NICARAGUA
After the Sandinista election defeat THE FLN'S DEFEAT on February 25, 1990, will have a profound impact on the revolutionary left, especially in Latin America. The Sandinista revolution's victory in 1979 meant, in many respects, the beginning of a recomposition of these currents. It ushered in a stage of transformations in the relationship of forces between imperialism and the national liberation struggle and between the reformist left and the revolutionary left within the workers' movement. While the
The growth of hyper-inflation has thrown the whole economy into turmoil. The figures speak volumes. In 1985, inflation was already 334.5% annually; in 1986, it was 747.4%; in 1987, 1,347.2%; in 1988, it reached the incredible rate of 36,000%; and in 1989, it fell to 1,700%. This illustrates well the pressure on the Nicaraguan economy. Of course, it has been the poor masses above all who have paid the price for the Sandinista government's economic management.
In his book Nicaragua, Oscar René Vargas wrote: "The gross domestic product declined to the late 1950s level, while the per capita domestic product plunged to the level of the 1940s. According to the official figures, if in 1980 buying power was 100, at the end of 1988 it was 3.7.
period that opened on July 19, future appears more uncertain defeat. SERGIO RODRIGUEZ T I HE CRISIS in the post-capitalist countries is exerting a pressure when it comes to defining different strategic hypotheses. For the majority of the revolutionary left, what is called the "socialist camp" played a fundamental role. It was the backup of the revolution. These currents complained in private about the bureaucrats in the East, but publicly and officially they maintained a totally uncritical attitude. Today, the "socialist camp" no longer exists as such, and this has left a sort of political void, since the processes in the East have not yet defined a clear position toward imperialism and the struggles of the third world.
The FSLN's defeat will be used by the imperialists and the Latin American national bourgeoisies as new evidence of the failure of socialism and the pointlessness of revolution. According to them, the revolution has not only been incapable of getting the Nicaraguan economy out of underdevelopment but, what is more, it has plunged the country into the worst crisis in its history. Now they are going to try to make us pay the bill, and that can have repercussions on some sections of the revolutionary left.
It has to be stessed that this defeat rep- It nas to be stessed that this deleat represents a victory for the imperialists' policy of "low-intensity conflicts." While it is true that the counter-revolution has been crushed militarily, the Sandinistas paid a high price in this area, as well as in the economic and social spheres. While the contras were never able to win the support of the masses, which would have enabled them to establish themselves in a zone under their control in Nicaragua, they nonetheless paved the way for the victory of the National Union of the Opposition (UNO).
The human costs of this war are staggering — more than 50% of the Nicaraguan
1979, is not closing today, its after the Sandinista election budget has been devoted to defense, 70,000 people have been killed and thousands of people wounded; almost all Nicaraguan families have lost someone, had a family member injured or suffered material loss. This weighed heavily on the minds of the people who voted for the UNO, thinking that it in that way they could stop the war and abolish Patriotic Military Service.
Facing the war-weariness of the population, the Sandinistas were forced to move up the elections in a search for legitimacy and a political hold that would prevent the US imperialists from pursuing their policy of aggression. "The FSLN's aim is to win the elections by 70% in order to hold onto a majority in the executive and the parliament. In order to accomplish that, the president is using a language that all Nicaraguans can understand, the language of baseball: "You have to hit the ball not to the right or to the left but toward the center."
This quote reflects quite accurately the electoral strategy chosen by the Sandinistas. The objective was to get a strong majority by using simple language, stripped of any leftwing undertones, in a wing undertones, in a
This shows the plummeting standard of living of the population. This element can have an effect on the vote in the February 1990 general election." This prognostication proved more correct than the author thought.
Inflation continues despite adjustment policy
Even though the inflation rate was reduced in the first half of 1989, thanks to an adjustment policy in the best traditions of the IMF, the standard of living of the masses has not improved. Inflation reached 792% at the start of the year, but wages increased only by 120%. Still worse, the price index for necessities rose by 927.56%. Inflation did not affect all products equally; the household basket was particularly hard hit.
