International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

War and Revolution in Iran — Interview with HKS Leader

International Viewpoint No. 16, 1 November 1982 · pp 14-19 · 6,717 words

Middle East Repression and political prisoners Armed forces and soldiers

War and revolution in Iran

Interview with HKS representative

The following interview was given to Gerry Foley in mid-October in London by Saber Nikbeen, a leader of the Hesbe Kargarane Socialist (Socialist Workers Party), which is one of the three groups in Iran that adhere to the Fourth International.

There have been a number of articles in the press of the International presenting the views of the other two groups -the Revolutionary Workers Party (HKE) and the Workers Unity Party (HKV). But there has been less contact with the HKS in the last period because of repression. Therefore, their positions have not been so fully presented. To remedy this, we will publish a series of interview and articles by HKS leaders in the coming months. Question: What does the HKS think that the Iran-Iraq war has represented politically? What were the political motivations behind it and what has it represented for the Iranian revolution? Answer: The war between the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein and the Iranian regime dominated by Khomeini and the forces around him has now entered its third year. Over the past two years, the character of the war and hence the attitude of the workers and oppressed masses toward it has undergone considerable changes.

These changes have followed the evolution of the decisive political factors in Iran, that is, the stage of development of the Iranian revolution and process of rebuilding the bourgeois state after the old state apparatus was broken up by the mass upsurge and insurrection in 197879.

The most obvious change in the war is that while it was begun by an invasion of the Iraqi army, Saddam has now had to withdraw his forces back across the "international border" and it is Khomeini's soldiers that are being sent on massive offensives inside Iraq.

Unless the changes in the circumstances of the war are taken into account, one could easily fall prey to mistaken and simplistic ideas, into thinking that the present aims of the two regimes are simply a continuation of the earlier ones. It would be wrong, for example, to accept the claims of the Iranian regime that it is still waging the "same old defensive war," only now inside the Iraqi border.

The Iraqi population certainly cannot believe this, when the Iranian press and government raised the cry around the last offensive that the "Islamic fighters" were within a hundred kilometers of Baghdad (actually that is about how far the Iraqi capital is from the Iranian border at the nearest point), or when the Iranian government proclaims that its prime intention is to liberate the Shiite holy cities of Nejaf and Kerbala in southern Iraq. In fact the headquarters of the Iranian invasion force is called "Nejaf Base."

There is no doubt now, if there ever was, that Saddam began this war with the tacit support of the reactionary Arab states and world imperialism, in order to weaken the Iranian revolution and to diminish the threats it was posing against the interests of reaction in the Middle East.

Therefore, revolutionary Marxists could not take a neutral position. The war was not simply a war between two reactionary bourgeois states. It offered the opportunity for reactionary forces to strangle the Iranian revolution. And -this must be understood clearly, it was not just aimed at crushing the Iranian revolution from without but at changing the balance of forces within the country in favor of reaction, including the reaction ensconced in the Khomeini government.

Wars represent vast social, political, and economic turmoil; they are not some sort of giant football game. There is usually a certain complicity between bourgeois regimes at war, that is, complicity against their respective working classes and oppressed population. It is very rare to bourgeois regimes to try to destroy the bourgeois social formation in another country; they usually have the idea of coming to terms with it at some point.

To assume that the Khomeini regime wanted to destroy the Saddam regime root and branch for example, one would have to assume that the Khomeini government actually wanted to spread a revolutionary upsurge through the region, when in fact its objective, as in the case of any bourgeois regime in a situation of such crisis, is to liquidate the upsurge in its own country, not to spread it. While it has tried to use the mass discontent in Iraq against Saddam to some extent, it has been very careful not to encourage a mass upsurge that could go out of control.

The opposite side of this coin is the determination of the Khomeini government to take advantage of the blows dealt to the Iranian revolution by the Iraqi invasion to strengthen its hold on the situation in its own country. Within the Khomeini regime, the right also looked for ways to take advantage of the invasion to strengthen its position.

In short, the war has not been a twodimensional military conflict, but a threedimensional political-social-military struggle in which the essential stake is the future of the mass movement in Iran.

