Spanish state
The general strike
Introduction to articles T HE GENERAL STRIKE call opened the way for the expression of a long festering social malaise. In fact, since 1985, strikes have occurred in various sectors, but this was the first "all together" effort against the PSOE government's austerity programs.
According to the unions, at least 5 million workers observed the call to stop work, reaching 100% in some branches of industry. Even football players struck! The central demands were around dropping the Youth Employment Plan, which falsifies unemployment figures while encouraging marginal, unstable jobs; catching up on the purchasing power lost in 1988, especially for public employees; making pensions subject to the guaranteed interprofessional wage scale; a review of the conditions for granting unemployment benefits; and the right of collective bargaining for public employees.
On December 16, another action against the social and economic policies of Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez brought tens of thousands of people into the streets of Madrid, one of the hot spots during 4 ally paralyzed by this moy wiza tin. the strike. The whole city was virtu-
THE TWO MAJOR
Spanish union confederations the contederations, the
Workers Commissions
(CCOO) and the General
Workers Union (UGT) - linked respectively to the Communist Party
(PCE) and the Socialist
Party (PSOE) — called a
24-hour general strike on December 14, 1988 that paralysed the country. It was the largest mobilization of workers that the post-Franco period has seen.
The strike was essentially a test of strength between the workers and the government, but also an impressive showdown between the latter and the unions. The confrontation between the UGT and the
PSOE was particularly nasty, and has opened some cracks within the confederation.
For example, in bringing direct pressure on the UGT unions In order to divide and weaken the strike, the government managed to force some union leaders to break ranks. Thus, the Chemical Workers Federation and the Agricultural Workers were obliged to expel some leaders who refused to implement the strike call. Relations between the UGT and the PSO had been very tense during the entire period leading up to the strike.
A union leader in Madrid stated that "Except for arresting union leaders, which it hasn't tried yet, the PSOE is behaving just like the Francoists used to.
"It is trying to frighten the population by making it believe that if it supports the general strike, the country will be a disaster zone, and then heaps abuse on the unions, calling them reds, communists and subversives" (El Pais, November 28 1988)
The unions refused to yield to orders to provide "minimum services" and decided to organize "emergency services" themselves in appropriate areas, such as health, childcare, security services, gas, electricity and so on. Likewise, they denounced the anti-strike decrees passed against the public service workers.
Given the breadth of the mobilization, the government itself had to recognize the success of the strike and proposed a meeting for negotiations. *
International Viewpoint #155 • January 23, 1989
"We must extend this combativity" JOAQUIN NIETO, the author of the article published below, is a member of the Executive Commission of the Workers Commissions (CCOO).
N DECEMBER 14, we mounted an impressive general strike. Once again, the industrial working class found itself at the heart of the strike. Early on, it had taken the decision, by means of thousands of factory assemblies, to participate in this protest movement and to ensure a 100% work stoppage in the villages and towns of the industrial belts surrounding the big urban centers. It kept that promise.
But this time, the public service workers also took part in the action. The Spanish television strike at midnight, December 13, was a radical break with the requirement for minimum services. It highlighted the vulnerability of some of the machinery of power, as well as the working classes' vast capacity to paralyze the system.
The great popularity of this campaign, as well as the fact that only the working class in action is capable of mobilizing all other popular strata, was illustrated by the participation of the rural population and of others without much tradition of struggle; by the ease with which commerce was paralyzed; by the response of youth and students throughout process; as well as by the support of many intellectuals, artists and members of the liberal professions.
Massive numbers came into the streets
The massive size of the strike was not its only feature. It was also active - taking the streets. In many cities, the demonstrations in the evening of December 14 were the biggest in their history, or at least in a decade, such as the gigantic one in Madrid on December 16. They made it clear that participation in the strike was a completely conscious choice, which naturally led on to people coming onto the streets in massive numbers.
The appearance of pickets everywhere
SPANISH STATE was, from the early hours, one of the most visible characteristics of the general strike. On this occasion, the generally very favorable attitude to the strike greatly helped the work of the pickets.
