What strategy for Solidarnosc?
explained that the workers "are ready to the July-August 1980 strikes. While there
The following article by the editors of Inprekor, the Polish language journal of the Bureau of the Fourth International, was published in issue No. 5 of that magazine. It has recently been printed also in issue No. 6 of Veto, the clandestine bulletin of the Committee for Social SelfDefense (Komitet Oporu Spolecznego — KOS), which is published in Poznan.
take much greater risks, if they know that this 'will be their final combat'." (2)
TOWARD OVERCOMING THE
CRISIS OF STRATEGY
The strategy of a one-sided "war of put forward by some Solidarwas no lack of workers in the streets, it was the university student youth, the nonindustrial workers, and youth of high school age that were the majority. They put forward slogans different from those projected by workers Solidarnosc. They themselves did not perceive any difference between themselves and nosc activists, especially in the Warsaw the workers Solidarnosc. the underground Solidarnosc leaders in Wroclaw, a city in the southwestern part of the country, as well as leaders in Warsaw called for preparing for a general strike. They envisaged factory occupations that would be actively defended. The calls of these leaders were echoed shortly afterward by those of underground leaders in other regions.
Along with this, the Warsaw Regional Executive Commission announced that "the present forms of expressing our refusal to accept the existing state of affairs - such as 15 minute protest strikes or 15 minute blackouts — are suspended in our region." (1)
On June 26, the Provisional Coordinating Committee of Solidarity (TKK) decided to suspend all strikes and demonstrations throughout the country until the end of July. It announced that this period "would be used by the union to develop and reinforce its organizational structures and to prepare for a general if the circumstances oblige us to resort to one."
In the first months of the "state of the symbolic resistance actions undoubtedly played an important role. But they have finally shown their limitations, at least as the main form of resisstoppages carried out in regions, and warning strike called by the TKK, have been assessed in varying ways. The reactions of the Warsaw trade-union activists collected after the Thursday, actions testify to this. They did strengthen the combativity and self-organization of the working class. But the results were not commensurate with the work that had to go into building
Still worse, the price that the strikers in many plants had to pay proved too high. The military dictatorship fired a lot of workers after these strikes. On the other hand, Zbigniew Romaszewski, a member of the Warsaw regional leader. ship and director of Radio Solidarnosc, region, has thus been shown to be inadequate and contrary to the dynamic of the movement. Instead of confining themselves to building the structures of a clandestine society, as dictated by the basic lines of this strategy, the working masses came onto the streets in impressdemonstrations. These actions very
The elements of a "war of movement" had accompanied the forms of a "war of position" earlier - in the form of strikes - after May 1. But now these elements began to come to the forefront. However, all this happened in a spontaneous way. The street battles were fought without any knowledge of the tactics of this form
It was in such conditions, for example, that the clashes took place in the Cracow marketplace on May 13, when the ZOMO (riot police) brutally attacked a defenseless crowd. Some even say that on this movement suffered important defeat.
On this question, a clandestine bulletin says: "After being broken up several times, crowds can become demoralized, they can become prey to feelings of help. lessness, or even yield to panic. Visible signs of this appeared after the Thursday, May 13, demonstrations.
"The plainclothes cops had no difficulty in arresting people in the crowd who had been picked out beforehand. And this was the same crowd that a few minutes earlier had attacked the water cannon in Grodzka street. After the 13th, there were no more demonstrations, and the wall slogans have disappeared. shows how much time it takes society to recover from this sort of thing(3)."
It is not the natural bastions of the working class, the big industrial plants, that have been the theater of this "war of
"The May 1 and 3 demonstrations that testified strikingly to the strength of the resistance to the military-party dictatorship not only by their form but also by their social composition, differed from to our knowledge - did not regard the demonstrators as outsiders. But it is, nonetheless, true that this spring the resistance has been led by sectors of the society that were in a minority in Solidar-
There is no doubt but that at this point the strategy that had been pursued by the resistance movement went into crisis. On Friday, May 1, Bogdan Lis, a member of the Gdansk regional leader ship, wrote to Zbigniew Bujak, chairman of the Warsaw region:
"I have reported on the meeting of the TKK, and I have conveyed to representatives of the big plants the position of the four regions on strategy and tactics of action. They were all downcast. They all thought that if there is no decisive action, if people are not convinced that we are preparing for a general strike to force a national understanding, even at the price of a major compromise — we will have no support (5)."