Therefore, what revolutionists in Iran and in the region had to do was to try to mobilize the oppressed masses in both countries to oppose the Baathist aggression. This campaign had to be focused around the central task of defending the Iranian revolution and putting an end to this war. Q: Was the Saddam regime simply acting as a proxy for imperialism in launching the war? A: No, the relationship of neocolonial reregimes to imperialism is not so simple. The Baathist regime had its own social interests, its own objectives and strategy in maneuvering with imperialism, and the specific national interests of the Iraqi bourgeoisie to advance.

Nowhere in the region was the impact of the Iranian revolution greater than in Iraq. It gave impetus to an upsurge of the so-called "Shiite" opposition to Saddam (which in reality is mainly the movement of the poor peasants, particularly in southern Iraq). It opened the way for the strengthening of the Kurdish movement struggling against national oppression. It encouraged a new wave of anti-imperialist feeling in a period in which the Iraqi bourgeoisie was preparing a shift toward a new increase in its integration into the world capitalist market.

The response of the Saddam regime to the Iranian revolution was a more marked shift to the right both internally and internationally, involving collaboration with ousted politicians and generals of the shah's regime, such as Bakhtiar and Oveissi.

The Iraqi regime began to advocate openly the overthrow of Khomeini's regime from the right and to systematically aid counterrevolutionary projects and schemes for coups in Iran.

The full-scale military aggression launched in September 1980 was simply the logical extension of this Baathist policy.

However, in mounting this attack, Saddam was able to take advantage of the

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reactionary chauvinist policies of the

Khomeini leadership, such as the brutal repression of the Arab national minority in Iran, the "Greater Iran" nationalistic statements of the regime made under the cover of "pan-Islamic" rhetoric, and the refusal of the new government in Teheran to renounce the one-sided 1975 border treaty imposed on Iraq by the Shah.

Although the Arab states and organizations did not raise open protests against the repression of the Iranian Arabs, the impact of this went very deep. For example, Khomeini ordered the closing of the

PLO office in Ahwaz, one of the main cities in the Arab area.

The Baathist regime also aimed at consolidating itself by getting the backing of the Gulf Emirates and Saudi Arabia. It sought, to a certain extent, to fill the gap left by the fall of the shah's regime as a major imperialist gendarme in the region, that is, to gain a privileged relationship with imperialism.

The Baathists also hoped that the war would assist them in their project of shifting their alliances away from the USSR to the USA (this began in 1979, after the break with the Syrian regime).

Already before the war, the Iraqi regime was getting encouraging signals from U.S. imperialism, although indirectly through the Saudi rulers. More directly, the French imperialists were offering ; help as a means of regaining a position in the region through Iraq. Homer he

However, there were contradictions between the aims of U.S. imperialism and those of the Baathist regime. For one thing, after the overthrow of the Shah, the U.S. had to rely more and more on Zionism as its "strategic" ally in the Middle East. In no way could it rely on Saddam to be its main gendarme. And the Zionists have demonstrated in no uncertain way that they will not accept a reinforcement of the Iraqi regime.

In general, it was in the interest of U.S. imperialism that the Iraqi regime be kept in a weak and dependent position so that it could not upset its Israel-EgyptSaudi Arabian axis. This in fact seems to explain, at least partly, why the Soviet bureaucracy has been willing to continue to pay the high and rising political cost involved in maintaining its support for Iraq in a war against the Iranian revolution. In fact both the Tudeh Party (the Iranian CP) and the Iraqi Communist Party condemned the Baathist aggression. Nonetheless, the Kremlin has continued to supply decisive military equipment to Iraq. This is hard to explain simply by the pursuit of diplomatic interests, since the Kremlin's main ally in the region is Syria, a violent enemy of the Baghdad government, and Moscow has been energetically wooing the Islamic Republic.

