Prerevolutionary crisis looms in Bolivia
In fact, the July 1980 coup was an hydroelectric potential.
With the military in retreat before the mass movement in Bolivia, possibility of a prerevolutionary situation developing in the country. The following is a summary of reports from Bolivian Trotskyists and Sergio Rodriquez, a leader of the Mexican section of the Fourth International who visited Bolivia in early October. Some other elements have been added to complete the picture.
Facing a nationwide general strike, the Bolivian military junta agreed on September 17 to withdraw from power. announced that the congress dispersed by the authors of the military coup of July 17, 1980, would be reconvened.
Early in October, the congress met and elected a civilian president and vice president, Hernan Siles Suazo and Victor Paz Zamorra. Both represented major components of the Union Democratica Popular
Siles Suazo is the leader of the MoviIzquierda (MNR-I, the Left Revolutioary Nationalist Movement); Paz Zamorra of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR - Movement of the Revo-
Left, originally a guerrilla
The key economic ministries of labor given to Communist Party representatives.
The July 17, 1980, coup was staged expressly to prevent the UDP from assuming office. That is an index of the turnaround. In the June 1980 elections, the coalition got 40% of the vote, and a smaller, far more radical grouping, the
(Socialist Party, between 11% and 12%. Together they held the majority.
The leader of the PS-Uno, Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz, was murdered at the time of the coup d'etat. Six months later, in early 1981, eight leaders of the MIR government's announcement of its austerIty program.
During the military takeover, the headquarters of the national labor confederation, the COB (Central Obrera Bolivia -destroyed by fire from tanks. The leadership of the COB was arrested, and violent military assaults were the working-class neighborhoods.
A large number of workers were killed, it is still impossible to say how many. Hundreds were sent to concentration
The COB was outlawed, and broken for a period.
attempt to repeat the Argentine military takeover of March 1976 in Bolivia. The coup was preceded by the buildup of rightist terrorist organizations modeled
Anti-Communist Alliance. In the most recent period, such 10,000 well armed and well paid opera-
An important element organized by the three gangs that control the cocaine trade.
It was on the section of the bourgeoisie that controls the cocaine business that the 1980 coup was essentially based. Its most direct foreign ally was the murderous military regime in Argentina, with its 30,000 "missing persons." This, to a considerable extent, explains the stand-
Washington, which refused to recognize the regime.
WHAT THE COLLAPSE OF THE
From a more general standpoint, the 1980 coup marked the failure of a long attempt to restabilize a form of bourgeois rule in Bolivia.The 1952 revolution, one of the deepest revolutionary processes in Latin American history, shattered the traditional structures of the ruling class and gave rise to very powerful working-class organizations, the COB, and in particular the miners union, the most radical driving force within the proletariat and
The revolution, however, failed to solve the problems of the peasants or dissolve the bourgeois army, and it was on that the counterrevolution based itself. The army was rebuilt in 1954-56 with American aid and training. In 1964, maintained it with the help of a largely
In 1971, General Hugo Banzer established a more right-wing regime, based in particular on the bourgeoisie of Santa Cruz, one of the most backward areas of the country. Santa Cruz differs economically and culturally from the rest of the country, in that it is a region traditionally dominated by big ranchers and where the population is almost exclusively of European origin. The bourgeoisie in this area was strengthened by an oil boom.
The rise of dictatorship in Bolivia was closely connected with the development of military regimes from the mid 1960s on in Brazil and Argentina, which intervened in various ways, among other
Again control of Bolivian resources, in particular natural gas and
Thus, the development of more and more repressive military regimes in Bolivia was an integral part of the rise of strong military regimes throughout the Southern Cone of Latin America. And it was tied up with a prospect of economic growth subordinate to imperialism.
DICTATORSHIPS OF THE
The withdrawal of the military rulers in Bolivia, therefore, represents a very deep crisis of bourgeois rule throughout the region. The nadir of capitalist economic development was a regime openly based on the drug trade, which became the country's main export at the end of the 1970s, passing tin and petroleum.
The retiring military ruler, General Torelio, is indeed a nonentity who was put at the head of the government because the U.S. vetoed the chiefs of the other services, well known members of the cocaine mafia.
The political failure of the junta is symbolized by the fact that two years after the coup. It had to call the UPD back to government to rescue bourgeois rule. That reflects the deterioration in the relationship of forces for the bourgeoisie vis-a-vis the workers movement and the masses of the poor. And in this situation, the bitterness of the workers and the poor toward the military is very sharp.
