This men responded. The November 12 massacre in Segovia, in the department of Antiquia, in which 42 harmless citizens were murdered and another 35 wounded, was carried out cold-bloodedly by an extreme-right squad calling itself "Death to the Revolutionists in Northeast Antioquia."
Spokespersons of this organization said shortly afterwards that the action was intended to demonstrate support in deeds for the statements made a week before in Bogotá by the Colombian defense minister, General Rafael Samudio Molina.! In fact, during the funeral of eight soldiers killed in a battle with guerrillas, the general called on officers and soldiers to "go on a total offensive, to destroy and liquidate the enemy." 2
This bloodthirsty order from the minister, who has been a stubborn advocate of military solutions — even if they might take the lives of civilians uninvolved in the conflict between the army and guerrillas? — was seen by the rightist paramilitary group for what it was: authorization to perpetrate outrages against individuals and towns that voted for the left candidates in the last elections.
### Death squad thugs murder activists
So, a dozen thugs from this death squad arrived in Segovia in the afternoon of November 12 in three unmarked jeeps and drove to the town hall. They wanted to murder Rita Tobón, the mayor and a member of the Unión Patriótica.4 Since they did not find her, they dynamited the building and started shooting at passersby.
The first to fall were two boys playing in the street. The slaughter continued in some homes and on some farms. The paramilitaries used lists of activists, searching house to house for the persons named. The shooting lasted more than an hour. Neither the police nor the army, which had barracks in the locality, intervened to stop the massa886L cre. Thus, the thugs were able to get away without the slightest inconvenience.
Minutes later, the country was informed that the criminals belonged to a guerrilla column made up of members of the FARC and the ELN. This report was given by a policeman, who quickly got in contact with a Bogotá radio network to put out disinformation. The network did not bother to check with the local people and broadcast the cop's story as factual news.
"Total war on subversion"
A day later, when a Unión Patriótica delegation came to Segovia to verify the facts, it found the town quiet but terrorized. At the same time the police, still in contact with the Bogotá radio network, were broadcasting live that an "intense" battle was going on in the town between the "forces of order" and the guerrilla column "responsible for the massacre."
The official mascarade could not be maintained any longer. A few hours later, the perpetrators of the massacre claimed responsibility for the operation and explained their motivations. After identifying totally with the minister of defence's call for launching "total war on subversion," the terrorist gang stressed that it was opposed to the position of President Virgilio Barco Vargas, who on September 1 proposed a political solution for curbing the violence. 1. El País (Madrid), November 14, 1988. 2. El País, November 6, 1988. 3. In November 1985, General Rafael Samudio Molina personally commanded the assault on the Palace of Justice in Bogota, which had been taken by M-19 guerrillas. Samudio Molina was the one who gave the ruthless order to dynamite the hall where 15 judges and other hostages were sheltering. The explosions and the machine-gunning of those who tried to flee brought the civilian death toll to 54. 4. A party founded in 1985 by former members of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), members of the Communist Party and other smaller left groups. 5. ELN — Ejército de Liberación Nacional, of Castroist origin, the second largest guerrilla force in the country.
The paramilitary group's opposition to the president's plans was only a copy of the line laid out by Samudio Molina in his strident statements of November 3, in which he also said: "I don't know anything about dialogues; I know that the armed forces are going to respond with their weapons."
Official tolerance of scorched earth policy
General Samudio's challenge to the decisions of Virgilio Barco was so obvious that the president found himself forced to call for the minister of defence's resignation, 24 hours after publicly disavowing him. Trying to keep the general's proposal from getting any further, since he had already gotten the support of two other ministers, the Colombian chief of state declared that it was necessary to avoid a situation "where the country's options would be limited to a scorched earth policy or a political revision of the state." The duty of a democracy, in his opinion, was "to seek civilized solutions." 6
The president's energetic sally surprised observers, because it was the first time that Barco has clearly differentiated himself from the military top brass and removed a head of the Ministry of Defence, which has been an almost untouchable preserve of the armed forces. Samudio's successor was another general, Manuel Guerrero Paz, who has been commander-in-chief of the armed forces? Still, the question arises whether his appointment means a change in the government's orientation with respect to"public order."
In fact up until now, official tolerance of a scorched earth strategy planned and executed by the armed forces in concert with paramilitary groups and criminal gangs financed by drug traffickers has been total. The evidence of this is that there has been no serious investigation of the great wave of atrocities perpetrated over the last three years against peasants, workers intellectuals, trade unionists, students and humanrights defenders.®
Of course, the balance sheet of this strategy today is worrying for the regime. Despite the brutal repression, the guerrillas are stronger than ever, and have achieved certain levels of military unity. They have achieved real results. For the first time in many years, the army has been put on the defensive in various regions of the country, and the number of military casualties exceeds that of the guerrillas.
