DESPITE a chorus of reassuring comments in the Western press about negotiations beginning between the Kremlin and the representatives of the
Baltic peoples, the confrontation has escalated. On May 15,
Gorbachev issued two presidential decrees declaring
"unconstitutional" the resolutions of the Estonian and Latvian Supreme
Soviets opening the way for independence for the two countries.
GERRY FOLEY
N THE same day violent
N THE same day, violent demonstrations by neo-
Stalinist unionists took place in the capitals of the same two countries. In Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, a few thousand demonstrators tried to break into the Supreme Soviet. They were stopped only when the premier appealed over the radio for a mass mobilization to defend the government. In Latvia, groups of Soviet military officers staged incidents at the Supreme Soviet. But the unionists seemed capable only of provocations.
Even in Latvia, where the titular nationality represents only 52 percent of the population, according to Bernard Guetta in Le Monde of May 17, attempts to organize strikes among the non-Latvian workers against the independence moves fell flat.
After these incidents, the Kremlin sent additional troops into the two republics.
In the same period, the monarchical powers of the president of the Soviet Union were reinforced with a law making it a grave penal offense to "defame" the
Kremlin chief executive.
The Kremlin has not relaxed its economic blockade of Lithuania, and stocks of petroleum are reportedly nearing whole series of older, honest Social Democrats have not liked this.
The Green party is in a similar position, for its rather moderate programme (including for example, a readiness to compromise on the question of the nuclear power stations) has met with sharp criticism from the Western ecological parties Which in many cases incline towards the radical left.
The only consistent and authentic left forces today in Czechoslovakia are the left-wing political movements that arose as independent structures before November 17, 1989.
### Defending the left's traditional values
This means the Left Alternative, the Czechoslovak Anarchist Association and Obroda-Club for Democratic Socialism. (Even in this latter case there are definite tendencies towards following behind the social democracy). In this situation it is very difficult to defend the left's tradition10th real squality of alico, solidarity and al values — social justice, solidarity and International Viewpoint #186 • June 4, 1990 which a free and dignified life is unthinkable in modern society.
Together with other social movements, (such as the Transnational Radical Party, independent peace and ecological initiatives, alternative cultural activities and so on), this new left must be the continuation of the best traditions of Charter 77 and the other independent structures, in an uncompromising struggle for human rights, including social rights, and in the struggle for tolerance, democratic dialogue, the free search for the truth and a truthful life.
All these values, cultivated in the past 20 years by a handful of brave individuals, at the cost of considerable personal sacrifices, cannot be pursued under the pressure of a pitiless competitive struggle, soulless pursuit of consumption, property and power, a commercialized mass culture and the sale of Czechoslovakia to foreign capital. Such values should be the property of the broadest layers, but this also is not possible without democracy and social self-management. It is the establishment of such a society that is the main aim of the new, democratic left in our country.
exhaustion. Lithuanian representatives say that not only are the Soviet authorities blocking the supply of Soviet petroleum but they are banning any deliveries from abroad, thereby escalating their economic reprisals to the level of a siege.
The Soviet authorities have continued to reject any negotiations with the representatives of the Baltic peoples on a basis which implies accepting their unqualified right to independence. As for what the Kremlin claims is the constitutional way to leave the Soviet Union, Yuri Afanasiev, one of the leading liberalizers in the Soviet CP, has acknowledged, in an interview published in the May 5 issue of the Estonian creative workers' paper Reede, that the new law on secession makes separation "100% impossible."
Afanasiev said, "Even if two thirds of the population are for it, the next to the last word belongs to the other republics and the last word to the 'center'. Let's suppose that at the political level, it [separation] is "permitted'; even then there are a lot of monetaryeconomic 'buts' that ultimately make leaving the Soviet Union impossible."
In the May 11 Reede, Kaarel Haav made a sharper answer to the "constitutional" argument. "The constitution of the USSR has never been applied. The rights inscribed in it have never been defended. It is only a scrap of paper, which besides is full of contradictions. For example, one paragraph declares all the republics sovereign, while another takes that right away. So, anyone can be accused of anticonstitutional and anti-Soviet activity." Suspension of independence declaration
The latest "breakthrough" in the conflict sighted by the Western mass media was the meeting May 18 between Gorbachev and the Lithuanian premier Kazimiera Prunskiene. The latter claimed afterwards that Gorbachev had made an important concession, agreeing to accept a "suspension" rather than an annulment of the declaration of independence as a basis for starting negotiations. On this basis she called a special session of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet to discuss meeting Gorbachev's demand.
