Hard times ahead for Indonesian regime DURING the last six months, Indonesia — one of Asia's last surviving military dictatorships - has once again drawn international attention for its human rights abuses. In August and September last year, the issue of Indonesia's ongoing genocidal colonial war in East Timor came to the fore once again when President Suharto and foreign affairs minister Ali Alatas paid a provocative visit to the territory, arousing considerable indignation even among the regime's imperialist backers.
The same can be said about the regime's second spectacular move, the execution of two political prisoners who had been sentenced to death in frame-up trials last October, twenty years after Suharto took power. An international campaign is currently underway
INDONESIA Manila Mi. 500 ¡PHILIPPINES MALAYSIA Pacitic Ocean 1 WEST /RIAN CELEBES INDONESIA* • 8
JAVA (Portuguese)
(Indonesian) TIMOR Indian Ocean AUSTRALIA meagre 2.2% in 19825 — hardly even enough to compensate for population growth — and it has never recovered. Revenues from oil and liquified natural gas (LNG) exports, which at times accounted for about three-quarters of Indonesia's total export value, plunged from $20 billion in exnort value lunged from S20 hillion in 1981 to $15bn in 1982, and are estimated to have fallen to $8.5bn for the period 198788.6
Debt servicing reaches dangerous levels
As the Suharto regime continued to borrow vast sums of money to finance large-scale industrial and infrastructural projects of doubtful importance for the country's development (as well as for the consumption of luxury goods for the ruling classes), the country's foreign debt rose from 1. Estimates vary concerning the membership of the PKI and its mass organizations (the trade unions affiliated to the SOBSI federation, the peasants' front BTI, the women's organization GERWANI, the youth organization Pemuda Rakjat and others). The figure of 15 million is cited in a number of sources, for example in Repression and exploitation in Indonesia, Taylor et al, Nottingham (Britain), 1974. But this seems considerably exaggerated, and half of that number is probably closer to the truth. 2. See The Indonesian Communist Party and land reform 1959-1965, R.A. Mortimer, Monash Papers on South East Asia 1, 1972, p.65. On sporadic resistance after the massacre and the destruction of the PKI as a national organization see also Tien Jaar onrecht in Indonesie, W.F. Wertheim et al, Amsterdam, 1976, p.153-. 3. An acronym of nasionalis (nationalist), agama (religious), komunis (communist). 4. Some economic growth occurred in the early phase of Suharto's "New Order" regime, mainly due to the influx of foreign investments and the return of domestic capital, which had fled the country during the Sukaro era. Nevertheless, this growth reached spectacular proportions only after the oil price rises of the mid-1970s: Indonesia's per capita GNP rose from $150 in 1974 to $530 in 1981. 5. Nederlands Dagblad, September 12, 1983. 6. Ibid. plus World Bank figures from Tempo, May 28, 1988. World Bank projections for the year 2000 put the
19 oil and LNG export revenues at $17.2bn - that is, still below the 1980 level. May 1, 1989 • #162 International Viewpoint to save the lives of 11 other SUBAKAT A LMOST TWENTY years ago, in his book on the counterrevolutionary coup in Indonesia Philippe Gavi drew the lesson of the defeat of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its total destruction by a fascist mass movement in collaboration with the army in late 1965 and early 1966. Gavi stated that to Che Guevara's call to "create two, three, many Vietnams" should be added the call to "prevent another Indonesia".
What may appear at first sight to be just a catchword phrase actually contains a reasonably exact assessment of the strategic importance of the 1965-66 defeat, both for the Indonesian and international workers' movements. It is indeed comparable to the defeat inflicted on US and international imperialism in Indochina. In 1965, the Indonesian CP was the world's biggest communist party outside the workers' states. The fascist mobs in Indonesia, composed of well-off Muslim peasants, as well as the urban middle class (notably university students), encountered virtually no organized resistance when they - together with special army units - massacred at least one million actual or alleged members and sympathizers of the PKI and its mass organizations.?
Although the coup fitted perfectly into the worldwide imperialist counter-offensive after the victorious Cuban revolution - and there are strong indications that the propaganda campaign that was prisoners (see box p.22). launched to whip up the anti-communist hysteria was masterminded by the CIA -it would be wrong to regard Indonesia's reactionary forces as mere handmaidens of their imperialist masters. It was the Indonesian national bourgeoisie's own class interest that led them to abandon the people's front-type NASAKOM-alliance under Sukarno, with its politics of limited confrontations with imperialism, and to embark upon a total reintegration of Indonesia into the world market, an "open door" for foreign capital and a close alliance with imperialism. It is more than tragic that the misplaced confidence in the progressive potential of a "national bourgeoisie" led to another catastrophe in Chile, eight years after the Indonesian debacle. Structural weaknesses of
Indonesian economy
All predictions of the rapid disintegration of the "unstable" Suharto regime, which have been made every time public discontent and protests spread in the country during the last 23 years, have, unfortunately, proved to be nothing but illusions.