The military did not send officers to the inauguration of the new president, evidently for fear of the response they would get from the crowd. Liberation's special correspondent, Veronique Soule, noticed a crowd gathering around five human silhouettes drawn on the pave. ment, representing five victims of the military coup. An old trade unionist who was in the COB headquarters when it was attacked spoke:
"Come up, you young people, so you Will know ...It happened on July 17, during the coup of General Garcia Meza. Look at what they did to our building Everything was taken away, burned. This is all that is left of the COB headquarters They fired on those who came out first. The whole leadership was gathered in the building. The others were able to escape over the roofs. I was there... it still hurts me today. And what became of my brother, a miner too? Come on, look don't forget what the military did."
THE NEW GOVERNMENT
In his inaugural address, Siles Suazo called for "a war economy, discipline on the job, productivity." At the same time, he promised workers a share in the management of the state owned enterprises, which dominate the mining industry. Before taking office, the new president had pledged to reform the armed forces and punish those officers involved in the cocaine trade; at the same time he promised that his government would not attempt to "take vengeance against the military." HOW THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT
WAS TOPPLED
In short, the UDP government assumed the mediating role that the military expected of it. It was not the UDP leadership that forced the cocaine generals to relinquish formal control of the government. The coalition leadership, as POR-Combate, Bolivian Section of the Fourth International (DR) well as the union tops had opposed the government over to the UDP before the raised by the miners. But the leadership unlimited general strike of September 16. It was the ranks and the leaders closest to them, especially in the miners union, that forced it.
This development at the same time reflected the pressure of an upsurge expressed in many protests and which forced the restoration of the legal status of the COB in May.
The miners union went on an unlimited strike first, announcing that the miners would not return to work until the government accepted four demands. The first that it withdraw in favor of a government of Siles Suazo and Paz Zamorra. The second was that this government should immediately call general elections. The third was acceptance of the miners' economic program, calling for (a) nationalization of the banks; (b) a state monopoly of foreign trade; (c) nationalization of the part of the mining industry remaining in private hands. The fourth demand was for a living wage of 20,000 pesos a month (the official rate is 160 pesos to the dollar, far below the real exchange value) and a sliding scale.
The miners wanted immediate elections rather than a recalling of the 1980 congress, because the right still held a majority in it. It is generally accepted in Bolivia that if elections are held now, the UDP and PS-uno will get more than 70% of the vote.
It was only during the mass workers rally in La Paz on September 15 that the COB leadership was forced to accept an indefinite general strike. Filemon Escobar, a leader of the miners union, appealed to the crowd and got overwhelming support for the proposal.
The Bolivian Fourth Internationalists played an important role in building and leading the strike, one of the prominent leaders being Felipe Vasquez, a well known member of the Bolivian section of the Fourth International.
Once the military saw the leadership slipping out of the hands of the reformists and moderates, it decided to turn the 12 radicalization could develop any further.
THE MINERS STRIKE
The miners, however, refused to end their strike, in partieular since the military had not accepted their economic demands. They remained on strike, even though 80% of their own leaders were
Union chiefs went into the mines all over the country to try to persuade the miners to go back to work. In many places, they were driven out. The strike continued until mid-October, when the
•Lechin Oquendo threatened that if the miners did not stop the action the leadership would resign en masse. His argument was that the contiwas favoring "putschist tendencies" among the mili-
Ironically, the union leaders used the same argument in the period before the 1980 coup to justify the Pacto de San Jorge with the military leaders. The pact involved a pledge by the unions that they reassure the military chiefs and keep them from doing anything rash.
The effect was to demobilize the workers, sowing illusions that the military
And the co acon t
had been satisfied. The coup came a few months later. And the COB had no plans defensive ones, calling for occupations and blocking roads. Facing ruthless and determined gorilas, the workers were smashed, with heavy casualties.
By breaking the miners strike, the reformist leaderships have already dealt a serious blow to the working-class movement in the new phase of development toward an all-out confrontation. Despite waging a long strike, the miners were obliged to go back without anything to show for it. There had been a demand that the government at least sign a statement of intent to comply with the calls was not even prepared to push this.
A NEW COUP IN PREPARATION
The fact is that a new coup is being prepared now; that is obvious. And it would be a far more murderous one than the last, because it would face rebuilt and stronger workers and mass organizations and more determined opposition.
At the same time, neither the military nor any bourgeois government can offer the masses any economic concessions whatever. The next military government will have to force the population to accept the results of an economic disaster unprecedented even in the dreary history of Bolivian economic development.
