The end of an era in West Germany
"I am proud of our joint endeavors, and I remain as unequivocably committed as ever to everything on which we agreed before today. " Helmut Schmidt on September 17, 1982, in the Bundestag. He said this in his speech reporting the breakup of the SPD's coalition with
"A great man comes along only every ten years. Who paid the price?" Berthold the breakup of the coalition between the Social Democrats (SDP) and the liberals (FDP), an era in the history of West German society came to an end. For 13 years the SPD was the leading party in Bonn and formed the government in coalition with the small FPD. In fact, the SPD has been in government for 16 years. Between 1966 and 1969, it shared governmental responsibility with the biggest bourgeois party, the CDU/CSU in a Great Coalition. This is the longest period in the history of the German Social Democracy that it has held the helm of the bourgeois
The breakup of the SPD/FDP coalition came about in a spectacular way. The SPD, which has been on the defensive since 1980 and been suffering catastrophic defeats in one state election after broke up the coalition on its own initiative.
Helmut Schmidt - who for years acted like a captive of the bourgeois liberals - took advantage of a proposal made in writing by his liberal Economic Minister Count Lambsdorff for a severe austerity program to throw the liberals out of the government.
Of course, the liberal party had an undeclared intention to shift from the SPD to the CDU in the near future, and thereby to bring down the Schmidt government. However, the FDP did not plan to do this so soon. Schmidt and the SPD leadership called their hand, and thereby gained the offensive.
The peculiarities of this breakup of the coalition are being widely discussed in West Germany and in the German media. "A masterpiece of finesse," is what the Handelblatt, the mouthpiece of West German capital, called Helmut Schmidt's coup. And Rudolf Augstein, the chief of West Germany's biggest political magazine, Der Spiegel, joined in the applause: "Schmidt's speech made it clear what the country is losing." (When Schmidt leaves the premier's office.)
All of this is the sort of superficial sound and fury with which the bourgeois press accompanies a historic event. It has not, however, in any way explained the meaning of this change nor the real reasons for the breakup of the coalition
Le Monde had, nonetheless, touched on the grave underlying question when it wrote: "Is the economic crisis making the democracies ungovernable? wonder when we see Schmidt and his government making their adjustments to the current of discontent that more or less everywhere in Europe is leading to the "ins being thrown out," of their political complexion. The West German case is all the more spectacular because that country held up the longest and the best against the recession." (September 9, 1982).
The underlying causes of the coalition breakup were pinpointed by the Financial Times:
"The prospect of economic growth in 1983 and of unemployment in West Germany rising to 2 million prompted the two men [Schmidt and Genscher (the FDP leader)]to move in opposite directions." (September 20, 1982)
THE STABLE WEST GERMANY
UNDER ADENAUER
The Federal Republic is the world's second strongest imperialist country and the dominant economic power in the Common Market. Up until now, it has undoubtedly enjoyed an economic and political stability that has scarcely any parallel. This stability stands in diametrical opposition to the situation that existed in Germany between the two world wars, in which the class struggle led to the emergence of several revolutionary crises (1918, 1933, and 1930-33).
interwar history, explains the essential reasons for the long period of political stability following the second world war. The crucial events were the defeats the workers suffered in these crises; fascism, which involved the smashing of the workers organisations; the second world war itself and the partition of Germany; and finally the defeat of the struggles in defense of democratic rights in 1945-52. These episodes broke the back of the German workers movement and left it politically disarmed. Such a cumulation of grave defeats must be unique in the history of the modern workers movement.
If you consider that the weight of all these defeats fell in three decades (19181948) on a generation of young revolutionary workers, then you can get a rough idea of the impact of this course of events.
the masses, working-class and revolutionary consciousness was not just undermined, it was shattered. This was the essential foundation of the capitalist rump state that arose in 1949 on the territory of the former U.S., French, and British occupation zones, and which was built up under the protection of the imperialist Allies.