Libération's correspondent, Pierre Briançon commented that Prunskiene was clearly trying to make the best of a bad bargain because that had been the Kremlin's position for a month. But in his own article he said that a division over accepting Gorbachev's condition had appeared for the first time in the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. The fact is that the Lithuanian independent CP has been waging a furious war of words against the nationalist movement Sajudis for many weeks in the name of "moderation," "prudence" "realism" and therefore of "dialogue" with the great liberalizer in the Kremlin. And its reporting of debates in the Supreme Soviet has also indicated differences.
In its enthusiasm for "realism," the independent CP's central organ, Tiesa, has served as a mouthpiece for all sorts of pressures on the Lithuanian leadership to retreat from its March 11 declaration, from the Western governments and media and even apparently from emigrés. Thus, the May 4 issue of Tiesa carried a long article by Algis Klimaitis, described as the general secretary of the
ESTONDE LITHUANIA European Parliament Baltic Group and manager of the mixed enterprise Litkomerc in Hamburg. Called "Between Demands and Truth," it criticized the strategy of the Lithuanian government, much more outspokenly than the independent CP itself could probably dare.
"I do not doubt that the decision of the Lithuanian parliament and government was motivated by patriotism. Nor do I doubt that, as they interpret the March 11 declaration, they thought it served the interest of Lithuania. Unfortunately, patriotism in itself is no protection against error.
"The error is not what the declaration proclaims. The error is that the declaration involves leaving the USSR now!....Such a stance...blocks dialogue, which all the protagonists (Lithuania, the USSR and the West) say is their objective."
No help from Washington or
European Community
Klimaitis continued: "Telling ourselves that after March 11 Lithuania is already an independent state is fateful self-deception. Reality has shown that there was no political, economic, diplomatic...or technical preparation for real independence, and there was no guarantee from Moscow, from Washington or
USSR from the European Community. The Radicals' political prognoses were based only on an untested assumption that Mr. Gorbachev's resistance would be limited to threatening gestures, while the West (and first of all the USA) would be quick to recognize Lithuania's independence.
"Not a single one of those Western States that never recognized Stalin's annexation [of Lithuania] has recognized the Lithuanian republic in accordance with the interpretation given to the March Il declaration. Except for words of concern and cautious warnings about possible sanctions, except for urging that both sides take the road of dialogue, the West is not going to help us."
This "line" of moderation is also being following by the CPSU press. For example, Pravda's correspondent, I. Teterin, wrote in the May 15 issue of the Soviet CP organ: "Personally, I am convinced that there is nothing reprehensible in the attempt of the Baltic republics to become real subjects of international law, to collectively defend their regional interests in the USSR and beyond its borders. The whole question is how to achieve that goal. Judging AUTH by all the facts, the leaders of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia chose the most radical road. But, as is well known, in the conditions of the world today, radicalism does not lead to integration in the community of civilized nations but rather to being rejected by it." Recently, Pravda has also noted expressions of bitterness at the Western states' attitude on the part of the Lithuanian leaders.
United majority formed in parliament
At the same time, Tiesa has been complaining that Sajudis is on a antiCommunist rampage, in particular since its recent congress. In the May 12 issue, Alvydas Sedius, first secretary of the independent CP city committee in Siauliai, complained that "autocracy prevails in the parliament. If you think differently, if you talk of differences (even if it is realistic, even if it is true, you are an enemy of the people! A united majority has formed in the parliament. But this unity, I dare say, is not based so much on a real alliance as on fear that you might be called an enemy of the people."
In the context of the independent CP's line, this sort of argument seems clearly intended to counter the pressure for maintaining national unity behind the republic's leadership against Moscow's threats. This also fits in with Moscow's propagan- 11 da that the national democratic moveJune 4, 1990 • #186 International Viewpoint
USSR / CHINA ments are trying to institute a "new totalitarianism." So, it would hardly be surprising if the party representatives in the government tried to break ranks to push for a more accommodating attitude to Gorbachev at the first opportunity. But the lamentations about "new totalitarianism" on the part of the independent CP also indicate that the pressure for national unity against Moscow and behind the declaration of independence has been extremely strong.
