The impact of the Soviet reforms on Castro's Cuba THIRTY YEARS AFTER the Cuban revolution', the charging of high officials for involvement in drug trafficking attests to the breadth of the crisis in the Cuban Communist Party apparatus. The accords reached with the Soviet Union at the time of Gorbachev's visit in April point up the economic difficulties and the political impasse in which the Castro
The most recent agreement between Cuba and the USSR is less favourable than previous ones. The price of sugar is fixed at 850 roubles per tonne as against 915 roubles for the previous decade. The proper comparison here is not with the world market price — the sugar "dustbin" as Fidel Castro put it — but with the quota prices used in a good number of transactions.
### Long-term agreements between Cuba and USSR
Outside the Eastern countries, such transactions are made for sugar exports from the ACP countries to the European Economic Community (EEC) and from Latin American, Asian and African countries to the United States. The preferential prices granted are higher than the world market ones, and often equal to, or even higher than, those paid to Cuba by the USSR. But the conditions for setting these prices are never guaranteed. And, in particular, the import quotas accepted by the US have shrunk considerably in recent years, sometimes dramatically cutting the resources of exporting countries. However, Cuba enjoys guarantees offered by long-term agreements with the USSR.
Finally, the interest rates on credits granted by the USSR are higher than in the past. The situation is much more negative with regard to other Comecon coun tries. Hungary has stopped extending credits, as have Poland and Romania. The most important partners are East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.
Since 1976, Cuba has taken part in the coordination of Comecon's five-year and long-term plans. Its specialization in agriculture and primary materials has been maintained. The planned target for the sugar harvest is 12 million tonnes in 1990, while production of citrus fruits is to rise leadership finds itself. JANETTE HABEL from 1.4 million tonnes in 1985 to 2.6 millions in 1990.? Nickel production has been given a boost, but two thirds of the extra production must be exported to the Comecon countries that have helped in the building of new factories, as repayment of loans. Some 90% of nickel production has been sold to the Soviet bloc, according to the Financial Times of February 2, 1989. This means that Cuba will not be able to fully benefit from the substantial rise in the nickel price since 1987. It is true that under these long-term agreements Cuba participates in scientific and technological projects in computer technology, electronics and biotechnology. And here there have been some impressive results. For example, the development of an advanced biomedical industry has enabled Cuba to export chemical and pharmaceutical products — above all to Latin America, where Cuba hopes to play a leading role in preventative medicine and sophisticated surgical techniques.
Soviet economists against continuing "subsidies"
However out of the 93 projects and 930 sub-projects in Comecon's development plan running up to the year 2,000, Cuba is only involved in 52 sub-projects in nuclear energy, electronics (computer terminal 1. See /V 159, March 20, 1989. 2. See the work of Turits, Brezinski, Petr Gey et al. 3. Comecon, or the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Cuba joined in 1972 4. In fact, this is an estimate made on the basis of exchanges of imports and exports in the context of barter agreements. 5. Brezinski. 6. The ACP countries: 66 countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific associated with the EEC through the Lomé Convention. 7. Credits, including some in hard currency, have been granted to make the necessary investments. 8. Financial Times, February 17, 1989.
keyboards) and bio-technology. Brezinski believes that Cuba's involvement is in fact very limited, despite official claims that the less developed countries of Comecon get preferential treatment.
The Forty-Fourth Session of Comecon in June 1988 and the Prague conference in April of the same year revealed that Cuba will continue to benefit from preferential tariffs until the end of the present five-year period. However, Soviet economists have spoken out against the continuation of "subsidies" to Cuba in the 1990s insofar as these do not open the way for "improvements in the performance of the Cuban economy"! In any case, Cuba remains to a large extent confined to the role of producer/exporter of raw materials, and this is to continue for a long time.
Regardless of the ups and downs of aid and the difficulties of judging how extensive it actually is, a second point needs to be made. It is true that the Soviet Union is Cuba's most important supplier. But over and above the fact that the financial conditions attached to some imports are not always advantageous, the quality of capital goods and products from the USSR is challenged. Moreover, it is by no means unusual to hear Cuban officials claim that the worst Soviet products are "bestowed" on Cuba.