Thus, when the revolutionists in the region stated that this war served the interests of imperialism (and Washington in particular), it was not because they thought the Iraqi regime was directly carrying out U.S. policies. The war objectively served the designs of imperialism by creating a situation in which it could 16 reinforce its military position in the area Moreover, the mass movement that led and step up its preparations for interven- to the insurrection split very quickly ing militarily at a later stage. In this after the shah fell. Within two months context, from the standpoint of imperial- after the overthrow, the Khomeini forces ism, a weakening of the Iraqi regime itself had succeeded in destroying or isolating was desirable. and intimidating the local and factory

For all these reasons, the question of committees, and begun mounting violent how to approach mobilizing the masses attacks on the gains made by the masses.

against the Iraqi aggression presented The mass movement was not smashed some difficult tactical problems for revo- There were subsequent upsurges, but the lutionists. same political problems remained.

While stressing that we had to conIt is false and dangerous to maintain demn this war between two semi-colonial that at the time the Iraqis launched their bourgeois states and fight for the unconattack in September 1980, the revolution ditional withdrawal of the Iraqi troops was the same thing that it was in Februa back behind the pre-September 21, 1980, ry 1979, a year and a half before, that is, border, we also emphasized that this war a mass movement of the oppressed under served none of the interests of the Iraqi the leadership of Khomeini.

or the Iranian masses. That meant that while we worked for mobilizing the Iran- The revolution, because of the Khoian masses against the military aggress on, meinites attacks on the masses and we warned against falling into the trap of because of the rising expectations of the defending the Khomeini regime, and help- masses themselves had come to have two ing it accomplish its objective of using completely opposed meanings for the the mass sentiment against the Iraqi vast majority of the toilers and oppressed aggression as a means of furthering its in Iran. own chauvinistic aims. There was the actual revolution, which

We also had to proceed from the meant the struggle of the toilers and the standpoint that the threat to the revolu- oppressed for the extension and unification from within was at least as great as tion of the independent factory councils the one from without, that they were in (the shoras) and for workers control. And there was the "revolution" (that is, the reality linked. We could not defend the

"Islamic" one) which meant destroying revolution against Saddam by delivering ourselves bound hand and foot to the the independent shoras by setting up counterrevolution within Iran, which in- Islamic shoras, which were not elected, cluded the Khomeini regime. not democratic, and antileft, and instal-

Cling watchdog committees of the regime Q: How was it possible to mobilize the called Islamic Societies (Anjomanhaye masses against the Iraqi attack in indepen- Eslami), which were run politically by the dence from, and opposition to, the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and Khomeini regime that came out of the linked to the repressive apparatus outside revolutionary upsurge and the insurrec- the factory. tion? The real revolution involved the moveA: It is an oversimplification to view the ment of the oppressed nationalities for Khomeini regime as the outcome of the self-determination, the struggles of the mass upsurge and the insurrection. poor peasants to form rural shoras, and of

Khomeini did not want an insurrec- the women, students, soldiers, and other tion. He based himself on the mass layers for the extension of democratic mobilizations against the government in rights. Khomeini's "revolution" meant order to try to force the government to genocide against the national minorities, transfer power to him at the top. The destruction of the peasant shoras, and the insurrection was actually led in Teheran, suppression of all democratic rights. the decisive place, by the left, by the It was the first revolution that was Mujahedeen and the Fedayeen. threatened by the war. The second was

In Kurdistan, the Kurds carried out already seen to mean counterrevolution their own revolutionary parallel to the by the vast majority of the revolutionary one in the Persian centers, but under their masses. It stood to gain from the Iragi own leadership. They never accepted regime's aggression. Khomeihi's leadership. That explains why The situation at the time of the Iragi within a month after the fall of the shah, attack was that there had been a very Khomeini started launching indiscrimi- extensive experience of mass mobilization nate military attacks against the Kurdish and experience and at the same time of centers. betrayal of this and attacks on it by the