This is not to say that there may not be "moderates" in Sajudis as well. The parliamentary debates opening up now may reveal some. Prunskiene's actions after her discussion with Gorbachev suggests she could be one. But the "moderate" line and logic of the independent CP, as put forward by Tiesa, seem quite consistent.
Ironically, while the independent CP is denouncing Sajudis for anti-Communism, the May 4 issue of the Russian weekly Russkaya Mysl' published in Paris ran an interview with a Lithuanian Christian Democratic personality, Viktor Piatkus, who argued that the front was a shadow of the Communist Party:
"Last year, some young lads from Moscow visited me and asked: Why are there middle-aged people in Sajudis and old people and youths in the other camp.' I said. 'I might answer your question with another. What do you think.' They told me that in their opinion Sajudis included people who must be a continuation of the Soviet administration. Almost half the Council of Sajudis were members of the Communist Party. I was struck how in two or three days they had managed to assess the situation."
### Waves leave Baltic
Communist Parties
Before the political changes in the USSR, the bulk of the intelligentsia was in the Communist Party. With the rise of the national-democratic movements, waves started leaving the Baltic CPs, whose cores also eventually shattered. But political experience is accumulating very rapidly in the Baltic, and undoubtedly changing people's views both about the Soviet bureaucracy and the Western states.
Disappointment with the attitude of the Western powers seems to be sinking more and more deeply into the consciousness of the Baltic national democrats. The May 11 Reede ran a long article by Edgar Savisaar, the Estonian People's Front's economic expert and now premier of the republic. He dissolved the problem of the Western government's attitudes into a broad exposition of historical and economic evolution. But he did have to take it up.
In the same issue of Reede, an article by Kaarel Haav was outspokenly radical. 12 It used anti-Communist-sounding language, referring to the Soviet Union for International Viewpoint #186 • June 4, 1990 example as an "empire of evil." But Haav also wrote: "Mr. Gorbachev has not condemned the Stalinist regime, but he calls it Socialism, and he is ready to defend this regime by any means, sacrificing human rights as well as the rights of national majorities.
"J. Stalin did not threaten to crush peoples but he did it. J. Stalin did not send tanks to the capital of any republic of the USSR [as Gorbachev did to Lithuania] or executioners with sappers' shovels [the April 12, 1989, massacre in Tbilissi]; he did his killing in the shadows. J. Stalin was many things to many people. Some saw him as a great national leader, others as a bloody hangman. Mr. Gorbachev is also many things to many people. The world sees his shining smile. Only the Soviet peoples see his big teeth."
Further on, Haav also denounced the West. "The whole world is used to this empire and does not want to see new free peoples or countries."
He also criticized the national democratic movements themselves. "Lithuania and Estonia will not free themselves if they do not raise their freedom struggle to the ideological level. Great state [suurriikliku, this term has become a characteristic negative term in the Estonian national democratic literature] lies, violence and dependency ideology (Stalinist Socialism) have to be opposed with an ideology of truth, human rights and freedom.... We cannot defeat Soviet totalitarianism socially, politically Or economically. We can only defeat it ideologically, only with the truth."
Haav pointed to a basic problem, which is likely to become more and more acute as the confrontation between Moscow and the Baltic and other peoples of the USSR deepens.
The political line of the national democratic movements has largely remained stuck in legalisms, diplomatic formulas and commonplace pragmatic notions. In order for them to be able to mobilize the sort of international movement necessary to break the grip of the Soviet bureaucracy, they will need to offer perspectives that can inspire the support of all oppressed peoples and of democrats among the majority populations of the great states.
Along with a fundamental critique of Stalinist national oppression, the programs of the Baltic people's fronts, especially the Latvian one (See International Viewpoint, No. 169, September 18, 1989) offered a perspective of radical democratization of social relations. But these conceptions have now to be deepened and extended internationally in order for the fronts to begin to appeal directly to the peoples. That is the only way forward now in the face of the unholy alliance of the Soviet bureaucracy, the Western states and all the establishments against the Baltic peoples struggle for their national rights.