Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) opened on July 2, 1990 in the midst of
La period of tumultuous changes in Soviet society. The congress was originally scheduled for the autumn, but the CC plenary meeting of February 5-6 — which also took the historic step towards the abolition of the sixth clause of the Constitution, thus giving up the CPSU's political monopoly - brought it forward by several months.
POUL FUNDER LARSEN gress was however considerably more one-sided, with party employees occupying more than half the seats, state functionaries another 20% and workers and peasants less than 10%.
This composition gave the conservative currents inside the party some room for manoeuvre. The conference of the Russian Communists, in mid-June, was turned into the founding congress of the Russian Communist Party (RCP). This project had been advanced by conservatives (notably in Leningrad) to give them a new platform utilizing the "national awakening" of Russia. The RCP congress, which was dominated by Brezhnevite rhetoric and populist attacks on the market reform, elected the conservative Ivan Poloskov as the chairman.
### Gorbachev controls
Congress
But at the 28th congress the Gorbachev leadership was in control, pushing its pragmatic programme of political and economic liberalization - a central ingredient of this being a market reform, in spite of the failure of the reform launched by the Ryzhkov government in late May.
Another aspect of this is a downplaying of the role of the CPSU as a central tool for the maintenance of bureaucratic rule in society and a mediator between the different bureaucratic strata. It means a CPSU which retains its governing function, but which is not necessarily the chief source of power for the leadership of the state apparatus. Instead this role would be played by the new presidency and presidential council organized around Gorbachev?
In his opening speech at the congress, Gorbachev vigorously attacked the conservatives, stating that the current problems "have been accumulated over decades". He went on to present the cornerstones of his policy: a market reform, which includes a change in the whole system of prices and the abolition of the central ministries, a new treaty regulating the structure of the Union and a "renewal" of the party. This renewal would imply more freedom to the local party branches and the right to set up platforms inside the CPSU, but no de-politicization of the army and KGB and no significant concessions on the party's property.
Despite their strong numerical presence at the congress, the political showing of the conservative, "anti-perestroika forces" in the party was very weak. This was evident in the speech of the conservative rising star Ivan Poloskov. While keeping himself inside the general consensus around the vague concepts of perestroika and "renewal" ', he tried to get some profile through traditional "Marxist-Leninist" rhetoric and some populist suggestions. He put emphasis on the need for social protection for all groups threatened by the market reform, and he also tried to play the Russian card. "The main thing for the destiny of Russia is unity - unity of the people, unity of the country and unity of the party."
Poloskov concluded on a defensive note; "Today we cannot find one person in this hall who is against reform. Not one who wants a return to the past." But the striking thing about his speech was the absence of any political ideas for the future — he did not put forward any political alternative to Gorbachev's line.
The weakened position of these tendencies was illustrated by the failure of Ligachev to get elected as Gorbachev's deputy. He got only 776 votes, against 3109 for Ivashko, the first secretary of the Ukrainian CP. In mid-August Ligachev was given his pension together with three other members of the old guard, Vorotnikov, Zaikov and Shlyunkov. 4
The congress saw thoroughgoing changes in the party's leading bodies, including 1. Moskovskie novosti, July 8, 1990. 2. A tendency confirmed by the fact that after the 28th congress a number of prominent leaders, including Ryzhkov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Yasov and Maslyukov are present only on the presidential council, and not in the politburo. 3. Pravda, July 9, 1990. 4. The conservatives still retain a strong position in many party organizations in the provinces and inside the armed forces. The main part of the 300 delegates from the army at the 28th congress supported conservative views, though not necessarily those of general Makashov, head of the Volga-Urals military district, milaryo RCP congres made veiled threas about • 21 military coup.