Cubans have a severe assessment of Soviet aid
Whatever the truth of the matter, it is undeniable that whenever the Cuban government has the opportunity to choose its own suppliers, it prefers to pay hard currency and buy from the market-economy countries, despite the limits of Western credits. 1° Although this is never said officially, the Cubans make a severe assessment of Soviet aid, claiming that, apart from the strings attached, it is not suited to the needs of their economic development. The Cuban criticisms can be summed up as follows:
EVERYTHING FROM THE PAST MUST BE CHANGED!
• Deliveries are made according to Soviet priorities and not Cuban needs.
• The equipment and machines are obsolete and often delivered after a considerable delay. The enormous difficulties encountered by the transport system in the autumn of 1988 are laid at the door of the late delivery by East European factories of spare parts for the maintenance of the buses.
Impossible to arrive at precise aid figures
• It is a matter of public knowledge that the USSR did not keep its side of agreements, causing a halt in nickel production and an estimated 10-year loss.12
• Some promised goods have never been delivered. In 1979, the USSR failed to deliver 40% of the 500,000 tonnes of lumber promised. Furthermore, useless goods are substituted for certain products, and agreements are abrogated without any warning, which means that purchases have to be made in hard currency at the last minute and thus at the highest price.
With respect to their efficiency, the costs of certain services are high. It is particularly shocking, for example that Soviet technicians get 80% of their salary in hard currency, on top of free housing, transport, medical care and access to special shops.
All these factors have to be included in reckoning the cost of the aid. It is impossible to arrive at precise figures. The Soviets say their aid amounts to $2.7 billion annually. But Western estimates cite a total of $4bn. The US State Department's last estimate, for 1986, was $6.8bn, including $4.7bn in the form of subsidies included in purchases of sugar and nickel in exchange for petroleum, $600 million for specific projects and $1.5bn for military aid (traditionally granted free of charge by the USSR).
A final objective fact must be added, which is not dependent on the will of
BUT... I'M FROM THE PAST AS WELL!
CUBA either partner — exorbitant transport costs due to the distance between the USSR and Cuba. Soviet tankers, which arrive at least every two days, make a journey of some 12,000km, representing 7% of the total cost of Soviet petroleum imports.13 Agreements have also been made for supplies from Venezuela, but only limited quantities are involved. During a visit to Cuba, grain producers from the USA claimed that they could deliver grain to Cuba at prices 30% less than the Soviet Union.
These figures clearly raise the question of the American embargo and the Cuban interest in seeing it ended. This was one of the points raised by Gorbachev during his visit, and it will also be a part of summit negotiations and any bargaining that takes place over Central America.
The 25-year Cuba-USSR Friendship and Cooperation Treaty signed by Gorbachev during his visit was primarily of symbolic importance. It was a reaffirmation that the special relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union would be maintained at a time of considerable speculation about an eventual break between the two countries. But, while the Treaty reaffirms the need to "restructure international economic relations on just and democratic foundations in order to eliminate unequal exchange and all discriminatory practices in world trade...to exclude economic coercion for political ends from the relations between states... and to] sort out the grave problem of the external debt which burdens the overwhelming majority of Third World countries" 14, the Cuban debt to the USSR was not cancelled.