Shortly after this, the workers in several dozen big plants in the Warsaw region demanded that the regional Executive Commission (RKW) prepare for a general strike.
for a general strike is a decisive event.
the first place, it means that the dynamic of the movement is inexorably linking forms of a "war of movement" with those of a "war of position." A general strike is the major form of a "war of movement" available to the working
Even the Solidarnosc activists who declared for a "war of position" have been forced by the dynamic of the resistance itself - since as spontaneous street
Tygodnil Mazowsze, No. 16, Warsaw, July wolnose uberpleczajacy, No. 19, May 30, 1982 dans les rues? " d'Information of the Comite de coordination
France, May 27,
confrontations developed, the resistance started getting out of the control of the movement's coordinating bodies - to recognize that they could not exclude the forms of a "war of movement" or relegate them to a limited tactical role. In fact, such forms appeared regardless, even were neither planned
Secondly, the call for a general strike means that the working class is taking an increasingly negative attitude to both symbolic acts of passive resistance and limited strikes, which are costly and offer no perspective.
On the other hand, the workers are favorable to, and ready for, actions of strategic scope, battles that would be at least decisive if not final, which could concentrate all the energy of the working class and the other oppressed sections of rallied around it, battles could lead to decisive gains, actions that, in other words, would oblige the bureaucracy if not to withdraw from the scene, at least to yield considerable ground.
- Thirdly, the call for a general strike - that is, the carrying of a "war of move. ment" into the factories and fighting it there - is the confirmation of the basically proletarian character of the resistance to the military dictatorship. From the outset, since the summer of 1980, this has been the character of the Polish revolution, not only because of its working-class social content and the leading role that the working class has played in it but also because working-class forms of struggle — economic and political mass strikes — have been the main form of struggle for the mass movement as a whole. The resistance has maintained all these features of
"The decisive struggle will begin where the previous struggle left off - behind the walls of the factories from which the independent workers union strength. In the wake of the spectacular street demonstrations, the process of regaining self-confidence through solidarity strike action has already begun and is continuing to grow. This time, there is a feeling of self-confidence radiating from the factory walls and from the workers behind them(6)."
In taking the decision to prepare for a general strike, we have to realize what a momentous decision this is for the leadership of the mass movement, how great a responsibility it involves, and the fact that has a historic importance. We have to realize the character that any real general strike and what conditions are necessary for it to lead to success. In fact, general strikes are governed by certain laws that have to be strictly observed.
In the first place, it has to be understood that a general strike is a large-scale revolutionary action by the masses, by the entire mass movement; that it means we are moving into an openly revolutionary situation. Trotsky wrote, regard: "... the general strike is not possiextreme political tension, and that is why it is always the incontestable expression of the revolutionary character of the situation(7)"
From this it follows that the launching of such a strike must reflect the fact that the masses are ready for a revolutionary action, and that all the component parts of the Solidarnose network are prepared to engage in such a struggle.
In the writings of the Solidarnose leaders, two tendencies can be perceived now, which if they persist, could reduce the chances for the victory of a general strike. One is represented, for example, by Zbigniew Bujak, who wrote a letter dated Friday, May 21, to Bogdan Lis, commenting workers in the big plants in Gdansk who their support for a general strike: "Explain to them that because of the character of this strike (active self-defense), it would amount to a revolution (overthrowal of the govern-
Bujak was right. The entire working class has to realize that this is a revolutionary action of great scope, and that it means taking the road that leads to overthrowing the bureaucratic regime. But, contrary to what Bujak says, a general will not necessarily end in either the defeat of the movement or the overthrow of the bureaucracy. As we will show further on in this article, it is possible to envisage a partial defeat for the bureaucracy and a correspondingly partial victory for the mass movement.