USSR a removal of many of the traditionalist forces. Only 56 members of the old Central Committee were elected to the new one consisting of 412 members - and only two members of the outgoing Politburo are on the new 24 strong Politburo.S
Yeltsin opened his speech to the congress with an attack on the conservative wing and "their" RCP; ". ...in the CPSU
(there was) created a secure environment for the conservative forces, which supported their certainty that they would have the chance to retaliate. This was also demonstrated by the founding congress of the RCP." He underlined that the CPSU was now only one party among others; "Therefore the main subject for discussion at the congress is not the question of perestroika in the country and its development. This question is being solved by the people outside the walls of this building, it is being solved by the soviets of people's deputies. This congress first of all poses the question of the destiny of the CPSU." Yeltsin's answer to this challenge was immediate changes in the CPSU including the right for members to set up platforms and the dissolution of all party organizations in the army and KGB, and other government institutions.
This line of reasoning was supported by another leader of the Democratic Platform, Shostakovsky, who, in a very flamboyant speech, attacked the very foundations of Soviet society; "Yes, the people went with the slogans of the Bolsheviks in 1917. Seventy three years later we still repeat them over and over again - Land to the peasants, factories to the workers, power to the soviets, peace to the people. But we have not carried out these slogans. The land belongs to the state, that is — it has no owner. The factories belong to the bureaucracy, the power to the party and there is no peace at all among the peoples. I will remind you of one more slogan from October: "Bread to the starving". This one is getting some new, tragic topicality. Why?" And in answering his own question he vehemently attacked the "social Chernobyl" created by the CPSU and demanded: "We must speak out honestly: People of the Soviet Union! The party regrets its mistakes; it will never again force its will on the people, and it will never again fail to ask the people instead of arrogantly abusing its name."6
The contradictions between the majority at the congress and the ideas of the most prominent leaders of the Democratic Platform, opting for political pluralism, a market economy and the transformation of the CPSU into a party of the "parliamentary 22 type", were impossible to reconcile? At the end of the congress this led to the International Viewpoint #190 • September 17, departure of several well-known "democratic leaders" including Yeltsin, Popov,
Sobchak, Stankevich and Lysenko. From the platform of the congress Shostakovsky announced the formation of a new party, the Party of Democratic Socialism, which will be founded this autumn.
However, it should be kept in mind that the Democratic Platform was an umbrella for many different interests and political currents, with some of them still remaining in the CPSU. It is today highly unlikely that all these forces could come together in one party.
### Marxist Platform draws attention
Although it constituted only a tiny minority at the congress, the Marxist Platform managed to draw considerable attention to its programme, and one of its leaders, the economist Alexander Buzhgalin, was elected to the Central Committee.
In his intervention Buzhgalin rejected
MINE EMP GORBACHEV AND THE THREE BEARS both the conservative and liberal solutions to the crisis of party and society. Instead he tried to present the idea of the real democratization, based on self-management; "a multi-party system, pluralism, democratization? Without any doubt - yes. But if it will be only this, then professional politicians will be in power....It is necessary to give real power to every working person. How is that possible? There is a way, and we have known it for a long time. The power of the soviets, when they get real economic authority, when questions concerning housing, health, education and culture are under the control and responsibility of the soviets; when the people and not the apparatus give everyone the feeling that they can go to the soviet — and the soviet decides how he will live, where he will live and what rent he will pay. To prevent people being alienated from the soviets it is necessary for them to be founded on the masses, on the self-management organs in the local areas, on the soviets of workers collectives, on the consumers' clubs and 1990 the ecological movement.®
For Buzhgalin the decisive test for the
CPSU will be its ability to intervene in the new movements in Soviet society — particularly the workers movement: "We have to strengthen the ability of Communists to work in different democratic mass organizations, not only in those which are orientated in a socialist direction....The
Marxist Platform works in the "Confederation of Labour" which, broadly speaking, supports anti-socialist positions. But when you suggest concrete slogans, protecting the interests of working people, they will support this. " For Buzhgalin this was the only viable alternative to the increasing isolation and rejection of the
CPSU among the people.
