With the Mudjahedin in the Panchir Valley The death of several hundred Soviet soldiers in the Salang tunnel explosion at the beginning of November highlighted the cost of the Kremlin's intervention in Afghanistan.
Two years after the start of a massive military intervention, the Soviet forces have not yet succeeded in smashing the guerrillas fighting foreign domination. They do not seem even to have made any serious headway. And they are paying a heavy and increasing material and political price.
Of course, the U.S. imperialists, as well as various conservative regimes in the region have an interest in seeing the Soviet forces bled and humiliated in Afghanistan. They also have an interest in developing their own local agents. And so, there is no question that they are sending in some financial and military aid.
On the other hand, it is equally clear that the outside military aid to the guerrillas is not a decisive factor. The type of material aid necessary to change the nature of the resistance to the Soviet forces could not be concealed. And its political effects would be even more obvious. Such aid would inevitably involve a major war with Soviet forces on the Soviet borders.
The conflict in Afghanistan does not have that kind of dimensions. And there is no indication that the imperialists or any of the local conservative regimes are prepared to risk such a confrontation.
In these conditions, only the determined support of the overwhelming majority of the population could enable the various forces fighting foreign domination to survive. This political reality is already well established, and it makes the perspective for the Soviets grim, at least unless they are prepared to make a qualitatively greater commitment.
The Kremlin's own press has begun to recognize that the Afghan operation has been a costly one. On November 8, the Soviet army's journal "Krasnaya Zvezda," published an article saying that the conflict was doing "enormous damage" to the economy of Afghanistan, and that the Soviet forces had had to "pay a heavy price" to "win the confidence of the Afghan people."
As the struggle continues and deepens, the forces fighting in defense of the Afghan people's right to self-determination tend increasingly to differentiate. This typically happens in national struggles as they mobilize the masses of working people, even in the most conservative ideological climates. The following interview points to some clear changes the struggles are producing in the leadership of the resistance, even though, in the case he cites, this has not taken the form of a conscious political difference. Along with this, there are already consciously socialist oriented currents in the resistance.
Against the background of this massive and deepening struggle, it is not surprising that the fact that Yuri Andropov held some of his first discussions as head of the Soviet bureaucracy with the Pakistani chief Zia El-Haq, Afghan president Babrak Karmal, and Mrs Ghandi of India encouraged speculation that the USSR might now be prepared to make big concessions to achieve some sort of compromise settlement in
In its editorial November 17, "Le Monde" wrote: "Of course, it would be hasty to conclude from the discussions Monday that the Soviet position on Afghanistan is going to evolve. But that cannot be excluded, since it is reported that Andropov was opposed to invading the country.
"This question should be followed very closely because it will be important in any normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. Along with a settlement of its border conflict with Moscow and of the Cambodian question, Peking is demanding a gesture of good will from the Kremlin in Afghanistan in order to continue the rapprochement that started in the last weeks of Brezhnev's reign.
"One might suppose that Andropov is dreaming of playing the Chinese card to get Washington to take a more amenable attitude."
In any case, it is likely that in the uncertain situation that can be expected to accompany a change of leadership of the totalitarian bureaucracy in the USSR, problems as acute as those caused by the Kremlin's Afghan war will play an important role and increase the instability of the bureaucracy's rule at a critical moment.
Not the least important of these problems, moreover, is the encouragement the Afghan resistance has given to the peoples subjected to national oppression by the Soviet bureaucracy, such as the Poles in particular.
Neither they, nor the Kremlin chiefs can have forgotten that the last major change of leadership in the Soviet Union, Stalin's death, opened up the way for the explosion of resentments against the regimes imposed and maintained by the power of the Soviet bureaucracy.
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Dr Jean-Philippe Tabard, a member of the International Medical Aid Association has just returned from Afghanistan. He was based in the Panchir region, north east of Kabul. It is a strategically important valley since it finishes up on the KabulUSSR road.