Zbigniew Bujak continues further on:
"If they accept that, explain to them that the TKK can prepare to lead such a strike and that we are beginning such preparations, but I personally will not be the one to call such a strike. In fact, issuing such a call is tantamount to sending thousands of people to their deaths, and they cannot ask me to assume such a responsibility. What the TKK can do is to take the leadership of a strike that has already begun, one called for example by the Lenin Shipyards, or the Inter-Enterprise Committee in Gdansk, or
Network of Big
Assuming the leadership of such a strike are prepared for it will make it possible to cut the losses through a coordinated resistance(8)."
We cannot agree with such an attitude. If a general strike becomes an immediate question, the TKK cannot wait to assume the leadership until it is initiated by the rank and file. It must take responsibility for assuring that the necessary groundwork for it is laid, and not just at the level of the plants and coordination beassuring effective coordination among the requires linking up the intervarious regions or establishing liaison, by radio for example, between during the strike, as is proposed by Zbigniew Romaszewski.)
In the preparatory stage itself, the TKK has to assure that there is a centralized strike leadership in every region and on the national scale, as well as the basis for united and planned action. It must take the responsibility for issuing the call for the general strike and setting the date for its commencement.
As Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, a Wroclaw region leader said back in April when he raised the question of such a strike: "The society must be prepared, it has to be kept in a state of conscious preparedness, and the most favorable time chosen. The society has to be prepared for seizing such an opportunity(9)"
The responsibilities of the leaders of the movement have to be understood as Zbigniew Romaszewski says:
"I assume the responsibilities I have when I accepted a mandate national and regional leadership. I am responsible not only for given decisions but for the absence of decisions, for the fact that Solidarnosc is in danger of paraand our country, of Czech-style
"Le printemps polonais: dans les
" Leon Trotsky on France, Monad, New York, 1979, p. 94.
Tygodnik Mazowsze, No. 15. 9. Tygodnik Mazowsze, No. 13, May 12, 1982.
normalization. I am responsible for disorganized actions that could end in effect(10)."
Another dangerous tendency, on the other hand, is reflected by Romaszewski.
out correctly that the December 1981 defeat was due in particular "to the fact that the demands put forward by means it was prepared to use." The means were in fact too limited. hand, he makes the same error today, but reverse, maintaining that combination of total determination by the society and limited demands can force the regime to compromise(11)."
A disproportion between means and ends - in both cases - can lead to defeat. And this danger is not any the less when the demands put forward are too limited, the movement - rescinding of the state of siege and reestablishment of trade-union rights - can only be achieved through the overthrow (or forced resignation) of the military dictatorship. However, winning them does not require overthrowing the bureaucratic regime right away but only force it to make conds must be included in Solidarnos: am for building the general strint. Not only are they not too ambitious but, they are insufficient for such a strike. "Nothing can be on a higher plane than the general strike, except the armed insurrection. The entire history of the working class movement proves that every general strike, whatever may be the
If only for this reason, it is necessary to envisages going from a passive general strike to an active strike in more and more plants as the strike continues. With respect to the active strike affecting most of the north Italian factories in 1920, stressed that such an action in reality establishing workers ... all that was lacking was to organize it, and to draw from it all the necessary conclusions(14)."
an active strike poses the question of power still more forcefully than a passive occupation strike. Commenting on this active strike while it was spreading, Antonio Gramsci asked: "Will not all these proletarian republics, which is what the factories occupied and run by the workers are, not be constrainslogans under which it occurs, has an ed by the force of historical development by comparison with the means employed internal tendency to transform itself into to federate and to organize in a united in the struggle to achieve them. It is precisely such an error that threatens an open revolutionary clash, into direct struggle for power(12)"
way to counterpose their own central power to the bourgeois power (15)?"
Solidarnosc today.
