The Iranian workers movement and Khomeinism:
From the insurrection to the war with Iraq An article in a coming issue will deal with what happened to the Iranian workers movement from the outbreak of the war with Iraq to the conclusion in recent weeks of the latest phase of the conflict. Saber NIKBEEN The periods of growth of the workers movement in Iran have been closely linked to general revolutionary upsurges, in which political questions have been decisive, and the future of the workers movement depended on the resolution of the question of power.
In all the previous upsurges, the leadership of the workers movement failed to offer a political line that would make it possible for the movement to grow and to advance. Instead of orienting the movement toward achieving social and political independence, these leaderships subordinated it to bourgeois politicians, thereby 16 undermining it and preparing the way for its liquidation. As a result, the Iranian workers movement lacks both organizational continuity and a political tradition.
Thus before the start of the revolutionary process that led to the overthrow of the shah in 1979, there was no independent mass workers movement in Iran. When the new movement arose, it faced the same basic political problems as the previous ones.
What we have seen since the rise of the present workers movement is a characteristic pattern of empirical advances, sometimes very rapid ones, which have been continually undermined by the lack of a leadership that could offer a perspective and an effective strategy for building a movement independent of the control of bourgeois forces.
This is a result both of the failures and betrayals of past leaderships of the working-class movement and of those forces which in the present period have had the strength to give impetus and form to an independent workers movement.
It is particularly important to clarify the lessons of these setbacks now, since the revolutionary crisis in Iran is not over and there is still time to achieve a historic breakthrough in building a mass workers movement. In fact, if that is not done the Iranian masses face the danger of a very grave defeat.
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST
In the revolutionary upsurge that fol lowed the second world war, a wave of strikes led to the formation of the first trade-union confederation, which united over 250,000 workers and artisans.
However, the leadership of this movement was in the hands of the Tudeh
Party, at the time a Stalinist-led national- Workers Protection Committees (which ist party (it later became just the Iranian CP by another name). Since the Kremlin wanted to maintain its alliance with "democratic" imperialism, the Tudeh party line was that the essential struggle in Iran was between the camp of dictatorship and the camp of democracy. It joined the bourgeois government of Ghavam, an agent of British imperialism, and led the workers movement into the bourgeois democratic camp. It dissolved the class struggle in Iran into a general movement of opposition to dictatorship.
Another result of this was that the Tudeh Party allowed the group of bourgeois politicians around Mossadegh to take the leadership of the mass movement that was developing against imperialist control of the country.
The Stalinists drew the conclusion that their error was not backing Mossadegh, that is, not dissolving the class struggle into the "anti-imperialist camp" instead of the "antidictatorial camp." They are trying to make up for that now but the result is the same, subordination to a bourgeois political leadership.
bourgeois nationalist leadership diverted the workers and the poor masses away from building their own organizations and putting forward their own demands. In this way, it sapped the vitality of the mass movement and prepared the way for the shah's coup in August 1953, which was both dictatorial and pro-imper-
On the basis of the demoralization of the masses, repression, heavy involvement of U.S. imperialism, and the huge inflow of oil money, the shah created a massive state machine that totally crushed the working class movement.
In the following 15 years, however, enormously, resulting in a huge increase in the numerical and economic strength of the working class. By the mid-1970s, the working class had grown to almost three times what it was at the end of the 1940s. It numbered over 3 million. Of this, nearly a third was the largest plants, of which about half were in the capital city.
On the other hand, the largest category of workers, both in Tehran and elsewhere were building workers, who did not have stable employment. They were an explosive layer but one with little economic power, industrial discipline, or cohesion. They blended in with the urban poor. Both their strength and weakness strongly marked the coming revolutionary process. They could be fierce fighters but also relatively easily dispersed and demoralized in the context of an economic crisis and in the absence of a united mass workers movement.
The combination of rapid economic growth and a strong repressive regime blocked the revival of independent workers organizations. The so-called unions that existed were corporative structures totally controlled by the Minister of
The life of the workers in the factories was closely monitored by the so-called were run by SAVAK, the secret police). Workers mobilizations, therefore, were few and far between.
In this period, what militant left forces there were directed their energies toward guerrilla warfare actions outside the working class.
THE RISE OF THE NEW WORKERS MOVEMENT
Then, the situation started to change fundamentally shah's system of economic development based on heavy state involvement and massive oil income ground to a halt beinherent contradictions.