After a period of considerable economic growth, since the early 1980s the Indonesian economy has slipped deeper and deeper into a crisis that has mercilessly revealed its structural weaknesses.* The annual growth rate sank from 9.9% in 1980 to a
INDONESIA $18.8bn in 1978 to $47.3bn in 1987.? Decreasing export revenues, combined with sky-rocketing foreign debt, raised the debt service requirement to the dangerous level of 41% in 1987.8
Another factor to be taken into account is that the structure of Indonesia's foreign debt is gradually changing. Credits from the late 1960s and early 1970s that had extremely advantageous repayment conditions are being replaced by government loans with higher interest rates and shorter repayment terms, alongside credits from commercial banks.? Given the present unstable situation in the oil market and Indonesia's limited success in compensating for losses in the oil and LNG sectors by promoting alternative exports, the economic prospects look grim indeed.
Little wonder, therefore, that last year's World Bank recommendations read like stories from A thousand and one nights: sustained growth at high rates in the nonoil/LNG sector, double digit growth rates for private investment, an overall increase in efficiency and other achievements will boost Indonesia's export surplus and facilitate a steady repayment of the debt, bringing down service on the debt to 22% in 1995.10
Dramatic cuts in
"development budget"
This concept relies heavily on the performance of the private sector, which has traditionally not exactly been the main pillar of the Indonesian economy. In 1988, the private sector even failed to fulfill the modest hopes of the regime's technocrats regarding its contribution to the state's tax revenue.! One of the major weaknesses of this concept is that the private sector, especially industry, has been hard hit by the decrease in government revenue.!?
The dramatic cuts over the past few years in the "development budget" - that part of 20 pulastspendi allocated to investment in infrastructure and industrialization - has International Viewpoint #162 • May 1, 1989 caused serious problems for private business as well, especially in some sectors like construction. The industrial sector's performance deteriorated partly in parallel to the decrease in oil revenues: the industrial growth rate fell from 22% in 1980 to 10.2% in 1981, declining further to 1.2% in 1982 and only slightly recovering to 2.2% in 1983.13 While diminishing oil revenues may not have been the main cause of the collapse of Indonesia's industrial growth, it has evidently prevented recovery.
Collapse of raw materials' prices
Furthermore, the World Bank's concept does not take into account the fact that the prices of a number of the main export commodities - tin, nickel and palm oil, for example — have also gone down during the last few years. On the other hand, commodities such as timber will hardly become a major export revenue earner, except for a very short period if the regime is willing to take the risk of the final destruction of the 7. Tempo, ibid. The projection for 1990 is $53.2bn. 8. Cited from the proceedings of the Netherlands parliament 1986-87, 19700, hfdst.V, nr.131, p.9. 9. Tempo, June 11, 1988. 10. Tempo, May 28, 1988. 11. Ibid. 12. Not only do oil and LNG provide the lion's share of the country's export value, but the state has also become more and more dependent on them for its revenues. The share of oil alone as a generator of public revenue (mainly through taxation on oil companies operating in Indonesia) increased from 19.7% in 196970 to 61.7% in 1981-82. Indonesia: The rise of capital, R. Robison, Singapore, 1986, p.171. 13.Kompas, June 21, 1986. 14. The exportation of log timber is now forbidden. Plywood exports have been growing for some years, in 1986 earning some $1.2bn in foreign exchange (Kompas, December 2, 1986). Nevertheless, the enormous fires that destroyed vast areas of Kalimantan's tropical rain forests some years ago — viewed by experts as the biggest ecological catastrophe in the country's history and expected to cause a permanent change of climate in the region — clearly show the narrow limitations of such destructive exploitation. In any case it is clear that earnings from the timber industry will never compensate for more than a small fraction of the
Kalimantan tropical rain forest. 14 As for the chances of exporting manufactured goods — leaving aside Indonesia's weakness in that field - neither the sharp competition with Asia's four "little tigers" and other newly industrializing countries nor the imperialists' increasingly protectionist trade policy should be forgotten. '5
Major imperialist countries' investments have also been stagnating for some time, and even domestic investment is lagging behind expectations.16 The notorious corruption of government officials, as well as the time-consuming procedures necessary to obtain operating permits and to employ foreign staff, have put off quite a number of potential investors despite Indonesia's extremely low wages.
Strategic interests of maior imperialist powers Major Imperanst powers
What is more, strengthening the private sector means pushing ahead even further with the deregulation drive of recent years." In its turn this leads to a loss of sources of revenue for the military and civilian bureaucrats who have appropriated the state apparatus and who had developed networks of patronage with businessmen. Capital accumulation and the entrenchment of a much stronger capitalist class in Indonesia during the past 20 years were facilitated in the first place by these bureaucratic capitalists.
