What lies behind the ZANU-ZAPU conflict
Perry FREEMAN Harare - Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Robert Mugabe appeared to have imposed a certain stability upon his war-torn country at the end of 1981. Mugabe's ZANU-PF party was loudly proclaiming the need for a one-party state; but this was to be achieved through discussion with the other major nationalist party, Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU. There was no suggestion that the one-party state would be imposed against ZAPU's will, and Nkomo appeared to be responding favourably to Mugabe's overtures. The major security problem facing the government, the integration of ZANLA (ZANUPF), ZIPRA (ZAPU) and ex-Rhodesian units into a single force appeared to be proceeding smoothly. There had been no repeat of the inter-factional fighting which had taken place in December 1980 and February 1981.
But then, in January of this year, the government announced the discovery of ZAPU arms caches in areas throughout the country, but especially around Bulawayo, centre of Matabeleland, the region from which Nkomo draws most of his support. Mugabe accused Nkomo of plotting against his government. Nkomo and some other ZAPU cabinet ministers were dismissed from the coalition government. Deputy army commander Lookout Masuku, and former ZIPRA intelligence chief Dimiso Dabengwa, both leading members of ZAPU, were detained without trial, along with many other members of their party. The government adopted a totally hostile attitude towards ZAPU.
At about the same time, the security situation in Matabeleland began to deteriorate. A spate of armed attacks on government official vehicles, as well as on stores and buses began. Desertions from the army increased at a rapid rate. In order to deal with the situation, the government launched massive security operations in Matabeleland. These included house-to-house searches and road blocks in Bulawayo and virtual counterinsurgency operations in rural areas.
WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE EVENTS?
The breaking of the ZANU-PF/ZAPU alliance should be viewed as a deliberate change of policy by Mugabe, not as a result of an accidental "discovery' of the plot. There is no doubt that all the factions involved in the Zimbabwe war cached arms when it ended, as "insurance' for the future. ZAPU in particular wanted to be able to defend itself against forcible dissolution at the hands of the numerically superior ZANU-PF. Furthermore, many of the weapons had been sold to the South African ANC, with which ZAPU has close links, for use in its guerrilla operations. So the existence of ZAPU caches does not necessarily indicate the existence of a plot. It is likely that the government knew of the arms caches a long time ago. Their 'discovery' represents a decision by ZANU-PF to abandon the strategy of unifying with ZAPU through persuasion and instead to create a one-party state through the crushing of its rival. This approach has advantages for ZANU-PF; it can crush more radical ZAPU elements.
The loss of government control in Matabeleland is only partly linked to the breaking of the coalition. There is no evidence that there is a ZAPU plot to destabilise the government, and Nkomo has frequently denounced the 'dissidents' (as the government has dubbed the Matabeleland bandits). But it is also clear that many of the 'dissidents' are ZIPRA exguerrillas who feel that the government has done nothing for them and does not represent them. And many peasants in Matabeleland are prepared to give them shelter because they share the 'dissidents' hostility to the government. Many of the 'dissidents' also have material reasons for their disaffection. Over two years after the war's end, many are unemployed, and some have not been paid their demobilisation benefits for ten or eleven months. The government's use of punitive measures against communities which fail to inform on dissidents are certainly having wholly counter-productive effects.
How "has Mugabe's government got itself into such a situation? The roots of Zimbabwe's present problems have to be sought in the circumstances in which ZANU-PF came to power. As a result of the combined pressure of imperialism and the war-weary 'front line' Áfrican states (especially Zambia and Mozambique), the Zimbabwean nationalists had to accept independence in the framework of the Lancaster House agreement. The agreement was the brainchild of the then British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, and was the lineal descendant of previous Anglo-American proposals to ensure that the transition to Black rule in Zimbabwe took place with a minimum of threat to imperialist interests and without a genuine social transformation of the country. The agreement provided constitutional guarantees for private property and compulsory compensation in those limited cases where government appropriation of property was committed. Given that imperialism would use its whole economic weight in the country to prevent any breach of the agreement on this point, it is a powerful check on any attempt at nationalisation of industry or agriculture. The structures of the bourgeois colonial state were defended through the agreement's insistence that Smith and Muzorewa's civil servants would retain their jobs and pensions and would be under the control of a Public Service Commission which would prevent political 'interference' in the civil service. The 'independence' of the judiciary -including Smith's hanging judges - was to be maintained. Most importantly, the guerrilla fighters of ZANLA and ZIPRA were to be integrated with ex-Rhodesian forces into a non-political 'National Army'
Two years later, how has the Mugabe government been able to deal with this straightjacket?