This policy, experienced by all coun tries in Latin America, was applied differently in Nicaragua. While the IMF has imposed austerity programs as conditions for new credits, Nicaragua has not gotten access to any kind of financing. US military aid to El Salvador was $1,630.8 million between 1983 and 1987, and $3,769.8 million for the rest of the region. Nicaragua has not gotten a penny (according to the figures of the Congressional Research Service and the Agency for International Development). If foreign financing was equal to 100 in 1985, in 1988 it was only 12.75. The election results The election results campaign without military uniforms. But this For the presidency and vice presidency Daniel antidote was not effec- Ortega and Sergio Ramirez, 40.8%; Violeta Chamortive enough to allay the ro and Virgilio Godoy, 54.2%, In the legislative elecfears of a large section tions, the FSLN got the majority of deputles in three of the population, who regions, Estell, North Atlantic and South Atlantic. In cannot be called anti- all, it got 39 deputies against 51 for UNO. The Social Sandinista but who Christian Party and the Movement for Revolutionary doubted that the Sandi- Unity (MUR) got one deputy each. nistas were able to stop The FSLN was also bested in the municipal electhe war. tions, holding on to only two major cities - León
Another key element and Estelf. It lost Managua, Chinandega, Matagalpa in this defeat is the and Granada, It nonetheless retains a presence in economic situation most municipal councils. 3 afflicting the country.
NICARAGUA
It has to be understood that the currency flow from agricultural exports has also shrunk. In 1979, it was $565.5 million, while in 1988, it was $235.7 million. The adjustment policy applied in Nicaragua was quite special in the sense that it did not even enable the country to capitalize.
The grip of imperialism is more obvious in Nicaragua than in any other Latin American country. The economic blockade policy has proved its effectiveness for a poor small country such as Nicaragua. In view of this situation, the question can be raised whether another economic model was possible in Nicaragua. Some might be tempted to think that the solution lay in nationalizing the majority of the means of production in order to keep market criteria from operating in an anarchic way. But this solution is utopian.
Nicaragua is a very small country with one of the lowest levels of industrialization in the world, with a small productive capacity concentrated mainly in agricultural exports. The adjustment policy applied was not ideal. Some aspects could have been corrected, in particular as regards the reinvestment of profits. But the fundamental terms of the problem remain.
What imperialist pillage represents has to be clearly explained. Otherwise nothing can be understood about what is happening in a country like Nicaragua that is trying to carry out a deepgoing revolution and which is experiencing grave difficulties in building a different sort of society. If we add to this the problem of the war, the picture is complete.
The question is complex. The imperialist countries have experienced a substantial change in labor relations. Economic reconversion has combined big technological transformations and deepgoing changes in the organization of work. The challenging of Taylorism has opened the way for a new sort of organization in the factories, which has led to a substantial increase in the productivity of labor. All this has been accomplished without the working class in the imperialist countries being able to oppose it.
Transformation in labour process necessary
Today, the economic adjustment policies applied in other Latin American countries also make necessary such transformations, but in the context of a disastrous economic crisis. The productivity levels have risen so much that they are sinking these economies deeper and deeper into underdevelopment. This situation concerns the Nicaraguan economy also, because the reorganization of labor does not affect only industry but also agriculture. The levels of labor productivity set by Japan, West Germany and so on are higher than in the past.
In this situation, the strangulation by 4 country in the third world can only be imperialism of a revolution in a poor avoided by a timely and firm counterattack by the workers in the developed countries. The revolution of the poorest countries in the third world can only advance with the support of the workers of the imperialist countries.
This does not mean that the Sandinistas have not made mistakes in the economic sphere, and more particularly in the social sphere. The existence of a layer of members of the state apparatus enjoying a series of privileges became an obnoxious reality. The opening of shops for diplomats (the "diplotiendas"), where certain Nicaraguan functionaries, thanks to special tickets, could buy at below market prices, provoked the anger of the most disadvantaged. Che Guevara had already warned against this danger. We do not think, however, that there was a crystallized bureaucratic social layer in Nicaragua but the pernicious effects of such phenomena in a devastated country cannot be denied.
