For example, the polls carried out immediately after the presidential election show
Communist Party representatives stressed that a number of important strikes continued during the election campaign, apparently unaffected by it. That does represent a change from the period leading up to the victory of the left in 1981, when the workers waited for a left government to solve their problems. But this attitude has two sides to it. It also reflects a loss of political confidence in the established left parties. And despite the Communist Party's attempt now to appear as an opposition left alternative, its political credibility has collapsed. A credible left alternative is still to be built, and the time is growing shorter.
The election, won on the slogan of "the unity of France," in fact was marked by growing cracks in the stability of the status quo. To some extent, already, Le Pen's breakthrough has destabilized the traditional parliamentary game. The following articles, from the April 28 issue of Rouge -newspaper of the LCR, the French section of the Fourth International - take up the changes in French politics revealed in the first round. In a forthcoming issue we will have further coverage of the political situation opened up by the election results. *
WHAT'S UP WITH YOU TODAY? NO MANOEUVRES?
NO MASSACRES? WHAT THE HELL ARE YOU UP TO?
WE'RE TIRED, Boss!
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10г
CHIRAC
PLANTE
PIERRE JUQUIN Still a long way to go ON APRIL 24, there was not enough of a "movement" to allow Pierre Juquin to create a surprise. But disappointment should not carry the day because, within a very gloomy overall context, a detailed study of the results reveals some promising phenomena. CHRISTIAN PIQUET
OR movement on the left!" -this was the theme of Pierre Juquin's campaign. In the aftermath of April 24, which registered deepgoing changes in the political map of France, it is possible to measure how far we have to go.
While not derisory, the candidate's national score fell short of what had been hoped for given the impressive attendance at his election meetings, the hundreds of action and support committees all over France and the thousands of people involved in them.
From this point of view, who could deny that something has "moved" during these last six months? The proposals that were put forward, and the defence of left policies that simultaneously rejected the neoliberalism of social democracy and the suicidal sectarianism of the Communist Party (CP), gained an unprecedented hearing. The "Juquin effect" was to multiply the forces involved in this principled battle, enabling activists with different origins and experiences to work together, often for the first time.
All the same, this phenomenon did not have a commensurate impact on the national electoral picture. In other words, although the National Front (NF) polarized 15% of the electorate to the right, the supporters of a radical change did not succeed in making the sort of breakthrough that could have shaped a new perspective to the left. Only the Greens, in a strong position with their 3.78%, created a surprise, in spite of what was a weak campaign, to say the least.
Three reasons can explain this situation. First, in the context of the economic crisis and the disarray among sections of work-
FRANCE ers, the polarization has principally been to the right. The revival of social struggles remained too limited to give a decisive push to the recomposition of forces in the workers' movement. This was to be the biggest handicap of the campaign.
Movement too new to win credibility
Next, the regroupment around Pierre Juquin was too new for him to gain enough credibility to change the terms of one of the most formidable tests in French political life in his favour. Before the voting, the forces involved in this battle did not have the time to prove themselves in struggles and win the confidence of a significant part of the workers' movement.
Lastly, many people noted that the errors committed in the final run up to the election did nothing to give the campaign a boost. The candidate's ambiguous or illconsidered proposals regarding whether or not he might participate in the government created confusion about his intentions. And the vagueness of some of his television appearances, where he referred to a "a society of a third kind", could not meet the expectations of his potential electorate: critical militants in the CP and the Socialist Party; unity-minded, class-struggle trade unionists; youth drawing the political implications from their participation in the winter 1986 strikes and so on.
Best results were in working-class departments
For all that, when studied closely Juquin's results did not lack some promising indications. In 80 departments, he exceeded his national average. Leaving aside HauteVienne where, with 4.06% of the poll, he gained from the reaction to the national party's bureaucratic offensive against the local Communist federation, he got over 3% in Alpes-de-Haute-Provence, Ariège, Corrèze, Haute-Corse, Haute-Garonne, Hérault, Puy-de-Dôme, Hautes-Pyrénées and Essonne. But this was not the most important thing.
The scores of the ex-CP spokesperson were less "consistent" than those of Lutte Ouvrière's candidate, Arlette Laguiller. This confirmed once again that she has a small, relatively stable, electorate. Juquin's best scores most often came in areas where there are big concentrations of workers and where there is still a steadfast militant tradi-
1988 Presidential election results
SECOND ROUND % François Mitterrand 54.02 Socialist Party (SP) Jacques Chirac 45.97
Rally for the Republic (RPR