The repression prevents the fundamentalists from appearing so openly as in other countries. However, at the same time as resorting to repression against fundamentalists, the regime favors some of them who are close to it. This is the case of the group around the journal El Islah, whose main activity is confronting left-wing students in the universities in the cities where the student movement is most active - in
Oujda in 1988, in Fez in 1989, and so on.
They are already an auxiliary repressive force, which, for example wages slander campaigns against atheists.
In any case, religious talk is standard in Morocco, since the regime claims to rule by divine right, which helps to cut the ground from under the fundamental ists.
• Is the student movement sti 11 structured by the Moroccan Nation al Union of Students (UNEM)?
1981, UNEM has been going through an Since its Seventeenth Congress ir 1 10 op 40 open crisis. It is no longer capable International Viewpoint #186 • June 4, 199 leading the student struggles, HAT is the Unión
Unión despite the willingness to fight that young people have demonstrated in recent years. The crisis came out into the open with the withdrawal of the USFP students from UNEM, which they realized they could no longer control. What is more, the students to the left of the USFP were not capable of taking matters in hand. Since then, the UNEM has had no leadership bodies, nor any form of organization. The students continue to identify with it and are systematically repressed by the "university guard." •a" Recently, the fundamentalists, especially the group around El Islah, a journal manipulated by the regime, are trying to speak in the name of the UNEM and work in it, which has resulted in almost daily clashes with left-wing students. The UNE has a lot of possibilities for development today because of the bad conditions for living and studying, bound up with the decentralization of the university system, and the building of very poorly equipped universities in several cities. All that favored the struggles in 1988-1989. • Are we seeing the appearance of a new leadership in the student movement? No. Even within the Qu'idiyin ("Rank and File Students"), the current traditionally close to Ilal Amam, which is very broad and open, there are disagreements about whether to structure the organization. Another weak point of the student movement is that it is based mainly in the north of the country, in Fez, Tetouan,
Meknes, Oujda, and not in the cities where the UNEM was traditionally strong, such as Casablanca or Rabat.
• We hear very little about the
Moroccan women's movement.
The women's movement had an upturn in activity in 1983, via the Moroccan
Association to Defend Human Rights and in the cultural associations in Casablanca,
Rabat and other cities. But this wave ebbed, without leaving any structures behind. On the initiative of activists close to the OADP, a journal called March 8 was published between 1985 and 1988.
Today, virtually nothing is left. The cultural organizations have been dismantled, and in the left in general disappointment and disillusion prevail. The women's movement is virtually nonexistent today, and the three human rights associations no longer do anything in this regard. The women's associations mainly disseminate information. They no longer have a base in the neighborhoods, and the political differences among the organizations generally loom larger than their mass work.
W Dotriftins'e Patriótica's position toward the elections after the murder of your presidential candidate, Bernardo Jaramillo? After Jaramillo's assassination, we held two national plenums, where we discussed the current election campaign. It was agreed virtually unanimously that we should withdraw from the election campaign. In fact, as we said publicly when Jaramillo was killed, we have been driven out of the election campaign at gunpoint. We think that there are no guarantees for genuine democratic participation, inasmuch as the government has neglected one of its constitutional obligations — making at least some effort to safeguard the lives of those who involve themselves in national political life. We think, moreover, that in 20 days (the time limit set by the electoral law) it was materially impossible to select a new presidential candidate able to wage a campaign that would enable us to present the UP's points of view on the national situation. • What person or persons do you think are responsible for Bernardo Jaramillo's murder?
We think that the paramilitary groups are behind it. The investigations have pointed up a strong involvement of the paramilitaries controlled by the drug traffickers. But the national government also bears a responsibility because of its negligence. The tragic episode represented by the Minister of Administration's absurd and inappropriate statements that the UP was the political wing of an armed movement are well known. Obviously, these statements were an incitement to the paramilitary groups. And this not only relates to Jaramillo's murder but also to other murders that are being plotted against UP leaders and the trade-union and peasant movement.