Essentially made up of vanguard workers, with the active involvement of left unionists and revolutionary activists, the pickets were able to carry out a function of spreading information that remained vital up until the last moment.
When confronted with violence and joint boss-police actions, they acted with the firmness and decisiveness required. They had to stand up to many police attacks, and had to exercise their right to self-defense and to use violence whenever this was necessary. The amount of violence used was in line with the situation and their determination to block any attempt to break the strike.
The massive response and action of the pickets created such a favorable relationship of forces that in every case the minimum services decreed by the administration were obstructed.
The left in the unions has always believed that the best minimum services are no minimum services, because the latter are nothing but tools designed to weaken strikes. Besides, unions and strike committees are adequate to guarantee meeting all of those needs we consider essential, which is exactly what happened this time. Thus, we were far from happy with the minimum-services accords signed by RENFE (the national railway,) Iberia (air transport,) and by the Madrid transport system, despite the insignificance of the services provided in the last case.
Funeral for the "social partnership"
Practice showed that we were strong enough to take care of those sectors ourselves. And this is also an excellent precedent in the struggle against minimum services, which have become one of the most effective anti-strike weapons.
The general strike revealed the impressive power of the union federations in calling such an action, showing once more that the will to fight exists in the working class and expresses itself when unions call for action. The union movement only weakens itself, on the other hand, when it adopts a conciliatory attitude instead of taking a stand for confrontation and mobilization. Reality dealt a crushing blow to those not disinterested prognostications warning that the union movement was heading for a debacle unless it further moderated its language and approach.
December 14 was the funeral for a period of social partnership that had been dead for quite a while. This stage began with the opening of the political consensus period and the signature of the Moncloa Pact.' It ended, about two years ago, with the signing of the Economic and Social Accords?
by a UGT that was already beginning to feel the negative consequences of its support for the government's anti-social policies.
After several years of such a policy of support for the socialist government of Felipe Gonzalez, the UGT realized that it was losing influence. In the last union elections, it lost ground in many factories and in the public sector. The union's identification with the PSOE, which had benefitted the UGT when the Socialists came to power, was beginning to have the opposite effect.
Today, in order to return to the social partnership policy, new forms and content would have to be invented. Ways would have to be found that could tie unions to the government's policies without attacking their interests and at the same time offering some concessions to the workers. While not utterly impossible, this would be very difficult to accomplish.
Outlook favourable for militant trade unionism
Certainly, the general strike did not open a phase where from now on there will be non-stop mobilization and struggle. But neither was it simply a one-day struggle without a future or serious implications.
Today, the outlook is more favorable for a change in the right direction and for a more left-oriented, more militant trade unionism. But we still have to take into account the fact that the trade union leaderships have come out of this stronger than ever, with a lot of authority and with a widely recognized position of leadership. Nonetheless, we are still talking about fundamentally reformist leaderships which will not change in any real sense. We have already been through other situations where we have seen how they have frittered away such strength won in struggle around the bargaining table.
The general strike was so powerful that Felipe Gonzalez was forced to recognize this triumph, and he has issued an appeal to the unions to negotiate. But to negotiate what? The government is not going to change its economic policy. That is very clear. But it could cook up some sort of face-lift operation: a "social turn" to satisfy temporarily some of the unions' demands, in exchange for an agreement from the unions, in one form or another, to support its policies.
Or, if that is not possible, it is going to try to force them, without getting into a direct clash with the union leadership, to accept some sort of collective bargaining agreement in order to head off any mobilizations when the next round of new contract nego1. The Moncloa Pact was signed on July 30, 1977, by the govemment and the unions, an attempt to assure social peace in post-Franco Spain. 2. AES, an accord signed between the socialist govemment and the UGT, which mainly dealt with enlarging the number of jobless who would be covered by unem- 5 ployment benefits.