The even greater inflow of money because of the higher oil prices only increased the problems. Enormous bottlenecks developed because of the lack of the social infrastructure for development. The destruction of the traditional rural economy led to the concentration of huge masses of unemployed and semiemployed in the urban areas.
The impact of economic stagnation and breakdown was compounded by the measures taken in 1977-78, including the imposition of price controls on small merchants.
With the perspective for continued economic growth dimming, class conflicts sharpened again.
Moreover, the shah's dictatorship was no longer able to contain the discontent created among the better-off layers by a distorted economic growth in which the top state bureaucracy and a small clique of capitalists closely associated with the state got the lion's share of the wealth. The traditional merchants and the small capitalists were marginalized without either being replaced or given alterna-
The massive Shiite clergy, traditionally an instrument of the state, was in effect replaced by the state bureaucracy. But it retained its roots among the people and marginalized merchant and small 1977, sporadic economic strikes began breaking out, and by early 1978, there were signs that the strikes were spreading and tending to become political. The working class was becoming involved in a national political struggle and beginning to throw the repressive forces off balance.
By late 1978, what might be called a creeping political general strike began to emerge. It involved over 1.5 million industrial, agricultural, and white-collar workers (bank and government employees). This phenomenon continued to widen with ups and downs but in a more or less continuous way, up to the February 1979 insurrection. It was what really broke the back of the shah's regime.
The impact of the strikes grew, in particular, after the mass street demonstrations reached an impasse in the wake of the September 1978 massacres, since they could not actually overthrow the shah. It was the militancy of the workers that revived the mass movement and gave it new strength and effectiveness.
Thus, after being absent from the political scene for almost three decades and despite its lack of class struggle tradition and organization, class demonstrated that it is the leading revolutionary force in the country.
This fact alone, regardless of later setbacks, has had, and will continue to have a decisive importance for the building of a revolutionary party in Iran.
THE PROCESS OF WORKING-CLASS
SELF-ORGANIZATION BEGINS
Unlike the mass demonstrations, which depended on a centralized organization that at the time could be provided only by the mullahs, the strikes favored self-organization of the workers.
The workers began to form strike committees (bypassing the corporative union structures), and found that extending and maintaining the strikes required forming coordinating bodies. Thus several coordinating committees developed. The strongest was in Khuzistan, the oil producing region. It was a joint coordinating committee of the oil and steel industries.
These coordinating committees represented a new force in the mass movement, but they did not try to assume the leadership.
The oil-workers strike committee did, however, refuse to accept the proposal
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by Bazargan, at the time the "Imam's representative," that they end their strike. The workers insisted that they would not end their action before the shah was overthrown.
Thus, the Khomeini leadership, which was still trying to make a political deal with the shah's government, was already colliding with the rising workers movement.
Despite all the threats made against them, the oil workers kept reducing production until they cut it off altogether. Moreover, they began to throw out what they called reactionary managers.
THE POWER AND THE WEAKNESS
OF THE WORKERS MOVEMENT
The demands raised most broadly by the strike committees were for rehiring of the workers fired for their participation in the struggle against the shah, for the payment of their unpaid wages, and for ousting of the pro-Shah and Savaki elefrom the plants. The struggle created a dynamic of workers control.
The railroad workers strike committee blacked all transport of military forces and material. It paralyzed the state, while assuring the transport, despite government sabotage, of the foodstuffs and fuel needed by the people.
The bank workers exposed the financial dealings of the capitalists and provided up-to-date figures on the flight of capital from the country. In addition, with the help of government employees (in the Ministry of Finance, for example), they paralyzed the state's financial ope-
The working class thus began opening the books and exercising workers control over production. But this was still confined to the level of the individual workplace. The workers assumed the power to stop production when necessary and to regulate it, but they did not move on toward an alternative way of orienting and organizing production as a whole. They were leading the fight against the shah, but they were not putting forward a political alternative of their own. On the political level, they were only putting their power behind the maneuvers of the bourgeois-merchant-mullah coalition in the leadership of the mass movement.