• The Communist Party of Colombia
(PCC) says that the people use many methods of struggle — election campaigns, armed self-defense, and so on. What is the UP's position regarding this? Well, at the outset, I should say that the
UP is not a political party. We are registered as a political party because the law requires it. But the UP includes Liberals,
Conservatives, Catholics, Communists and so on. And none of these forces can impose their viewpoint about the line to follow. The UP, for example, is not a movement in favor of fighting for socialism. It is not at ta T UP is a movement that is working for democracy in our country, for a democratic opening that could restore peace for the Colombian people. This conception does not embrace the combination of different forms of
COLOMBIA
Colombia: the left and the crisis
THE COLOMBIAN LEFT and far left have been shaken by important changes against a background of repression. On
March 9, 1990, with great publicity, the M-19 guerilla movement laid down its arms. In exchange it was granted the right to take part in the March 11 regional elections in which it succeeded in stealing an electoral march on the Patriotic Union, a front dominated by the Communist Party, previously the leading force on the left. In the capital Bogotà, M-19's candidates got twice the UP's score.
Since then the UP has gone into crisis. Eight of its 12 main leaders have left to set up a bloc with the M-19 and other political forces — the Popular Front, led by the Communist
Party (Marxist-Leninist), the Colombian Union, and Democratic Socialism. This bloc supported the presidential candidacy of Carlos Pizarro, the historic leader of M-19, until his assassination on April 24, 1990, to be replaced by Antonio Navarro. Faced with this new bloc, which has a reformist line,
UP and A Lucharfind themselves in a difficult situation. The UP, if it has remained able to keep its base, is seeing its political space shrinking, given that its political line is very close to that of the M-19 led bloc. For its part A Luchar, which is meeting fierce repression, is maintaining a radical line against the stream. Despite their differences, UP and A Luchar are certain to enter into discussions. These realignments on the Colombian left are taking place in a period of retreat of struggles. The United Workers' Central (CUT), which in 1988 had almost 700,000 members, where all the forces of the left are found, is itself in crisis and is incapable of organizing a reply to the the Barco government's austerity policy. The following interview with the vice-president of UP, Carlos Romero was conducted for International Viewpoint by Eric
Toussaint.
to the fact that the traditional political leadership has not shown the political will necessary to attempt a solution to this problem, we have offered new proposals. These have the advantage of opening the way for forces outside the country to act as mediators. In the first instance, we sent a message to the Pope, asking not only for his solidarity against the violence, but also for him to approach the international bodies and offer to mediate in an attempt to bring about peace in the country. • Would such an agreement be of the same type as those arrived at by the Central American presidents?
No. We still do not envisage any agreement of that type. In the first place, we appealed to the Pope, and recently we turned to the United Nations. We are looking, for example, for a way in which the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan governments, which are headed by people linked to the international social democracy, can play a role in the search for mediation acceptable both to the armed forces and the armed movement. • How do you assess the period the UP is going through since the departure of Montaña, Angelino Garzón and other leaders, who have formed a new bloc with other political forces?
Well, in Colombia people have always said that any left movement is divisible by three. But the fact is that the UP national leadership is confronting a crisis that it has already begun to overcome with the holding of its last national plenum. On the other hand, it seems to me that it is still not facing up to the whole truth about the causes of this crisis.
My assessment of the situation is that the old leadership, led by Dr. Diego Montaña, showed considerable incoherence in regard to proposals for solving the crisis that the country has been experiencing.
For example, on one occasion, compañero Bernardo Jaramillo made a proposal, which no one understood at the time, for dialogue with the drug traffickers. Of struggle the PCC refers to. One of its components might have such an idea, but not the UP as a whole. • Could you explain more fully the conditions required for achieving such a democratic opening in Colombia? in
We think that the worst problem facing the Colombian people is violence in all its forms, including that arising from the confrontation between the armed forces and the guerrilla movement. We think that there is no possibility of a military solution to this problem. Conditions do not exist for a military solution either for the army or for the guerrillas. In other words, the confrontation between these two forces could last until the year 2,000 and go on into the next century without any chance of a resolution.