The self-organization of the masses Khomeini forces. In this context, it was went further in Kurdistan than in the possible to call for a revival of independparts of the country where the Khomeini ent factory and neighborhood commitforces had effective control. The peasants tees independent of the regime in order began to take the land first in Kurdistan to oppose the attack. It did not mean and Turkmenistan, an area inhabited by necessarily opposing the regime directly a brutally oppressed Mongol people who but it did mean appealing to the masses' speak a Turkish language. No publication understanding of the need to organize in their language was ever permitted. The independently of it. first book published was a small collec- There were various tactical ways of tion of verse that appeared after the fall applying this approach, but the fundaof the shah. Khomeini's pasdars burnt mental problem was to avoid being pulled every copy of it they could find. into building committees that were in

fact means of political control and repression by the regime. This was essential because the war offered a pretext for strengthening the instruments of repression such as the army and the state's armed militias - which were already being used against the Iranian revolution. Secondly, it offered a pretext for increasing repression against the movement of the oppressed and the toilers in the name of "national defence" and "national unity." Thirdly, the war threatened to prepare the ground for a return of the forces of the old regime (through a coup linked to outside military intervention).

In fact, the attack came at a very dangerous point for the Iranian revolution. The masses were breaking from Khomeini, but this meant a moment of reflection and division, that is, of downturn of the mass mobilizations, and a certain skepticism on the part of broad layers. The disillusion with Khomeini threatened to lead to demoralization.

Moreover, in the wake of the seizure of the U.S. embassy and the taking of the hostages, Iran was isolated internationally, and the chances of an international outcry correspondingly less.

On the one hand, Iran was isolated diplomatically. On the other, the demagogic diversion of the mass movement to focusing on symbolic questions and emotional anti-Americanism had created tremendous confusion and isolated the Iranian revolution from the real world anti-imperialist movement.

The attack came after the occupation and shutting down of the universities, that is, the new wave of repression launched by the Khomeini forces in the spring of 1980, after the mass upsurge of autumn 1979 had been successfully diverted and given time to burn itself out. At this point, those left offices remaining open were attacked and a new massive campaign was launched in Kurdistan.

Actually, the upsurge itself had followed the defeat of the regime's first attempt to restabilize the bourgeois state in the first war against the Kurdish people. This war, which was launched on a full scale in June 1979, included a massive repressive campaign throughout Iran. The Kurdish people defeated the Khomeini forces in August-September 1979.

When the embassy diversion had run its course, the government resumed the Kurdish war and the repression and the campaign to restabilize the bourgeois state.

Finally, at the time of the Iraqi attack, the Iranian army was torn by rifts between the army officers trained and promoted under the old regime as the pasdars, Khomeini's revolutionary guards.

So, the Iraqis apparently thought that they could score more decisive victories quickly and establish a base for the right in Iran in the "liberated zones." Q: How big a victory were the Iraqis striking for, overthrowing the regime outright, establishing a protectorate over the oil producing areas where there is a historic Arab majority? A: There are documents indicating that was an agreement between the In fact the Kurdish Democratic Party rightists to set up a "provisional govern- offered the "a truce" in ment." It is possible that the rightists mis- return for a joint campaign against the led the Iraqis about the situation in Iran; Iraqi Army. They would have had to give a totally The introduction of the land reform false picture of it for anyone to think bill was postponed until "the forces of that the regime could be overthrown in infidelity are defeated." All political that way. To overthrow the government discussions were banned in the high militarily from Iraq would be an enor- schools, and students now face armed mous undertaking, involving a long march Islamic Society members in every high across desert and mountains. There is no way the Iraqi government could have The left political parties were banned, The U.S. contemplated that. including the Mujahedeen, which government warned nearly two million votes in the parliamenIraqis against attempting to take the oil tary elections according to the official fields. And in point of fact, throughout figures and a lot more in reality. The prethe war they never made a serious text was that they were sabotaging the attempt to seize them or put them out war effort. of operation. In opposition to this, we called for

By its nature, the Iraqie regime could arming the masses through their shoras not attempt to mobilize the Khuzistan (which meant fighting the regime's Arabs; that would have represented as big attempt to dissolve these bodies) and for a danger to it as to Khomeini. In fact, a revival of the democratic neighborhood they waged a purely military campaign, committees to organize the work of and as a result the Arabs were driven defense and military training (and therefrom their homes and alienated. fore fighting the government's policy of Arabs were also the victims of spoliation using the Imam's Committees to suppress and atrocities at the hands of the Iraqis. the mass movement in the neighbor-