Thus, a peculiar situation arose. The mosques and the bazaar merchants were partially financing some of the major strike committees (including even in the oil industry). The bourgeois opposition to the shah found the general strike to be a powerful lever for forcing the transfer of power to the mullah-merchant and liberal bourgeois factions of the ruling
The result of this sitation was that even the most advanced layers within the working class were very much under the mullah-merchant leadership of the mass
The vanguard layers of the workers movement did not, therefore, rally
Rigged elections strengthen mullahs' hand. (DR) around the left but remained under the political leadership of the mullahs and the broad coalition of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois forces in opposition to the shah. This had a profound effect on the subsequent course of the Iranian revolu-
The general strike could only give rise power if it went beyond the limits of the individual workplaces and threw up Soviet-type structures. February 1979 insurrection, which took place despite the efforts of the KhomeiniBazargan leadership to prevent it, could have opened up the way for such a development. It did not, however, create a situation of dual power.
A POLITICAL COUNTER-REVOLUTION
To the contrary, immediately following the insurrection, the revolutionary elements accepted the demands of the bourgeois-mullah leadership to disarm disband the committee.
A bourgeois government was established over the heads of the masses, and was able to present itself as the culmination of the mass upsurge: "The revolution has been victorious, what we have to do now is rebuild the economy," the bourgeois leadership said.
Khomeini himself called on the workers to end their strikes and increase production. Those who refused to do this, he threatened, would be considered "coun ter-revolutionary saboteurs" and would be dealt with as such.
For a brief period the employed workers, mainly building workers, struggled against the new regime. But since these struggles were not effectively linked to the building of a mass workers movement, they were isolated and led no-
To replace the strike committees, the "Islamic Shoras" which were supposed to be the means for assuring the "participation of the mostazafeen (the humble) in building a new Islamic society."
The political counter-revolution began. At the beginning, in fact, little actual force was needed. The bourgeois regime was able to take advantage of the politica illusions of the vanguard to push them into capitulating. The strikes were ended and the strike committees almost totally liquidated.
There were some exceptions, such as the committee in the oil industry, which renamed itself a coordinating committee But even it was housebroken. The attacks of the mullah-bourgeois leadership did not destroy it outright. But since its leaders had no political understanding of what was happening and why and had no political alternative, they became intimidated and demoralized.
The large centrist and Maoist organizations that dominated the Iranian left at the time barely noticed this turn in the
The centrist and Maoist organizations were unable to see the way that the question of which class was to rule was being posed on the level of the mass movement and the entire society. For them, the role of the proletariat meant simply the leadership of their particular group. They were only interested in increasing the numbers of their own organi-
The only voice of opposition raised by any major force in the movement was that of the leaders of the oil industry's the workers organizations be "represented" on the Islamic Revolutionary Council (IRC) set up by Khomeini as the governing body. They did not demand elections for a constituent assembly.
The political role of the working class was pushed back below what it had been before the insurrection, and the class struggle became even more confined within the limits of the individual plant or concern. Furthermore, the working class, or at least its vanguard, was now split between an Islamic wing and a class-struggle wing.
RESURGENCE OF WORKERS' SELF-ORGANIZATION
Nonetheless, the insurrection had opened up the road for class struggle and political and social advancement for the
workers. Because of the enormous weakening of the whose members fled the country) and the old instruments of repression, in nearly every factory a favorable relationship of forces existed for the workers on the ground. This was true despite their political illusions in the mullah-bourgeois
In a context of deep world economic crisis and growing revolutionary struggles in Iran, it was necessary to permit a certain amount of workers control to revive
New workers committees, many of the workers who had been active in the strike committees, were formed with the help of the Imam's Committees, the groups that were set up in the neighborhoods under the control of the mosques. They were called Islamic Shoras and given a certain role in managing
Alongside the Islamic workers organizations, a center for independent and lett worker activists was set up shortly after the insurrection in the Workers House, a government building taken over by militant workers. In the first months, this could compete with the Islamic organizations. But because it lacked a coherent strategy for building the workers movement, over time the backing of the state and the Khomeini leadership for the Islamic groups put it at an increasing dis-
In many factories, the shoras elected the managers themselves. They began to intervene directly to find sources of raw materials, spare parts, credits, and so forth. And they were obliged to play a role in the distribution of products. They also decided on hiring and firing. The dynamic of this situation was leading the workers to fight for the abolition of busiTHE REGIME ATTACKS THE SHORAS
Nonetheless, this type of workers control had inherent limitations. To lead to actual control of production, workers such campaigns by the regime to regain control. The process of becoming indewent hand in hand becoming more democratic and
At the same time as the shoras were formed, activists most directly linked to the mosques set up Islamic Societies (Anjomanha-ye-Eslami). But at the start the latter could not dominate the fac-
The regime itself was divided about how much, if any role, these groups should play as a means of organizing and controlling the workers. In some places the Anjomans were in fact dominated by the shoras.