Deregulation will even mean cutting down on the privileges enjoyed by Suharto's own family, which, making use of their direct access to power, is known as the strongest business formation. Indeed, criticism of "monopolies" in Indonesia's economy has often been a means employed by dissatisfied factions in the ruling class to lash out at Suharto
Although the economic problems discussed above considerably limit the regime's ability to ensure the loyalty of certain groups via bestowing material benelosses in the oil sector. 15. An example is the US government's protectionist measures against textile imports. Brought to the verge of bankruptcy in 1985 by insufficient export opportunities, most Indonesian mills and garment plants operated at only just over 50% of capacity. (Kompas, March 15, 1988.) 16. Indications of this tendency are the massive revocations of investment permits for foreign, as well as domestic, investors due to the failure to realize projects filed at the Investment Coordination Board The diminishing interest of Japanese investors in Indonesia has been the subject of a public debate by the country's leading economic analyists. (Kompas, January 12 & 24, 1986.) 17. For example: simplification of the import licence system; the lifting of certain monopolies; and even the transfer of Indonesia's customs to a Swiss company, the SGS, in 1985. 18. Civil servants are one example. Due to their quasicompulsory membership in the ruling corporatist movement, GOLKAR, their wages (and those of public enterprise workers) increased tenfold between 1969 and 1977, but have been frozen for several years now. ("Pockets of privilege..." by C. Manning in The life of the poor in Indonesian cities, Jellinek, Manning & Jones, Monash Univ., 1978, p.31.)
fits'8, there is no question of it facing shortor medium-term bankruptcy. The major imperialist powers, organized in the InterGovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), will not allow that to happen.! Besides their strategic interest in keeping a stable reactionary regime at the head of one of the principal members of the Asean group of countries, there is also inter-imperialist competition for the sizeable Indonesian market. Access to this market depends a lot on official goodwill, which in turn is bought with credits. European members of the IGGI worry about the "unbalanced" high levels of Japanese contributions to the IGGI's aid fund for Indonesia, which evidently stem from the dominant position of Japanese imperialism in the Indonesian market.2
Aside from the problems of corruption and inefficiency, the monopolies controlled by members of the Suharto family and the regime's extremely poor human rights record have at times stirred up anger among the regime's imperialist backers. The latter would undoubtedly prefer a regime like those existing in Malaysia or the Philippines, but for the time being there seems to be no credible alternative to Suharto that could guarantee the same stability of bourgeois rule in Indonesia with all its implications for the region. Beefing up the Indonesian armed forces
Apart from the IGGI credits, the Suharto junta received various forms of financial, military and diplomatic support. Britain's aircraft sales, West Germany's supply of submarines and Dutch corvettes (all of which have been campaigned against by anti-imperialist organizations in Europe and Australia, unfortunately without success) significantly helped the Indonesian army to effectively wage its colonial war in East Timor. Despite the somewhat delicate position of some of them as military allies of Portugal, all major imperialist powers have given at least tacit diplomatic support to Indonesia's annexation of the Democratic Republic of East Timor (by abstaining in the UN General Assembly when the question was voted on). At least the USA, West Germany and Australia are involved in training schemes for Indonesian army officers.
In Bandung, West Java, the Indonesian aircraft industry IPTN was established with considerable help from West German and Spanish companies. Shortly before the fall of the Marcos regime, IPTN supplied the Filipino army with two medium-sized transport aircraft. Imperialist aid has also been used for the setting up of the PT PAL naval construction plant in Surabaya, East Java, where small- and medium-size vessels for the Indonesian navy are being constructed.
Beefing-up the Indonesian armed forces and developing the country's arms industry
INDONESIA does not only help to stabilize the Suharto regime against popular movements on Java or regional independence movements on the other islands, but also strengthens the reactionary Asean community on the military level.
Abysmal wages and working conditions
Although the "New Order" regime's modernization drive has brought about an increase in the number of workers employed by industrial enterprises and a decrease of those earning their living in petty commodity production, the Indonesian working class nevertheless remains quite fragmented and unstable in its composition. Apart from a very limited sector of foreign capital, as well as a number of major domestic and state enterprises (oil, high-tech industries and so on, which need a stable, qualified workforce), the turnover rate of the workforce in any given enterprise is very high, as is the level of circular migration that reintegrates urban proletarians into the ranks of the rural poor or allows them to be absorbed into the urban "informal sector" 22
Apart from the section that is sometimes referred to as "protected workers" 23, living conditions for Indonesian workers are precarious. The majority of workers have to make ends meet with wages considerably lower than even the "physical minimum need" (KFM, kebutuhan fisik minimum) fixed by the ministry of labour affairs. It goes without saying that this index is determined in a manner that is not particularly favourable to the workers. In 1985 in the East Kalimantan province, one of the richest in Indonesia, the KFM-index was fixed at 64,851 rupiahs for a worker without children, Rps 146,064 for a worker with one child and Rps 181,472 for a worker with two children." One third of the workers earned less than Rps 60,000 a month. As the average number of children in an Indonesian working class family tends to be more than two (to put it mildly), it can be assumed that the majority of working class people in the area lived in abysmal poverty.
