The fundamentalist earthquake
H OW do you analyze the results of these elections? We still do not have the full details of the results. Officially, the FIS has won 55% of the municipalities and 32 wilayas out of 46-. The FLN says it is in second position, with 30% of the
THE impressive victory of the fundamentalist Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) over the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) in the Algerian regional and municipal elections of June 12 has sent shock waves through the country and beyond. The following Interview with ner in which the voting took place. The FIS used a lot of unsavoury methods to boost their vote, but that does not mean they would not in any case have achieved a good result. If the boycott had not taken place, the FFS, the PST, or the others who did not contest the wilayas where they could have fulfilled the municipalities and 14 wilayas (districts), and the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) is in third position with 5% or the municipal- position with 5% of the municipalities — the independents, finally, have won some municipalities. But, in reality, the results of the FIS are better than this indicates, to the extent that all the big and mediconducted on June 19 by Natacha conducted on June 19 by Nalacha
Monlapin and Cecilia Garmendia.
tions appears as a "protest vote"
against the FLN. If the nonfundamentalist opponents of the regime had participated in the elections, instead of calling for a boycott, would that have significantly reduced the level of support for the
FIS?
Only the FLN and the FIS were able to contest the elections on a nationwide basis. Even if it had participated, the
Front of Socialist Forces (FFS), of
Hocine Ait Ahmed', would not have been able to contest all the 1,241 municipalities and fulfil all the administrative formalities. These elections were from the beginning false and unjust - they were held to give a majority to the FLN, on the basis of its national apparatus. Only the FIS was equally capable of contesting all the localities, for it has an organized presence as much in the town as in the countryside.
The regime monopolized television coverage throughout the campaign — the other participants were reduced to a miserable poster campaign on the little official hoardings.
The FIS, however, has held demonstrations and meetings with its members in the towns, the neighbourhoods, and so on.
The government let them do this, thinking that these events would turn the people towards the FLN through fear.
From the analysis you have put forward, the boycott slogan would seem to have been counterproductive...
It is necessary to take account of the electoral law and the manadministrative conditions, would not have stopped the victory of the FIS — it would perhaps have been less impressive.
If the boycott slogan had not been advanced we would be in a position of despair today - the high rate of abstention shows that political reserves exist which have not yet electoral law distorts reality. • How do you explain the appeal of the FIS? On the negative side, it can be interpreted as a rejection of the FLN, but on the positive side...
Beyond the factors which underlie the upsurge of such currents around the world, the Algerian fundamentalists have benefitted essentially from the fact that all public political activities were shackled by president Chadli in the year which followed the events of October 19882 banning of meetings, administrative complications for the legalization of organizations, and so on.
Through the network of the mosques, during this period, the fundamentalists were capable of maintaining a high and very virulent level of propaganda against the regime. This has won them, for example, an important audience in the popular neighbourhoods of Algiers. They take a very radical stance against the regime, whereas the opposition tolerated by the media - who were not muzzled like us - take a very much more moderate tone. When the leader of the FFS, Ait Ahmed, returned to Algiers, he declared that Chadli was "the president of all the Algerians", , whilst the FIS, through the mosques, was accusing the FLN of every evil. Since last February, Ait Ahmed has adopted a more vigorous approach, 1. Hocine Ait Ahmed is the founder of the FFS (Front of Socialist Forces). A leader of the FLN during the war of independence, Ait Ahmed went into opposition after independence. The FFS' stronghold is in Kabylia, the Berber region to the east of Algiers, from where Ait Ahmed originates. 2. On October 5, 1988, rioting broke out in Algiers and in the rest of the country to protest against price rises in basic necessities. The government declared a state of siege for the first time in the history of the country since independence — the subsequent repression cost 21 more than 500 lives. Chadli restored calm through promising democratic reforms. July 16, 1990 #189 International Viewpoint mentalists (with scores of up to 70 or
80%) - the FLN has maintained its influence in the rural municipalities and the hinterland which are less populated and were less affected by the October 1988 riots and their aftermath. The FLN got votes from those who fear the FIS, often even people in the opposition — whereas the FIS has extended its appeal beyond the fundamentalist movement and won support from the popular masses who wanted to show their rejection of the regime. Oran, the biggest city in the west, where the fundamentalists barely exist as an organized force, was won by the FIS.
