ETHIOPIA
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SIXTEEN years after the revolution which
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Recognizing the setbacks suffered by the government army, the Ethiopian president sounded the alarm to his fellow citizens in his address on the occasion of the anniversary of the revolution at the end of September. The military situation is indeed more and more worrying for the authorities.
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Mova dence conquered through armed struggle.
The EPLF faces an additional problem, as a result of the international situation, above all the Gulf crisis. The great powers are less than ever favourable to the idea of Eritrean independence, and still less to the perspective of a military victo-
N O LONGER knowing how to ensure its survival, the Addis Ababa regime has effected a diplomatic turnabout, drawing closer to Israel and converting itself to economic liberalism. Mengistu has thus abandoned any reference to the Soviet model with as much ease as he adopted it in the preceding years. The Workers' Party of Ethiopia has become the Ethiopian Democratic Unity Party, without ceasing to be the sole political formation of the regime. The portraits of Marx and Lenin have disappeared from the Place of the Revolution. And last March the government adopted an economic reform which liberalizes internal commercial exchanges, offers investment facilities to foreign capital and envisages the privatization of certain state enterprises and shops.
For the moment, the principal effect of this reform has been to increase the purchasing price for the agricultural products of the peasants, and to encourage the farmers of the rural belt around the capital to sell their commodities on the urban market, thus increasing supplies a little. But the economic programme has little chance of having any significant real effect outside the capital as long as the civil war - which absorbs half the state budget — lasts.
Government troops are being forced back in the north by the forces of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF, which has for some decades led a fierce struggle for independence. Last February the Eritrean nationalists took the Red Sea port of Massawa, and since then they have threatened Asmara, the capital of Eritrea. Around 120,000 government soldiers are encircled there, awaiting a possible assault by the Eritrean forces, who regularly bombard the town's airport.
Asmara receives no supplies by land, and only the planes coming from Addis Ababa link it to the outside world. The 200,000 Eritrean civilians in the town, and the 800,000 others in the surrounding small towns which are subject to the ELF's blockade, are being used by the government forces as a human shield, and are threatened by famine.
Government attempts to hold Eritrean capital
Government troops, fearing the infiltration of EPLF fighters, are preventing all commerce with the arcas held by the rebels. The latter seem however divided on what military strategy to adopt. The presence of numerous Eritrean civilians, very many with relatives among the guerillas, would render any attack on Asmara very costly in terms of civilian losses. But, on the other hand, the military conquest of the Eritrean capital by the EPLF would place the international community before the established fact of an indepenry of the EPLF. Moreover, Mengistu has joined the anti-Iraqi camp, which inclines the US to a greater indulgence towards its enemy of yesterday. Finally, the divided Arab states are less than ever in a position to offer the EPLF the diplomatic cover it would need in case of an attack against Asmara. The aid which it receives from some Arab countries is exacting a high price today.
Little prospect of serious negotiations
Despite US-Soviet pressure for the resumption of negotiations between the rebels and the government, no common ground is likely to emerge in the short term. The Addis Ababa government — whose minister of foreign affairs, Tesfaye Dinka, met an EPLF delegation in Washington last month, on the insistence of the US state department - will not go beyond the promise of internal autonomy for an Eritrea cut off from the coastal province of Dankalie, where the Red Sea port of Asab is located.
In the absence of a government commitment in favour of a referendum on self-determination, clearly axised on the question of independence for all Eritrea and conducted under the supervision of the UN, the ELF is maintaining its commitment to the armed struggle. It has recently announced its intention of launching at Asmara "a final and decisive battle" for independence. 3
In Tigre, the Tigrean People's Libera-
ETHIOPIA tion Front (TPLF) have liberated a good part of their province. Profiting from the rapid decline in the morale of the government forces, who are often badly trained and forcibly recruited from the peasantry, the Tigrean resistance has extended its field of action further to the south, as far as Shoa, less than 200 kilometers from the Ethiopian capital. In the wake of this, the TPLF has drawn into its ranks some non-Tigrean oppositionists. For its Amhara partisans, it has founded the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM); it has formed, initially from its prisoners of war of Oromo origin, an Oromo People's Democratic Movement (OPDM); and more recently an organization of free officers has been founded.