Reasons why USSR did not cancel debt
This fact is all the more significant because this occasion could have been the opportunity for a public announcement that would have cost little, since the repayment of this debt is more-or-less ruled out. Such a declaration would have been a bonus point for Soviet diplomacy, which is looking for closer economic relations with Latin America. The likelihood of such a decision even led to a headline on the front page of the Italian Communist Party paper.' It had taken Gorbachev at his word when he said at the United Nations on December 7, 1988, that the USSR was "ready to put in place a longterm moratorium, of up to 100 years duration, on the servicing of the debt of the less developed countries, and in some cases, to cancel them altogether " 16 9. Brezinski. 10. Mesa-Lago/Gil, Documentation française, December 1988. 11. Le Monde Diplomatique, April 1989. 12. Robert Graham, Financial Times, February 17, 1989. 13. Mesa-Lago/Gil. 14. Granma, April 16, 1989. 15. L' Unità, April 4, 1989. 16. Bux, March 31, 19agaise, Probièmes politiques e 23 sociaux, March 31, 1989. July 10, 1989 • #167 International Viewpoint
PANCHO
CUBA
It seems that the decision not to cancel was well thought through. It probably resulted from two considerations. One would be the relative lack of importance of the Third World in Soviet foreign policy and the need to avoid destabilizing or embarrassing Western governments over the issue of debt renegotiation. The other would be a desire to hold on. a useful means of pressuring Cuba to quietly accept changes in its economic policy or at least "a search for the most efficient forms in the framework of bilateral interaction" in economic and commercial cooperation and "socialist economic integration in line with the resolutions of the CMEA".! A "radical alteration of Soviet foreign trade"
All this fits in with the fact that the idea of preferential agreements for the developing countries (proposed by the Group of 77) and the "new international economic order" proposed by Fidel Castro were rejected by the Soviet government in favour of an undertaking to remove trade barriers. It also refused to meet the request of developing countries that it devote 0.7% of its budget to them.18 The 1989 trade protocol between Cuba and the Soviet Union, signed on March 26 in Moscow, provides for the USSR supplying fuel, raw materials, machines and various types of industrial equipment; and Cuba supplying more than 4 million tonnes of sugar, fresh or canned citrus fruits, nickel and some new machines for the electronics industry in accordance with the recent specialization of Cuba within the CMEA, that is, in the manufacture of computer keyboards and electronic circuits. But although an increase in trade is envisaged, the Soviet officials have made it clear the sort of aid and conditions offered in the past cannot be continued.
This is also hinted at in an elliptic comment by Granma's Moscow correspondent: "the agreements have been negotiated in the context of the process of restructuring and reorganization of the central state administrative organs and of the enterprises in the USSR. This required a a lot of work, determined effort and flexibility". 19
Everything suggests that Soviet pressure will be applied in an indirect manner, using the possibilities offered by the new rules of the economic game. Since April 1,1989, Soviet firms have had the right to plan and organize their external relations as they wish, and to cooperate freely with other firms and foreign countries. According to Aleksandr Kashanov, vice-minister of commerce, this measure "will radically alter Soviet foreign trade". 20 This is certain to apply to Cuba. The same official, furthermore, specified that Cuba would 24 _ have to adapt to the new reality:
"It is necessary to change the forms of International Viewpoint #167 • July 10, 1989 collaboration in order to improve their efficiency". It seems that the Nineteenth Session of the Soviet-Cuban intergovernmental commission for scientific and technical collaboration was devoted to a thoroughgoing reorganization of the mechanisms of economic collaboration. The commission was chaired by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, the vice-president of the Cuban Council of Ministers; and Vladimir Kamentsev, vice-president of the Soviet government. It adopted measures to assure implementation of the agreements on reciprocal trade and greater efficiency in the economic projects undertaken with Soviet aid. According to Carlos Rafael, this reorganization is the result of both perestroika and the rectification process underway in Cuba.2
It seems certain that vital oil deliveries will be governed by specific intergovernmental agreements and guarantees, and therefore not at the mercy of the interests of individual Soviet firms. But in all other areas, the Cubans are starting to feel the effects of the new system. According to a document published in the Miami Herald, and corroborated by information of the defector Perez Cott, an ex-official of the State Technology Committee, Soviet firms are already giving preference to supplying their Western clients who can ay ın nara currency. li o the detriment o Cuba and in spite of the agreements reached between the two states.
The message is clear: Cuba is, of course, "free" to decide its own economic policy. But if Cuba does not shape up to the demands of profitability and efficiency, it will have to take the consequences — isolation and difficulties on a far greater scale than previously. The irresistible force of perestroika that Gorbachev has talked about brooks no exceptions.