For Surabaya, Indonesia's second largest town, the KFM-index in 1984 was Rps 45,000 rupiahs, but even according to the official yellow trade union, FBSI, many companies only paid their workers Rps 700 a day!?
Working conditions are hardly more encouraging than wage levels. Although in theory even under the military dictatorship Indonesia has relatively progressive legislation, in practice working conditions frequently defy description. Protective equipment is hardly ever supplied by the companies, or has to be paid for by the workers themselves. At a cold-storage plant processing prawns on Pulau BuayaIsland, for example, workers had to enter the freezing chamber at -17°C without any protective clothing. They could purchase insulated coats at the cost of Rps 40,000, or 50 days wages. 26 Agricultural workers often use pesticides without any protective masks. Accidents are frequent and medical provisions quite limited. In case of invalidity there is hardly any financial compensation or continuous support.
A serious pressure on the living standards of Indonesian workers is exerted by the enormous unemployment in the urban centres, as well as the large percentage of under-employed rural poor. Reliable overall figures for unemployment (and underemployment, which is also an important factor) are not available. But the regime admits that the difference between the annual demographic expansion of the workforce and the capacity of the labour market alone means a rise of 600,000 unemployed.2 And this figure does not include existing unemployment or the effects of the massive lay-offs in industry during recent years of economic crisis.
Poisoned rice and mass starvation
But the rural population is even worse off. Research among the urban poor carried out by some Indonesian social scientists indicates that, despite their deplorable living conditions, people are better off in Jakarta's slums than in their native villages in Central or East Java. The so-called Green Revolution that has been pushed through during the last 15 years has aggravated the already critical situation at the end of the Sukarno era when the Indonesian Peasants' Front (BTI, Barisan Tani Indonesia, linked to the Indonesian CP) waged a struggle for the implementation of the land reform law promulgated in 1960.
Repeated cases of mass starvation are even reported in the tightly-controlled Indonesian press. Particularly tragic are the numerous cases of peasants dying from poisoned rice, prepared by the authorities to kill rats and then washed by the desperate people who thought that when its warning colour vanished so would the poison.
According to the so-called Sayogyo criterion proposed in 1978, for rural areas families with an annual per capita income 19. The great "concem" of imperialism about the country is for example reflected in the fact that the US government even drew up plans for invading Indonesia in 1956, when political relations between Sukarno and the imperialist powers deteriorated. (Kompas, April 13, 20. Nederlands Dagblad, October 29, 1988. 21. Kompas, January 11, 1986. 22. Manning, op.cit., p.27. 23. Manning (op.cit., p.26-) divides the Indonesian working class into three categories: protected, semiprotected and unprotected workers, according to the stability of their jobs and earnings, the degree to which they enjoy the protected of labour legislation, social benefits and so on. 24. Exchange rate (before the 1986 devaluation) was approximately Rps 1,000 = $1. Figures from Kompas, February 21, 1985. 25. Kompas, June 23, 1984. 26. Kompas, February 21, 1985. 21 27. Kompas, April 3, 1985.
INDONESIA
Political prisoners need solidarity SEVENTEEN members of the PKi, or military personnel sympathetic to the party, have been executed since 1985. They had been imprisoned and condemned 15 or 20 years previously. The last two executions took place on October 17, 1988.
Fifty-nine others, imprisoned at the time of the 1965 events, are still in jail, and 14 of them were given death sentences - as yet not implemented -between 1965 and 1971. These prisoners face execution at any moment. Among them are:
Ruslan Wijoyasastra; Sukatno; Iskandar Subekti; Asep Suryaman; Satar Suryanto; | Bungkus; Surono; Athanasius Buang; Simon Petrus Soleiman; Marsudi; and Nobertus Rohayan.
Demands for their sentences to be repealed and for the immediate release of these prisoners should be sent to President Suharto, Bina Graha, Jalan Veteran 17, Jakarta, Indonesia, with copies to national embassies. * avoid at all costs a dispute that could continue long enough to develop a dynamic where the workers gained self-confidence and experience of struggle, and where a leadership could crystallize. To achieve this, sometimes the company in question is forced to make minor concessions and, at the same time, the workers are intimidated into ending their action lest it should be considered as "masterminded or manipulated by political elements" (that is, communists) and suppressed.