Despite the discrediting of the bourgeoisie in the eyes of the masses, owing to fascism and the world war, a bloc of bourgeois parties headed by the newly formed Chrstian Democratic Party (CDU/ CSU) was able to win a majority in the first parliamentary elections in 1949 and to form the government of the new state under the leadership of the conservative CDU leader, Konrad Adenauer (1).
The 1952 elections resulted in another severe defeat for the SPD at the hands of the CDU. The situation created by the bourgeois restoration between these two elections deepened the demoralization of the workers movement. The Adenauer government put the seal on the partition of Germany, by driving forward the integration of the Western rump state into the imperialist bloc.
The currency reform carried out by this government amounted to a forcible expropriation of the "small savers" and fell almost exclusively on wage earners. A law establishing solid capitalist authority relations in the plants, the Structure of Enterprises Law ("Betriebsverfassungsgesetz"), was imposed in 1951-52, despite the fact that there was a mass strike against it.
Then, with the onset of the Korean war, the Western rump state experienced the beginnings of the long economic boom.
This development could not fail to be reflected in the SPD itself. This party was 1. It has, however, to be realized that at this time the bourgeoisie could not openly avow a bourgeois ideology. The CDU program, for example, claims to be against capitalist society (as well as against the system of "the Eastern type," such as the East German). The then stil that German hands Will never again take up CDU/SCU politician F.J. Strauss arms." The boss of the biggest arms producer, Krupp, publicly pledged never to engage arms production again. Adenauer himself never had any connection with the Nazis. Overall, in 1949, the bourgeoisie operated under the cover of populism.
built up in a rather artificial way after the war from the top down and with strong restoration and the electoral defeats in 1949 and 1952 impelled a trend further to the right within the party. It was led by the three figures that formed the leading "Troika" in the SPD in the 1960s and 1970s - Herbert Wehner, Willy Brandt, and Helmut Schmidt.
This rightward trend led to the adoption of the Bad Godesberg program in 1959, which remains the official programmatic underpinning of the SPD to this day. It expresses support for the "market economy," and envokes only the vaguest continuity with the traditions of the German workers movement.
The "socialist goal" disappears for all practical purposes. The only trace left is a few vague formulas about "democratic socialism." Shortly after the Bad Godesberg congress, the SPD leadership came out in support of NATO. This was the final seal in the integration of the restored capitalist society of West Germany into world imperialism.
In the last big oppositionist mass movements before the SPD came into the government, such as the Easter March movement against atomic weapons, the party failed to play any significant role. This was quite different from situation in the similar mass mobilizations of the 1950s, such as the "St. Paul's Church Movement" against the rearmament of West Germany; and in the "Fight Nuclear Death" Movement against atomic weapons.
The role and development of the SPD in the 1950s, up to the mid-1960s, can be summarized as follows:
It remained the main party of the wage earners, and on the electoral level even gained increasing support from the wage earners. On the other hand, it moved continually rightward, losing many of the characteristics of classical reformist parties. It has not, however, cast off its fundamental nature as a bourgeoir workers party. In this respect, there was a correspondence between the very extensive integration of the SPD into the bourgeois system and the evolution of class consciousness explained by the historical background outlined above.
By the mid-1960s, the party had been pulled so far over to the bourgeois side that even the highly suspicious West German bourgeoisie regarded it as a party that could be "trusted in government."
THE PRACTICAL TEST -THE GREAT COALITION In the mid-1960s, some changes appeared in the political landscape of the Federal Republic. In 1966-67, we saw our first recession, as insignificant as it may seem in comparison with the present one (2). At the same time, social unrest developed among coalminers, as a result of massive layoffs. Finally, the first signs appeared of student protest, which were soon to turn into the student rebellion of the "Extra-parliamentary Opposition."
The CDU/CSU and the FDP (3), continuing to govern in one coalition after another, were running out of steam. With respect to economic policy and readjusting relations with East Germany and the other East European countries, this bourgeois bloc had failed to show the necessary flexibility.