New forms of cooperation envisaged
As for bartered goods, in particular sugar, Kashanov specified that the present annual delivery of 4 million tons "represents an optimum level, which may only slightly increase in the future"22 This statement is ambiguous, since we do not know if it calls into question the perspectives of the CMEA, or if it is connected to the Soviet wish to diversify their imports using other sources of supply in Latin America, as they have done already with Honduras and with the Dominican Republic, signing contracts calling for a lower price for sugar than is paid to the Cubans. 23
One of the new forms of cooperation envisaged by the USSR is that of assembly factories (maquiladoras) on the lines of those which flourish along the Mexican/American border. Under this new system, the Soviets would send processed raw materials to Cuba, where they would be made into clothing and shoes which would then be re-exported to be sold to
Soviet consumers. 24 The aim is to stimulate direct contacts with Cuban firms, who will be directly dependent on their Soviet partners, so that the latter can make their operations more profitable by using a cheaper labour force and improving the distribution of consumer goods, which has been disturbed by the crisis that is hitting those firms where the reform has been applied first.
Restricting possibilities for opposing perestroika
This type of collaboration will make the working of Cuban firms closely dependant on Soviet management and will restrict the margin for manoeuvre open to the Castroists to oppose perestroika. This is in any case the wish discreetly expressed by the Soviet officials who accompanied Gorbachev on his travels.25
There is a further aim of Soviet policy — to use Cuba as a way into Latin America. There is a lot at stake here for Gorbachev's diplomacy. Cuba is to be used to penetrate the Latin American market, distributing certain Soviet products and breaking down the linguistic and cultural barriers to trade with the continent. This economic rather than ideological approach requires a diplomatic turnaround in Cuban policy. At this level there is agreement between Gorbachev and Castro. The specialization in electronics, biotechnology and the advanced medical industry are part of this framework.
However there are basic problems in the way of carrying out this new role. As Brezinski emphasizes, the prices of agricultural products and raw materials are subject to numerous fluctuations "and will not rise as fast as those of industrial products".
Once again, the problem of the American blockade raises its head. According to Mesa-Lago and F. Gil: "the low level of world prices for sugar and petroleum does not favour imports, while the restrictions imposed on imports of certain products may lead to bottlenecks and bring on a drop in production." Thus, if the present policy of reducing imports, increasing exports and improving productivity does not offer the expected results, the Cuban economy may come under considerable pressures. The recent agreements with Moscow have not reversed the previous trends.
This puts in question the whole balancesheet of Cuban economic development, and its integration in Comecon. In order to 17. Friendship Treaty, Articles 2 and 4. 18. Mesa-Lago/Gil., p.70. 19. Granma, April 2, 1989. 20. El Pais, April 3, 1989. 21. Granma, May 28, 1989. 22. Financial Times, April 12, 1989. 23. The Economist, August 27, 1988. 24. Miami Herald, April 23, 1989; Latin American Monitor, May 1989. 25. Miami Herald, April 23, 1989. 26. Tim Coone, Financial Times, April 12, 1989.
develop an industrial infrastructure, Cuba, with the benefit of high sugar prices in the early 1970s, was able to import Western products and use the technology thus gained. Re-exportation of oil then took over. After the sugar and oil prices fell, the government tried to maintain the same level of imports through borrowing from the West. Today, all these resources have dwindled? and repayment of the debt is sucking up the available hard currency. From June 1987 to June 1988, the debt owed to the imperialist countries increased by 15.5%. It stands today at $6.4 billion.2
Despite these constraints, a certain amount of industrialization took place in the 1970s, even if assessment s of this vary considerably. A. Zimbalist underlines the very considerable progress made in mechanizing the sugar harvest. Two thirds of the cutting and collection are mechanized, and progress has also been made in the treatment of sugar derivatives. The same author believes that но о 060% пенса Cuba's industrial base has been transformed since the 1960s.
Imports of manufactured products went from 58.9% in 1970 to 44.7% in 1983. The construction of a nuclear power station - scheduled to come on line in 1995 -should reduce imports of petrol in the next decade, although Cuba will remain dependent on the Soviet Union for its enriched uranium. He also gives weight to the technological progress made in the medical industry and the possibility for exporting sophisticated pharmaceutical products.
