"There are indications of a quasiinsurrectional situation" HUMBERTO CENTERO is one of the main leaders of the National Union of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS), in which he represents the telecommunication workers' union
(ASTEL). Arrested several times, jailed and tortured for long periods, he has been released on every occasion as
La result of protest actions in El Salvador and internationally. On February 24, 1989, he was publicly sentenced to death by the People's Counter-revolutionary Army
(ECRP), one of the sinister death squads. A reporter for
International Viewpoint did the following interview with him in February in San Salvador.
International Viewpoint #160 • April 3, 1989
W HAT WERE the reactions of the ruling-class parties to the FMLN's proposal to postpone the presidential elections to September 19892
The FMLN's proposal was a bold one. This is the first time that the Front has taken such an attitude to elections since the start of the war nine years ago. The initial reaction of the Christian Democratic president Duarte was negative. In fact, he is living in the past. He reacts as if he were still under the Reagan administration and that all he has to do is reject every proposal by the FMLN.
ARENA, for its part, dragged out its moth-eaten so-called "peace and freedom" proposal, which it formulated after it won the legislative and municipal elections of March 1988. It proposed a temporary amnesty, which would permit five FMLN commanders to present their proposals to the Legislative Assembly.
But when the general commander of the FMLN declared that he was ready to go to the capital to speak to the Assembly, ARENA balked at putting this proposal to a vote.
After maintaining a total silence in the first few days, the general staff of the armed forces reacted by saying that it was up to the civilian government to decide. Subsequently, the chief of the general staff, Colonel Emilio Ponce, said, in essence, "If the army accepted the FMLN's proposal, it would split. If we reject it, we will look bad in the eyes of the population. That is why it is up to the civilian authorities to make the decision."
Anyhow, a few days later, other military chiefs said that if the elections were postponed, that would be a violation of the constitution, and then they would be obliged to stage a coup d'état.
Finally, all the parties of the right met for three days, and at the end of interminable discussions, they agreed to say that they were going to meet with the FMLN, but in a foreign capital. That is why a dialogue between the FMLN and the rightwing parties has just taken place in Mexico. Convergencia Democratica also took part in it. If the right-wing parties went to Mexico, it is because they are afraid to show the people that they reject dialogue. • What is the relationship of forces in the electoral arena?
The parties that really count electorally are ARENA and the PDC. The other parties altogether, including Convergencia Democratica, cannot expect to get more than 200,000 votes. ARENA knows that participation in the elections is going to be low, barely 30% of qualified voters, who total about 2,200,000. Roughly, I think ARENA can count on 400,000 votes and the PDC on 300,000.
The two parties that would lose from a postponement of the elections are therefore ARENA and the PDC. I say the PDC as
EL SALVADOR well because, since it is totally supported by the United States, it is not excluded that a massive electoral fraud will be organized on its behalf under Washington's auspices. • How could such an electoral fraud be pulled off when the overwhelming majority of mayors belong to ARENA?
The mayors play no important role in the elections. The departmental and local election authorities are appointed by the Central Council of Elections and are made up of representatives from the parties sitting in the Legislative Assembly - that is ARENA, the PDC and the PCN. But in fact the experts in electoral fraud are the military. They have several tools for carrying it out.
"Here, it is the army that elects and not the people"
First is the National Telecommunications Administration, whose director is the brother of the minister of defense, Colonel Casanova. Then, the military transport the ballot boxes (often by helicopter). So, fraud is easy, since you just have to have a helicopter carry 20 ballot boxes, of which 15, say are full of votes for ARENA. You stop at a base and replace those ballot boxes with ones full of votes for the PDC. Here in El Salvador, it is the army that elects and not the people. And since the army is under the thumb of the Americans, the PDC candidate could perfectly well win the elections, because he is Washington's choice. • How did Convergencia Democratica's campaign go?
Convergencia Democratica did not have a chance to win over a substantial part of the voters because of lack of time and because the army drastically limited its right of expression, especially outside the capital.
Often participants in Convergencia rallies outside the capital were arrested by the army when they returned to their homes. This became known, and so the attendance at Convergencia's rallies was poor. The army also frequently banned Convergencia from going into localities.
In the present circumstances, therefore, Convergencia is not able to compete electorally with ARENA or the PDC. This is why, as UNTS, we are calling on our members not to take part in the March 19 elections. We are not even going to pick up our voters' cards. • Can you say something about the instance of unity that has been achieved between UNTS and the UNOC?
