A bold stroke by Gorbachev THE SPECIAL Central Committee plenum called by Gorbachev aroused considerable speculation in the international press about a sharpening of the conflict between the reformers and the conservatives. With the departure of Gromyko and some other dinosaurs, the Brezhnevite old guard suffered a setback. But who will be the real winners from the Gorbachev reforms?
The following article from the October 6 issue of Rouge, newspaper of the French section of the Fourth International, looks at the present stage of the reform in the USSR.
fines. The decree was also used to ban and repress the August 21 demonstration in Pushkin Square against the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia that was called by the Democratic Union (which recently constituted itself as a party). On this occasion, we saw a new special riot police unit, all in gray, employed with vigor.
Finally, there was the attempt to limit the circulation of the press, or at least to make a strict selection of the publications that would have the right to get enough paper to meet the demand for subscriptions (in August people were standing in lines for several hours in the hope of re-subscribing to the more liberal press). Growing discontent about shortages
The reaction aroused by this obviously political rationing essentially knocked the props out from under this measure. But
CATHERINE VERLA G ORBACHEV certainly has a dramatic flare. Let us admit frankly that one could have feared the worst, a conservative counter-offensive. The only sign that pointed in the other direction was undoubtedly the theatrical bent characteristic of the Soviet leader. But more and more facts — not just signs
— in the recent period had been pointing to a conservative hardening up.
In August, first of all, there was the decree by the Presidium - still headed by Gromyko - which severely restricted the right to demonstrate. The Karabakh Committee leaders have already suffered the initial effects of a multiplication of heavy
ICIP overall, on the eve of changes in the apparatus and re-elections that could make more than a few bureaucrats fear for their livelihood, new conservative initiatives could be expected. They would no doubt have exploited the growing discontent of the population about shortages. The ideological cover for the power conflicts has shifted in this direction recently.
After taking up the cudgels in the debate over Stalinism, the conservative press adopted the question of the well-being of the workers — and "disorders" of all sorts that are blamed on glasnost — as their arguing point. Ligachev's speech this summer attacked the social effects of the reforms.
Nonetheless, the weakness of such a speech —or of the conservative position -is that they have no credible or attractive program other than maintaining the old order, which is in a profound crisis.
The reserve or distrust of workers toward reforms that threaten the existing level of employment and the standard of living (through price rises) are not sufficient to guarantee the conservatives a situation equivalent to the one in which Khrushchev fell. Besides the international successes he has scored — unlike Mr. K. - Gorbachev is benefitting from the political aspect of the "revolution" he advocates.
In the socio-economic sphere, the reform has been little applied, if at all, and it is still possible to say that the main problems are being created by bureaucratic obstruction. Thus, reforms of the political system and elections seem a prerequisite for any perestroika (regardless of what content it has).
The early retirement of Gromyko and the other rhinoceroses of the Brezhnev period, as well as Ligachev's transfer from his post as chief of ideology to agriculture (a trap, given the difficulties of this task have one purpose. It is to reinforce the confidence of the partisans of reform, to deprive the conservatives in the intermediate and base 7 structures of their spokespersons "at the
USSR • HUNGARY top."
In short, the objective was to inspire a certain boldness in renewing the party's base structures and cutting back the apparatus that up until now has paralleled economic administration (50 per cent of this apparatus is to disappear).
We are being told that Gorbachev has just gained a stable majority. That supposes that at the beginning of the meeting he did not have one. How, then, was he able to impose on this unfavorable majority decisions that could not have been to its liking? And, what is more, get unanimous agreement? There is not quite enough "openness" for us to understand all this.
The coming months are going to be marked by the elections. The reform's unpopular measures — price changes — will be applied, if they are applied (the example of Poland inspires caution at the top) after the elections. National questions coming to the fore
Right now, national questions are coming to the fore. Perestroika has found unhopedfor support in the Baltic republics, where the mass of the population has taken literally the talk encouraging initiative and autonomy. Rather than leave the field open to separatist national currents, the local parties - and it seems, Gorbachev — have clearly chosen to accept, if not support, the creation of "People's Fronts," whose logic is to demand autonomy for the republics within the Soviet Union.
Given impetus by the main intellectuals in the republics, the fronts have opened the way for expression on a massive scale of long suppressed national aspirations. The taboo has been lifted from such questions as demands for cultural rights, for openness on the history of these republic's attachment to the USSR, putting forward the local languages and national symbols, the demand for control over the use of resources - and the terrible environmental harm caused by policies planned at the "center" — and, finally, "accounting autonomy" for the republics.
It is on such issues that the first very popular pro-Gorbachev demonstrations (although involving many party members) have taken place. It is easier for the Soviet leader to support the Baltic demands than to grant the reunion of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia in the face of Muslim fundamentalism.
However, more autonomy for the republics would also mean less redistributing powers for the central plan. A Yugoslav logic might then be set in motion (the rich republics against the poor ones). If the winners are only the richer areas, with higher levels of skill, then a dynamic of colossal tensions will loom. Conservatism is all the more suicidal because of that. "Realism" and efficiency are on the side of a redefinition by the Soviet peoples of the bases on which they live together. The official slogans today are "openness" and "democracy," "the perestroika Ecology demo S EVERAL THOUSAND people participated in a demonstration in Budapest on September 12 called by the Democratic Forum and the Danube Circle against building of a hydroelectric plant at Nagymaros on the Danube near the Czech border. Austrian environmentalists, including two Green deputies, also took part in this action.
Nagymaros is only a complementary part of a much more ambitious project. A second dam and power plant are to be built at Babcikovo in Czechoslovakia. The combination of these two dams will have the effect of diverting the Danube over 180 kilometers and destroying the environmental balance of the ground water tables that supply the entire region, and notably Budapest, with drinking water.
The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project is a joint Czech-Hungarian project that has been under study since the 1950s and officially in the works since 1977. The total cost of this project is estimated at about $3.5 billion, more more than triple the Hungarian annual budget deficit. Austrian bank credits will finance nearly 28 per cent of this amount. This is in fact an advance payment on the electricity that Austria will get from Nagymaros up until 2015.
In 1985, massive mobilization by Austrian environmentalists managed to stop a similar dam and hydroelectric power station scheme in Hainsburg. So, for the Austrian government and the Donaukraftwerk company, which has the contract for the project, this was a golden opportunity to accomplish in Hungary what was no longer possible in Austria and to secure electricity supply at a lower cost.
The Austrian Greens have denounced this "purely imperialist" attitude of their government, and have undertaken court actions (without success) in Austria to get the contracts signed with the Hungari? government annulled.
Moreover, besides its high costs - the threats it poses to the environment, the Nagymaros project is not very profitable either. Once the 12,000 megawatts are drained off for Austria, the complex will produce only enough electricity to cover 2 per cent of Hungary's needs.