THE GENERAL STRIKE AND TYN INFORMACYINY THE QUESTION OF POWER ROSCE
Every large-scale revolutionary struggle, and therefore any general strike, has to be armed with an action program. In building a general strike, such a program has to be put forward. Its precise formulation and popularization play a dual role. First, only this program being taken up by the broad masses, by the whole mass movement, makes it possible to determine when the latter is really ready for a general strike. Secondly, the program makes it possible to advance the consciousness and combativity of the masses, and this plays a fundamental role in the preparation of the strike itself.
This is why, while it is correct and necessary "to organize a poll of the factories to find out when they are ready for the strike and what forms it should take (11)" - as the Warsaw Regional Executive (RKW) proposes - this is in itself insufficient. Such consultation should also be carried out with respect to the action program, that is, the immediate and transitional aims to be achieved by the strike.
Such a program must correspond to the nature of the general strike. It should obviously include all the most pressing demands of the mass movement represented by Solidarnosc. But the question has to be raised where these demands should
They can be divided into two categories - demands that can be met within the limits of the military dictatorship those that can be met within the framework of the bureaucratic dictatorship in general (military dictatorship being only one of the possible forms of the bureau-
The release of all the political prisonis conceivable, although not very likely, within the framework of the military dictatorship. The military government, feeling its grip slipping, might agree to this in order to maintain its rule.
On the other hand, the other two demands presently being put forward by
STRAIKOWY BIULETYN INFORMACYINY
#SOLIDARNOSCE
This is sort of a "law of movement" of
"The fundamental importance of the general strike, independent of the partial successes which it may and then again may not provide, lies in the fact that it poses the question of power in a revolutionary manner. By shutting down the factories, transport, and in general all the means of communication, power stations, etc., the proletariat by this very act paralyzes not only production but also the government. The state power remains suspended in midair. It must either subjugate the proletariat by famine and force and constrain it to set the apparatus of the bourgeois state once again in motion, or retreat before the proletariat (13)."
These statements also hold for bureaucratic states, although we must not forget certain special features of such regimes. The bureaucracy can resist generalized work stoppages better than the bourgeoisie because, unlike the capitalists, it is not a class integrated into the process of production but only a parasitic layer. As a result, a general strike would have to be long to break its resistance. The danger of famine, therefore, is greater.
TY INFORMACYINY
1NOS0EE
What are the conclusions to be drawn from all this? Let us go back again to Trotsky's reflections
"The leaders of the proletariat must understand this internal logic of the general strike, unless they are not leaders but dilettantes and adventurers. Politically this implies that from now on the leaders will continue to pose before the proletariat the task of the revolutionary conquest of power. If not they must not venture to speak of the general strike
This is essential to judge whether the mass movement represented by Solidarnosc is prepared to put forward and to fight consistently to achieve the demands that are necessary in any general strike.
However, all this does not mean that a general strike can achieve victory only if 10. Tygodnik Mazowsze, No. 16. 12. Leon Trotsky, op. cit., pp. 93-94. 13.Ibid., p. 100.
Trotsky, The Struggle against Fascism in Germany, New York, 1977, p. 189. 15. Antonio Gramsci, Ecrits politique, I, p. 385. France," p. 100.
relationship of forces achieved through of political democracy, such as the the military dictatorship and the rule of the bureaucracy in general are overthrown, being replaced by workers power in the cities and countryside. The general strike can lead to a partial victory, to a compromise between the state and the society. But two questions have to be taken into account.
- First, there is no way to reconcile the interests of the working class and the great majority of society with those of remain diametrically opposed. Thus there compromise" between them. Degenerate and isolated, the bureaucratic regime by its nature can only be totalitarian, and it will remain so as long as it survives. Under such a regime, the working class and the society cannot be self-managed.
Only a tactical compromise is possible, achieved, it will be the expression not of an inclination of the bureaucracy to seek a "national understanding" but only a concession to the power and determination of the mass movement. It will be the expression of a relationship of forces existing at a given moment between
La relative balance making it impossible for either to achieve total victory. It will thus be a ceasefire, and at the same time the prelude to new and violent struggles.