As early as March 1979, the prime minister began attacking the shoras, saying: "They want to own the factories; they want to be the boss. They want to decide on the management. So, what is the role of the government?" His labor minister, Foroohar, was saying: "I do not believe in shoras. At most, we can accept trade unions." In the large industrial plants, the government began in
April to impose managers appointed on the shoras, especially in the state-owned industries, such as the oil refineries and petrochemicals. And it did this with the backing and the blessing of
In May, new law "for special force in regulating labour and social affairs" was passer of Justice to "prevent the interference of unauthorized individuals or institutions in workplaces."
government also used various methods for bringing pressure to bear on the independent shoras. These included stopping the payment of wages, cutting the flow of raw materials, and preventing the independent distribution of products.
Mullahs were sent to the major factories to preach on the virtues of "constructiveness" and "respect for law and order." They called on the workers to subordinate themselves to "the government elected by the Imam." They played on the religious feelings of the workers to whip up anti-Communism, purge the
So, with much fanfare and display of public rejoicing, the government announced in the summer of 1979 that it was nationalizing all the plants belonging to fifty top capitalists (with more than generous compensation for the foreign capitalists and the so-called "other share holders"). Almost without exception, these concerns had debts to the state's Industrial Credit Bank that amounted to many times their declared capital.
After these so-called nationalizations (that is, the writing-off of the capitalists' debts) the government greatly tightened its control of capital investment, wage levels, production levels, and the sale of products. The workers were now called upon to exert themselves to help rebuild
"which henceforward belongs to the Islamic flock." Managers began to be imposed wholesale, with the backing of the preachers and the pasdars.
The second strategy the government adopted was to coopt the shoras more into the state apparatus. In April 1979, a united center of Islamic set up. In this, the Islamic Societies at the major universities, espe cially the one at the Tehran Polytechnic (from which the Students Who Follow the Imam's Line later emerged) played an important role.
THE MULLAHS ATTACK THE SHORA MOVEMENT FROM
This center then drew up and adopted a constitution for the shoras. It set up an armed unit of Pasdars on the basis of the "Special Force" law. And then, with the backing and direct involvement of the office of Revolutionary Islamic Public to "reorganize" and "unite" the Islamic shoras, starting in the newly nationalized industries. In June it started publishing a journal called
This operation was closely observed and backed by the newly formed Islamic Republican Party. The concomitant of this was that it was viewed with a certain disapproval by the Bazargan faction, since control would have to go beyond the shoras of militant workers, and to keep confines of the individual factory. The abolition of business secrets could be achieved only on a national scale. But the political illusions of the vanguard blocked them from taking up the fight for this.
A lot of activists in the shoras placed their confidence in bourgeois ministers who had "the blessing of the Imam himself." This political factor obstructed and slowed down the process of unification of the shoras, as well as the development of
In any case, the role the shoras were playing led increasingly to confrontations between the individual shoras and the bourgeois ministers of the Provisional Revolutionary Islamic Government. And these clashes impelled a deepening of the radicalization of the
There was a constant tendency for the Islamic shoras to break away from the control of the Khomeini forces and become independent. This reoccurred after them from functioning in a democratic
At the same time, the state repressive forces remained in total disarray. And the attacks on the shoras were producing further radicalization. Many of the shoras started denouncing "the new capitalist
THE REGIME'S STRATEGY TO STOP THE WORKERS MOVEMENT
The ruling bourgeois-mullah coalition adopted two basic strategies for dealing with this radicalization.
program of nationalizations make it easier for the state to intervene in those plants whose owners had fled and where production was almost totally controlled by the shoras. The government had already achieved a certain success in the state-owned industries.
by this time a factional struggle had developed within the bourgeois-mullah coali-
Representatives from the Polytechnic Center would go to the factories (with a group of Pasdars), show their papers from the Public Prosecutor's office, inter-
Islamic Society and members of the shora. Then they would draw up a new list for the leadership, new elections, and set up shoras" which would then affiliate to the center. If they met with any resistance, they would call the nearest Imam's Comtroublemakers.