An AMI medical team, which was looking after Afghan Mudjahedin fighters was there during several military offensives carried out by Soviet occupation forces and Afghan government troops. Dr Tabard spoke to Michel Lequenne in Paris in late October.
We publish this interview as information material on the development of the situation in Afghanistan. We refer readers who want to know the Fourth International's position on Afghanistan to read the resolution adopted by the May 1981 International Executive Committee (IEC) of the Fourth International meeting, entitled "For an independent, federal and socialist Afghanistan" (publicly available in English from Intercontinental Press, 410 West Street, New York, 10014 New York, USA). Question: You were in the Panchir Valley during the Soviet offensives this year?
Answer: Yes, there were two. I arrived as one of the replacements for a previous team around June 10, this year, after nearly a month-long journey, at the very moment when the fifth Soviet military offensive since the beginning of the war (January 1980) had begun. It was a very large offensive with the deployment of 10,000 Soviet troops, tanks, helicopters, planes etc. Due to this the Mudjahedin commander of the Panchir valley, - his real name is Ahmet Shah - thought it was too dangerous for us and ordered us to return to Pakistan.
We returned to the same area around August 15 and we went to work caring for those wounded in the offensive (not that many and the civilians mainly injured by the bombing raids. This 'mobile makeshift medicine' - since our hospital had been destroyed - continued for 15 days. Then on August 27 we found ourselves in the middle of a new offensive. It was a massive offensive, once again involving 10,000 men with 150 to 200 tanks from what I could tell from mountain-top observation, with at least 40 airplanes bombing the valleys, 80 helicopters, airlifted troops etc... This offensive finished on Thursday September 18 in a rather surprising way. Although the Soviets were in a rather favorable situation in the valley one night they all left — just like that. We did not really understand very well why they did so.
Q: Did these troops fight the Mudjahe-
A: Massud's tactic is to not stand and fight - which is understandable - since his fighting forces are only a tenth of those who are attacking him and they are much less well equipped. At strategic positions he has units which try and resist but he withdraws as soon as that becomes bad and opts for commando-style operations. Before they only did this at night since the Soviets did not move at night, but now the Soviets also move at night so Massud changed tactics and attacks both day and night but always with small groups capable of withdrawing very rapidly.
Q: It is more or less Mao Zedong's strategy of revolutionary war?
A: In fact they do talk about it and people say Massud has read Mao Zedong and Vo Nguyen Giap.
Q: So you have to mainly look after civilian wounded? 12
A: Yes, people injured by bombs, especially those notorious fragmentation bombs whose shrapnel cut people to shreds. If a fragment hits your foot it is torn apart, if it gets your arm, as a minimum you have an open fracture with large chunks of flesh torn away. I saw a kid who had his buttocks completely ripped away.
Q: How is the offensive going?
A: In practice they occupy the terrain.
Q: Do they destroy villages?
A: It's the helicopters which destroy them. They destroyed most during the first offensive. The whole south of the valley below a village called Bozorah was eighty percent destroyed. The rest of the valley up to a village called Omar was forty percent destroyed. All by air bombing, except in a few valleys where the Soviets have established positions and burnt some houses - but to a negligible degree compared to the bombings — especially by helicopters. The latters' missiles are very precisely aimed but because they are small rockets they do less damage than the planes whose missiles destroy everything for 100 metres when they hit a house.
Q: When the troops arrive have the inhabitants already left?
A: Almost all of them. During this second offensive - which I observed - I estimate there were at least 60,000 people who found refuge in the mountains and adjacent valleys out of a population of some 100,000 people. Only the old people - thinking they would not be harmed - stayed behind in the villages. In general they were right. I've heard contradictory stories from other provinces like the Logar region, but in the Panchir region the Soviets were content to lock them in.
Q: And we don't know why they withdrew?