On the other hand, there was a real danger that in conditions where demora- We called for the soldiers to exercise lization was already spreading among the control over their unreliable officers masses, the human and material sacrifices through their own shoras (and therefore imposed by the war would further for fighting the government's policy of weaken the will of the masses to resist reimposing the old discipline of the shah's and thereby open the way for a more army in the barracks).

consolidation of the bourgeois Despite the downturn in the revolution and despite the demoralization of Q: What were the political results of the the masses, the Iraqi attack provoked a attack within Iran? new wave of mass mobilizations against A: The immediate results tended to con- the war and for the defense of the revolufirm the Iraqis' perspective. The reaction- tion. Neighborhood committees revived, ary officers in jail were freed to reorgan- and independent workers defence comize the Iranian army. A committee was mittees were set up in many factories. In set up immediately to negotiate a settle- Teheran the day after the start of the ment to the conflict over the U.S. war, spontaneous mass demonstrations hostages (which ended in the Algiers began, calling on the government to arm agreement that signed away over half of the people. (They were suppressed by the Iranian foreign reserves. The details of nian foreian pasdars).

agreement have never been made Q: Was it realistic to think that neighborpublic in Iran.). Approaches started being hood and workers committees springing made internationally to get arms from up spontaneously could play a real role in anyone willing to sell (and this eventually opposing a full-scale invasion by a large included Israel, from which at least two and well equipped army? large sales are fairly well documented). A: In fact, the decisive battle of the war

Strikes had previously been banned. was won by fighters organized independBut now they were dealt with by armed ently of the regime. That was the battle intervention inside the factory. To help of Khorramshahr, which halted the Iraqi the war effort, workers were forced to blitzkrieg. The population of the city, the "step up production," vast majority of whom were Arabs, took working sometimes up to 15 hours a day, up arms and stopped the Iraqi army for and to give part of their pay (on the nine days. The army and the pasdars fled average three days pay per month). The It was rumored at the time that the workers were also obliged to accept mili- government had deliberately pulled the tarization of the factories by armed army out in order to avoid a confrontaIslamic Societies (which now had a good tion with the masses. Later, documents cover for their reactionary role in the were released by the IRP to prove that factories). Bani Sadr ordered the withdrawal as part

All the democratic gains of the soldiers of "his conspiracy to crush the Islamic were taken away, and a tough repressive revolution." That at least shows that the code of discipline was reestablished in the army was ordered to pull back, although armed forces. now for its own purposes the IRP is try-

Under the pretext of the war, the cam- ing to put the blame on Bani Sadr. paign against the Kurdish people was The mass sentiment was so strong that stepped up. The regime claimed that "the the Khomeini regime itself was forced to Kurds are basically serving the war aims concede that it was necessary to arm the of Saddam." masses and mobilize them outside the

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regular army and the pasdars. Baseej

(mobilization) committees were set up in many neighborhoods to enroll the volunteers and canalize this sentiment. The committees were then put under the authority of the pasdars and used to provide cannon fodder for mass suicidal assaults.

The regime managed to keep the mass mobilizations from getting out of control by two means. First, the war zone was cleared of civilians. Military bases were set up in the middle of populous towns. No efforts were made to build civil defense shelters. And food shortages were allowed to continue, despite the massive support of the entire Iranian people for the front.

In Ahwaz, the central storehouse of ammunition was placed in the centre of town. One night it exploded. The next day, at least a third of the population was in flight.

The depopulated towns were put under tight control of the pasdars and any independent mobilizations were brutally crushed.

In the first months of the war, at least twenty Mujahedeen supporters and 12 leftists, and many more Arabs were executed in the war zone as "armed saboteurs." In fact, they had been fighting the Iraqi army. Even independent medical aid was banned.