Given such economic prospects, the military decided that it would be better to let the UDP administer the crisis for a period. As long as the government can keep the masses under control, the military can afford to wait for the people to become demoralized by the economic situation and the lack of hopes for improvement. And then, at the proper moment, it would be able to make its move.
The incoming government, including two Communist Party ministers, has met the military's expectations, as the UDP's attitude to the general strike and the miners strike before demonstrated that it would. Now it faces one of the world's worst economic situations.
### ECONOMIC CATASTROPHE
With a population of 5 million people, Bolivia has a foreign debt of 4 billion dollars, when only 35% of the labor force is employed. For this year, the service on the foreign debt amounts to 600 million dollars, while the total government income is only 900 million. That means that the total resources available to the state are 300 million dollars. And of tha 14% is allocated for the police and
army, that is, for repression. The rate of colonial countries for the sake of prices between 150% and 300%. Since a third of air out of them. The oil reserves in this the food consumed in the country is area are classified as probable rather than inflation for this year is expected to be imported, the result is that food prices have increased by 500%.
Today in Bolivia there is not a single major state or private enterprise that is not working at a loss. Some 90% of the private sector is in the red. Only one mine in the state mining trust, Combol, is not working at a loss — the one at Huanuni.
Even the food industry, which remained the longest untouched by the crisis, is now working in the red and is maintained only by state subsidies. Despite state support of the food industry, moreover, food shortages have become dramatic. Nearly every staple is scarce from meat to bread and milk, potatoes and vegetables. Milk in particular is prohibitively expensive, so that even employed miners cannot afford it.
COCAINE INSTEAD OF FOOD directed toward food production, since the only profitable cash crop is now
In this context, demands for control by farmers over prices and marketing of products have been raised by the small coca growers in a part of La Paz province. These farmers have been subjected to spoliation by the military drug mafia, which often steals their crops outright. Even when they are paid, what they get is a pittance compared with the profits of the racketeers.
That is the reality to which U.S. imperialism has reduced the economies of neocolonial countries in its "backyard." Even the Mexican government has been forced to threaten, for example, that if its U.S. creditors refuse to renegotiate its foreign debt it will stop trying to block the flow of marijuana into the
The idea is abroad among the farmers that agriculture should be toward food production. But given the nature of the world market today and the pressure of prices, that would only be possible in the context of a centralized economic plan.
Any real independence for Bolivia is impossible without such planned development of agriculture, since at present the country is heavily dependent on U.S food surpluses. U.S. experts estimate that Bolivia would face famine in three months if American surplus food shipments were cut off.
THE NARROWING SOCIAL BASE
FOR BOURGEOIS RULE
The various options for achieving even neocolonial bourgeois stability have withered away over the last decade. The Santa Cruz oil boom has faded. One factor is the international oil glut now. But in general the imperialists tend to inflate speculative booms around the development of extractive industries in and attracting investors, and then let the the development of the natural gas industry, the major branch of petroleum exploitation in Bolivia, has been left stranded by the crisis of the major neocolonial countries in the region.
was exported to Argentina. As the prices dropped interthe Bolivian junta increased amounts pumped to ruinous levels in order to try to maintain income levels. Then, the Argentines, gripped by their to keep up their payments, deciding to deduct the large debt
So, the Bolivians lost a major part of the income they were counting on to meet their other foreign obligations. In announce that they were unable to meet the interest payments falling due.
The Falangist party, the fascist organization based mainly in Santa Cruz, was wiped out at the polls in 1980, failing for the first time in its history to get over the 50,000 vote minimum for participation in
RADICALIZATION OF THE PEASANTS
In the context of the economic crisis, the peasantry has moved away from its old bourgeois leadership toward a closer and closer alliance with the workers. Most of the peasant unions have now affiliated to the COB, which is now in a position to serve as the framework for unity between the workers and the farmers.
the major form of solidarity that the miners got during their strike was the farmers, who brought them THE INDIAN MOVEMENT
The national Indian movement, which consists essentially of the peasant union leaderships, has radicalized and affiliated to the UDP. It is pushing various Indian cultural demands, such as recognition of the native language and culture. The Indian organizations conduct their affairs in Quechua and Aymara, as well as in
The radicalization of the Indian organization has already led to a split and the development of a group with a revolutionary orientation, the Movimiento Indio Tupac Katari. It is much smaller than the traditional formation but has considerable strength in certain areas. This group has accepted the position that no solution to the problems of the Indian people is possible without a socialist revolution. It is involved in discussions with the Bolivian section of the Fourth International for the formation of a revolutionary front.