So, in December 1966, a Great Coalition was set up, including the CDU/CSU and the SPD. It is illustrative of the character of the SPD leadership that the change in government came about at that time in exactly the same way as it has in 1982, but now the party leaders find it expedient to strike a critical pose. That is, the change of government came about within the parliament without new elections as a result solely of the alliances
An official SPD statement correctly summarized the party's role National Coalition as follows: "In this situation, the SPD helped once again to pull the chestnuts out of the fire." The most important results of the National Coalition were the following:
—Passage of the "Emergency Laws" that were to be applied in the event of war or "domestic emergency, " legislation for which there was no prevision in the West German constitution. Since the constitution could be altered only by a two majority, the bourgeois parties needed the votes of the SPD (and therefore the National Coalition).
-The introduction of a new "Policy Toward the East," which would be based on the new realities that had emerged in Eastern Europe.
### POLITICAL STABILITY
UNDER SPD GOVERNMENT The 1969 elections brought an SPD victory. In the meantime, the liberal party, the FDP, had indicated its readiness to join in a coalition with the SPD. The result was the formation of a "small coalition" of the FDP and the SDP. In 1969, probably no one thought that this coalition would last for 13 years and serve for such a long time as the basis for relative political stability.
Almost everywhere else big political shakeups occurred in this period. In Great there was a changing from
Labour to Conservative governments and
This The decisive thing
3.
the state of Bavaria.
sister party, Union, the
Social The CSU has
4. In 1969-74, chancellor respectively (Scheel later became president).
bourgeois bloc under Giscard d'Estaing; and finally, Giscard himself, a bosom buddy of Schmidt, was ousted by Mitterrand. In Sweden, the bourgeois parties ousted the Social Democrats for the first time in 44 years. The Franco regime fell, and both Spain and Portugal went through revolutionary crises. The U.S. was rocked by the anti-Vietnam war movement and the Watergate affair, and the government changed hands back and forth between the Republicans and Democrats. But over this entire period, the government in Bonn continued to be led by the SPD and based on the SPD/ FDP coalition. There was also a striking continuity of the political personnel. (4)
At first glance, this situation seems to contradict the general experience that in the crisis of late capitalism, bourgeois workers parties have only a very limited reliability as parties that can run the government in the interests of the bour-
What made such a contradiction possihand, is the relative strength of West German imperialism. This was a powerful factor up to the end of the 1970s, and continues to have an effect (5). On the other hand, what the wage earners expected from the SPD in government was relatively modest. The historical reasons for this have noted. Thus, from the mid-1970s onward, the SPD was able to carry out a bourgeois policy for combating the economic crisis without encountering substantial opposi-
The results of 13 years of SPD dominated government now, when the BrandtSchmidt era is coming to an end, can be used to build up a kind of political mythology. The SPD itself is promoting this. 1969-82 is presented as a period of social reform, social welfare, and wide-ranging
VILV
CDU/CSU-led government now is sup posed to represent counterreform, cutbacks, and a "strong state." But the SPD cannot escape its historical resposibility so easily. An objective balance sheet would have to take the following lines:
(1) In the field of social and economic policy, there were a few small reforms
(e.g. lowering of the retirement age). But rule, projects reform were reduced to ruins or pure hot air the moment the conservatives put up any resistance, as in the case of against real estate speculation, abolition
Schmidt replaced Brandt as chancellor in 1974 • and remained in this post until 1982. Genscher was always the second man in Schmidt's cabinets. Throughout this period, Brandt retained considerable influence as party chairman and chairman of the Second International.
5. Since the 1974-75 economic crisis, I have analyzed this specific situation of West German imperialism, its "relative strength," and at the same time the decline of the special factors that produced this position of strength. See Englishlanguage Inprecor January 1975, "The Relative Strength of German Capitalism"; and June
28, 1975, "Not Yet an Upturn". I also did this in the context of analyses of the world economic crisis of 1980-82. See the French Inprecor
January 17, 1980, "La nouvelle recession internationale en 1980," and February 16, 1981,
"La spirale des recessions ne peut s'elargir a l'infini."
13
of Section 218 banning abortion, giving priority to public mass over highway building, and apprentice.