All these movements remain strictly subordinated to the TPLF, in the context of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). This coalition advocates the overthrow of the Mengistu regime on the basis of a fairly general democratic programme. On the economic plane, the EPRDE seems to have no disagreement with the liberal reforms recently undertaken by the government.
Eulogies for Albania and
Stalin
Until recently, some leaders of the Tigrean resistance were still eulogizing the Albanian system and Joseph Stalin. Now, apparently, the movement is seeking to shed the Stalinist and intolerant image created by its original proAlbanian kernel in the eyes of international opinion.
For some months, the backbone of the EPRDF's strategy has been the proposal for a provisional transitional government, open to all the opposition forces as well as representatives of the current regime — a scenario inspired by recent events in Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, in practice, the EPRDF's attitude to the other forces of the opposition has never been totally free of a desire for domination. On the other hand, the Tigrean resistance remains a regionally-based group, which prevents it, in the multi-ethnic context of Ethiopia, from appearing by itself as an alternative for the whole of the Ethiopian people. The nationalist basis of its conceptions limits its attractive power in the other regions of the country, notably amongst the Amharas and the Oromos.
The government uses this to portray the TPLF as a secessionist force and to stir up for its own benefit a "patriotic" reflex in the Amhara milieu.The attempt by the
EPRDF to challenge for the leadership of other ethnic and national groups could lead to confrontation with these national and social movements.
Another regional rebellion also exists.
The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) is 4 active militarily in the west, along the Sudanese frontier, and in the east in
Harargue, with a very nationalist vision of its fight against the Addis Ababa regime, which it characterizes as "colonialist". This anti-Amhara reaction has its roots in the decades of oppression which the Oromos have suffered (despite being in a numerical majority), as much under Haile Selassie's empire as under the Mengistu regime.
Finally, the small Ethiopian opposition groups are also engaged in anti-government military activities, amongst them the members of the formerly ultraleft Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party, today allied to the monarchist partisans of the descendants of the emperor.
On the other hand all civilian opposition has been decimated or forced into exile. Occasionally there have been some sporadic student revolts or army mutinies, but these have been quickly repressed.
On the defensive militarily, the Addis Ababa regime is also being undermined by its Soviet bloc allies who no longer believe in its capacity to consolidate itself militarily, and have even begun to discreetly question its continued existence. All these allies, however, bear a historic responsibility for the reinforcement in power of the military clique in Addis Ababa. Cuban, Soviet and East German advisers have for many years supported, sometimes even in combat, the troops of the Ethiopian regime. These countries have also contributed to the totally false image of the regime which exists abroad.
Not so long ago, Granma, the daily newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party, was publishing entire pages of culogies to the "companion in struggle" and "revolutionary" , Mengistu. The CPSU pushed hard for the formation of the ruling Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE), as an instrument of control and supervision of the kebeles, the neighbourhood committees born of the revolution.
Soviet bloc support for Ethiopian dictatorship
The East Germans took in hand the training of the regime's political police and contributed to a policy of agricultural collectivization which was to prove a tragic fiasco. Finally, the Cubans and Soviets sacrificed their former support for the Eritrean struggle for independence on the altar of their alliance with Mengistu.
The first to take their distance were the Cubans, who first withdrew their advisers from the zones of combat in Eritrca, then left the country some months ago. East Germany has now disappeared and the USSR has reduced its assistance. The USSR refused to deliver supplies of arms and munitions which were covered by an already signed contract and refused to sign any new arms contracts. Its pilots however remain in command of some
Ethiopian planes.
International Viewpoint #195 • November 26, 1990
On the diplomatic level the USSR and the US proposed some months ago the holding of a regional conference for peace in this area of Africa. Washington and Moscow are searching for a hypothetical global solution to the entangled conflicts of this region of the world. Each of the states in this region is trying to turn to its profit the internal problems of its neighbours. Sudan supports the Eritreans, whilst Addis Ababa is supporting the SPLA of Colonel Garang which is fighting in southern Sudan. Ethiopia is also aiding the Somali National Movement, which is fighting in the north of Somalia against the regime of Siad Barre. And this list is far from exhaustive.