In this way, in many industries, the Polytechnic Center organized a purge of the left. It was initiated in July and August 1979, and became particularly extensive in September 1979. This was the same period in which the regime launched full-scale offensive against the Kurds, and the Polytechnic Center helped
to recruit workers to go to fight against the Kurdish people. FACTIONAL SPLIT IN THE REGIME
The fact that this center was critical of the Bazargan government led many workers to think that it was anticapitalist. But the faction fight in the mullah-merchantbourgeois coalition was really over other questions.
Bazargan represented the old Iranian national bourgeoisie based on small industry, which was largely bypassed by, and excluded from the enormous possibilities for capital accumulation provided by the state after the start of the White Revolution. It wanted a "liberalization" of the state and a "fairer" distribution of state credits and money making opportunities among all the capitalists.
It is true that this section of the regime wanted to reorganize the capitalist state as soon as possible and with the least possible upset. But that did not mean that the wing that opposed it did not also seek to rebuild capitalism and the capitalist state, or that it was any less dangerous an enemy for the workers
The IRP was formed right after the revolution by the mullahs around Khomeini to ensure the political domination of the Shiite hierarchy.
Gradually the traditional mercantile of Iranian capital, closer to the masses but also more parasitic, obscurantist, and despotic - both in their mentality and ideology and in the social relations bound up with their economic activity - gathered around the IRP. This backward merchant class was also closely linked to the mosques. They saw the IRP as the plank for getting to the state trough and sinking their snouts in it.
The IRP could appeal to the urban and rural poor because the sector of capital it represented was marginal to the modern economy and had nothing to lose by indulging in demagogic "Islamic" rhetoric about "these capitalists and landlords who fear not the Lord and want everything for themselves." That is, they had nothing to lose so long as the workers could be kept from organizing independently and raising their own concrete demands. And to assure this they were certainly no less inclined to use strongarm methods than the Bazargan government.
Of course, the bazaar merchants could get away with this only because of the weakness of the class-struggle and political tradition in Iran.
In their struggle against the mullahs and the bazaar merchants, the Bazargan forces relied on demagogy about "democracy" and "modernism." They argued that the mullahs did not have the technical skills needed to run society.
In response the IRP argued that the Bazargan forces were weak, lacked revolutionary will, and were Western values. It preached the dictator-
Khomeini, who "loves 20
Ayatollah Khomeini gives press conference (DR).
In the early stages, the IRP could not take over the state because of its weakness within the state bureaucracy. It achieved control of the state by a gradual process, including several stages. most important was that initiated by the takeover of the U.S. embassy. This was followed by a gradual purge of the state stage was the so-called Administrative Revolution initiated by Khomeini in June 1980, to purge the old "idolatrous" elements. The way for this was opened by the assurance of an IRP majority in parliament through rigged elections. The new parliament began sitting in June 1980.
For the sake of its own operation, as well as that of the IRP, the Polytechnic Center had to make a certain demagogic pretence of defending the workers inte rests. But this was only the bait on the hook.
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE POLYTECHNIC CENTER
By early autumn, 1979, the Polytechnic Center had managed to "unite" some 120 shoras in Tehran, 40 in Ghazvin, and a few in Shiraz, and Isphahan. By comparison with the number of shoras that existed at the time, this was rather insig-
The Polytechnic Center had absolutely no success in the large industrial plants, where it was not so easy to set up a new shora from the top. This operation totally failed in Ahwaz, Tabriz, and Rasht, where there was a stronger working-class tradition and militancy.
In those industries where for objective reasons the tendencies toward united shora activity had developed early, the Polytechnic operation did not make any inroads. This applies to the plants grouped under the Organization for the Development and Modernization of Iranian Industry and in transport.
In other cases where shoras had already developed links with other shoras through their own independent efforts. the Polytechnic operation also did not get very far. This applies to the shoras, mostly in Tehran, which were organized on a geographical basis - in the east, west, and south of Tehran.
At the height of its power, the Polytechnic Center claimed to represent 900 factories throughout Iran. That did not mean that 900 shoras were affiliated to it, however, but that in 900 factories it had at least individual members of the shoras working with it.
even in those shoras that the Polytechnic Center managed to gain control of, radicalization continued under the pressure of the class struggle, even though in a distorted form. The Polytechnic Center was obliged to organize meetings of representatives of various factories and to discuss many real problems
Despite the bureaucratic control ove these meetings by the Polytechnic Center they began to become a problem for the regime. For example, at the monthly and later weekly meetings at the Leyland's car factory, at which forty factories were represented, the participants drew up a plan for workers cooperatives that would sell factory products directly to consumers. They proposed this as a method of fighting hoarders and speculators.