The Mujahedeen and Fedayen medical tents in the area were attacked by the pasdars and the staff was put in jail. Moreover, these groups had played a key role in the defense of Khorramshahr.

The second reason the government succeeded in getting a firm grip on the situation is that the major groups and parties to the left played into its hands. The Tudeh Party and the Fedayeen (Majority) took a line indistinguishable from that of the regime, calling on the masses to work harder, demand less and to help the government to organize its war effort.

The Mujahedeen also, who had called for independent mobilizations in the beginning, quickly dropped this. They entered into an alliance with Bani Sadr who was trying to use the war to strengthen his faction in the ruling apparatus (based on the army, the technocrats, and a section of the clergy) as an alternative to the IRP. This alliance required dropping independent mobilizations since Bani Sadr was against that.

The Mujahadeen made a mistake similar to those who thought it was necessary to support Khomeini in order to oppose the Iraqis.

Bani Sadr tried to base himself on the rising demands for democratic rights, the mass reaction against the demagogy and antidemocratic attitudes of the mullahs and the IRP.

It was to that sentiment that Bani Sadr owed his overwhelming victory in the presidential election. He appeared to represent the popular will, on the basis of an election that was less rigged than the parliamentary elections, in which the IRP was able to control the polls and thus 18 assure that its people got in.

Of course, the presidential election was not that free either, since "nonIslamic" candidates were banned, but by comparison it smelt like a rose.

The Mujahedeen, who were influenced by Maoism and bourgeois populism at their origin, therefore decided that Bani

Sadr represented the democratic bourgeoisie and therefore the democratic alternative. In fact, he was just as determined to stamp out the basis of real democracy in the conditions of the revolutionary crisis in Iran, the independent mobilization of the masses.

The Mujahedeen used the government's repression against them as a pretext for withdrawing from involvement in the mass mobilizations and to throw all their weight behind Bani Sadr's solution (a palace coup).

Khomeini's regime gradually succeeded in consolidating its power through the IRP dominated parliament, the vastly strengthened Pasdaran, and an IRP government. Linked to the so-called mass committees, which had become instruments of repression - the Imam's Committees, Reconstruction Crusade (Jihad Sazendegi) and the Baseej - the Khomeini government started preparing for a showdown with the so-called "liberal" faction, having already crushed the left. Q: What effect did this have on the attitude of the masses to the war? A: From that point on, coming about six months after the outbreak of the war, larger and larger sections of the masses began to regard the government's war effort as simply a maneuver to consolidate the power of the IRP and crush the revolution. This did not mean that they did not want to see the Iraqi army defeated. It meant only they realized that the government was crushing the mass movement and thereby sabotaging the war effort and therefore not fighting the imperialist plans.

In this phase, only the government was saying "the central issue facing us is the war with the infidel Saddam." The masses were already mobilizing in all the major cities around democratic demands and a program of social reforms.

In the absence of a powerful revolutionary organization, this movement could very easily be strangled by Bani Sadr, who was trying to improve the position of his own faction within the ruling class.

The next three months were basically taken up by the regime's preparing for the overthrow of Bani Sadr and the containment of the mass movement against repression and for social justice. In this period, the demagogy about the "panIslamic" aims of the war was stepped up. Fantastically exaggerated reports of mass revolts against the Saddam regime were constantly trumpeted in the totally controlled press and media.

In many cities, the vastly increased forces of the state apparatus were being used openly to intensify repression. Mujahedeen members were being attacked and killed on the streets. There were more than a hundred known cases in northern Iran alone. Purges of militants in the factories were intensified. In Teheran alone, over 1,500 workers were either arrested or dismissed.

The campaign against the Kurdish people reached genocidal proportions, with bombardments of the villages and forced evacuation of the population from the strategically important regions (e.g. Saghez and Baneh areas).

Those political groups who had refused to fight for independent mobilization of the masses and which had helped to strengthen the instruments of the mullahs' repression by providing them with a left cover now found themselves forced into the position of actively aiding the repression.

Fedayeen-Majority and Tudeh Party members were involved in the Islamic Socities, which were spying on the militant workers and reporting them to the government authorities.

