Absolute majority for the workers parties in Spain
Gerry FOLEY The results of the October 28 Spanish elections confirmed the dramatic class polarization that has been shaping up in the country.
Since this is a process going on in the society as a whole, the vote count produced no surprises. It was almost exactly what all the informed observers expected.
The great majority of the working-class voters backed the only immediate alternative they saw for a working-class government, the Socialist Party. The SP got 201 seats, an absolute majority, and 46% of the popular vote.
The next largest party, the Alianza Popular (People's Alliance) got only about half as many votes as the SP, 25.3%. But it was the second biggest winner in the elections, increasing its vote from a mere 6.1% in the last parliamentary elections in 1979.
The Alianza is the party of the hard right, politicians directly compromised by their relationship with the Francoist dietatorship. It is not too unfriendly to the putschist sentiment in the military.
In the first bourgeois democratic elections in Spain since the civil war, in June 1976, after Franco's death, the AP represented Francoism and was swamped. The bourgeois politicians who stood for parliamentary government and liberalization won.
In this election, the alternative of 'normal' bourgeois parliamentary rule was reduced to rubble. The governing Democratic Center Union had already split before the election. The two pieces together got barely 10% of the vote.
The larger group that maintained the old name got 7.2%; the Social Democratic Center, headed by the first post-Francoist premier Suarez got a mere 2.2%.
The other main loser in the elections. logically enough, was the party that had put the biggest stake on the stabilization of normal bourgeois parliamentary rule — the Communist Party. The strongest opposition party in the years of the dietatorship, the main force in the underground workers movement, got a mere 3.8% of the vote and five seats in parliament.
In fact, the CP was already effectively marginalized in the 1976 elections, in which the SP gained a commanding lead as the main electoral party of the working class.
In 1976, the SP managed to look to the left of the CP, which was bending 8 over backward to prove to the Spanish bourgeoisie that it could be trusted as a housebroken parliamentary party. The CP stressed the need to support the bourgeois politicians leading the democratization. Felipe Gonzalez, leader of the PSOE (DR).
The SP, however, was more concerned with competing with the bourgeois parties for a stronger role in parliament. Therefore, it posed itself, to some extent, as an alternative to them.
The perspective of stabilizing parliamentary democracy essentially foundered on the international economic crisis, which knocked the pins out from under the rapid economic development of the 1960s and 1970s that led the Spanish bourgeoisie to go over to parliamentary forms of rule.
Even the boom had not produced anything like a decent life for most of the working people in the Spanish state. The onset of the world economic crisis revived the spectres of misery and famine.
In this situation, the CP was torn apart by its attempts to demonstrate its acceptability as a parliamentary party and to take its distance from Moscow. The EuroCommunist leadership gave up their traditional dogmatic armor without being able to offer the ranks of the party any gains or credible perspective to replace it.
The one place that the CP had major electoral strength, in Catalonia, it suffered an important split in the year preceeding these elections, with the formation of the PCC last spring.
In fact, the party fell so deeply into disarray that the Workers Commissions, the country's largest labor confederation, which it built and almost totally controlled, did not back the CP's campaign. The prostration of the CP, for the moment, has created a new situation of relative political fluidity in the Workers Commissions, and this is likely to be a factor in the recomposition of leadership in the factories in the coming class confrontations.
The CP leaders explained their rout at the polls by saying that the voters subordinated all other considerations to getting a different kind of government and therefore voted for the SP as the biggest opposition party.
But in a parliamentary system, the eclipse of the CP was not an automatic result of the fact that it could not offer any credible perspective of forming a CP government. It was big enough to offer a political alternative by voting for an SP government in parliament and then putting pressure on it. But there was no point in complicating things by voting for the CP, when it did not offer any proposals substantially to the left of those of the SP.
In its November 5 issue, Combate, the central organ of the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria, the section of the Fourth International for the Spanish state, commented:
"The CP's disaster followed a campaign in which the party activists gave everything they had, the last peseta, the ultimate effort, with an enthusiasm deserving of a better cause. What is more, the ultramoderate policy of the SP left a lot of space on its left that the CP did not try to fill, although it certainly could have.....
"In reality, the CP's electoral disaster is another demonstration of its crisis of strategy and leadership. It has lost all credibility as a party of struggle, even among broad sections of its own ranks. Very few people thought that a strong CP would be a 'guarantee that the SP will not move to the right.
The Partit dels Comunistas de Catalunya (PCC - Party of Communists of Catalonia), which was formed in April on the basis of about half the CP members in Catalonia, got 1.3% of the Catalan votes. This new formation represented a combination of conscious left currents in the CP, Moscow loyalists, and a confused combination of both. It was generally identified by the mass media as a "pro-Soviet" party.
Commenting on the results of the PC's first electoral campaign, Combate Combat said:
"This was a poor result for a party that includes the most militant sector of the Catalan workers movement. We imagine that there will be a discussion in the party on the balance sheet. We hope that the outcome will be a strengthening of the commitment to struggle and mobilisation that gave rise to the PCC, not a step backward, nor a reinforcement of the line of claiming that it is the party, which has been coming from the leadership.
"The result of these elections, as well as the experiences and struggles in the most recent period strengthen our conviction that a revolutionary alternative able to compete with the reformists can only be built in Catalonia and in the rest of the Spanish state on the basis of the unity in action of all revolutionaries.