Up until the mid-1970s, wage earners enjoyed steady improvement in their living standards and level of social security. This was the result, however, not so much of the policies government but of the bigger strikes and mass mobilizations in 1969-74. (6). This fact was reflected in the slogan that was common in the workers mobilizations of the time: "We get only what we take!"
In the last two years, in the conditions of the recent crisis, the SPD in government went over to a policy of social cutbacks. A clear index of this is the budget they themselves introduced, which called for reducing social appropriations by arms expenditures increased by 4%.
In the 1980s, for the first time in the history of the Federal Republic, there have been perceptible drops in real wages (6% to 7% in 1980-82).
(2) In 1969, Willy Brandt came into government with the slogan "Dare to Try More Democracy." In fact, in the beginning of the 1970s the with East Europe, and in a period of ports to the Shah's Iran rose from 928 government went over to a policy of dismantling democratic rights, using as a pretext the terrorist actions of the Red Army Faction led by Baader and Meinhof. This course went so far that the Russell Foundation thought it necessary to set up a tribunal in 1976 to study these developments.
It was Willy Brandt himself who initiated the decrees calling for the banning of "radicals from public service" helping to spread a new ugly German word around the world, Berufsuerbote (political blacklisting). Under the Brandt and Schmidt governments, various represwere passed, which made it a criminal offense to propagate revolutionSection 88a and Section 130a) and which limited the rights of the defense in political trials (the law denying lawyers access growing crisis West German interest had a big interest in such a new export outlet. In line with this, the proportion of total exports represented by trade with East Europe doubled.
If other areas of foreign policy are taken into account, the looks different. For example, the Federal Republic under the SPD-led was the U.S.'s most reliable partner in Europe. Even at the peak of the U.S.'s genocidal policy in Vietnam, neither the government nor the SPD
Schmidt even claims to be the father of the notorious "two-track decision" of NATO, whose logic led to the stationing of a new generation of intermediate-range U.S. missiles in Europe, starting in 1983.
In Portugal, at the height of the revolutionary crisis, the SPD, through the Pormillion Deutsch Marks in 1967 to 5.2 billion in 1975. Exports to racist South from 1.2 billion Deutsch Marks in 1967 to 3.4 billion in 1975. The same thing can be seen for the same period with respect to the dictatorships of Brazil, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, and others.
THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT
AND THE ECONOMY
The decisive reason for the change in Bonn is the fact that the Federal Republic has now come fully into the grip of the capitalist crisis. For two years, since the middle of 1980, the economy has been stagnating.
The number of bankruptcies has been increasing rapidly. It has gone from 4,000 tuguese SP under Soares, which it built in 1970, to 9,000 in 1975, to 15,000 in to their clients).
In no previous period were the various services and "anti-terrorist units"
so beefed up, and the possibilities for massive electronic surveillance as unscruup, carried out an effective policy of containing the revolutionary upsurge. And if
Felipe Gonzalez becomes the premier of
Spain tomorrow and carries out a bour-
1982. This includes the biggest failure in the history of European capitalism, the collapse of AEG-Telefunken.
In recent months, the decisive impetus pulously used as in 1969-72. The bour- geois policy for dealing with the crisis to frenetic trading geois bloc that is now taking office will find an apparatus of surveillance that bourgeois repression, and it will know the field of foreign policy, Bonn's "Ostpolitik" is often cited positive example. Of course, it was a step forward for West German governments to recognize, to a considerable extent, the economic realities in Eastern Europe, and stop proclaiming that these had to be changed by means of force.
Nonetheless, the SPD has never taken any initiative to challenge the essential juridical basis for revanchism, the constitution itself (7). Moreover, it should be noted that the new East European policy was a precondition for expanding trade under the banner of the PSOE, this party and Gonzalez himself are also a product of the "SPD foreign policy" (8).