New witch-hunt against suspected militants
In other cases the conflict is ended by outright repression, as in the case of the 800 workers at the PT United Can Company in Jakarta who were collectively fired by the minister of labour affairs, ex-admiral Sudomo. (Sudomo was formerly the head of the notorious "command for the restoration of security and order", Kopkamtib, which was responsible for some of the massacres in the aftermath of the 1965 coup.)"
This strategy of the regime has so far effectively prevented the development of even embryonic forms of organization. Even at a plant level, there has never been a case where workers in the same company waged actions more than once under the same leadership. Given the tight surveillance of labour affairs by the military and the secret services, it will be an extremely difficult task to change this state of affairs. An additional illustration of how difficult it is for workers to organize is the fact that sometimes they even have to wage a fight to obtain recognition of a factory branch of the regime-sponsored yellow FBSI trade union federation.
Struggles can still sometimes yield certain limited results, but the present economic situation puts workers in a definitely weaker bargaining position than they were a decade ago, when struggles flared up again for the first time under the "New Order" regime and a big strike at the oil company Caltex was won. On the other hand, it remains to be seen whether the regime's industrialization drive, aimed at replacing revenues lost from the oil sector, will result in a more stable composition and overall strengthening of the industrial proletariat.
The already difficult situation under which Indonesian workers have to wage their struggles has recently been exacerbat28. Kompas, August 28, 1984. 29. Ibid. the population of the more sparsely-populated "Outer Islands" was better-off, with 29% below the poverty line. However, their situation has also probably deteriorated in recent years, as vast areas of poor tropical rain forests have been cultivated by transmigrants with disastrous results, especially in Kalimantan. 30. Primarily, the SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia — All-Indonesian Trade Union Congress) and all its affiliated unions; and the BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia - Indonesian Peasants' Front). 31. Tempo, August 31, 1985.
equivalent to less than 240kg of rice have to be classified as poor, and those below the 180kg mark as living in misery. Even according to this extremely flexible criterion, which barely allows for physical survival, there were still 52% of Java's rural population living below the poverty line in 1976.29
The impact of the "Green Revolution", while in the mid-1980s putting Indonesia for the first time in decades in the position of being self-sufficient in terms of rice production, nevertheless destroyed much of what has been left of mutual assistance between villagers, and deepened social polarization in the countryside. Sharecropping arrangements for rice harvesting, as well as the traditional labour-intensive harvesting methods, have been largely abandoned in favour of wage labour with more efficient harvesting methods. Whereas formerly large numbers of landless or almost landless peasants would have found seasonal employment as harvesters, cutting the rice with a small ani-ani knife and remunerated with one-third of the actual harvest, the work is now carried out by wage labourers who cut the more resistant, high-yield varieties mechanically with sickles, and are paid in money the equivalent of only about 10% of the crop's value.
Harsh repression waged by the regime
It is hard to estimate whether in absolute terms the living standards of the urban and rural proletariat, urban poor and poor peasants have fallen during Suharto's rule, as they were already deplorable during the Sukaro regime. But it is certain that their relative share in the nation's wealth has decreased drastically, and that even the small gains by some sectors (civil servants, oil workers) are presently being lost as the regime, with its IF-inspired austerity policy, tries to make the masses pay the foreign debt bill.
The above-mentioned problems of economic crisis, widespread unemployment 22 and fragmentation of the working class already suggest that the conditions under International Viewpoint #162 • May 1, 1989 which the exploited masses of Indonesia have to wage their struggle even for the most modest immediate demands are extremely difficult. Yet the most decisive factors limiting their combativity are those engendered by the harsh repression waged by the regime against any attempts to achieve improvements in their material situation (let alone to gain basic political rights), and the total atomization of the workers and poor peasants through the destruction of their organizations in 196566.30
Difficulties for organizing resistance
The traumatic experience of the fascist and military repression - which reached genocidal proportions in certain rural areas of Central and East Java, where whole villages regarded as BTI/PKI strongholds were virtually depopulated — seems to be underestimated by those (sometimes even progressive) analysts, who try to explain the difficulties encountered in organizing resistance against the Suharto regime with the arguments of "traditional submissiveness of the Javanese" and other "cultural obstacles". While not denying that certain backward and authoritarian behaviour patterns rooted in traditional culture are at times skilfully exploited by the regime, as well as by individual capitalist or landlords, it would be fallacious to analyze such factors in isolation from the concrete political context and their historical development.
But in spite of these adverse conditions, labour conflicts are by no means a rare occurrence. The demands raised by workers in their struggles cover protests against lay-offs or demands for severance pay, higher wages, bonus increases, working conditions and so on. The forms of action are varied, too. They range from complaints filed at the arbitration board or collective prayers to demonstrations and strikes.