SPANISH STATE tiations comes up in 1989. Such an operation would be complex, because there is very little margin for satisfying the unions' demands, and because the pressure from the rank and file of the unions will be enormous.
For the moment, the spokespeople of the Workers' Commissions and of the UGT have declared that some of the demands have be met before there can be any thought of negotiations. The "Youth Employment Plan" has to be jettisoned. The eight million workers who were shorted because of incorrect forecasts of the rate of inflation have to be given a two-point compensatory raise. Pensions have to be brought into line with the minimum wage. And unemployment insurance coverage has to be extended from the current 35% of
The battle is still to be won... "NOTHING will be the same again," this phrase, often repeated, but rarely determined by the events, takes on a whole new meaning after a mass mobilization as enormous as that of December 14. [From Combate, newspaper of the LCR (Spanish state section of the Fourth International), December 20 issue.] jobless to 48%.
The unions have also stated that they do not want to discuss the "Kingdom's accounts", that is, the whole of the government's policies, but only their own demands. They fear compromising themselves with the government because that would alienate their base at least for the short term, and dilute the strength gained in the mobilization.
Bring the spirit of the strike into the factories
The unions have also announced that there is no possibility that they will enter into discussions with the bosses about collective bargaining. That is all very well, but now they must stick to it. If the government does not give any ground, and it will not easily do so on the major demands, we will need to keep up the pressure through mobilizations.
The upcoming period of contract negotiations is an excellent opportunity for building up a climate of militancy and for a the ripening of new conditions for all-inclusive struggle.
Today, there is a contradiction between the general line of union leaderships which, in the last analysis are orienting toward confrontation with the anti-social policies of the government, and their attitude in daily activities on the shop-floor, which continues to be determined by a bureaucratized and concessionary kind of unionism. One of our tasks, therefore, is to bring the spirit of the December 14 mobilization into the factories so we can put an end to this contradiction.
The left in the unions worked hard for the success of this general strike, above all by putting pressure for calling it. We were well able to see the dynamic leading to a united call. We were able to work to advance the strike in its preparatory stage, and later with the pickets. Today, we must extend this combativity into day-to-day union activities, to keep up the pressure, holding firm to our positions, and to remain 6 vigilant that our victory is not wrested from our grasp. *
N SOME RESPECTS, profound changes in the political situation had already occurred. But the radical challenge posed by the general strike is to throw out all together the policy of social pacts that has ruined the workers' movement and to bring about a lasting revival of workers' struggles and social mobilizations in general.That battle is still to be won. The general strike represents an initial victory which will undoubtedly serve as an important springboard. But considerable efforts over a prolonged period are still necessary.
The most important political effect of December 14 was to break the political deadlock that emerged from the defeat of the working-class movement in the NATO referendum, and which was consolidated in the 1986 general elections. At that time, an all-powerful government devoted itself totally, with more and more despotic methods, to implementing a generally reactionary policy and a particularly aggressive social and economic policy. Resistance by workers and other social forces to this policy seemed incapable of obtaining tangible results.
But this was only an appearance. In fact, in recent months workers' , students' • antimilitarists, and nationalist resistance mobilizations got results that were hard to measure in the immediate term. The December 14 general strike precisely is one of the best examples of this.
### Buildup of internal tensions
For quite a while, we have characterized the period as one of mounting social malaise, without this leading yet to any substantial change in the relationship of forces. This type of situation is among the most difficult to analyze. The political orientation to adopt is much less clear than in periods when the mass movement is either clearly on the rise or in retreat. However, even if the signs are not yet visible on the surface, the buildup of such internal tension produces important changes in the depths of society. The general strike reflected, and at the same time accentuated the problems specific to this situation.
What was the basic political content of December 14? Three aspects are inseparable. First, of course, is the fact that there was a a massive, united action in opposition to the government from the left, the most powerful demonstration of the so-called "social left." Second, its explicit goals were elementary union demands and the hope for a change in government policies. The third aspect was the radical character of the tactic employed — a general strike. It was radical not only because strike pickets and the other hard-hitting forms of workers' struggle were used but also because this was a direct action by the masses against the government.