Such a compromise will not form the basis for any "national accord." (This is the utopian and muddled perspective put program that is circulating clandestinely in Poland(17).) The following approach is
"Let us face reality - basic democratic rights cannot be reestablished in Poland, Solidarnose cannot be rebuilt without overthrowing the dictatorship installed on Sunday, December 13. The hope for a national accord was destroyed on that day by the regime itself.
"While the idea of an accord itself has managed to survive, it can only be achieved in opposition to this regime. That is what is happening. A real national every day in the underground organizations, in the factories, the universities, the prisons, and the opinions and with different political pasts are coming together in such an accord.
"All that is lacking is a link up between these various milieus and the various regions for this accord to take on a fully national character(18)."
We agree with these remarks, are taken from the bulletin of the Interenterprise Workers Committee of Warsaw.
- Secondly, even if it does not solve the question of power - and it is probable that it will not - a general strike will pose this question forcefully. If the bureaucracy is forced by intolerable pressure to make a tactical compromise, the only way that the mass movement will be able to keep this partial victory from being wrested later from its grasp is to take proper advantage of it to transform the the struggle into a more or less advanced situation of dual power.
To build a situation of dual power -that is what is necessary to win a partial victory in the general strike, and that is the meaning that such a partial victory has. The conclusions of this have to be presented in Solidarnosc's action program for building a general
THE QUESTION OF POWER IN THE ACTION PROGRAM
The first demand that has to be included in the action program is for the release of all the activists of Solidarnose and other independent organizations whether sentenced after being tried or interned without trial.
every war," as Zbigniew Romaszewski has correctly pointed out, "even in a war waged by a government against its own people, one principle is observed - the question of prisoners has to be discussed before there can be any talk about agreements. Otherwise, any accord would be only a capitulation, capitulation all the more grave because it would weaken out most important weapon - our solidarity
The second point of the program has to be the demand for ending the state of war and therefore the military dictator-
Finally, the program has to include the demand for the reestablishment of trade-union and democratic rights in general that were won between August 1980 and December 1981. In particular, this means fully restoring the freedom of action of the independent self-managed union Solidarnosc, with its present statutes, all its democratic elected leaderships, its organizational structures, and the programmatic resolution adopted at its First National Congress of Delegates chosen by the
However, these are only immediate demands. Along with them, Solidarnose's include more demands representing the elements of a transitional program. In those demands that can be won under bureaucratic rule cannot be severed from the goal proclaimed in the political resolution of the First National Congress of Solidarnosc, the building of a self-managed republic.
Such demands cannot be isolated from the strategic aim that the Polish working class adopted after August 1980, when it took up the struggle for genuine socialism - that is, a democratic system run for the by the workers. And in this the Polish proletariat linked workers democracy and republican democracy with a genuine socialization of the major means of production. The precondition for achieving this goal is overthrowing the rule of the bureaucracy. The demands that, when achieved, will make it possible to open up the road leading to this goal must, therefore, have a place in
We think that partial gains in the realm achievement of the immediate demands already mentioned, must be complemented by at least some limited gains that will provide a basis for protecting the society from the dangers that imperil its material existence. These are gains that will make it possible to shield the society from the effects of the economic crisis and open up the way for waging an effective struggle against this crisis.
A social (working class) program for combating the crisis - for combating the spectre of famine, poverty, massive unemployment, and more generally the final collapse of our national economy - has to be, therefore, an integral part of Solidarnose's action program.
There are two social priorities today assuring full employment for all workers minimum living standard for all citizens. The achievement of these objectives must be the basic goal of social and economic planning in the near future.
The goal of production cannot be the profitability of the individual enterprise, which is an expression of the market economy, but rather the satisfaction of the most pressing social needs, which is the expression of cooperation among the
This means that it will often be necessary to maintain production in one or another plant or to start it up even when the costs of such production are higher than the average costs in a given industry. However, the real costs of production in enterprises have to be clear. The society must know how much it "pays" and why, and at the same time the total cannot exceed the sum of the income gained by the other enterprises.