By early June 1981, the Khomeini faction was ready to move. Bani Sadr, seeing the handwriting on the wall, issued a call for a referendum so that the people could show who they supported, him or the IRP-dominated parliament. He did not, however, call for any mass mobilization to back this up. And he was quickly deposed as chief of the armed forces and later as president.

Demonstrations in support of Bani Sadr, which were mainly organized by the Mujahedeen, were brutally crushed. A rally in front of the parliament building in Teheran was machine gunned. On that occasion alone, over 170 people were killed. A quick deal was struck with the leaders of the army, who were considered Bani Sadr supporters. As it happened, they died in a suspicious airplane crash a few months later.

The Mujahedeen's response to this wave of terror was to adopt the tactic of "armed struggle." In practice, this meant assassinating individual government leaders. They did not call for, or try to build, mobilizations and strikes, although they were by this time a mass organization capable of calling hundreds of thousands of people into the streets in their own name. The growing mass opposition to Khomeini was polarized mainly by them.

In fact, their "armed struggle" was the outcome of their class-collaborationist political line. They thought that by weakening the pro-Khomeini faction, the way would be opened for the "more progressive" liberal faction to come to power in collusion with the army, and that such an alternative would then be supported by the masses. Their bourgeois friends in the government would not, of course, have approved of general strikes and mass mobilizations.

This tactic simply played into the hands of the regime. The masses were further demoralized and demobilized. The forces of repression were unleashed with savage ferocity. The day after the explosion at the IRP headquarters, at

least 15 thousand people were arrested in Iranian government, however, Teheran, of which at least 3 thousand insisted on stepping up the war and talk. were militant workers from every factory. ing in terms of setting up an Islamic (From Evin Jail a caravan of buses went Republic in Iraq and of a pan-Islamic the Teheran-Karaj road, calling on every revolution throughout the region. There factory and picking up workers named by were certain contradictions in the line, the Islamic Societies.) with some of the military commanders

Street executions, house raids, whole- talking about going Iraq only far sale purges, mass arrests, and mass execu- enough to assure that Iranian cities could tions followed. In the course of one year, not be shelled from Iraqi positions. Such over 20,000 political prisoners have been vacillations were ended by the Imam himexecuted in Iran, and over 60,000 persons self immediately after the Israeli invasion are being kept imprisoned for political

Large numbers of people volunteered

Obviously a terror of this scope was to go to Lebanon and defend the Palestiaimed at the mass movement as a whole. nians. The government feared that this All the independent organizations have could upset its own reactionary designs. been broken up or driven far under- Khomeini declared that in fact the invaground, the major gains of the revolution sion of Lebanon was "an imperialist conhave been rolled back. This is why despite spiracy to divert attention from the Iranthe victories at the front, we have not ian victories" in the war with Saddam. He seen a rise in the mass movement and in declared that "the forces of Islam are fact repression has increased. prepared to go to Lebanon but only

This is tragic confirmation of our posi- through Baghdad." tion at the start that the only way to The regime's motivations are not defend the revolution effectively was to difficult to understand. The end of the avoid being trapped and disarmed by our war would produce an explosive politienemy at home. It has been shown that cal situation in Iran. Furthermore, the there is a danger that we can win the war rainy season will soon begin, making miliand lose the revolution. operations impossible

Once the real revolution was stopped southern front. The cold weather in the and rolled back, the regime began to back mountains would have a similar effect in even from its demagogic north. So, the government could nationalization plans and land reforms. a phoney war for several

The regime did pursue the war effort months. against Iraq. But this took on du ever If the war ended, the war refugees increasing chauvinistic chr ictr would have to return to Khuzistan, and a constant declarations of int • impose new nationwide movement for social and a "truly Islamic" governn : on Iraq. economic reforms would begin. Secondly,