The weakness of the mass organizations formed after the revolution was another key element in the FSLN's defeat, as well as the relationship between the state, the party and the masses. The big popular organizations have suffered from the economic policy put into practice. They have thus found themselves facing a dilemma. They had either to mobilize pressure able to alter the government's economic policy or endorse it and thereby become mere instruments of the state in the eyes of the people.
Face to face meetings with the people
Two attitudes developed. The "face to face with the people" meetings were often prepared with the express objective of putting pressure on the president to change, even partially, the wages or credit policies. Daniel Ortega in fact modified a series of economic measures. But these meetings were also the occasion for endorsing and hailing the economic policy, and therefore provoked a negative reaction from the masses.
This discontent was neither channelled or organized by UNO. In my opinion, it still is not. But a mute, barely perceptible negative attitude took hold. Daniel Ortega's wind-up campaign rally in Managua brought together hundreds of thousands of people (500,000, according to the most modest sources). There were also big mobilizations in Masaya, León and other places. However, many of those who participated in them did not vote for the FSLN but for UNO. Some must already have decided to vote for Violeta Chamorro and the legislative and municipal coun cil candidates on her slate.
The vote in the three elections was, moreover, quite even. Nonetheless, all these people took part in the FSLN's rallies. There are two explanations for this. People voted for UNO thinking that the
International Viewpoint #181 • March 26, 1990
FSLN would win the elections but that it was necessary to create a counterweight to the FSLN, or that they went to the rallies under constraint. They did not take part because someone in particular forced them, but simply because of the state's weight on the society and the existence of an official government party. Latin Americans are quite familiar with such situations.
I by no means want to make a comparison between Nicaragua and the totalitarian regimes in East Europe. Nothing would be more wrong than that. But the FLN reduced the problem of building a democratic country to the question of multipartyism and elections with universal suffrage and a secret ballot. There was no development of a democracy of another type — for which embryonic forms were present at the start of the revolution. But that was fundamental.
The great masses of people cannot accept an economic policy and a war like the one in Nicaragua without being able to make decisions about them directly. The identification between the masses and the state was not destroyed, but in the absence of direct links, the majority of workers in the countryside and the cities did not understand the reasons for certain economic measures.
Creating conditions to resist
Imperialist aggression
Today, the FSLN needs to maintain the objective of building democratic people's power. Only such a government can create the conditions to resist an imperialist policy of aggression by making the workers the masters of their history and their future. In the present conditions in Nicaragua, regaining the government by parliamentary means may even come through the consolidation of such a power.
The result of the elections surprised not only the FSLN but also UNO. The discussions in this alliance have always been focused around the place the legislative candidates of the various components are to have in the regional slates and the designation of the first five names on the slate. UNO expected to get about 33% of the votes. Several days after February 25, it was still unable to establish the bases for forming a stable government and preventing a civil war at the same time as crushing the FSLN's influence in society.
This incapacity is bound up with UNO's nature. It was possible to form this coalition only thanks to the pressure of the US government. Newspapers such as the Financial Times (February 28) characterized UNO as a motley alliance supported by the United States." The coalition goes from the National Action Party (PAN) of the extreme right to the Communist Party of Nicaragua (PCdN) of Stalinist origin. Immediately after the election, the vice president elect, Virgilio Godoy, expressed
his disagreement with the person named by Violeta Chamorro to negotiate the transition with the Sandinista government, saying that he considered himself best able to do this job.
Godoy is not just megalomanic. These disagreements reflect differences that exist among the UNO forces. In his campaign wind-up speech, Godoy directly threatened the members of the Sandinista government, declaring that after February 25, he was going to "make them pay the bill." To the contrary, Violeta Chamorro understood that a confrontationist position was totally counterproductive. She has identified herself with the current that directly represents the interests of the United States, which is led today by Alfredo César of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), who belonged to the Sandinista government and then joined the contra leadership.
This current wants to carry through a transition to change the nature of the state apparatus without going through a civil war. It is trying to gain at least a good part of the power before taking more radical measures against the Sandinistas by using a trump card, the legality of UNO and the legitimacy of the election.