Medium-term effects of the general strike
The medium-term effects of the general strike will depend on the way these factors combine and in particular, on the resolution of the contradiction between the relatively modest goals and the radical means used.
But today we can already say that December 14 is was big popular victory. First, because the working class showed all of society, and itself, the formidable social weight that it has when it goes into movement united. And second, because the Socialist government has suffered its first serious political defeat since taking power.
This defeat was as general as the strike itself. It was an ideological defeat, because it brought into ridicule the line taken by the government spokespeople and their acolytes against workers' struggles, against class struggle unionism, and particularly against general strikes as a method of action. It was a political defeat because governmental authority was seriously undermined, and the authority of the established institutions even more so.The latter aspect took on a particular importance during the day-long strike, when the government wanted to base itself on the parliament to break the strike. It was an economic defeat, finally, because it showed the breadth of the rejection of a
International Viewpoint #155 • January 23, 1989
policy that is completely identified with the government. The anti-strike campaign that Gonzalez launched in order to defend this line, mobilizing the whole PSOE and its periphery, failed miserably.
This victory has brought on considerable changes in the political situation. The government is weakened, even if it still has excellent prospects for the next election (proving once again, unfortunately, that in day-to-day matters the electoral behavior of a very large sector of the population bears very little relation to its socio-political attitude.) The workers and people's movement teels stronger. It is ready to make its voice feels stronger. It is ready to make its voice heard and has regained the hope in the possibility of change. This is not, yet, a radical alteration of the situation, and there is no guarantee that we will continue on in the right direction. But the changes are positive, and may lead to greater things in the months to come.
Contradictory nature of reformist leaders' role
The leaderships of the Workers Commissions (CCOO) and the General Workers Union (UGT) undeniably played an active role in the general strike. This has naturally raised questions in the minds of the more militant sector.
The contradictory nature of this role must be understood. Of course, the general strike has not at all changed the natures of these reformist bureaucrats, nor their basic political ideas. It would be a grave error to harbor any illusions on this score. But it has to be understood that with the call for, and organization of, a general strike, these bureaucrats have regained a certain amount of authority. This is not because they have gotten results with their social-partnership line, but because they took a stand for a united mobilization of the masses, and because they had to abandon temporarily their policy of social pacts.
There is no reason to suppose that after December 14, the majority of workers are going to give a blank check to Redondo and Gutierrez, the major leaders, respectively, of the UGT and the CCOO. On the contrary, it has to be realized that there is already pressure from below. If this were not so, the reorientation of the CCOO, and even more of the UGT, would be incomprehensible. This pressure from the base operates against all attempts to divert popular aspirations, especially since the show of strength represented by the general strike.
In the days to come, negotiation with the government will no doubt be a focus of discussion. Felipe Gonzalez has reacted by offering a dialogue, understanding that he must, as soon as possible, regain the initiative if he wants to defuse the explosive situation created by the general strike. Gonzalez will probably be prepared to offer something to achieve this goal. But it is nearly inconceivable that he will decide to
SPANISH STATE make any significant change in his economic policies.
Besides, he quite clearly believes that class-struggle unionism, even led by a reformist leadership, is an obstacle to "modernization," an onerous and embarrassing inheritance from the past. Many goverment spokespeople expressed this point of view in the days leading up to the strike.
The government and the union leaderships therefore have a real interest in finding areas for social-partnership. But there are very serious sources of conflict between them, most important being popular pressure.
The revolutionary left has adopted quite a correct orientation toward the changing political situation in recent years. The situation opened by December 14 confirms that the organization of the resistance, the very special effort to work among youth and the accumulation of revolutionary forces have been, and remain, a line adequate to the situation.
We must continue to build on these gains, understanding that we need to carefully study reality and increase our capacity for initiative and imagination. *
Young people and the general strike THE DROPPING of the Youth Employment Plan (YEP) was one of the maor objectives of the general strike of December 14. But in order to analyze its implications for youth, we have to look farther than the day of the strike Itself, and take into account the whole process, particularly the mobilizations of November 24 and December 1.