"Even a united-front campaign in Catalonia would probably not have elected any deputies this time. Such a campaign would have been overshadowed by the polarization and the pressure to "make your vote count.' But it still would have been a very important help for continuing the struggle after election day, which is the important thing."
The LCR participated in far-left coalitions in Madrid and in Catalonia. In both cases these united slates received only a token vote, 5,000 in Catalonia and 3,700 in Madrid.
As for Madrid and Catalonia, Combate commented: "The results are not very different from what we expected, but we still cannot say that we are happy with them. In any case, whatever the limitations of these campaigns, they were valuable experiences. We hope those who participated with us will draw the same conclusion and continue and stengthen this united front.
"Our general conclusion from the campaign is that even in those areas where there was a coalition or where we stood alone without asking people to vote for us, this approach of unity in action must be extended and strengthened in the coming months." (In a number of areas, the LCR alone or with other forces ran token campaigns in order to get its ideas out and then withdrew shortly before the vote.)
In Valencia, the LCR participated in the Esquerra Unida del Pais Valencia coalition which got 10,000 votes, or 0.5%.
With respect to the results in Valencia, Combate said: "The Valencia United Left is a very specific case because a unitedfront of action has been established there for some time. It was a campaign whose importance went beyond Valencia as a test of the possibility of such fronts and the usefulness of such campaigns. The campaign was obstructed by the severe floods that hit the region. So, the results were modest but they have to be seen in comparison with these difficulties.
In the Basque country, the LCR called for a vote for Herri Batasuna (the People United), the Basque revolutionary nationalist party. The HB increased its vote significantly from 192,000 in the elections for the new Basque local authority, in which it could be expected to do better than in an all-Spain general election, to 206,700.
Although the opposition to the instittutions of the Spanish state is greatest in the Basque country, the pressure of the demand for a general alternative was also felt there.
The big winners were the PNV, the traditional nationalist party, and the SP. The first increased its vote from 365,420 in the local assembly elections to 406,804. The latter from 178,800 in the assembly elections (as opposed to 247,700 in the last all-Spain general election in 1979) to 463,200. For the first time, the SP managed to outdistance the PNV to become the first party in the Basque contry, even though it went out of its way in the campaign to convince the Spanish bourgeoisie that it would not make any concessions to the Basque nationalists.
Nonetheless, the nationalist parties together still have a much larger vote than the SP, and the revolutionary nationalists have half as many votes as the broad moderate nationalist party. The total vote in the area for the centralist bourgeois parties was 257,000.
The vote for the CP was only 22,000. In the period before the election, most of the local CP joined a moderate left nationalist formation, Euzkadiko Ezkerra. The EE got 98,000 votes, exactly the same as its score in the assembly elections, while the CP vote was nearly wiped out. more or less grouplets outside of the Basque country. That is the only area where the national question occupies center stage in polities, and this creates special problems for organizations active on an all spanish state level.
The Basque sister organization of the LCR, the Liga Komunista Iraultzailea (LKI) ran candidates in four consituencies. But throughout the area, it backed the Herri Batasuna because of the role that this organization has played in the development of the Basque struggle.
In its preelection issue, Combate published an interview with Inaki Esnaola, one of the most prominent candidates of Herri Batasuna. He said the following about the relationship of the Basque struggle and that of the working class throughout the Spanish state:
"The HB is for the building of a nation that would fit together perfectly with the other nationalities in this state. And of course, this process must be led by the working class. From the all-Spanish state left parties we ask solidarity in this strug gle, and we will reciprocate.
"For us, what the LKI has done here 1s a principled approach to the problem of the nationalities, and we are pleased with it."
The results for the individual LCR-LKI candidates are not yet available as we go to press.
The tensions created immediately after the elections by the assassination of General Victor Lago Roman, commander of the Madrid garrison, the politically key unit of the Spanish army, indicate that the pressure created by class polarization is continuing to rise sharply after the vote. During the funeral, a crowd gathered outside army headquarters shouting, "the army to power."
As cravenly pro-bourgeois as it is, the SP leadership will be the first leadership to hold office since the civil war not directly controlled by the bourgeoisie. This will be the first government in more than forty years that the masses expect to represent them, a government in which the authoritarian institutions of the Spanish state, in particular the police and military have no confidence. It is also a government taking office in a period of growing economic and political turmoil.
In its concluding comment on the election results and their implications, Combate said:
"In the coming months there will be no lack of occasions to demonstrate that it is both necessary and possible to build mobilizations to force through the process of change against the opposition of the right. In the struggle against putchist blackmail and the civilian warhorse of the putschists, Fraga (leader of the AP). In the fight for jobs for all and in combating capitalist sabotage and capital flight. In forcing through withdrawal from Nato and demanding that the government set the date for a referendum on this question. In fighting to advance the recognition of the right of peoples such as the Basques to self-determination.... In exposing the hypocrisy of those who defend the 'right to life,' while they accept a flourishing illegal abortion business. In winning public schools and putting an end to private business in education.
"In these and other battles that are shaping up, the revolutionary lett must take the initiative and unite in action with many of those who have voted for the SP. It would be a grave error not to take into account that the new government will have the confidence of millions of workers, a confidence that they will need time and experience to see is misplaced.
"But we would make an equally serious mistake if we did not stress right now that without the weapon of independent mobilizations, independent of any 'compromise' with the right, this electoral victory can be transformed into a lost opportunity, a mere interlude before the return of a still more reactionary government of the right."
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