Here the FSLN runs up against a limitation that is easily explainable in the context of the imperialist aggression. In an attempt to gain recognition, the FSLN signed the San Isidro accords, thereby accepting a conception of the state according to which the legality and legitimacy of regimes flow directly from the ballot box. From this standpoint, the Cristiani government in El Salvador is legal and legitimate because it is the outcome of an electoral process, even though the biggest political force in the country did not take part and though the president got only 20% of the vote.
Still worse, according to this doctrine, a goverment can do anything it wants if it is elected. If it slaughters the leaders of the mass movement, if its army murders six Jesuits, if it bombs the population indiscriminately, that is not so bad, since it was elected.
This view obscures the difference between legality and legitimacy. Alfredo Cristiani and Violeta Chamorro have been elected according to "actually existing" laws in their countries, but that does not mean that they are legitimate. The legitimacy of a revolution or a social movement flows precisely from the loss of legitimacy of a governmental institution. In other
NICARAGUA words, legitimacy expresses and includes the problem of political hegemony within a society. The legitimacy of Violeta Chamorro's government is compromised by the support it gets from the United States.
In Nicaragua, we are seeing two forms of legitimacy side by side, the legitimacy that flows from the results of the February 25 vote and that which flows from the July 19, 1979, revolution.
It is important to understand this situation. The Nicaraguans have not voted en masse against the Sandinista revolution. They voted against the government's administration and economic policy. But they have not voted for the imperialists' political schemes. They have voted
Waiting to vote in Managua on February 25 against the war, but not for the contras.
They have not voted against the agrarian reform, or against the right of poor people to be masters of the plot of land where they live, or against the nationalization of the banks, or against the monopoly of foreign trade. They have still less voted against the right to strike or assistance for old people. They have not voted either against the Sandinista People's Army, even if they do not want any more obligatory military service. •
These two legitimacies thus stand in confrontation. The FSLN is obliged to accept the election result, but also — as its leadership has said - to defend the gains of the revolution. The road between these two legitimacies is strewn with contradictions and with blind turns. The problem of the army is obvious.
There are three possibilities as regards the Sandinista People's Army, which sum up the three different scenarios of confrontation possible between these legitimacies.
The FSLN may think that it will inevitably have to wait six years before returning to government. In that case, it would no longer be the party of the July 19 revolution and would become a social democratic party. According to this assumption, the FSLN would no longer act in the interests of the gains of the revolution and above all would accept the dissolution of the army.
There is little chance that this hypothesis will take form. The attitude taken by the FLN, by its leadership and its ranks, after the announcement of the election results points in the opposite direction. I, therefore, remain optimistic about the impossibility of such a hypothesis.
The second possibility is that the FLN leadership may take a hard-line position and accept no agreement to smooth the way for Violeta Chamorro to take power.
The FSLN would, in that case, insist on holding on to the commands and leadership of the army. In that event, imperialist intervention is quite possible. The US will wait patiently for agreements to be arrived at for the transfer of government. If that does not happen, the decision to invade Nicaragua has already been made. The final possibility is that the FSLN will be forced to negotiate about some aspects of the state apparatus and even discuss the problem of the army, in order to give no pretext to UNO or its boss, the United States, for an invasion. At the same time, it will develop a class struggle policy and begin progressively to create clear areas of ungovernability, winning the majority of the population over to the legitimacy of the revolution. In this case, the question is no longer whether this process lasts two years or six years, but how to regain political hegemony in the society in a very complex international context.
The FSLN (along with the entire Latin American revolutionary vanguard) faces a very difficult political situation. Perestroika, the aggressive policy of imperialism, the failure of the nationalist currents and so on are all favorable elements for a ferocious international anti-Communist campaign. The fables about the "end of history" or the need for "weak" ideologies clash with a social reality of hunger and poverty.
A new chapter in the struggle of the peoples of Latin America is being written. As in 1979, the FLN finds itself today at the head of this struggle. Despite its election defeat and some errors, the FSLN is still the vanguard of the Latin American revo- 5 lutionary organizations. *