Brezinski, on the other hand points out that, despite the progress in industrialization, sugar still represented 77.2% of Cuban exports in 1986. He calls into question "a strategy based on growth funded by the export of traditional products, given that import substitution has not achieved the planned levels" . He notes that in 1986, the economy remained characterized by "the typical model of exchanges between industrialized and developing countries". This foreign trade structure is made worse by the lack of hard currency resources that would allow Cuba to import from the West. Finally, he believes that Cuba's international competitiveness "has declined since its integration into Comecon". These assessments converge with those of Mesa-Lago and F. Gil, who consider that Soviet aid has helped to maintain imbalances in the economy and long-standing distortions.
It is recognized that some high-tech industries have been developed. But doubts have been expressed about Cuba's reliability as a supplier in these sectors "when the workers producing such quality goods have to spend a large part of the time waiting for the bus or queuing for tomatoes". . There is also a question mark over the outlook for exports. "it is one thing to produce interferons, another thing , to sell them to the rest of the world" 29
To sum up, Cuba's independent economic development seems to be fettered by external dependence, the prevailing disorder in the firms and in the organization of production, the effects of the Comecon division of labour and above all by the uncertainties about the future course of its economic relations with the Soviet Union. Contrary to to some superficial assessments, neither Gorbachev's visit nor the agreements signed have removed the clouds on the horizon for the Cuban economy.
After three years, the initial objectives of the rectification campaign announced by Castro seem to have become blurred. The leadership's primary aim now is to gain time. Gorbachev's visit gave Castro the opportunity to occupy centre stage and reaffirm, in the name of the principle of non-interference, "the right of each country to apply its own formulas for building socialism". Then he put his guest on the spot: "If a socialist country wants to build capitalism, we cannot intervene, just as we demand that nobody should interfere in the sovereign decision of any country, whether capitalist or semi-
CUBA capitalist, whether in the developed or under-developed world, to build socialism" 30
Over and above the rhetorical formulas, the two speakers expressed different conceptions on peace, debt, defence and building socialism. However, Castro's rejection of the "methods of capitalism"
has had to give way in the face of the hard realities of joint ownership agreements with European and Japanese firms in such fields as tourism, textiles, and the food and canning industries.
They have demanded in some cases control over hiring and firing, wage levels and sometimes the right to repatriate their profits."1
According to one observer,
"Perestroika is creeping in by the back door, but nobody dares to say it out loud"
To adapt to the national peculiarities, President of the Cuban Chamber of Commerce, Julio G.
Oliveras, calls this
"cha-cha-cha socialism" 32 Thus, they are orienting toward a coexistence of economic sectors managed in very different ways, which is exactly what Fidel Castro denounced at the start of the rectification process as a source of division and inequality.
Such pragmatism results in part from constraints over which the
Fidelista leadership has no control. But it also testifies to the absence of any overall conception of the relationship between economic and social democracy and political democracy in a transitional economy in an underdeveloped country.
The contrast between a waste deeply ingrained in the general organization of the economy and the growth of some high-tech industries reflects quite well the incoherence and chaotic character of the policies followed. "The inability of the political structure to respond adequately to the severe economic constraints and to planning failures"33 is central to the economic dysfunctions.
The combination of decisive control over the major economic options by Fidel
Castro and his lieutenants and the monopoly of power held by the Communist
27. The negotiations with the Club of Paris in May
1989 failed to produce any results, and repayments on the debt eat up the hard currency available (Financial
Times, February 17, 1989).
28. Financial Times, February 17, 1989.
29. Tim Coone.
30. Granma, April 16, 1989.
31. International Herald Tribune, January 12, 1989.
25
32. Newsweek, June 5, 1989.
33. Tim Coone.
CUBA Party has the effect of obscuring responsibilities, of concealing incompetence and corruption, of favoring the tacit understandings among bureaucrats that the Cubans call "sociolismo," the socialism of socios (pals).
Political-organizational means for correcting dysfunctions are nonexistent. The monitoring mechanisms are bereft of any power. The mass organizations are only echo chambers. And the People's Power structures, which had aroused a lot of hopes, have no political weight, although they do play a real administrative role.
### Voluntarist notions increasingly on the wane
The idea that the bureaucratic paralysis could be corrected by voluntarism - and what is more, a voluntarism limited to a few — is more and more waning, although, unlike the USSR, the regime can still count on the disinterest and devotion of some sectors. Only a confrontation of ideas, of policies, a transparency of responsibilities and decisions, the establishment of monitoring mechanisms and freedom of criticism could be effective against the opacity of the system. Unlike Castro, Gorbachev has well understood the role of glasnost in economic restructuring.