Given this situation, we think that the only real possibility is to find a political, peaceful solution to the armed conflict. In pursuance of this orientation, we have knocked on all the doors within reach. The problem is that we have run into big problems, which everyone knows about, that have generated a mutual mistrust between the armed forces and the guerrilla movement. In response to this mistrust, to the fact that there is no national political force capable of mediating in the conflict, and course, Dr. Montaña's response was resoundingly negative. In big headlines, the press reported his disavowal and threat to resign from the presidency of UP, because he thought that dialogue with the drug traffickers was morally impossible.
You also have to take into consideration that Jaramillo made his proposal at exactly the time that the government, the DAS, the army and the police had come to an agreement and decided to make a thoroughgoing assault on the traffickers. It was a completely absurd proposal!
A month later, however, Dr. Montaña signed a joint statement with the "notables" (López Michelsen and others) that meant dialogue with the drug traffickers and son.ething more. This was obviously a very grave political inconsistency for a murlult widt, like ours, has been expert- movement that, like ours, has been experi. 19
COLOMBIA encing very difficult conditions.
This whole business did us a lot of harm. But I think that we are in the process of recovery, and that, based on the work of the new leadership, headed by Oscar Dueñas, we are going to rejuvenate the UP's whole national leadership team and get all of the ranks moving.
We are going to try to do this through a policy that will not be simply a result of agreements at the top, but also and fundamentally, involve working with the ranks and the Colombian people, who these days are being left on the sidelines by political projects that fail to recognize that any change can only be the work of the Colombian people. • I'm still not clear about the differences between UP and the new bloc that has formed.
To be honest, I too still don't understand what the differences are. I think that we will have to wait until they are expressed publicly and coherently. After that, we can say what we agree with and what we reject.
I can refer to the positions expressed by some leaders of this new bloc. For example, with respect to the armed struggle, Garzón has came out for a negotiated peace. But if that is his position, I don't understand why he is with M-19, which was not able to achieve a negotiated peace and which, in fact, ended up by capitulating.
We made a distinction between capitulation and a negotiated peace. We think that the guerrilla movement has a very important role to play — to guarantee a democratic opening through negotiation. I think that it is possible to achieve this. I think that the guerrilla movement wants to negotiate and reach an agreement, including to demobilize itself.
But on the basis of offering something to the Colombian people. Giving up just so they grant us 15 minutes TV time a week doesn't seem to me to have any point. We are for peace, but for a negotiated peace. I think that on this point we differ.
As for the other questions, it seems to me that another political project is in the works that counts on the support of the international social democracy. It seems to me that it is a process very similar to the one that took place in Venezuela
(through Carlos Andrés Pérez) and in
Ecuador (through Rodrigo Borja).
In this regard, I'm sorry that elements external to our country have gotten involved in the divorce among the left.
However, we are not against the emergence of this new project. We think that it is a good thing for them to form a social democratic party. Maybe we will have points of agreement. For a start, we have already agreed on the need for a negotiated peace, a constituent assembly, plural20 ism and on on. International Viewpoint #186 • June 4, 1990
THE COLOMBIAN LEFT Legal political organizations
The Patriotic Union (UP), dominated by the Communist Party, was set up In 1985. Its General Secretary, Jalme Pardo Leal was assassinated in 1987. The UP has a considerable number of elected representatives at various levels. It has withdrawn from the current presidential elections after Its presidential candidate, Bernardo Jaramillo, was assassinated on March 23, 1990. The UP continues to develop on a reformist line. A Lucharis a revolutionary organization which has developed important mass work (unions, neighbourhoods, among women and so on). Militants of Castro-Guevarist origin, strongly influenced by the Cuban revolution, find themselves alongside ex-Maoists and Trotskyists. The Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR — Colombian section of the Fourth International) dissolved itself in 1989 to take part in the construction of A Luchar, while continuing to exist as a Trotskyist current within the organization.