A: There are various explanations. A British journalist I met out there, who had already been eleven times in Afghanistan, thinks that all the Soviet offensives are very precisely programmed down to the exact days required. Therefore once the day comes for ending the mission the troops go back to base whatever the success or failure of the offensive ... Perhaps he's right. But in this case it seems very bizarre that the withdrawal was so quick. The Dara valley takes a minimum six hours to cross at a good walking pace but the withdrawal was made in one night. This was particularly rapid since a military withdrawal takes another four hours on top of this, and it is a region where neither tanks nor lorries can pass and one goes only on foot.
Q: Do the Soviets suffer losses?
A: The figures Massud gives are pretty high. I am naturally wary of figures given only by one side but I've observed that up to the May 1982 offensive all the figures given by Massud have been confirmed by diplomatic sources in Kabul -hence my confidence in him. For the May/June offensive he says 3,000 Soviet troops were killed, 180 tanks destroyed and 20 helicopters and Migs. I can assure you that there were certainly significant material losses. I've seen wrecks of all sorts. In May the Mudjahedin attacked Bagram airport (60 km north of Kabul) the main Soviet airbase and destroyed 24 grounded aircraft. This figure has been confirmed in Kabul.
Q: What arms do they have?
A: They have the classic Kalashnikov assault rifle. Nearly all the Mudjahedin are now equipped with them. One no longer sees the old English Lee Enfield Mk III which is still used in other regions. They have 13 anti-aircraft weapons, including big tripod mounted automatic machine guns which can be transported over several kilometres in two hours and artillery cannon mounted on wheels.
Q: Where do these weapons come from?
A: From Pakistan and are all marked with the Chinese triangle which does not mean that they are supplied by the Chinese. There are also heavy weapons which come from Egypt, the only coun try which officially recognises its aid. Everything goes through Pakistan. The relations between Pakistan and the resistance movement established within its borders at Peshawar are rather good at the moment.
Q: What about the relationship between the internal resistance and the Afghan political parties based in Peshawar?
A: It is difficult to judge. The three 'fundamentalist' parties based in Peshawar seem to me to have eighty percent of the Afghan resistance behind them. The numerically biggest is the Harakat-e Enquelabe-e Islami (Movement of the Islamic Revolution); the second, the Jamiat-e Islami (Islamic Society) is the most important military force, and the third, the Hezb-e Islami (Islamic party of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) is now rejected by all the other parties. The alliance between nationalists, fundamentalists, indeed some progressive forces in my opinion seems to work quite well in Peshawar in terms of dividing out financial aid and arms. The Hezb-e Islami is not only rejected by everyone else but it excludes itself from unity with the others. Massud himself went so far as to tell me that Hezb-e Islami was: "a worse enemy than the Russians!" (1) In the interior the resistance needs the Peshawar parties since arms can only pass through there. Some resistance leaders have good links -like Massud who is a member of Jamiat-e (1). The Le Monde of 4th November 1982 reported fighting between the different movements in the Koh-e Safi mountains near to the Panchir valley. The Hezb-e Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a fundamentalist party, is carrying out an offensive to regain its influence over villages in this region which have fallen into the hands of rival factions. Hezb-e Islamic supporters are therefore in an armed opposition to the coalition regrouping Jamiat-e Islami, Harakat-e Enquelab-e Islami and a dissident grouping from Hezb-e Islami led by Yunus Khales. The Le Monde journalist quotes a local Jamiat-e Islami chief who stated that the Hezb-e Islami had gone as far as striking the village women, even the Soviets did not go as far as that.' The journalist further notes that in this region such fighting has become more important than actions against Soviet and Afghan government troops.
Islami. Others only use the parties for arms supplies.
Q: Is the resistance unified in the Panchir region?
A: Yes it is. It is entirely controlled by Jamiat-e Islami. Only one village is supposed to be favourable to Hezb-e Islami. The Tajiks who live throughout the north of Afghanistan, whose chief is Rabani, are all politically controlled by Jamiat e Islami. But in this country differences are sometimes much more related to ethnic divisions than ideology.
Q: Is it true that other resistance centres have sent aid to those in the Panchir region?