First it should be said that the only difference was over the support the organizations linked to the PDC gave to Duarte's anti-popular government and to American policy. Aside from this point, there was already a considerable convergence.
After the PD's electoral defeat in March 1988 and the internal struggles that ravaged it, UNOC found itself in a more and more contradictory position. A minority supported the presidential candidacy of Fidel Chavez Mena, while a majority supported Rey Prendes. But finally, after various pressures, the UNOC lined up behind Chavez Mena.
After May 1988, UNTS and UNOC engaged in a dialogue in order to confront the resurgence of the death squads and the increasing power of the hardest-line elements (ARENA) in the command of the government's armed forces.
The first discussions made it possible to agree on public communiqués denouncing the repression, although they were often issued separately. It was not until after the FMLN's proposal on January 26 that, on the initiative of UNOC, our two organizations reached an agreement on February 10 and published a common statement. It welcomed the FMLN's proposal as positive, denied that the political parties had any monopoly on representing the people and declared that the constitution could not be an obstacle to dialogue. It is clear that the first two points are extremely important.
This position got a broad response from the masses, and was considered by the media as a change in the situation. In principle, we have agreed to jointly organize a march of 200,000 Salvadorans for peace. But this decision has to be confirmed
On its side, UNOC held a march on February 14 in which 40,000 people participated. All the demonstrators' placards expressed concrete demands of the workers and peasants, and none supported Chavez Mena's candidacy, even if the organizers reaffirmed their support for him when they gave interviews to journalists. • What is UNOC's position as regards the agrarian reform?
UNOC is very worried at the possibility of an ARENA victory. The cooperative organizations linked to UNOC have received millions of colons from the US [5.5 colons=$1] to advance the agrarian reform. This has favored them over other cooperative organizations, without however saving them from enormous debts. If ARENA wins, there is a great danger that the lands held by cooperative members will be restored to the old landowners.
Initially, ARENA wants to divide up the lands of the cooperatives, distributing them to the member families, who will then have the problem of repaying the debt as individuals. Since they will not be able to meet the payments, they will have to sell off their family plots. The Supreme Court, which has been controlled by ARENA since 1988, has ruled on several occasions 9 for returning the lands of bankrupt cooper-
EL SALVADOR DOCUMENT atives to their former owners, members of the oligarchy. On this occasion, UNOC leaders have said that if this continues, there will be nothing left but to take up arms and "go into the mountains." "Whatever else happens, the polarization will increase"
The peasants and cooperative farmers also have to contend with the anti-popular policy pursued by the public administrations controlled by the Christian Democracy. The nationalized banking system and the state institutions have a monopoly on trading agricultural products and act constantly in opposition to the peasants' interests.
This explains why already a large part of the organized cooperative farmers have joined UNTS [UNTS seems to have four times more cooperative farmers than UNOC]. And those who remain in UNOC are also unhappy with Duarte's policy, even though American aid is mitigating their problems a bit. UNOC is demanding a rescheduling of the debt. • If the elections are held as scheduled on March 19, what is going to happen?
In these conditions, the polarization will increase. If ARENA wins the elections, this is going to create complications for US policy toward our country, because behind its liberalizing mask, ARENA remains fundamentally an extreme rightist formation.
If, on the other hand, the PDC wins, with or without fraud, the ARENA elements that control the army general staff are going to be tempted to carry off a coup d'état. If there is not a coup d'état, as president, Chavez Mena, would have an extremely narrow margin of maneuver, because ARENA already controls the Legislative Assembly, the Supreme Court, the revenue court and so on.
In any case, ARENA is going to step up the war, and the rapprochement that has developed between UNOC and UNTS will pick up momentum. So, the polarization will increase and we will move toward a social explosion, the portents of which can already be seen.
For example, the victims of the September 1986 earthquake, after taking land and building new homes, decided to connect up the houses to the electricity wires and water pipes themselves. There are indications of a quasi-insurrectional situation.
For example, we as UNTS have set up permanent barricades in the street that leads to our headquarters for the sake of self-defense. We did that without authorization, after our headquarters was dynamited on February 15. The people are going 10 to be impelled to render justice themselves. * International Viewpoint #160 • April 3, 1989