The Popular Front (FP) is the political front of the Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) (ex-Maoist and ex-pro-Albanian). It has just joined in a bloc on the initiative of the M-19 guerilla movement and an important split from the UP. The aim of the bloc is to create a social democratic force. The querilla movement in Colombia
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are the oldest and the strongest of the Colombian armed organizations. They are implanted in rural areas. Led by the Colombian Communist Party (PCC), the FARC took part in 1983 in a truce initiated by the government of
Belisario Betancourt at a time when the PCC was trying to integrate Itself into the political state institutions, going so far as to envisage dis-
Warming itself.
The Natlonal Liberation Army (ELN) Is led by the Camilloist UnionArmy of National Liberation (UCELN) — named after the guerilla priest, Camillo Torres, who died fighting in 1967. It has about 4,000 guerillas and is the second largest armed organization. This organization, of Guevarist origin, was created during the high tide of Cuban-style focoIsm at the end of the 1960s when It was joined by ex-Maoists and Trotskyists. After drawing a balance sheet of its strategy, it has turned towards the creation of stable zones and towards the peasantry.
The People's Liberation Army Is led by the Communist Party (Marxist-
Leninist). It has about 1,000 guerillas.
The Qinti Arme Armed Indigenous Organization has about a hundred fighters.
The Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT) is an organization of Maoist origin, with about a hundred fighters.
These organizations came together in the Coordinadora Simon Bolivar in September 1987.
The April 19 Movement (M-19), which laid down Its arms on March 9, 1990, had some hundreds of fighters. Very marked by left-wing nationalism, the M-19 was born out of a split in the FARC. In the 1970s it won considerable mass support, and became a pole of attraction for the radIcal unlon movement. It was able to carry out large-scale military opera-
After participating in a "dialogue" with the government in 1984 and tions after an Important part of its leadership was killed by the repression that followed the collapse of the truce in 1985, the M-19 now defines
Itself as "civilian and democratic" as do the UP and FP. Its presidential candidate, Carlos Pizarro was assassinated on March 19, 1990. The M-
19 Is continuing to take part in the elections. The unions The United Workers' Centre was created in 1986. It brings together three previous union confederations, tied respectively to the liberal and conservative parties and the World Federation of Trade Unions as well as independent unions.
• What role did the international situation (perestroika, regional accords and so on) play in the division of the UP?
The UP has never discussed such questions, or at least not since I have been a member. So, I was surprised by Dr. Montaña's statements that he had proposed a humanitarian socialism modelled on perestroika. I was also surprised, because I as told you, UP is not a party or a socialist movement. Its objective is not socialism.
Its objective is to achieve democracy under capitalism. In the economic domain, for example, our proposal is for a mixed economy with social provision.
• Do you really think that you can achieve genuine democracy within the framework of capitalism?
Well, I don't say that we will achieve perfect democracy. But I do think that the country can be given very extensive democracy. I am sorry that socialism is not on the agenda in Colombia. What this country needs is full democracy, that is, a democracy that would restore the rights of the workers.
Colombia is one of the few countries in the world where forming a guerrilla force is easier than forming a trade union. There is no freedom of association in Colombia.
Those who try to associate are persecuted.
Being a union leader in Colombia means risking your job, your family allowance, your life, everything! That is the way things are. We are fighting for a democracy in which it would be possible to form a union. That is an elementary right for the
Colombian people.
Another important aspect has to do with the democratization of the means of communication. As everyone knows, the main
Colombian TV channels are in the hands of the four presidential families. In these conditions, it is materially impossible to gain access to this important means of communication.