The reactions to struggles of individual capitalists and the repressive apparatus differ widely. Their central principle is to
ed further by a new witch-hunt against suspected former members of the progressive mass organizations. In order to intimidate the workers, but also to push through layoffs — regarded as "economically necessary"
, but which are unpopular and in contradiction with the regime's self- proclaimed paternalistic "Pancasila labour relations" 32 — there have been several instances in recent years of mass redundancies of public sector employees. They were regarded as belonging to the "C2" category of involvement in communist activities
(something McCarthy might have called a
"second class fellow-traveller").
Since 1988, a large-scale campaign has been launched for a
"clean environment" (bersih linghungan). This is Indonesia's version of the Nazi's Sippenhaft:
everybody who has even a distant family member involved in progressive organizations before
1965 is to be dismissed if he or she works in the public sector or any other enterprise of "strategic importance". Given the massive membership of such organizations before the military coup on the one hand, and the far- reaching family ties on the other, this criterion applies to the overwhelming majority of the country's population and is a very effective means of intimidation.
As for the rural proletariat and the poor peasants, their situation tends to be even worse. The massacres in 1965-66 affected the rural poor and their organization, the PKI-linked peasants"
front BTI, even more than the urban proletariat. The so-called unilateral actions (aksi sepihak)
that had been waged by BTI supporters in their struggle for the implementation of the 1960 land reform law had incited the wrath of the rural elite organized in Islamic groups, which conducted the anti-BTI/PKI campaign in the countryside at times even more savagely than the army.
Struggles by the rural poor, according to the scarce information available, are less frequent than those of industrial workers.
They usually centre around defensive issues like compensation for land taken over for government projects, problems created by pollution or the election of village heads. Except in the few cases where human rights groups in the towns took up a cause or even tried to mobilize international support, these struggles are usually quickly suppressed by intimidation carried out by the local military. The Indonesian
(and particularly Javanese) countryside is under very close surveillance by the military, which is omnipresent down to village level.
To keep the countryside even more closely controlled, even the two political parties created by the regime itself, the PPP
INDONESIA and the PDI, are not allowed to conduct election campaigns in places below the level of district capital. Only the governing corporatist organization GOLKAR (dominated by military and civil servants) is entitled to do so.34
The land question in Indonesia is particularly delicate because of the difficult demographic and ecological conditions. Two-thirds of the Indonesian population are concentrated on the three islands of Java, Madura and Bali, which represent only slightly more than 7% of the country's territory. Over-population of rural Java has thus reached a level where the struggle of the poor peasants and rural workers cannot be led by simply putting forward the demand "the land to the tillers".
Cooperatives used to exploit poor peasants
The situation is further complicated by the fact that peasant cooperatives - the formation of which is imperative under conditions where redistribution of land on an individual basis would only lead to the creation of extremely small units insufficient to produce a decent income for a peasant family — have been used as an additional means of exploiting poor peasants, thereby thoroughly discrediting the idea of cooperatives in general.
Meanwhile, the disastrous results of large-scale transmigration projects involving hundreds of thousands of poor peasants who were resettled in Kalimantan, South Sumatra, Sulawesi and West Papua (see IV 161), have shown that the question cannot be solved either by colonizing so-called empty spaces. As agronomic and ecological studies have shown, the relative "emptiness" of Indonesia's bigger islands definitely has ecological reasons — the poor soils of the tropical rain forest support only a very limited amount of shifting cultivation, which has been the traditional mode of agriculture of its original inhabitants.
Transplanting the extremely intensive cultivation methods used on the fertile volcanic soils of Java quickly leads to economic disaster, such as the vast bush fires that have destroyed considerable sections of Kalimantan's tropical rain forests.
Important as every single action of the workers or poor peasants in defence of their interests might be, there will always be little chance of success and a greater danger of retaliation against activists if the subsequent step, building trade unions and poor peasants' organizations, cannot be taken.
One of the major preconditions for the re-emergence of such organizations is a minimum of political freedom. Although it is certainly not ruled out that a minimum margin of democratic freedom could be brought about by a future crisis in the regime
— due to internal faction fighting, or a "liberalization" under a coalition of reformist forces within the army and a faction of
32. Pancasila or "The Five Pillars": 1)
Belief in only one god; 2) just and civilized humanitarianism; 3) Indonesian unity/nationalism; 4) democracy led by wisdom, born of consultation; 5) social justice for the entire Indonesian population.
Pancasila was a populist ideology launched by the first president, Sukamo, but flexible enough to fit neatly into the fascists' need for a state ideology. Criticism of or resistance against the Pancasila, or even against the present regime's interpretation or implementation of the five "principles", is automatically regarded as subversive and therefore liable to the death penalty.