According to the data of the government security agencies, in the first nine months of 1988 there were 235 armed clashes between the guerrillas and the army in eight departments, resulting in 1,174 deaths. In October alone, 55 military men were killed in combat in the course of a rebel offensive. Dozens of soldiers were captured, and electric pylons and bridges were hit, especially in the banana-growing region of Urab, where the death squads had perpetrated
COLOMBIA
NUEVOS SALARIOS particularly savage massacres against the population.
A few weeks before the ousting of the minister of defence, fears began to be expressed that the tens of millions of dollars the government has channeled to the armed forces over recent months had been flowing into private pockets. The pro-regime press even went so far as to criticize some trips that General Samudio made to Israel to conclude negotiations for purchase of Kfir airplanes, whose usefulness in "antisubversive" warfare is far from apparent, when the generals have "been complaining that the soldiers do not have boots," as a Liberal weekly put it.
The press also raised questions about where the $80 million appropriated last year for submarine repair finally went. There was also a flood of criticism of the way in which certain military operations were carried out that resulted in disastrous failures for the army, such as those in Puerto Wilches, San Pablo, Paujil and Saiza.
It was in this context of setbacks for the military and doubts about where national defense money goes, which represents 40 per cent of the national budget, that the first signs of disagreement appeared in the governmental team. While General Samudio was talking about relentless war, the minister of the interior, César Gaviria, was pouring oil on the waters. He invoked the September 1 peace plan, despite the fact that rebel activity was up by 140 per cent.
ALZA DE ¡ PRECIOS
It was evident that a section of the executive branch had begun to question the exclusively military scheme that has been followed up until now, in view of the poor results it has been having in keeping the people under control.
The other dimension of Barco's problem is mass upsurges in urban centers, such as those that have occurred recently in Pasto, Riohaha and Bucaramanga. Such rebellions remain for the moment isolated and sporadic, but they have been very radical. The demands raised have been for an end to the "dirty war," better public services and rejection of the IMF's plans.
In addition, there were the peasant marches in May, which were severely repressed by the army, and the general strike conducted by the United Federation of Workers (CUT) on October 27, despite the militarization of the country. All these mass actions are a new factor which, in addition to the advance of rebel activity, may be forcing the Colombian bourgeoisie to draw up another strategy. 6. El País, November 6, 1988. 7. The general narrowly escaped an attack recently in Bogotá, in which his driver and bodyguard were killed. 8. According to the Standing Committee for the Defense of Human Rights, in 1987 there were 1,651 political assassinations, 109 disappearances and 372 persons tortured and wounded. In only 60 days (from the end of June to mid-August) in 1988, the Comitee reports that there were 14 massacres in which 119 people were killed; 163 individual political assassinations, 5 24 disappearances and 17 death threats.
COLOMBIA • YUGOSLAVIA
Such a "new" strategy has not been explicitly formulated for the moment. It would not involve an end to military harassment of the population and those areas where the rebels have influence. It would probably consist of a more sophisticated two-sided alternative — a "peace plan" calling for "direct" dialogue with the insurgents and regional dialogues for "coexistence" with the population; and a reform of the constitution.
The problem is that dialogue with the guerrilla bodies has not been clearly defined so far by the government, and such proposals have in general been rejected by the armed groups. The latter have considered that this amounts to a sort of "unconditional surrender in three stages," in disregard of the fact that the Colombian guerrillas have not been militarily defeated. The proposal of a constitutional reform does not appeal to them either. Turbulent political situation will continue
In fact, the change proposed is a timid one that would not alter the foundations of the present institutions. It would only increase the powers of the Congress and allow for referendums. Despite its moderate character, the government's constitutional reform scheme has been criticized by liberals and ultra-right conservatives, who want a more a more retrograde and clericalist constitution. Barco was expressing his opposition to this when he rejected General Samudio's view and ruled out both scorched earth policies and "a political revision of the state."
The signals given by the Segovia massacre indicate clearly that the most extremist wing of the armed forces and civilian right will place serious obstacles in the way of negotiation with the rebel movement and even the most timid liberalization. The article in the proposed constitutional reform stipulating that all parties represented in parliament, even radical opposition parties, are to be briefed by the government on foreign policy, national defense and public order has thrown a scare into the reactionaries and the military.
For his part, Barco lacks the political strength to open up the way for these cosmetic reforms which, moreover, have not aroused any enthusiasm among the masses. Everything indicates that the turbulent political situation that Colombia has been experiencing will go on. International solidarity is more necessary than ever. It is urgent to sent letters and telegrams protesting against the Segovia massacre and the dirty war to Dr Virgilio Barco Vargas, presidente de la república, Palacio de Narino, Bogotá, Colombia; and to Colombia's embassies in every country.
Copies of such messages can be sent to the Comité Permanente por la Defensa de 6 los Derechos Humanos, Carrera 7 N. 13-58 oficina 806 B Bogotá, Colombia. * International Viewpoint #153 • December 12,