A third aspect is achieving peace with a perspective of establishing a pluralist govemment, that is a government that can include Liberals, Conservatives, Communists, UP, in short all those who are interested in building a fully fledged democracy in Colombia. • What is your position on the constituent assembly?
For a start, I think that a constituent assembly is a necessity to overcome the reality now facing the Colombian people. However in order for there to be some signs of democracy in Colombia a constituent assembly is not necessary. In order to end the state of siege, that has gone on for 35 years, a constituent assembly is not necessary; to restore the people's right and capacity to organize and mobilize, a constituent assembly is not necessary. To guarantee the lives of people, a constituent assembly is not necessary. We do,
COLOMBIA of course, need reforms to institutionalize all these constitutional rights.
But if there were the political will today on the part of the ruling classes, there would be no need for constitutional reforms to move on to a more or less acceptable form of democracy, to representative democracy.
• Don't such arguments weaken the demand for a constituent assembly?
No, because if you read Dr. Carlos Lleras Restrepo's proposal, you will see that it says that the text of the constitutional reform has to be worked out by two delegates from the parliament, two delegates from the Supreme Court and two delegates from the Council of State. In other words, he is proposing that it be drafted by Liberals and Conservatives.
• What is your proposal, then?
We think that the constituent assembly should be formed through two mechanisms. The first is direct elections. The second, is giving representation to the country's social and political forces — the business organizations, the trade- union movement, the political parties and the armed movement.
A pluralist, democratic constituent assembly confronting the country's problems can only come from these two sources. A constituent assembly does not involve just amending the 1886 constitution. A constituent assembly means above all electing people to discuss a political and peaceful solution to the armed conflict.
• What are you doing to get the masses to take up this demand?
We think that there should be a referendum on the question of a constituent assembly. In this way, the participation of the source of constitutional authority, the
Colombian people, would be guaranteed. If you think about it, you will realize that the proposal being made is an elitist one — to call on the political experts. As if the constituent assembly could be held in isolation from the country's problems. • What other left forces does the UP hope to bring into its alliances?
We think that Colombia has very great democratic reserves. Unfortunately, these reserves are dispersed because of very strong personal or regional differences. They, therefore, need a point of reference and a form of coordination that will make it possible to attract them to the search for the necessary reforms. I think, for example, that there are important democratic sectors in the Liberal Part that we have to attract. In the Conservative Party, there are also such tendencies. In general, we think that we can find allies for the cause of democracy a sc movements. in all the social movements.
• Haven't you thought about making alliances with A Luchar or other left forces?
Yes, of course. At the moment we are discussing a proposal by A Luchar to join the UP. On the level of organizations (A
Luchar or the Popular Front), their incorporation should occur on the basis of respect for their organizational structure, with equal conditions for participating in the UP's national leadership and decisions being made by consensus and not by majority vote.
The PCC is a majority in UP, but we have come to an agreement that decisions will be made by consensus.
Some personalities are also asking to be given a special status in order to participate in UP. Some compañeros, for example, are asking that they be granted the status of permanent guests of the UP. We are discussing how to include them, without their necessarily having to become UP members. • Municipal elections were held recently. What do you think of the results Pizarro and the UP got?
I think that the UP results represent a setback. But there are many reasons for this. The first is the impact of the dirty war both in the countryside and the cities. It should not be forgotten that several UP leaders have been murdered in Bogotà. But the worst thing, it seems to me, is the discrimination against us as regards the lack of guarantees.
We were on the defensive not only with respect to the paramilitary groups but also with respect to certain authorities and military commands, which became organizers of a struggle against the UP. Another problem derives from internal conflicts generated by different political assessments both within the UP and in the various forces that make it up.
Even so, we got 255,000 votes throughout the country and have elected nine members of the House of Representatives, 18 deputies to the departmental councils, one senator, eight mayors (as the UP, about 93 in coalition) and 257 city council members. So, despite all the problems I mentioned, we have maintained our basic positions. *
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