The regime had a lot of trouble keeping the workers from putting this plan into operation. The IRC itself had to intervene in the matter. The pages of Shora began reflecting the workers dissatisfaction with the regime's support for the bazaar merchants.
The process of political differentiation within the working class, however, was limited and did not develop fast enough or on a wide enough scale to match the reconstruction of the instruments of state repression. The mullah's base within the mass movement was mobilized to stop the advance of the revolution. This base was narrowing, and this was happenin most rapidly in the working class nonetheless, it meant the creation split within the revolutionary
that a bourgeois controlled constituent pose the mullahs and their bourgeois mass radicalization, there was no way Experts (shown on TV) had helped to ex-
And this, coupled with the continuing illusions of a section of the vanguard in
"progressive clergy," hampered the spread and unification of the workers
THE ROLE OF THE LARGE LEFT GROUPS
The so-called left, the big centrist and reformist organizations, made the situation worse. The Tudeh Party counterposed its line of building traditional trade unions to the actual revolutionary movement of the shoras. This meant in practtice concentrating on organizing the workers, in the old industries and small workshops, in general the most backward Unions," and set up a number of sectarrian organizing committees in conjunction with various Maoist groups. None of these got anywhere, and were subsequently bypassed by the shora movement. The Fedayeen then went into the shora movement, but together with a number of small ultraleft groups, they formed and
"real" shoras, which were even less democratic than the Islamic shoras. On the other hand, the most right-wing opportunists simply sang the praises of the existing Islamic shoras, and in particular, the state-backed Polytechnic Center, which was the largest of these
Only a small fraction of the left worked, in fact, for extending and unifying the shoras that actually existed, for democratizing them, and developing them into organs of workers control over the national
The fight for a united shora movement could not bypass the Islamic shoras, even those most directly linked to the state. But neither could it ignore the real obstacles that the state had placed in the way of working-class unity.
The weakness of the bourgeois state meant that there were possibilities for working through the Islamic shoras. But the illusions that existed workers in the national leadership meant that unless a consistent struggle was waged against the political counter-revolution there was the danger that the concept of shoras could be transformed into its opposite - into a cover for forming against the working class.
the movement remained on the rise for a whole period. On May Day 1979, nearly 300,000 people came out in Tehran for an independent workers demonstration called by the Workers
THE REGIME'S FIRST MAJOR REPRESSIVE OFFENSIVE
The regime realized that the illusions of the masses in Khomeini were not sufficient, without the backing of much more material force, to hold back the advance of the revolution. In the context of the elected. So, government set in motion a massive wave of repression, which was now systematic and concerted between the government and the hezbollahi gangs. It began by ban-
"the Zionist press" (that is, the liberal and democratic press that defended democratic rights and was open to a certain extent to the views of the left, papers such as Ayandegan).
Despite the advances of the workers in action, the political weakness of the left and the workers vanguard disarmed the workers movement in the face of this offensive. There was no strong force in the movement putting forward the line of fighting for political independence from the regime and for consistent defense of the workers interests. There was no strong force putting forward a realistic political perspective for the workers movement as an alternative to the regime. To a considerable extent, moreover, this was the result of the confusion caused by the adoption of dogmatic schemas from Stalinism by the large left currents, which included many thousands of activists and who were subjectively revolu-
Ayandegan was first banned in May, for example. But at that time the regime was forced to retreat by mass demonstrations. Then it was banned again at the end of July, in the context of the beginning of the first Kurdish war. The Democratic National Front organized a demonstration to protest. The major left groups, the Mujahedeen and the Fedayeen, refused to participate on the grounds that the NDF was a bourgeois group.
The demonstration came under heavy attack from the hezbollahis. The following day, Khomeini called for outlawing the NDF and insisted that Ayandegan must be destroyed. It never reopened
On that same day about 40 left and revolutionary papers were banned. The political headquarters of the major lett groups, such as the Mujahedeen and the occupied. Then Khomeini declared a "Holy War" against the Kurdish people, and this offensive proceeded under the cover of almost total press censorship.