In November 1989, in a spectacular reversal of previous policy, diplomatic relations were reestablished with Israel as a counterpart to the acceptance by Addis Ababa of the departure of the Falashas (black Ethiopian Jews). Dozens of Israeli military advisers have come to replace the Soviets who have left. According to some reports they have even participated in combat alongside government troops in the region of Asosa, in the west of the country, against the Oromo nationalists of the OLF. There has also been speculation that Israel was taking over the facilities provided for the Soviets in the Dalhak islands off Eritrea. Moreover, Tel Aviv has supplied light arms and bombs to Addis Ababa.
Regional strategy of Israeli state
For Israel, this support for Mengistu adds up to a tactical unity of interests. The regional strategy of the Jewish state has always been to seck allies against what it calls "Arab hegemony in the Red Sea". Today, as in the time of Haile Selassie, this diplomatic option is also being prioritized by Addis Ababa. However, Israel has neither the means nor the desire to aid Mengistu in a manner comparable to that provided by the Soviets over the last ten years.
But this diplomatic and military aid is enough to give some breathing space to the Ethiopian regime. Moreover Mengistu can also hope to profit from his support for the United States in the Gulf conflict. Here, he is characterized above all by a will to outbid other supporters of the imperialist effort. Thus, he has come out in favour of the blockade of Baghdad and has even proposed the sending of an Ethiopian contingent lo Saudi Arabia. It seems that these positions have already been rewarded by Saudi financial aid and greater US goodwill.
Ten years after the popular uprising which overthrew the feudal dictatorship of Haile Selassie, this is the sad balance sheet of the petit bourgeois military faction which commandeered and diverted the revolutionary process. Yet, in contrast to other changes of regime in Africa, and
in contrast even to the collapse of the colonial regimes in Mozambique and Angola, the Ethiopian revolution of 1974 brought about a real change in the relations of ownership in the countryside, where an anti-feudal agrarian reform was implemented through a popular mobilization. But the dynamic of the process was directed and utilized by a Jacobin military clique which has progressively stepped into the shoes of the former feudal dignitaries in at least three ways; relations with the peasantry, Amhara chauvinism and the monarchical" conception of the regime (the maintenance of the empire by force and constraint).
The famine of 1984-85 and the forced displacement of the population marked the defeat of the agrarian policy of the regime which issued from the revolution. They also revealed the complacency and the contempt of the petit-bourgeois and urban leaders for the rural population of their country. It is in many respects reminiscent of the passivity of Haile Selassie before the terrible famine of 1973, which, at the time, constituted the spark for the radicalization of a good part of the civilian intelligentsia and the Ethiopian military. In 1984-85 a similar attitude opened the way to the development of the opposition, notably to the extension of the activities of the Tigrean nationalists.
The new emperor in Addis
Adaba
Henceforth, President Mengistu openly took up the themes most favoured by Haile Selassie, in internal policy as well as foreign affairs. The most flagrant betrayal of the regime is its refusal to recognize the right of self determination of the Eritrean people, the only solution which can put an end to the civil war in the north of Ethiopia. On the contrary, Mengistu has pursued the bellicose policies of his predecessor, notably thanks to the military support of the USSR. In foreign policy, the Ethiopian leaders have taken as their own the theme of a besieged Christian Ethiopia surrounded by a hostile Arab environment - a dis- by a nostile Arab envıronment - a discourse which is music to the ears of Israeli diplomats.