It is already clear that the "rectification of errors" has not corrected the defects of the system. The Cuban people have shown an ironical scepticism with regard to what they have termed the process of "ratification of horrors". The effect of a combination of verbal radicalism and appeals to work harder - "it is necessary to work hard, it is necessary to work a lot" as Castro repeats34 — is to make people more cynical, if nothing else changes.
Many young people are already concentrating on trying to improve their place in society, and the prospects for this are uncertain, since there are not always openings commensurate with their qualifications. The official posts in every field are occupied, in the best of cases, by veterans of the revolutionary war, or by those who came over at the last moment, and who often lack real authority.
The ideological evolution and capacity to mobilize the new generation as well as its adherence to Castroism, are essential for the future of the revolution. But the fact is that a lot of the youth lack consistent revolutionary motivation. Such demobilization is fostered by the contrast between a disappointing domestic scene marked by a lack of debate and political democracy and economic waste; and the anti-imperialist speeches, which have lost some of their credibility, inasmuch as their real scope is limited by the diplomatic opening to Latin America.
This policy is itself the source of contradictions. It reinforces the need for a politi226 recent concessions, there is no sign as yet. cal beralization, of which, despite some International Viewpoint #167 • July 10, 1989
At the same time, cultural relations with Latin America are expanding. As regards news, the regime faces the problem of a radio station in Miami that gives Cubans all the information that their own press does not provide. For example, the Cuban media barely mentioned the Chinese events for the first few weeks. Moreover it seems that soon there will be a television channel operating out of Florida.
On the diplomatic and trade fronts, the Cubans' search for support in Latin America could compromise the backing traditionally given to Castroism by revolutionary organizations. This was shown by the turmoil caused by Castro's recent visits to Mexico and Venezuela. As Lazaro Cardenas commented "they [Castro and Ortega] have their reasons for taking part [in the inauguration of the dubiously elected Mexican president Salinas de Gortari], but there will be a price to pay" Moreover, the riots in Venezuela and Argentina render the prospects for stable trade with these countries uncertain.
Thus, Castro risks pyramiding contradictions and losing on several fronts. On the domestic front, by not taking the initiative in launching the inevitable glasnost; and externally, by losing valuable sources of support without getting new ones in return. The disastrous effects of the confusion of roles between party and state and their symbiosis in a single leader have become apparent. In this field also openness is what is needed.
The new Soviet policy in Latin America as elsewhere is going to reshuffle the cards both on the diplomatic front and in the ranks of the traditional left and the revolutionary movements, where the effects cannot yet be foreseen. For the third world countries, the first settlements of "regional conflicts" can only arouse disquiet. The agreements in southern Africa for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola in order to open the way for Namibian independence in no way entailed a halt in US aid for Savimbi's UNITA.
A bad omen for Namibian independence process
The circumstances in which SWAPO36 guerrillas were massacred on returning to their country's border by South African troops able to act with impunity is a bad omen for the independence process and for what are supposed to be "free and democratic elections." [See also article on p.8.]
According to the Cahama (Angola) accords signed on May 19, 1989, by the South Africans, Angolans and Cubans, "the armed elements of SWAPO were confined to their bases north of the sixteenth parallel." Angola and Cuba were charged with seeing to this. The accords also state, "in conformity with UN Resolution 435, the Namibian police will continue to play its fundamental role, which is to assure the maintenance of order" and strive "to uncover the arms caches left in Namibia" by the SWAPO guerrillas driven back to Angola.37
So, here is a country gaining its independence after 74 years of South African occupation, and those who have fought to liberate it have to return unarmed and submit to the diktats of the colonial power. This example of settling a regional conflict and of "national reconciliation" will no doubt be cause for reflection for revolutionary movements involved in liberation struggles. This is no doubt why the Cuban government, although it signed the accords, has strongly criticized the decisions taken by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (including the USSR) to cut by 40% the UN forces that are supposed to supervise the application of Resolution 435 and Namibia's accession to sovereignty.