33. In the early 1970s the Muslim parties were forced to merge into a single party, the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP or P3, Unified Development Party), whereas the secular nationalists and smaller Christian parties were ordered to form the Partai Demokrasi
Indonesia (PDI, Indonesian Democratic Party).
34. As with a lot of other repressive legislation, this is modelled after the policy of the Dutch colonial regime, which - along with harassment of nationalist activists
— tried to use all kinds of regulations to keep the anti- colonialist movement out of the villages in the 1920s and 1930s.
35. One of the main reasons for the continuation of the demographically almost useless transmigration policy is the regime's intention to better control some sparsely-populated regions via colonization and to destroy bases for future regional guerrilla movements. The jungles of the Malaysian/Indonesian border region, for example, were the principal base for armed struggle of remaining PKI forces until the mid-1970s. (Wertheim et al., ibid., pp.157-160.)
Not surprisingly, the transmigration projects attracted enormous financial support from several imperialist countries, as well as the World Bank. A quite intensive international campaign has been waged in recent years by human rights groups and ecologists against this destruction of Indonesia's natural riches for the sake of profit and counterinsurgency.
INDONESIA
National liberation struggles
A PART FROM its determination through sepcrimes against the aration from the rest of popular movement Indonesia, are indispensain 1965-66 and the contin- ble, and are the only way to ued repression ever since, get rid of the new type of the Suharto regime has colonial oppression that also ruthlessly waged colo- has developed in Indonenial wars against peoples sia. not willing to accept Since its installation, the Javanese rule. Regionalist Suharto regime has waged movements in the 1950s, savage wars against the usually led by right-wing Papuan people (see /V 161) leaderships linked to Dutch and, for the last 14 years, or US imperialism, were against the people of East usually condemned by the Timor. Today, the aspiraIndonesian left as "running tions of both the Timorese dogs of imperialism". and Papuan peoples have
But the popular support become accepted among that some of these move- progressive forces in Indoments enjoyed indicates nesia. that the problem as a whole Despite savage represcannot be reduced simply sion, during the past years to separatism instigated by the West Papuan people the CIA. Given the enor- have been able to broaden mous cultural diversity of and deepen their implantathe country it is obvious that tion among the population national rights, including of that region. In East Timthat of exercising self-or, there is apparently still
EAST TIMOR
EAST TIMOR was a former Portuguese colony that declared independence in November 1975. The struggle for independence was led by the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRET-
ILIN). Several days after the declaration of independence, the Democratic Republic of East
Timor was invaded by Indonesian troops. In 1976 the Suharto regime announced the annexation of the territory, but armed resistance continues to this day.
The massacres committed by Suharto's soldateska, as well as widespread famine after the invaders deliberately destroyed crops, claimed the lives of about 200,000 Timorese, or one-third of the populaarmed resistance against the Indonesian occupation. According to press reports at the end of 1988, there are still some 15,000 Indonesian troops guarding that tiny territory. FRETILIN forces are estimated at around 500 guerrillas.
Besides the two most well-known struggles mentioned above, numerous other nationalities in the Indonesian state are unhappy about Javanese paternalism. Recently, there has been a certain revival in the underground activities of nationalists in the South Moluccas themselves (and not by exiled groups in the Netherlands).
The Acehnese nationalists seem to have received some support from Libya. Their main leader, Teungku Hasan di Tiro, is presently in charge of the Mathaba organization set up by Gaddafi to prop up his image as a supporter of national liberation movements around the world. How much support the movement enjoys in the Aceh region itself is unclear, but it may not be insignificant given that there have been repeated reports of ferocious repression against it for some years. So far, this region is the only one where the regime has displayed a certain measure of caution in pursuing its Javanization
ACEH ACEH was the last Independent state of Indonesia to be conquered by the Dutch at the beginning of the century after 30 years of war. The heroic guerrilla resistance of the Acehnese contin ued even until the late
19208. After freeing themselves from Japanese occupation at the end of World War II, the Acehnese never allowed the Dutch military to set foot on
Acehnese soll during the war of independence spirit was again displayed by Daud Beureuh's movement in the 1950s.
Occasional reports in the Indonesian press (Kompas, July & August 1984) suggest that there is also considerable dissatisfaction and desire for autonomy in other areas, such as Lampung (South Sumatera), where Javanese transmigrants have already outnumbered the local population, and South Sulawesi.
A correct position on the national question and the abandonment of the concept of "separatism" will be crucial in the fight to bring tion. Recently, a petition signed by 182 members of the US Congress urged the secretary of state to push for a solution to the conflict that would put a stop to the Indonesian forces' human rights abuses.
colonialists. This fighting down the dictatorship, and to prevent the divide-andrule tactics being used successfully by the regime to defend itself. * them. The submissiveness of the older leaders of the PPP and their readiness to accept humiliation after humiliation by Suharto and his henchmen has produced a certain disenchantment among younger activists.