Finally, another result of the SPD-led governments is that the collaboration and involvement of the Federal with bourgeois terror regimes has remained close, and to some extent been expanded. Thus, West German ex the evolution of per capita real wages was as follows in West Germany: 1969than 30% increase; 1975, slight stagnation; 1980-82, standard of living are taken into consideration, example, there has been a constant increase in
1969 to 23 in 1975, and 30 in 1982.
The Bonn constitution is supposed to apply to all Germans, including those who live in East speculation, threatening to bring about an international financial crash, has been generated by West German banks. In particular, the Dresner Bank, the second biggest in the country, has accumulated a large number of high-risk paper, including a large part of the Polish government debt and the debts of the AEG. [annexed by Poland and the USSR].
The SPD conducts its own foreign policy outside of the government, that is, in the framepolicy cannot, to be sure, be simply described as counterrevolutionary. It is not that today with respect to El Salvador. In certain specific situations, especially revolutionary bly becomes an instrument of counterrevolu-
the same period, the Federal Republic has acquired a massive deficit. Payment and interest on the debt has become the second largest item in the budget and will become the biggest in
This situation demands a different bourgeois policy, the one advocated by the CDU/CSU but also by the SPD's forcoalition partner, includes the following points:
-A drastic assault on the underpinincluding a sharp lowering of unemployment insurance.
-A massive shift in public spending away from expenditures on social welfare toward bailing out businesses and investment programs for certain industries. A big role will be played in this by an accelerated program of building nuclear reactors (9). Finally, the West German concentrated and built up, bringing the country into line in this area as well with the other imperialist states (the U.S., France, and Great Britain).
-The West German bourgeoisie has to be able to respond in a flexible way to the stepped up competition between the U.S. and Europe. While on some points, as the Schmidt government has done (on the natural gas pipeline, for example U.S. demands will be rejected - the West German interests involved here were too others Bonn will go along meekly with U.S. policy. This has been the case for example with respect to the stationing of new U.S. missiles in Europe
In the longer term, there could be a change in Bonn's East European policy -that is, a reduction in trade and the adoption of an aggressive blackmailing policy toward the USSR, East Germany, and Poland. Such a shift could easily suit the West German capitalists, if it is carried out in an abrupt way.
The economic crisis in East Europe is evident today and the possibilities for exhausted. Thus, after the completion of the natural gas pipeline deal, there is not much more to be gained in this area.
The best "climate" for carrying out such a policy is high and rising unemploy. ment. In mid-1982, the number of unemployed was 1.8 million, and in the winter of 1982-83, this figure will exceed 2 million for the first time, and should reach an average of 2.3 million for 1983. A further prolonging of the crisis and a severe austerity policy could even push the figure up over 3 million at the end of 1983. It is hard to conceive of a policy permitting such a growth of unemployment being carried out in the present circumstances with the SPD as the government party. On the other hand, a bourgeois bloc of the CDU/CSU and the FDP can pursue such a policy, claiming that the economic policy of the previous government has made this necessary, and that now it has to clean out the "Augean Stables.
This turn in the bourgeoisie's policy is in fact a sharpening of the policy that has been introduced by the SPD itself in recent years. However, the SPD is not equipt to implement this turn fully. In its last two years in government, it already lost a considerable part of its capacity to keep the workers quiet. This was reflected, among other things, in the massive it suffered in state elections.
At the SPD congress this April, the writing could already be seen on the wall: "The days of the SPD-dominated government seem numbered in any case (10)." Under the pressure of their ranks, the unions called for big mobilizations this fall against social cutbacks and unemployment. This is the first time since 1969 have considered mobilizing against the SPD on a political question.
Finally, the threat was looming that in mass peace movement would shake the Schmidt position and push the SPD in the decisive year to oppose the stationing of new U.S. Intermediate range missiles in Europe.
A STABLE BOURGEOIS GOVERNMENT?
