Egypt in the Gulf
Crisis
Interview with Egyptian Marxist EGYPT has sent 20,000 troops and 150 tanks to Saudi Arabia as part of the US-led crusade against Iraq. In return, Egypt will see some of its massive debts cancelled. However this is unlikely to resolve the grave economic crisis afflicting the country. IV spoke to Egyptian revolutionary militant Ahmed Shafei about the situation. The interview was carried out on there?
The Egyptian workers have a long tradition of struggle. Although these were suppressed under Nasser, they have since been rapidly rediscovered. There are frequent spontaneous explosions, which have not led to the creation of powerful workers' organizations — whether unions or parties.
In general these movements have economic motives, but direct clashes with the state are inevitable given that the state is the main owner of the means of production. Thus economic demands give way rapidly to political demands and the government-controlled unions are swept aside to be replaced by "workers' committees" Struggles also imply democratic demands, since in Egypt it is forbidden to strike or demonstrate. Often such movements end up in bloody confrontations
October 10 by Luiza Maria. V IEWED from Europe, Egypt seems to have given its support to the US in the Gulf crisis almost automatically. Is this accurate? In fact, there was a delay of two days before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came up with a statement demanding the resolution of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict in an Arab framework and calling for the Kuwaiti people to have the right to choose their government. This position - which does not imply support for the emir of Kuwait - was considerably modified after the Congress of the Arab League in August 1990, where Egypt aligned itself with the Gulf countries and condemned the Iraqi actions!. This decision was followed up by a series of concrete measures, most importantly the sending of Egyptian armed forces to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This position needs to be understood in the light of the economic crisis facing Egypt and the pressure of international financial institutions which restrict the Egyptian government's room for manoeuvre. The Egyptian regime is compelled to accept everything the imperialists do to protect their interests in the region, in the hope of seeing the cancellation of some of its debts, or at least the postponement of interest repayments. Egypt owes a lot of money to Kuwait, which from the lending point of view operates like one of the big imperialist institutions. Iraq offered to cancel Egypt's debt to Kuwait in return for support, but Egypt is too dependent on imperialism to take such a course. The US supports the Egyptian economy with loans and grain deliveries - between 75% and 80% of the staple food of the population comes from the US. • How can the apparent popular support for the Egyptian government's position be explained?
The regime is able to touch a specific chord in the Egyptian people to gain at least tacit connivance - the relations between Egyptian workers and the Iraqi regime. Despite the Arab nationalist demagogy of Saddam Hussein, Iraq has been undergoing an unprecedented economic crisis after the eight year long war with Iran.
After the hostilities ended, the Iraqi regime exploited the competition between Egyptian and Iraqi workers for its own ends. The Egyptians found themselves subjected to various forms of administrative persecution as well as hostility from Iraqis. The result was repeated attacks on Egyptian immigrants, including dozens of killings. Thus, it is easy enough for the Egyptian government to reawaken resentment against Iraq to justify its alignment in the Gulf crisis.
Certainly nothing has been seen in Egypt to compare with the massive popular displays of support for Iraq in, for example, Yemen, Sudan or Tunisia. • Is that the only factor at work?
No. The extent of the economic crisis is everyone's main preoccupation and pushes everything else into the background. The Egyptians are in the grip of austerity and mounting poverty. Each year they await the budget vote. Today, the Mubarak government is holding out the hope that his pro-imperialist position will offer some sort of alleviation of the crisis. Even though outbreaks of popular anger at the regime's anti-Arab posture cannot be ruled out, the expectations of economic relief make for their postponement. • Egypt has a large and concentrated working class. What is going on between the strikers and the forces of order, as at Helwan in 1989 (see IV 174).
This class consciousness can also be found amongst the Egyptian emigres, who, unlike their Europe-bound North African cousins, are mainly to be found in the neighboring Arab countries, such as Libya, Jordan, Iraq or the UAE. The Egyptian emigrant workers confront their new employers, be they Libyan, Jordanian or Iraqi, as their bosses rather than their Arab brothers. Thus class consciousness replaces Arab national consciousness.
Having being expelled in their thousands by Libya, exploited in Jordan or murdered in Iraq, the Egyptian workers do not feel an urgent need to denounce imperialist attacks on Libya's Qadhafi, support the Palestinian Intifada or the Iraqi regime. While this does not explain everything, the anti-worker outlook of the Arab nationalist regimes only reinforces the failure of nationalism after the defeat of Nasser.
Furthermore, the working class lacks a political framework. The left has not managed to implant itself. On the other hand the present combative mood offers enormous possibilities to the left, especially in a situation where the economic opening threatens the interests of layers of the petty bourgeoisie, poor peasants and sections tied to the state apparatus.
The Communist Party is torn by internal problems, weakened by clandestinity and has been sent into a spin by the events in Eastern Europe. It is currently updating its propaganda, not from any concern for theoretical rigor, but in order to justify Gorbachev's policies. Its contortions over the 1. The transfer of the seat of the Arab League from Tunis to Cairo was more than a coincidence. Egypt ceased to be the home of the League due to the boycott of Egypt by Arab countries after the visit by Sadat to Jerusalem and the Camp David accords with Israel in 1978. The boycott was broken by Yasser Arafat's visit to Cairo in 1983. Subsequently Egypt re-established relations with the League. The fact that the League is Ar sionalist dama demonsracion of the failure of 5 again to be centred in Egypt is a victory for the Egyp Arab nationalist demagogy.
EGYPT / USSR Gulf issue are in the same style as at the time of the Camp David accords, when the CP contrived to support the EgyptIsraeli agreements, the PLO, the international conference proposal and so on all at the same time. • What about other political forces?