 3, 1990.
10. Ash-Shaab, March 31, 1990.
JORDAN/PALESTINE eon. He has posed as a mediator for settling the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict within an Arab framework. The Arab solution, while accepting imperialist domination in the region, rejects resorting to military operations. It calls for maintaining some limited but essential gains for Iraq — its freedom of access to the Gulf (through territorial concessions) and payment of compensation Baghdad for the losses inflicted on its oil business by the Gulf emirates. It takes up the call of Yasser Arafat and King Hussein for an international conference to settle the Palestinian problem. Hussein's version of the "Arab solution" also proposes the setting up of an Arab investment fund to promote development in the region while guaranteeing stability.
The Jordanian regime's policy is explained by its fear of the upsets that would inevitably result from an armed confrontation between the United States and Iraq. Its opposition to a military solution, and its turn to the reformist left and the fundamentalist movement are creating illusions among the population. In fact, contrary to what many imagine in Jordan, King Hussein has not broken with the imperialists. He has supported all the UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq. He endorsed the Saudis' right to appeal for US forces to protect them from Iraq. When the king held back from condemning the invasion of Kuwait, the press, the left and the fundamentalists drew the conclusion that he was supporting Iraq. When he proposed an "Arab option", ", evoking the dan-