We don't know yet how many votes this represents, and the rate of abstention was high.
Abstention has been another key factor in these elections
- the rate of participation was 65%, but it is necessary to recall that these were the first multiparty elections since independence. That shows the relative success of the boycott campaign waged by sections of the opposition.
• The result of the elec-
PANCHO
Chawki Salhi, spokesperson of the PST
(Socialist Workers Party) of Algeria, was been expressed, and underlines that the um towns have been won by the funda-
ALGERIA demanding the election of a constituent assembly, insisting on the rights of women and of Berbers, and so on. The FFS then engaged in a resolute opposition and its activity extended itself beyond the Kabylia (Berber) areas. But the FIS had a head start, thanks to its anchorage in the popular quarters of Algiers, in particular, which went further back, and because it was identified with the events of October.
On this subject, it is necessary to note that the international media continue to claim that the victims of October were Islamic fundamentalists, which is false! Those tortured and imprisoned as a result of the riots were above all militants of the left, of the Party of the Socialist Vanguard (PAGS, the Algerian Communist Party) - the Islamic forces were miniscule at this time. But because of the absence of a plausible alternative at the end of 1988, they stepped into the vacuum with big demonstrations against torture and for democracy. The FIS appeared above all as the party of the people of the most deprived quarters of Algeria - this image has contributed to the ria - this image has contributed to the extension of its influence.
The FLN, for its part, has suffered a terrible blow in the last period, when the misappropriation of $26 million by a former prime minister of the regime was made public — it has attempted to coun ter this campaign by pointing to the acts of violence committed by the fundamentalists, notably against women. This very virulent campaign momentarily isolated the fundamentalists, including in the popular neighbourhoods. But their demonstration on May 17, 1990 which was enormous — only the FLN was able to do better, after the event — led to a terrified somersault by the regime; it understood that people were strongly attracted by the fundamentalists. The regime ran a very awkward electoral campaign, announcing that it had "returned". This has led to a renewed rejection of the FLN, which we can see now, burying the fear of the FIS which had predominated until then. • Faced with the corruption of the regime, the FIS was able to use a moral argument — with a religious content.
Rejection of the government was central to the vote for the FIS; the corruption of the FLN, but also the desire for liberty, for sovereignty, in short the democratic factors. Paradoxically it is an authoritarian and retrogressive current which has attracted the votes of those who wish to see the end of the dictatorship. At the electoral level, the FIS has achieved a level of support going well beyond those who subscribe to an Islamic discourse.
There exists, obviously, a hard Islamic core which has a moral discourse and which demands the application of the 22 , Sharia, the Islamic law — but religious feeling is a very much more important International Viewpoint #189 • July 16, 1990 element than fundamentalism. There is an enormous revival of spirituality and religious feeling in Algeria today, going beyond even those who voted for the FIS. • Are there really divergent lines inside the FIS, as the press claim?
There is a hard fundamentalist core inside the FIS which does not correspond to its very much wider electoral impact. At the level of the FIS leadership, there exists a very clear difference between, on the one hand, Ali Belhadj, one of the most popular orators in the poor neighbourhoods, who bases himself on the revolt of the young unemployed, the dispossessed, and so on, and whose stance against the regime is very radical; and on the other hand, Abassi Madani and other notables who are very much more moderate and would be ready to make a deal with the
ALGERIA
400 mls
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Atlantic
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Oran
ALGIERS
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regime. The electoral victory has regime. The electoral victory has reinforced the Madani current. The wave of violence which shook Algeria last April - against cinemas, young women and so on — was the work of a radical fundamentalist tendency which did not accept the electoral caution advocated by Madani. But in the euphoria today, there is no contesting Madani's predominance — those who preach a "democratic" and conciliatory attitude have carried the day. • What attitude is the regime going to take towards the FIS? And vice versa? Will the parliamentary elections that the fundamentalists are demanding be held?