After the 1986-87 mobilizations, political activity in the vast majority of university centers was limited to actions and demands focused around academic issues, anti-militarism, feminism and so on, led mostly by a small vanguard. This vanguard had, moreover, very limited relations with the workers' movement...
The discussions and student assemblies that were called in order to explain and speak out against the YEP in schools and universities were crucial for the preparation of the general strike.... Hundreds of debates and meetings were held, attracting large numbers....
The results, , however, in terms of student organizing have been quite limited. There was not enough time for interest in fighting the YEP or organizing for the general strike to become widespread enough to extend beyond the small core of student activists.,.and they built only a very informal sort of organization. Results were best where a stable coordinating center or student collective was in place. Where such collectives did not exist - which was most often the case putting together even an informal coordinating meeting was a slow and difficult process.
The first student strikes and demonstrations on November 24 showed that they were ready to mobilize, although student assemblies and school discussions had barely taken off at that point. On that day, many institutes and training schools stopped work with the sole Intent of supporting the strike call.
On December 1, another step forward was taken when a much stronger strike was called, and local town demonstrations joined the huge march on Madrid which drew many tens of thousands of young people from all over the Spanish state. School youth supported the general strike so wholeheartedly that there was very little motivation for student pickets. In the end they joined some of the central pickets....
This general strike has been the first serious experience of joint action between workers and students with common demands and using similar tactics. The YEP is a new theme around which there is the possibility of a massive youth mobilization. Until the call for December 14, unemployment and unsteady employment were very serious problems facing young people, but their capacity to fight back was still quite low. In this respect, in the general strike there was a broadening of the Issues around which young people are radicalizing and the beginning of a struggle against some of the key aspects of capitalist exploitation, as well as the start of a convergence in action with the workers' movement.
The success of December 14, the decisive blow which it struck at the YEP and the positive experience of collaboration with the workers move. ment are factors which encourage optimism. But serious problems remain in terms of organization and the attitude of some union federations....
The general attitude adopted by the unions to the bosses and the government will be of major Importance in determining what position youth will take toward them. Convergence was possible around the general atrike, but it can only be sustained if this fighting spirit is kept up. Youth will be the first victims of any pact with the government and the bosses, and that will ruin any chance of unity between the youth movement and the unions. * F. Cruells
CANADA New Democratic Party fiasco sparks debate THE NOVEMBER 21 federal election in Canada was an upset victory for the Progressive Conservative Party -or Tories — led by Brian Mulroney. The Tories swept into power for a second consecutive term despite all predictions that the Liberal Party under John Turner would carry a majority, or at least be in a position to form a coalition government based on its protectionist opposition to the recent free-trade agreement signed with the United States.
But even more spectacular than the unexpected conservative victory was the abrupt rise and equally sudden fall of the traditionally last place social-democratic and labour-linked New Democratic Party in the period preceding the election.
cial programmes and government intervention in the economy.
A week after Gerrard's criticisms, Robert White, president of the Canadian Auto Workers Union (CAW) and a vice-president of the federal NDP, issued a seven-page letter that bitterly attacked party electoral strategists for ignoring labour's ideas and leadership. Seen as the opening salvo in White's bid for the NDP leadership(leader Ed Broadbent is expected to step down after leading the party to four third place finishes,) the letter accuses party officials of structuring the NDP's campaign so as "to distance itself from the labour movement, both in appearance and issues."
Significantly, there is much truth to what White wrote. Canadian social democracy has consistently sought to downplay the NDP's identity as a labour party and appeal instead to supposedly classless "average Canadians." This election was no exception.