Then the regime announced that instead of organizing elections for a Constituent Assembly it would prepare the way for an "Assembly of Experts" (experts in Islamic law). This assembly drew up a
Islamic constitution that gave the supreme authority to Khomeini as expert on Islamic law (Velayet-eFIRST REPRESSIVE ASSAULT FAILS
The regime's attacks on democratic rights had a profound effect on the mass consciousness. Opposition to the mullahs grew rapidly in this period. So, the repression was gradually running out of steam.
the government suffered major military and political defeat in debates at the Assembly of friends. Moreover, the start of the new academic year in September 1979 brought with it a new wave of political activity independent of the regime on the
All this had its effects on the workers movement too. Not only had the bourgeois government failed to destroy the shora movement, but in fact a new upsurge was developing that was raising clearer political and economic demands.
The Polytechnic shora had failed to gain effective control of the shora movement and housebreak it. By the end of the summer of 1979, it controlled a very small fraction of the shoras (no more
In the oil industry, a united shora had developed representing the refineries, the white-collar workers in the offices, and the drilling operators and pumping stations. The United Shoras of the West of Tehran (which was dominated by the left and the Mujahedeen) included nearly thirty shoras. The Center of Shoras of the East of Tehran could speak in the name of about twenty factories. The Center of the Islamic Shoras of Rey (south Tehran) brought together the shoras at over sixty small and medium construction-materials factories. The big steel plants had organized the Central Shora of the National Industrial Group of Iranian Steel.
All the shoras belonging to the factories under the Organization for the Development and Modernization of Iranian Industries had united in the National Union of Revolutionary Islamic Shoras.
In Tabriz, the workers in the machinetool plants had organized a powerful shora that was playing a major political role in the city and drawing representatives of the small factories and workshops
In Arak and Ghazvin, regional centers of the shoras had developed that were constantly organizing meetings and sending delegations to Tehran to present the workers grievances to the government.
In Gilan, over forty shoras (mainly dominated by the left) had united to form the Union of Workers Shoras in Gilan. This confederation was developing independent networks of workers cooperatives in the rural areas to sell factory products and to buy raw materials and
At the same time, there was a growth of trade-unionism in the more traditional and small industries, such as textiles and
In one form or another, all these orga-
Polytechnic Center) were involved in struggles in opposition to the capitalist policies of the government. Demands were being raised for the abolition of the old labor laws and for the workers shoras to draw up a new one, for futher nationalization, for the removal of ministers, for the access of the shoras to the TV and radio. The revolu-
The crisis at the top was also intensifying. The bourgeois liberal politicians were gradually losing their hold on power.
They were now openly expressing worry about the new constitution that would put power in the hands of the religious hierarchy. They were also pressuring the mullahs to take a more active role in heading off the mass movement. The mullahs on the other hand were more and more openly showing their intention to take control of the financial and political instruments of the state.
Moreover, in order to try to stem their loss of credibility among larger and larger sections of the masses, the mullahs were putting all the blame for the crisis on the bourgeois liberal politicians.
It was in this context that the occupation of the U.S. Embassy took place. It was designed by the IRP to divert the
In the first place, empty anti-imperialist demagogy was a good course to take to divert the real anti-capitalist dynamic that was developing. The workers and peasants who in their daily struggles were striking at the real bases of imperialism were now called on to come to the front of the U.S. Embassy to hail "the Imam's Anti-Imperialist Line." A few weeks later the Imam himself called on the masses to stop all strikes and sit-ins second and greater revolution is going on against the Great Satan."
Secondly, this situation provided the
unpopular Bazargan government. Thus the Khomeini leadership could recoup the political defeat of its first attempt to rebuild the bourgeois state by winning new popular support for an "anti-imperialist" bourgeois regime.
Any politician who stood in the way of the IRP was promptly exposed by the Students Following the Imam's Line, who would publish the documents of their "collaboration" with the U.S. embassy. Information on contacts between IRP figures and the U.S. embassy was covered up, as was exposed later by a group that split from the occupiers.
The IRP used the embassy hoopla as a cover for pushing through its unpopular Islamic Constitution.
Thirdly, under the cover of mobilizing "the army of 20 millions" to fight the Great Satan, the armed instruments of the new regime (the pasdaran and the Imam's Committees) were enormously strengthened.
Ironically, this slogan was dropped after the Iraqi invasion when it threatened to take on real meaning.
The regime's reinforced armed units were used efficiently to crush the Turkomanis (December-January) and the Azerbaijanis in Tabriz (November). The operation in Tabriz prepared the way for the breaking of the militant organizations in Tabriz, where in March 1980 strikes broke out in three factories demanding the expulsion of the hezbollahis from the workplace.