It is certainly true that it has been able to carry out many important social and economic reforms, which have given it a wide popularity. A minimum wage for all grades of workers has been imposed. Health care has been made available free to low-income earners and services in the rural areas have been expanded. Primary education has been made free and both it and secondary education have vastly expanded their intake of pupils. The government has supported campaigns against racism at work. Promotion of Blacks in government employment has been tremendously accelerated. Encouragement has been given to co-operatives although these are few in number. Unused or abandoned land on white farms is being acquired for the peasants. But, at a more fundamental level, the aims of Lancaster House have been achieved. Imperialist ownership of industry and finance remain. The huge white-owned farms are intact and secure. The structures of the civil service are as they were in Smith's day, despite a change of personnel, (and in many cases even the personnel are the same). The integration exercise in the armed forces has gone forward; and effectively the structure of the old Rhodesian army has absorbed that of the guerrilla armies.
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Why is it that ZANU-PF has not been able to produce a revolutionary solution to these fundamental problems? Above all the answer must be sought in the all the answer must be sought in the character of ZANU-PF as a party. Despite a great deal of socialist verbiage, it never developed an analysis of how to deal with the settler state and imperialist capital.
This lack of a revolutionary analysis is in large part due to the totally undemocratic policies of the nationalist leadership during the struggle; they always placed the maintenance of their control first, and liquidated or imprisoned a number of left wing currents in both ZANU-PF and
ZAPU. In power, ZANU-PF has increasingly adapted itself to the task of running a capitalist economy. In a recent speech,
Mugabe proclaimed that although Zimbabwe was a socialist country, it would not be necessary to nationalise any industries, and that there need be no conflict with the interests of the business community'
In short, the leadership of ZANU-PF has never transcended the limits of petty- bourgeois nationalism in practice. While it was absolutely correct to give unconditional support to ZANU-PF and ZAPU in their struggle against the Smith regime, there must be no illusions now that their leaderships were or are of a revolutionary character.
But left critics of the ZANU-PF government have to answer an important objection to their strictures on the regime's actions. It can easily be asked - what was the alternative? Having had little alternative but to accept Lancaster
House, and given that an attempt to tear up the agreement would have led to a full-scale confrontation with imperialism in a highly unfavourable situation, could ZANU-PF have done anything else? Could any more radical a strategy have been adopted?
We would answer in the affirmative. Even in the post-Lancaster House situation there was a way to develop a revolutionary mobilisation - a path that was taken by the government. During the course of the armed struggle of the independence election, powerful grassroots organisations had developed throughout rural Zimbabwe. In most areas elected party committees assumed effective control over the administration of their locality, totally usurping the functions of the racist regime's civil service. They mobilised migrant workers in support of the nationalist movement. This mobilisation, which by its very nature involved struggle around the social conditions of the masses as well as the overthrow of white rule, could have been the basis of a continuing anti-imperialist mobilisation. But far from attempting such a project, the nationalist leadership, obeying the logic of Lancaster House, demobilised the mass movement, and replaced its local control with that of the inherited state machine, which had earlier been driven out of the rural areas.
The nature of the politicial process which is taking place in Zimbabwe can be 24 seen most clearly in the way in which the
Mugabe government has responded to the self-organisation of the masses.
When a wave of strikes against racist management practices and low wages broke out at independence, ZANU-PF's leadership immediately responded with calls for a return to work. Labour Minister Kangai made the first of many speeches around the theme that the country' could not 'afford' strikes. In
December 1981, the government used police against striking teachers and and victimised strike leaders. In March
1982, when bus drivers, emploved by g public company
British capital went on strike, the government has 1000 arrested and supported the dismissal of 1800 workers.
A national trade union centre was established, not through democratic discussion amongst the workers, but through a meeting of hand-picked trade unionists presided over by the Minister of Labour.
The government has sponsored the establishment of workers committees in factories and workplaces, which can be a focus for worker organisations, but are barred from dealing with issues relating to wages, and have no lateral links with each other.
On the land, the government has given little support to the large numbers of peasants who are squatting on the big white farms. Only land which is unused or has been abandoned is being taken over for utilisation by the peasantry, and such land is in general being paid or compensated for rather than expropriated. This programme is in any case proceeding extremely slowly and the mode of resettlement is one of individual tenure.
While most of the reforms in the fields of health and education have brought welcome improvements in the lives of the mass of the population, they have been administered through civil service structures in a way which has undermined local initiative and self-organisation. The government is trying to establish a kind of Social-Democratic welfarism which it does not have the economic resources to sustain. In a country of this type, an all-round transformation of social conditions requires mass politicisation and mass activity - it cannot be conferred from above.