About 68% of the population of Bolivia speak Indian languages, including the bulk of the peasantry. However, the
Indian population has been divided into two antagonistic nationalities, the Incas (Quechuas) and the Aymaras, who have a history of being subordinated by the first.
Among other things, the integration of the peasant unions into the COB has for the first time provided a framework for uniting the struggle of the two Indian peoples. The Indian movement has been forced into sharper confrontation with imperialism notably by a giant missionary campaign by U.S. Protestant sects, which threaten the languages, cultural values, militant traditions of the Indian peoples. The sects serve as an instrument for ideological penetration and cultural Indian movement has demanded restric-
THE ARMED FORCES bourgeois solution has narrowed to the the social base available for a vanishing point. The military remains the major institution of the bourgeoisie. It has grown into a gigantic mafia feeding on the country. It has its own economic organization, the COFADENA (Corpora-
Nacional de Desarrollo de Development Corporation). In 1975, this trust had a capital of 85 million dollars. Today, its capital is estimated at between 250 and 300 millions. It functions as a enterprise without any state
The military are the recipients of a whole gamut of privileges, opportunities for importing, exporting, for buying food and clothing at low prices, etc. They also control the cocaine trade totally.
However, at the same time the army is very poorly armed. It is still equipt for example with outdated FAL rifles. And it has a correspondingly low technical level, besides being totally corrupt. It would not be worth much as a fighting force against either a very widespread or well organized mass resistance.
### ARGENTINE HANGMEN
GET SQUEAMISH
Moreover, the Bolivian military finds itself increasingly bereft of effective back. ing in the region. This is symbolized by the bloodstained Argentine junta objecting to the appointment of Colonel Luis Arze Gomez as a military attache in Buenos Aires.
Arze Gomez, who was minister of the interior at the time of the murder of the eight MIR leaders, is now considered by the Argentine hangmen themselves, the inspirers of the rightist terror in Bolivia, as something they do not dare be associated with.
The Argentine dictatorship is in deep crisis, and could fall in one way or another in a short time, opening up the way for a resurgence of mass mobiliza-
In Uruguay, in a referendum organized by the junta itself, 75% of the voters expressed opposition to the dictatorship.
13
In Chile, the reorganization of the working class is already well underway and the regime is in retreat, symbolized by the resignation of Admiral Ley, the hardliner in the junta.
In Brazil, the dictatorship has been decaying for some time. A mass workers party is developing, and the government party faces defeat in the upcoming elec-
In turn, as the weakest link in the neocolonial setup in the Southern Cone of
Bolivia could initiate a series of exploisions throughout the area.
MASS PRESSURE ON THE
What happens now depends on the political struggle that is opening up in the left, including the UDP, which holds the government.
The coalition in office is far from homogeneous. Ironically the most rightwing component of it is the MIR, which calls for a government of national unity including representatives of the armed forces. The Communist Party, which follows the usual line of seeking an alliance with bourgeois forces, does not far. It represents the biggest
Siles Suazo's party, the MNR-I is divided into a number of wings. The right Wing wants to rebuild the old MNR as the typical bourgeois nationalist party it was. But the youth in particular look to socialist solutions. pressure from the left, if a clear and determined left pole can be built.
In this situation, the PS-uno can play an important role. This party has a basis of maneuver in the parliament, 15 deputies in a house of 250. It support, and a more militant line. As a it has served as the gathering ground for the broad class-struggle opposition. It is not a hardened reformist formation but rather a fluid, militant mass current.
In fact, the PS-uno is hardly a party. It is not structured. It has no press of its own. And in the period of the dictatorship it played little role. But with the return of parliamentary democracy it has blossomed as a pole of regroupment for the broad military, class-struggle left.
THE REVOLUTIONARY POLE
The Bolivian section of the Fourth
(POR - Revolutionary Workers Party) is trying to build a pole of revolutionary regroupment in order to be political process that has opened up. Besides the Movimiento Indio Katari, it is in discussions with a number of smaller far left groups, Vanguardia Comunista, the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional, and a left split from the MIR, the MIR-15 de Enero.
The strategic objective of the POR is to begin to prepare the masses for the continuation of their struggle under the UDP government and for a confrontation in the not very distant future with the military. At present that does not involve all-out opposition to the government, but a strategy of pressuring it and exposing the capitulationist leadership.
As a result of the role it has played in the resistance to the military dictatorship - indicated among other things by its most widely read in the underground -the POR is now in a position to serve as the political and organizational backbone of a revolutionary front that could play a decisive part in the process that has now go so working-class component of the coalition.
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