The Cuban press has pointed up the role played by Pretoria's army and police, as well as SWAPO's fears of a massive repression aimed at preventing it from getting the two-thirds vote necessary to abolish the discriminatory laws left over from South African colonial domination.
Castro attacks UN Security
Council members
Fidel Castro could not be taken in. Despite the military victory the Cuban troops won over the South African army at Cuito Cuanavale, the political agreements reached in Africa are not a success. In the past, the Cuban leader linked the departure of Cuban troops to the end of apartheid. His grievances no doubt explain why he challenged UN Security Council members (including the USSR) so sharply in February 1989. He said that they "have acted together, as a tight little group enjoying the privilege of the right of veto." And he reminded them of "the great responsibility that will fall on them if the racists are able to block the self-determination and free choice of the Namibian people". 38
These warnings were to be reiterated during Gorbachev's visit in April. In the speech that he was to give after Fidel, the Soviet chief came out "against any theory or doctrine that seeks to justify exporting revolution or counter-revolution and against all forms of interference in the affairs of states".39 This reference to exporting revolution could only exasperate the other participants on a continent 34. July 26, 1988. 35. See IV 158, March 6, 1989. UNITA, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, a movement founded in 1964 by Jonas Savimbi. It fought the Angolan goverment with the support of South Africa and the United States. 36. South West Africa People's Organization, founded in 1960 by Sam Nujoma. A nationalist guerrilla organization fighting for Namibian independence. 37. Le Monde, May 21/22, 1989. 38. Granma, February 12, 1989. 39. Granma, April 16, 1989.
where there has been no letup in the export of counter-revolution to crush native revolutions. Fidel Castro made the first move, launching a counter-attack that provoked the US representative to walk out of the National People's Assembly. Castro attacks US imperialist interventions
The Cuban leader cited the case of Afghanistan, where "the US reserves the right to continue to supply arms to the Afghan oppositionist and counterrevolutionary forces" , despite the withdrawal of Soviet forces; the case of southeast Africa, "where the US reserves the right to supply arms to UNITA"; Nicaragua, where the United States "reserves the right to maintain organized counterrevolutionary forces on Honduran territory as a means of applying pressure on the government and people of Nicaragua". 40 In this way, he answered the false symmetry between revolution and counterrevolution made in Gorbachev's speech in order to "demand the abolition of this theory and this doctrine" — the exact terms used by the Soviet leader - "by virtue of which the US arrogates the right of aiding irregular forces against established governments by providing arms". This shed quite a different light on the settlement of "regional conflicts"
In these circumstances, one can understand why the parallel made by the Soviet ambassador between the negotiated settlement in southern Africa and the one called for in Central America is so disturbing. Yuri Petrov in effect said: "In order resolve the conflict in Central America, the same approach should be used as in southern Africa. In the same way as we have collaborated with the United States in the case of Angola and Namibia, third countries should play the role of mediators in the case of Nicaragua and El Salvador" 41
However, not only the nature of the states but also of the organizations concerned differ profoundly. (How can you equate the MPLA and SWAPO with the FSLN and the FMLN?) Moreover, the relationship of forces on the ground is not comparable. This explains the indignation that this aberrant comparison aroused.
The conditions for a solution of the Central American crisis have been clearly defined by the US government. It claims that the region holds no strategic interest for the USSR but that it does for the US. Therefore, the USSR should respect the spheres of influence drawn by the Monroe Doctrine. There can consequently be no idea of a bilateral halt to military intervention as Gorbachev proposed but only a unilateral one. Thus, the USSR's halting its supply of arms to Nicaragua "is not enough."
As Oscar Arias, president of Costa Rica, said in Washington, echoing state-
CUBA ments reiterated many times by James Baker, what is needed is a halt to Cuban arms deliveries to El Salvador, or even pressure on the USSR to cut its aid to Cuba. 43
Cuba's position is that "peace is a twosided coin - reduction of the worldwide nuclear threat and a just settlement of the regional conflicts" 44 Over and above the differences in the approaches to peaceful coexistence, the USSR and Cuba have very different state interests as regards Central America. This is only a secondary matter for the USSR. But it is a major question for the Cuban revolution, which is going through a very dangerous period.