Of course, the mobilizations around the embassy had initially a contradictory effect, encouraging large sections of the population to demonstrate their hatred of imperialism and their aspirations for a 22 different Iran. But in the absence of forces strong enough, united enough, and politically clear enough to present these masses with concrete alternatives, the demonstrations soon became purely the demagogic show that they were designed to be, burning themselves out harmlessly.
The working class was the section of the population least fooled by this demagogy. The first official demonstration in support of the Students Who Follow Imam's Line called by the Center of Islamic Shoras in December drew less than 50,000 persons. The second one was only slightly larger. By May 1980, the support had declined drastically. The official May Day demonstration in front of the U.S. Embassy gathered less than 20,000 workers.
In fact, the working class tried to take advantage of the sharpening of anti-imperialist feeling among the masses to push its own social and economic demands. The workers shoras everywhere were calling for a purge of all the capitalist and pro-imperialist managers and owners in industry. That is, they were trying to fight a real struggle against imperialism.
The weight of the regime-controlled mass movement fighting the Great Satan, however, had its effect on the working class. The anti-imperialist demagogy of the Khomeini leadership also offered an excellent cover for the class collaboration of the Tudeh Party and reinforced the arguments of the rightward-moving group in the Fedayeen leadership.
The Fedayeen, who were the largest organization on the left at the time, split into a pro-regime "majority" and a leftcentrist minority. This had a profound effect on the shoras movement. A large section of the workers vanguard was drawn into direct collaboration with the Islamic regime. And within the factories, the Islamic Societies directly controlled by the IRP were gaining a new credibility with the help of the large left groups.
A NEW, LARGER OFFENSIVE BY THE REGIME
In February 1980, the regime launched a new operation designed to curb and destroy the shoras movement. After FriWorkers House, drove out all the workers that were there, and on the spot set up a new Center for the Coordination of the Islamic Societies and Workers Shoras. This was a regime-controlled umbrella organization for coordinating the proKhomeini elements within the Islamic Societies and shoras.
This new center also split the old Polytechnic Center. It began immediately to organize conferences of Islamic shoras in various cities (Tehran, Isfahan, Meshed, etc) to organize the pro-regime forces in Iranian industry and to block any further development of the independent shoras.
The proceedings of these conferences were all well publicized in the censored mass media. All the resolutions they passed had at least ten clauses about the revolutionary anti-imperialist principles of the regime and one or two demagogic calls based on some popular but apolitical and harmless "workers demands" such as participation of the workers shoras in drawing up a new labor law.
Although it gave lip service to the concept of shoras, the new center was in fact working toward replacing the shoras with more easily controllable Islamic societies (Anjomans). In factories, where the independent shoras would not accede to the demands of the Islamic societies, the repressive forces were used to break them up
It was in this atmosphere that the Khomeini regime began a new wave of repression. Having successfully gotten through the rigged elections for the Islamic Consultative Parliament, it launched a new general offensive against the Kurds in March, a much more ruthless and large-scale one than the offensive of the preceding summer.
In April, the Student Islamic Societies and hezbollahi thugs took over the uni versities, physically ejected the left groups, and shut the campuses down. They remain closed to this day.
In June and July, open moves to shut down shoras and arrest their leaders began. The leaders of the oil industries shora were arrested, their bulletin was banned, and the shora itself was liquidated. The Union of Revolutionary Islamic Shoras was declared illegal. The railway workers shora was closed down. The Center of the Shoras of East Tehran was occupied by a pro-Khomeini gang and its leaders arrested.
These repressive attacks on the workers movement were reinforced by a major offensive against the workers standard of living, and were in fact a concomitant of it. The right of workers to a share in the profits was abolished. Wage increases were declared illegal, and any management that disobeyed this decree was threatened with imprisonment. A new code of conduct for the shoras was passed by the IRC, which basically put an end to any independent election of the shoras and excluded them from any involvement in management.
The repression was so severe and the attacks on the working class so open that even the state controlled shora centers were forced to come out in opposition to the new laws.
In early September, both the Polytechnic Center (which had now lost a lot of its base and represented less than 60 shoras) and the Coordinating Center for the Islamic Societies and Workers Shoras - Workers House condemned the new codes and called for a "greater share of the working class in the running of Iranian industries." The polarization was sharpening
This was the context in which the Iraqi invasion intervened in late September and posed a new decisive test for the workers movement and the left.