International employers' offensive
But the kind of leadership White has in mind offers no genuine alternative. It puts "nation" ahead of "class". He would line up workers behind their Canadian imperialist bosses and favor inflationary protectionist policies, rather than correctly portraying the so-called "free-trade" deal as part of an international employers' offensive led by Thatcher and Reagan to drive down wages, social benefits and working conditions in the interest of profit maximization — an offensive that can be defeated only by the mass mobilization of the working class.
Class collaboration, rather than class struggle, is the logic of the position of Bob White and his colleagues in the Pro-Canada Network, an umbrella organization of antifree trade groups including Canadian businessmen and Liberal politicians.
Consider one of their major post-election criticisms. White and the Network took the NDP leadership to task for focusing their attacks on Liberal Leader John Turner in the final weeks of the campaign. "All we did was move votes to the Tories," wrote White.
But the opposite is true. NDP leader Broadbent stressed his party's opposition to the trade deal both before and during the election campaign. Next to the rather vacuous demand for "honesty and integrity in government," opposition to the trade deal was the major plank in the NDP campaign.
The problem was that the NDP's position was barely distinguishable from that of the Liberals, who reverted opportunistically to a left-nationalist stance reminiscent of former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in the late 1970s. (Remember the man who created PetroCanada and the National Energy Programme?)
NDP and labour leaders simply echoed Liberal claims that the trade deal would lead to a US takeover of Canada (Canada is
BARRY WEISLEDER T HE NEW DEMOCRATIC Party
(NDP) blew it — and now an unprecedented debate on election strategy is underway in the party and its affiliated unions leading up to the NDP federal convention next August in Winnipeg.
Over a fifteen month period the NDP tumbled from first place and over 42% popular support according to opinion polls, down to its traditional third place and 20% in the November 21 federal election in the Canadian state.
The party's lacklustre, timid performance allowed the scandal-plagued Progressive Conservative Party to form a second consecutive parliamentary majority government. Despite a 7% decline from their 1984 results, the Tories captured 169 of the 295 seats.
The NDP's slide particularly benefited the Liberal Party which miraculously recovered from a nearly paralytic internal leadership crisis to grab second place and double its parliamentary representation to 82 seats.
Although the NDP vote showed a 2.4% increase and elected 43 members of parliament (its largest ever caucus) this result fell far short of all pre-election projections. In fact, NDP gains, which were concentrated in the western provinces, were largely the 8 product of a shift of Tory votes to far-right wing parties such as the wester separatist
Reform Party, the Confederation of Regions Party and the anti-abortion Christian Heritage Party.
So how did the NDP manage to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory? How did it fail to make the much-anticipated breakthrough, especially in Quebec?
Canada-United States trade deal
Labour leaders, social-democratic commentators and bourgeois pundits have not hesitated to advance various explanations. Unfortunately most of them miss the mark; worse, their analysis points the NDP in the wrong direction for the future.
The public soul-searching for New Democrats began at the Ontario Federation of Labour Convention in Toronto on November 28 where United Steelworkers of America (USWA) Canadian District 6 Director Leo Gerrard complained that the NDP had downplayed its opposition to the recently negotiated Canada-United States trade deal during the election campaign.
The pact, which will be ratified by parliament early in January, aims to eliminate most tariffs and duties on goods crossing the border over a ten-year period. It became the central issue in the election, evoking both chauvinist anti-Americanism and legitimate concern about the future of so-
International Viewpoint #155 • January 23, 1989
itself one of the seven leading imperialist countries in the world,) and with it the loss of Canadian sovereignty and culture. To this was added the usual social democratic prescriptions for band-aid tax reform and "fiscal responsibility." The Liberals actually promised to spend much more to meet social needs than did the "responsible" NDP.
NDP tries to beat the Liberals at their own game
NDP strategists had to scramble to salvage their traditional bases of support in the face of a Liberal resurgence following the televised leaders' debate. This rescue operation could be carried out only by attacking the Liberals as one of the twin parties of Canadian imperialist big business. Of course Broadbent should have been doing this from the beginning, instead of promoting the possibility of a coalition government with the Liberals (even with the Tories!) which he did "in the interests of parliamentary stability."