Public opinion is very shocked, there are a lot of rumours, and there is no longer any political expression, from the FIS or the FLN. The strike of newspaper distributors has aggravated the confusion. But in the neighbourhoods, the militants of the FIS are reappearing — for example, during the strike of roadsweepers in Algiers, their supporters have swept the streets. Some street demonstrations have taken place in certain areas, but all this has had little echo and there is no sense of any particular tension.
The FIS is demanding the dissolution of the assembly and new parliamentary elections. But the leaders of the FIS explain that this is not equivalent to a demand that Chadli should go - they do not want to be perceived as being so aggressive for the moment.
Chadli, some maintain, would be ready for a cohabitation with the FIS - according to others, he wants a broad "coalition" with the FIS, a sort of "presidential majority". It is not yet known where all this will lead. In any case, the intention of the FLN is to discredit the forces which appealed for a boycott and to push forward the RCD - which, for its part, would be in the forefront of this alliance.
Ait Ahmed has also the intention of creating an alliance, a third force, which would appear as a bourgeois democratic alternative to both the fundamentalists and the regime, but he does not dispose of the necessary means of propaganda and suffers from demoralization among those of his supporters frightened by the result of the boycott. If the parties defeated in the elections (the RCD, the PAGS, and so on) regroup, they could become a true force of support for the FLN and permit the regime to maintain itself. This is opposed, obviously, to the project of Ait Ahmed.
As for Ben Bella? , he has the declared project of regrouping everybody, including the FIS, and playing a Bonapartist role.
The tendency is towards polarization around the big blocs which have emerged from these elections (on the one hand the FLN, and on the other the FIS). It will be necessary to work hard to shatter the popular idea of the FIS as a democratic alternative — only a secular social radicalism can expose the doubletalk of the fundamentalists and detach the youth from them. • Do you rule out a democratic alliance with the forces which are not part of the regime, like the FFS?
The PST has always declared itself ready for an alliance in action with all progressive forces on precise democratic questions — we have even worked with certain elements close to the regime in defence of the right of women to work. We could constitute a front for the monitoring of the next elections, or to demand changes in the electoral law. But an elec-
toral alliance involves different problems. We must fight for an electoral program that defends the interests of the workers. Above all, we do not wish to sanction a program of economic liberalization.
In the context of the electoral pressure which will exert itself, from the bipolarization which exists, we will certainly not give any sanction to the pro-imperialist bourgeoisie in the name of some kind of modernist alliance against the FIS. We are not going to make an alliance with the current dictatorship of Chadli against the future one of Madani!
Since the elections, we have witnessed a revival of strikes, even if trade union activity has not improved. The roadsweepers, for example, went on strike to protest against the allocation of housing made to the managers. The FIS attempted to break their action, whilst making promises to them. The postal workers have gone on strike, as have the petrol pump attendants, teachers, and so on. There is then a curious social climate, given the then a curious social climate. given the general political depression. We must continue to fight on the democratic terrain against the current regime and against the dictatorial plans of the FIS, not leaving the monopoly of radicalism to the fundamentalists.
We must, beyond this, counter those who, panicked by the victory of the FIS, could be tempted to abandon the struggle for socialism. There are even people who have resigned themselves to the dictatorship of Chadli, and hope to bar the route to the FIS by abandoning the struggle for democratic elections, which would be suicidal. • How is the women's movement reacting to the victory of the FIS?
Our comrades in the women's movement have fought alone for some months against the fundamentalists, despite their threats (see IV 182, April 9, 1990). During the teachers' strike, the FIS demanded that women return to the house; in April 1990, Madani was obliged to recognize the right of women to work. This is evidence of the impact of the women's movement and the democratic forces! Meanwhile, leaders of groups which, until recently, justly pointed out the responsibility of the regime for the situation of women (the Family Code and so on) have declared that they have voted for the FLN, to oppose the fundamentalists. The pressures for unity around a "modernist front" will be very strong also in the women's movement. In the Berber movement, in Kabylie, there will also be strong pressures for the constitution of a bloc with the FFS, regardless of its political basis. * 3. Ahmed Ben Bella, a leader of the FLN during the war of independence, was president of Algeria from 1963-65 before his overthrow by the head of the army, Houan Boumedienne. After several years in prison in Algeria, Ben Bella founded the Movement for Algerian Democracy in exile.