The masses were called on to foot the it would be difficult for the government with ever increasing to justify maintaining the military instrumaterial sacrifices. The Iraqi army was ments forged in this war the hugely defeated in a number of major battles, inflated corps of pasdars, and all the but at the cost of the lives of over 70,000 manifold foundations. Iranian youth, 150,000 crippled, and Thirdly, the Iranian government look more than 2 million war refugees. ed to a Shiite uprising in Iraq linked to

Most basic necessities are now ration- the advance of the Iranian army as a good ed. The standard of living has fallen by solution to all its political and social over 50% by comparison with what it was problems. in the last years of the shah. A vast black For these reasons, the Iranian regime market run by the Pasdaran and the has embarked on a dangerous course bureaucrats has now developed. The which can only bring greater material and whole country is mourning its dead. human losses and therefore a deeper poli-

Victories won in such circumstances tical crisis sooner or later for it itself, a did not result in mass jubilation. The res- course which has the effect of increasing ponse was just a sigh of relief and a hope the threat of imperialist intervention in that the war would end soon. the entire region, including in Iran itself.

Not even the victory at Khorramshahr This is because the war is dividing the was greeted by mass demonstrations. The oppressede peoples of the region in the demonstration called by the government face of imperialism and because the Iranin Teheran to celebrate the victory did ian advance is seen by the overwhelming not draw more than 100,000 participants, majority of the Iraqi people as a threat to a comparatively small number for the their national independence, to the gains circumstances and the society. of their national revolution, and to the

With his army demoralized and facing aspirations of the Arab people. It is defeat, Saddam was by this time under reconsolidating the reactionary Baathist pressure to end the war. Further- regime and providing a justification for more, the capitalists in Iraq had achieved the passivity of the Arab regimes in the of the objectives they sought in of the imperialist attacks in launching this war. There was a lot of Lebanon. money to be made through the many Moreover, in circumstances when the deals concluded with Western imperialist Khomeini regime is being regarded with interests (estimated to involve 65 billion disillusion by a growing majority of the dollars). And for the most part, these Iranian masses, the military defeat that is contracts are to go into effect only after likely if the war is pursued could precipithe war ends. tate a radical shift in the balance of forces in favor of imperialism and its most subservient local agents.

That is, defeat of the Iranian army followed by mass demoralization could provide favorable conditions for the old counterrevolutionary forces of capitalism in Iran. Khomeini's "Islamic" counterrevolution is thus only preparing the ground for a final crushing of the Iranian revolution that would involve the destruction of his own regime.

The extent of the repression, which no one can deny is massive, shows the real state of the mass movement and the real balance of forces in the country.

Effective democratic and trade-union rights are the result of a favorable relationship of forces for the proletariat and the masses.

The mistake that is made by those who mistake the demagogy of the regime for mass radicalization is that they leave politics out of the equation in calculating the balance of forces. In order to fight effectively, the masses have to have some concrete political perspective and leadership that really represents their interests. There are other historical examples of the collapse of very powerful mass movements when these decisive factors are lacking.

For example, in Italy, some local Communist Party leaderships built up mass insurrectionary movements during the war, thinking that this was the real line of Stalin. When Moscow turned against them after the war, they collapsed politically and so did the movements they led, although these included hundreds of thousands of conscious revolutionary fighters.

I have described how the development of a mass political leadership was diverted and crushed. Those who now maintain, against overwhelming evidence, that the mass movement is continuing to go forward are obliged in fact to try to present Khomeini and the IRP as a kind of revolutionary leadership, albeit with contradictions. That has a certain logic, but it is political lunacy. Q: In this situation, what should revolutionaries do? A: We must call for an immediate end to this war and put forward a program of social and econmic demands representing the interests and the deeply felt needs of the toiling and oppressed masses.

We have to call on the masses to resist in every way possible this regime of hangmen and deceivers, to return to the traditions and the experience of the mass movement that overthrew the shah, which this government in no way represents. It is the gravedigger of that movement. * The core of the Kurdish nation in Iran belong to the Sunni sect of Islam. Those who are Shiites are border peoples that generally stand in a more fluid position relative to the Persian state and culture, or else assimilated middle-class layers in the centers of Persian administration - IV.

19

The war in Lebanon-

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