One example was the recent daring protest of the Muhammadiyah36 students' organization against the banning of some works by left-wing writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer. Another example was the stubborn resistance of sections of another the industrial bourgeoisie opposed to the inefficiency of the present patronage system — it would be fatal to place too much hope in such a development.
Legal aid groups, which provide assistance for victims of human rights abuses and try to force the regime at least to stick to its own laws, have been an important factor in denouncing repression and providing a limited opportunity for defence.
The shamelessness of the regime in violating its own legislation frequently defies
24 description, and exposures of abuses such as those occurring during the trials against
International Viewpoint #162 • May 1, 1989
Muslim grassroots activists since 1985 have by themselves helped to create a good deal of critical consciousness. Because these groups — whose clients include quite a number of workers — operate either under the patronage of prominent political figures renowned for their anti-communist attitudes or of religious organizations, it is not easy for the regime to simply crack down on them.
Among Muslim non-governmental organizations in recent years, especially after the vicious repression waged against Muslim activists since 1984, bitterness drive in order to avoid arousing the fighting spirit of the Acehnese, who were much feared by the Dutch against Suharto has been growing. Themes like social justice and political rights play a major role in aspirations of a number of
Islamic students' organization, the HMI, against the infamous law on associations, which stipulated that the state ideology of Pancasila should become the sole organizational principle of every organization.
Groups monitoring pollution problems or defending their rights against government projects (compensation for land and so on) have become more numerous. The regime's tough legislation on social organizations, introduced some time ago, indicate that it is well aware of the dangers of such a development for its rule.
The degree of dissatisfaction with the regime among the masses was clearly demonstrated during the 1986 election campaign, when huge rallies were organized by the PDI — usually associated with the stillidolized former president Sukarno — which were attended by hundreds of thousands of young people who made little effort to conceal their contempt for Suharto ana the GULAAk party. When the masses and the GOLKAR party. When the masses came into the streets at the end of that campaign it seemed as if they controlled Jakarta. For the time being that remains a dream, but it shows very well that the position of the regime is not exactly one of unshakeable stability. This is especially true since it is young people (a substantial majority of the population) who seem to be the most fed up with the regime, and whose spirit is free from the trauma of 1965-66.
Vital to cut off Suharto's life-line The fight against repression and for basic political rights, linked to the task of reestablishing trade unions and poor peasants organizations, constitutes the strategic task of revolutionaries in Indonesia today. It is indispensable for building a movement that can eventually bring down the ignoble dictatorship, which, during 23 years of terrorist rule, has shed more Indonesian blood than the Dutch colonialists did during 350 years. As support from almost all the imperialist countries has been one of the major factors in keeping the Suharto dictatorship in power for more than two decades, it is vital to cut off that life-line. The key thing here is the financial "aid" given to the generals by the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia. Suharto has been able to almost completely ignore even quite large campaigns, such as those against Indonesia's occupation of East Timor? or the protests against the executions of long-term political prisoners in 1985 and 1988, simply because he was never in any real danger of losing IGGI credits or facing an arms embargo. It is therefore decisive that support for the Indonesian opposition is not limited simply to protests against individual human rights violations - though such campaigns are not unimportant - but that there are campaigns that will really hit the dictatorship around cutting financial aid and ending arms supplies.
INDONESIA
Anti-IGGI demonstrations have been organized for many years by the DutchIndonesia Committee.
Destruction of tropical
Train forests
A lot of work remains to be done to exert sufficient pressure on the imperialist govemment's involved to withdraw that support. Bearing in mind the disastrous global effects of the continued destruction of the tropical rain forests, campaigns against World Bank support for transmigration projects and against the imports of precious tropical timber by certain imperialist coun tries are an additional axis of solidarity. This campaign has already achieved some success and has sensibilized sections of the ecology movement to the situation.
Last but not least, the campaign mainly led by Amnesty International and other human rights groups against the executions of 11 political prisoners sentenced to death a long time ago for alleged involvement in the coup of Sukarnoist army officers, which paved the way for Suharto's counter-coup, is of utmost importance — not only for humanitarian reasons. Some of the soldiers in Sukarno's former palace guard, who have been awaiting execution for years, are the last direct witnesses to Suharto's involvement in the abortive coup led by Colonel Untung and others. * 36. A reformist Islamic organization founded at the beginning of the century, involved mainly in educational and social work, and based mainly on the urban Muslim elite. 37. Nevertheless, this campaign has caused considerable annoyance to the regime, and was probably one of the key factors recently preventing Indonesia from mustering enough support when running as a candidate against Nicaragua for the leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement.
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