Finally, the shrinkage of the regime around the Amharas goes hand in hand with a concentration of responsibilities in the hands of Mengistu himself and those close to him, such as his half-brother Kassa Kebede, responsible for relations with Israel. Mengistu has constructed a vacuum around himself, notably in the army which he has partially decapitated after a failed coup d'état in May 1989. Dozens of officers were shot some months ago on the direct insistence of the head of state. There is no place for the least dissidence or civil opposition in Addis Ababa. Meanwhile the United States is host to some tens of thousands of Ethiopian refugees, several of them ministers who have
ETHIOPIA The struggle for Eritrea
ERITREA is a small country about the size of England, stretching along the Red Sea to the north of Ethiopia. It has
3,500,000 inhabitants, for the most part Muslim and
Christian. More than three quarters of the population is rural. Eritrea has always had a separate identity to Ethiopia, and its various component kingdoms united in the 8th century under the threat of invasion from the Nilotic powers to the north and Ethiopia to the south. The area around Massawa came under Ottoman control in 1557. From 1869 onwards, Italian colonialism extended its hegemony throughout the country — this was sealed by a frontier agreement with Great Britain and Ethiopia signed in 1903. Following Italy's defeat in the Second World War, a federal union with Ethiopia was imposed by the United Nations and
Great Britain in 1952 — this envisaged a continuing autonomy for Eritrea. On November 14, 1962, the Ethiopian army annexed the whole of Eritrean territory, leading to the outbreak of a war of liberation which has continued since then. Whilst initially several opposition groups existed, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, established in 1977, has emerged as the major component of the liberation movement. Traditionally identified with a pragmatic "Marxist-Leninist"
outlook, the EPLF has recently been moderating its ideological tone; thus, according to Ali Said Abdallah, EPLF political bureau member responsible for foreign relations, "Our programme is clear; we are for multipartyism and the market economy" (Le Monde, May 18, 1990). However, Abdallah did not deny the "left influences" which continued to mark the ELF's policy, and a Financial Times reporter found that "life in the liberated areas has a socialistic flavour"; food and clothing are distributed by the economic departments of EPLF commissions, political education is mandatory for the entire population and "even in the trenches there are no ranks, no saluting" (FT, December 1,
1989). * demanded political asylum (including, very recently, the vice-minister of foreign affairs).
The dynastic conception of the regime has become such that, when Mengistu confided recently to a meeting that there had been several attempts on his life, he added that in case of his death, his son was ready to take over the reins of power - a hypothesis that the Ethiopian people will be very little inclined to accept.
The fiasco of the Ethiopian regime also constitutes the most flagrant refutation of Soviet theories of states of this type, elevated to the status of revolutionary regimes. It is of course legitimate to pose the question of whether the Ethiopian revolution of 1974, taking account of the social formation of the country, could give birth to a true socialist, democratic and revolutionary leadership. But nothing obliged the Kremlin to give its support to a repressive and oppressive military regime - nothing, obviously, except its own bureaucratic self-interest.
Today, the Soviet leaders of the perestroika cra have "discovered" that it was very presumptuous to see in this regime a real point of support for the Soviet Union. This disenchantment allows them to pass easily on to diverse projects of regional negotiations with the United Sates, to the profit of the latter alone. These are the fruits of a theory and a practice in which the fate of peoples and their social inter- 5 ests are totally ignored. *
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
The end of consensus AT THE end of October 1990, a leadership meeting of the Czech part of Czechoslovakia's ruling Civic Forum/Public against Violence coalition (OF/VPN) elected dogmatic free-marketeer Vaclav Klaus as its new leader. On October 30, the same body, on Klaus' proposal, voted to expel the left-wing Left Alternative and Obroda groups from the Forum on the grounds that they had "departed from the political line of the OF". At the meeting, according to the protocol, Klaus claimed that the "greatest enemy of OF is [leading human rights activist and revolutionary Marxist] Petr Uhl" and that it was necessary to peel off the leftist current. Shortly after Klaus' election, Czechoslovakia was finally granted Most Favoured Nation trading status by the United States. COLIN MEADE dissidents — is marked by utopianism. He summed up his credo in the main independent daily Lidové noviny on June 21, 1990: "The East European revolutions of 1989 did not provide any fundamentally new ideas on key questions concerning politics, economics and the laws of international politics — and I would add that it does not really matter. The important thing is to realize this fact and to accept humbly (both) tested solutions and old truths as soon as possible." According to Pavel Rychetsky, the deputy chair of the Federal Assembly, Klaus' election "is a positive event. I have constantly emphasized the fact that the time of dissidence and of demolishing the state is over"2
In line with this call for stabilization, Klaus is opposed to extreme anti-communism and rising nationalism in Slovakia, both of which threaten to disrupt the state?. He will also, one imagines, be against wasting further time on such chimeras as Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier's statement in January that Czechoslovakia would end its involvement in the arms trade "without taking into account What the pragmatists say or whether it will be a blow to the state's coffers" 4 or the vision of a "pluralist Europe without blocs" outlined by Dienstbier in January and revived by the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly which met in Prague this October (sce /V 194).
Centre and left unite against right