The same subject was taken up by the chairman of the central trade union confederation, Janaev°, who noted: "Comrades, we have lost the political initiative."
And he went on: "It is necessary to have a special programme for action in the workers' organizations, both in the official and the informal ones. "10 The situation for the central trade unions and their leaderships is indeed very difficult, as independent unions are forming ...
rapidly, as workers" conventions — for example, the independent miners' congress this spring — are calling on all workers to leave the CPSU, and as the Confederation of Labour is becoming a new rallying point for the opposition. This pressure from below makes it urgent for the union bureaucracy to pursue a line independentARVEI ly from the party in one way or another! • Janaev tried to emphasize this by attacking the "paternalist commandist attitude" of many party organs to the TUs and underlining the doubts of the TUs about the way the market reform is being implemented — demanding that priority is given to social security.
A recurrent theme in this and many other interventions at the 28th congress was the pressure on the CPSU from the people and the new social movements. This means that the centre of political gravity is 5. Izvestia, July 16, 1990. 6. Pravda, July 8, 1990. 7. During the 28th congress there were some joint initiatives of the Democratic Platform and the Marxist Platform trying to set up a bloc of "Democratic Unity" together with a group of Young Communists. On July 27, a common statement of the two platforms concerning the democratization of the party and society was issued. 8. Pravda, July 8, 1990. 9. Yanaev resigned as the chair of the official unions after being elected to the politburo at the 28th congress. 10. Pravda July 9, 1990. After the congress the CC set up a new department for cooperation with other organizations. 11. The populist workers fronts inside the OFT current have links to parts of the TU bureaucracy.
MY PERESTROIKA
MY PERESTROIKA
IS TOO RADICAL! IS TOO CONSERVATIVE...
MY PERESTROIKA
IS TOO RADICAL! IS TOO CONSERVATIVE...
increasingly to be found outside the CPSU.
A trend strengthened by the departure from the party of leaders of the Democratic Platform. Even during the eleven days of the congress, which ended on July 13, there were several clear manifestations of the political activities outside the framework of the CPSU. In Moscow the democratic movement arranged a demonstration shortly following the congress (July 15) as well as a public meeting on July 3. Miners challenge Communist
Party
But the most explicit challenge was staged by the one-day nationwide miners' strike, which took place on July 11 in spite of the congress calling on the miners to cancel it. The demands of the strike committees included a depoliticization of the army, KGB and the legal system; a nationalization of the CPSU's property; the resignation of the Ryzhkov government and a reconstruction of the trade unions. Demands not far from the programme put forward by the Democratic Platform. As in the strikes in the summer of 1989 this warning strike proved the extraordinary strength of the miners, and their ability to coordinate in spite of the huge distances separating the coalfields.!?
Since the end of the congress the political pressure on the CPSU has been mounting - the question of the property of the party has been carried to the forefront of public debate and the new press law, put into force by August, has opened new possibilities to political forces outside the party. This tendency is also leaving its mark on the membership of the CPSU. In the first six months of 1990, 27,000 members left the party organizations in Moscow and another 19,000 — half of these workers — left in July.1 Also in July 162,750 members left the Russian Communist Party,
90,000 of them workers. 14
In spite of this exodus the CPSU is still by far the strongest political force in the
Soviet Union, as the new parties are still small and scattered. But the 28th congress was a clear sign that the party is now entering a new period of fierce political struggles. In this period the new workers movement can pose a serious challenge to the hegemony of the party in certain areas.
The party will be forced to engage in the broad struggles of society or risk the fate of its unfortunate sister parties in Eastern
Europe. *
12. There have been various estimates concerning the size of the strikes. It seems safe to assume that the strike had a massive following in the Donbass, with most pits joining, in the Kusbass, with more than 60 pits and a dozen other enterprises striking, as well as in
Vorkuta, Karaganda and some minor fields in the
Urals and the Far East.
13. Pravda, August 14, 1990.
14. Sovjetskaya Rossia, August 19, 1990.