A: Figures are a bit contradictory, but it is certain that other resistance groups have sent reinforcements, particularly the Hazaras. I've heard reports of 1,000 fighters. In my opinion such a figure is difficult to accept - moving 1,000 Mudjahedin about is not an easy matter. But there is certainly support of men from Shamali, Nuristan and Hazarajat •.. And without doubt Massud's biggest victory is to have brought together these forces to support his front. He has thus become the symbol of resistance in Afghanistan.
Q: During your stay in Panchir did you get to know about military actions in other areas of the country?
A: Yes. In June there was another offensive in the Logar region which turned out very badly for the resistance because there all the parties are fighting one another. More than 2,000 Mudjahedins were supposed to have been killed. I found out about this in Peshawar because when you are in a region like Panchir, one knows practically nothing about what is happening elsewhere - except through the BBC which is listened to to get news from other regions of Afghanistan. News also reaches Kabul about the operations carried out by other forces on the Shamali plateau which are more or less controlled by Massud. Reports mention that
Wor Literacy class in Afghanistan (DR) Mudjahedin actions inside Kabul itself A: It is difficult to say. They are very have increased - which is confirmed by worried, especially the adults. However reports received by Islamabad (Pakistan) they are all very much in solidarity with diplomats from their Kabul colleagues. the Mudjahedin. At the end of the offenThese actions are said to have very much sive the people expressed themselves with increased since December 1981: destruc- one voice: We've kicked them out!' It tion of police stations, petrol stocks etc. was really their victory as much as the
Q: Were there Afghan government fighters. But at the same time they suffer troops with the Soviets during the offen- from big psychosomatic problems, diffisive against Massud in the Panchir region? culties in sleeping, headaches, etc, which
A: Yes but the Soviets have changed is understandable given the intensity of their tactics of using them. At the begin- the bombing in the region. But they are ning they always put the Afghan troops holding out. in the front line, but the Afghans are not Q: Has there been a political evolution very keen to do this dirty work and there in the resistance? are an enormous number of desertions. A: We spoke a lot with Massud. His So now the Soviet elite troops go to the objective is the Islamic revolution. But front and do the difficult work like going what does that mean? When we asked into the mountains. The Afghan soldiers him like Khomeini's in Iran?' he replied never managed to do this while the Soviet *No, Khomeini has not put forward anycrack troops do - preceded by helicopter thing for the people in his Islamic revolubombing. Then airlifted troops are drop- tion' and he added The Koran is not a ped on the hilltops - which permit the political ideology' • He understands this elite troops to cross the mountains. The very well and even compares the Koran to Afghans follow. During the May-June the Gospels, saying 'In your countries offensive the Soviets took positions you can draw out two hundred political throughout the valley then progressively ideologies from the Gospels, from Pinowithdrew their troops. Finally after a chet on the far right to the left. It's the month and a half they set up five military same thing with the Koran. We hope that outposts held by Afghan government the Jamiat-e Islami in Peshawar develops troops. When I arrived three of these mili- a policy from the Koran for us. Here on tary posts had been retaken by the the front we have other things to do.' Mudjahedin. Two outposts at the bottom We asked him precisely which policies of the valley still controlled by the he would like to come out of that but his Afghan goverment troops during the Sep- answers were much more vague. tember offensive had still not been We took him up specifically on the retaken a month after the offensive. question of women and he replied that Massud was aiming to annihilate them the present condition of women in before the winter began to facilitate his Afghanistan did not conform to the arms supply lines. Generally this type of Koran. For example he said that women operation does not pose too many pro- should not have to give dowry and should blems since the Afghan pro-government have the right to choose their husbands. forces do not have the stomach for war. According to him this problem has to be During my stay out there I saw about looked at when the war finished. fifty Afghan deserters and there must He even pointed out that all the probhave been certainly many more. lems which had caused the 1978 Noor
Mohammad Taraki coup d'etat such as
Q: How are the people putting up with the situation. What is the state of their the problem of sharing out water, land remorale? form, education, women, were going to
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