The stockmarket reacted euphorically to Helmut Schmidt's departure. The price index rose by 10%. The bourgeois press greeted the change with a chorus of applause. The big bourgeois commentators are even saying openly that the SPD should move to the left in the opposition so that it can regain control of the peace movement and the class struggle forces in the trade-union movement and thereby help once again to assure bourgeois stabi-
This perspective can, however, by no means be assured. It leaves out of consi deration the problem of the international relationship of forces. And that cannot in any way be said to be turning everywhere to the right. (The cases of France, Spain, and Sweden indicate otherwise.) Moreover, such a projection fails to take sufficient account of three domestic factors: "the first is, that the new elections could produce a result promising anything but stability and consolidation ... It is also possible that the Greens - amorphous movement embracing ecologists, critics of NATO and so on — might gain parliamentary seats while the FDP got none. This could just open the door to an SPD minority government tolerated by the Greens ... This is not very likely ... but also not impossible and one international factor -the second warning point - might help them. This is the NATO's so-called two9. The powerful antinuclear arose in West Germany in 1975-79 forced a de facto moratorium on the construction of new nuclear reactors and related facilities. As result, the French nuclear industry pushed the West German one into second place. 10. See the balance sheet I made of the SPD congress in International Viewpoint, May 24, 1982. The title of the English version ("Party Majority Supports Peace Movement Position") was not was misleading, since the majority voted against the peace moment's position. 11. The leading bourgeois journal, the Frank. furter Allgemeine Zeitung, writes in a comtrack' decision As the deadline approaches, opposition to deployment of nuclear missiles seems bound to rise and could help unite the Greens and other groups. Finally an era of consolidation presupposes that the present recession throughout the western world does not turn into deep depression (12)."
Is there any reason why, as a conclusion for this kind of article, I should not quote an analysis by someone on the side of the class enemy - The Financial Times - when it is intelligent and more or less correct? ***** ****
The preceding article was written before the September 27, 1982, Hessen state elections. The results of this election are disappointing for the bourgeoisie, and the conclusion of this article. The shift in Bonn in no way means that a of bourgois stability is being
The FDP vote was reduced from 6.6% to 3.1%. Thus, the party lost its representation in parliament, since it fell below the 5% threshold. On the other hand, winning 8%, the Greens topped the undemocratic 5% barrier. The SPD suffered only minor losses (-1.5%), winning 42.8%
The CDU remained the single party, winning 45.6%, almost the same result as in previous years.
The division of the seats in the state parliament is as follows: 52 for the CDU, 49. for the SPD, and 9 for the Greens. This result contrasts with the results of previous elections in other states and with the predictions of the opinion polls, which projected CDU gains of 6% to 10% and corresponding losses for the SPD. Obviously the events in Bonn have led to a polarization, in which the SPD in particular has been able to mobilize its electoral
"Hesse is ungovernable," was the uniform comment of bourgeois circles. And they all fear that a similar relationship of forces could develop on the national level, if the early elections envisaged are
Of course, Hesse is governable, and West Germany would be governable if a national election produced a similar line. up. But it would be presided over by a very unstable bourgeois government, one formed by the SPD and tolerated by the Greens. Such a government would not be able to push through the austerity policy the bourgeoisie wants. And so the bourgeoisie has to fear a lineup of this sort, and therefore cannot look forward to new elections without apprehension. mentary on September 23, 1982: "The SPD members and voters are beginning to get the felling that the luster of the big people's party cannot be maintained over the 1980s." And the leading business paper, Handelsblatt expressed approval on September 20, 1982, when Willy Brandt said that the SPD now wanted "to workers and shop stewards in the factories" and pay more attention to critically minded to the peace movement. "Channelling these forces can not only benefit the SPD but the state as a whole. 12. Jonathan Carr, "A New Political Era Opens," in the Financial Times of September 20, 1982.
15
More than 200,000 people attended our election meetings
The Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT - broadcasts.
Revolutionary Workers Party) Mexican section of the Fourth In International Viewpoint we have carried regular coverage
International, has just led a very dynamic and effective election of the progress of the campaign. In IV Issue No 13 we described campaign around the candidacy of Rosario Ibarra de Piedra for the massive electoral fraud that had robbed the PRT of its president, and dozens of PRT activists and supporters in the representatives in Parlament.
local legislative