In a context of economic and political crisis, attested to by the accusations of corruption at the top of the hierarchy and ousters from the apparatus, pressures are being applied from all quarters. They come from the USSR; from the US, which is making the dropping of its economic blockade conditional on a change of course in the region; from the Latin American bourgeoisies; and from the European bourgeoisies, which are demanding economic and political quid pro quos for renegotiating the debt in the framework of the Paris Club.
Regional relationship of forces decisive
In this tug of war, the regional relationship of forces is decisive. The outcome of the conflicts in Central America will have a crucial influence on the evolution of the domestic situation in Cuba.
Gorbachev's offensive has put the Castroist leadership on the defensive, and promoted distrust of Cuba in the international workers' movement. There is speculation about the possibility of links between Castro and Ligachev and the conservatives in the various Communist parties. The fact that representatives of the Czechoslovak, East German, Portuguese and French CPs were in Havana at the same time could create such an impression. However, it does not seem that any such coming together can crystallize (unless there is a reversal of the relationship of forces in the USSR itself, because Castro needs Soviet aid too much.
On the other hand, the defense of Marxism-Leninism that Fidel would like to embody can only be effective and credible if the gauntlet thrown down by Gorbachev is picked up. This would make denouncing the evils of the marketeconomy reforms or a conception of peace at the expense of the oppressed peoples more popular.
"No" to perestroika, "yes" to glasnost is the only answer to those in the international workers' movement and in Cuba who see no democratic salvation except in the market reforms.
This would be the underpinning for a genuinely internationalist offensive that would popularize the influence of the Cuban revolution. * 40. Ibid. 41. Le Monde, April 7, 1989. 42. El Pais, April 6, 1989. 43. Newsweek, December S, 1988. 44. Rafael Hemandez, Granma, February 26, 1989.
AL-MITRA Q
Journal of Fourth Internationalist organizations in the Arab region (Lebanon, Tunisia & Israeli state)
Issue 6 (April 1989)
includes three features around the theme of the intifada:
1.
• Palestine: from resistance to the intifada
• Israeli state: effects of the uprising
• Algeria: the other intifada
Individual copies 15FF. Orders to: Al-Mitraga/Inprecor,
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27
CHINA W HAT MOST struck you about the mobilization in Beijing? It was the independence of the movement. In all of China's history, from its liberation in 1949 until today, there have only been mobilizations directed from the top. But this time it was the people themselves, the workers, students and intellectuals, who organized a movement from the bottom up and not from the top down - a movement for democracy and against the bureaucracy and the corruption of the past.
The students built their independent organization, and they had the project of building a national organization. Workers also set up the Independent Union of Workers on a national scale, as well as unions in several cities. • Do you think that, through this desire for self-organization, they demonstrated their refusal to support any current in the bureaucracy]?
The workers told me very clearly what they thought about the General Federation of Unions, that it did not defend the workers' interests and that the only thing good it did was hand out movie tickets! The students thought the same thing about the student federation, whose leaders are all over 40.
On the other hand, they never said, "Down with the Communist Party," they only wanted to reform the party, tay to me party, to have the right to organize freely, to be able to have a check over the party, to end corruption. In the beginning, the party spokespeople said that they agreed with these demands.
However the party could not allow all However the party could not allow all its vices to be exposed before the Chinese people. The party could not have its role as ruler be challenged by the ranks. As long as the questions are raised by the top echelons, there is no problem. But if the ranks question decisions, demand democracy, challenge the leadership, then all opposition has to be crushed. • The Workers' Union was just getting started?
Yes, it was not yet a big organization in Beijing. They came out spontaneously to support the students. First, they protected the students, surrounding them with lines he students, surrounding them with lines of stewards. Then, they announced that they were forming the Independent Union of Beijing Workers. Their official declaration dates from mid-May. They existed for only two or three weeks.
What they told me about their demands shows a similarity with those of the students - against the corruption of the bureaucrats, for real involvement in the decisions in the plants. They had already drawn up statutes; they were setting up a leadership, recruiting members. think International Viewpoint #167 • July 10, 1989