The establishment of workers control over production and distribution (including over rationing, and in fact such a check was established in the fall of 1981
Solidarnose in the Lodz region), workers control over all the enterprises, has to be the axis of a program for fighting the crisis. Therefore, it should be the main demand in this part of Solidar-
In 1932, Trotsky wrote:
"In contemporary Germany, under the conditions of the present crisis, control over industry signifies control not only over the operating but also over the partoperating and shut-down industries. This pre-supposes participation in control by those workers who worked in those industries prior to their dismissal. The task must consist of setting the dead industries into motion, under the leadership of factory committees on the basis of an economic plan (20)."
Kowalski, A. Malinowski, Aout apres Decembre: programme
7277 18. CDN, No. 2. April 17, 1982. May 1982; in French in Inprecor, No. 127, May
20. Leon Trotsky, The Struggle Against Fascism
Let us be specific about the sort of plans involved:
"If it appears that in a given enterprise stopping production would benefit the society more than continuing, the workers concerned must be given the time to draw up an alternative plan. In this time, the workers, under the leadership of their council and with the involvement of the union, must develop a plan for a new kind of socially useful production, on the basis of the available machines and raw materials, so that the enterprise can resume operations and maintain the present level of employment (21)."
It is necessary, therefore, to demand the workers councils. Such councils should have the status of workers control. At the same time, since any tactical compromise is only a prelude to new struggles, they must be means for organizing the fight for self-management. They have to prepare the workers to take power in the plants and the working class as a whole to establish a system of self-management throughout industry and in commerce and all other economic activity. This involves building up a vertical structure, coordination, and cooperation, and thus democratically centralizing the self-management bodies.
Workers control is a form transitional to self-management. This is the way it was understood, to cite a Polish example, by the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). Under the influence of this party, the National Council of Ministers of the clandestine state approved, on August 1, 1944 -the the Warsaw uprising was launched - a call for plant councils (which is what they called workers councils then).
A PPS activist later wrote: "The decree on plant councils, which reflected a determination to socialize the means of production and at the same time a way of assuring this, introduced democratic principles into the internal life of the factories and the mines. It established the principle of workers participation in and supervising production. It was a first step toward workers management.
"This decree, which was drawn up in the underground, called for setting up a system of workers representation and pointed toward the introduction of a system of planned economy, which is a form of transition to socialism (22)."
The setting up of such workers control in the present conditions would mean the burgeoning of a situation of dual power in industry and in the state sector of the economy as a whole, since the system of workers control "has a contradictory character, presenting a sort of economic interregnum." (23)
The bureaucracy will no longer hold total and exclusive power over the means of production and, likewise its monopoly of power in the state will be cut into. In this respect, Trotsky wrote:
"This means that to the regime of dual power in the factories corresponds the regime of dual power in the state. 22 should not be understood mechanically, that is, not as meaning that dual power in the enterprises and dual power in the state are born on one and the same day."
In certain conditions, Trotsky writes, and we have to take into account the possibility of such conditions existing in Poland if a general strike leads to a partial victory for Solidarnosc; control of production can come considerably ahead of developed political dual power in a country (24)."
demand for workers control should be complemented by one for citizens control over the organs of local administration. Only national councils, chosen through free elections - in the beginning at least at the elementary level -can be the means of exercising such a control (and at the same time be organs of struggle for territorial self-manage.
Such a demand appears even in the Theses of the Social Council of the Primate of Poland (mimeographed, Warsaw, 1982), which take a very moderate line toward the bureaucratic regime. So, all the more, such a demand must be part of Solidarnose's action program.
Ael
SOCK
It is impossible to foresee what the relationship of forces between the regime and the society will be at the moment a general strike proves victorious. It cannot be excluded that such a strike will overthrow the rule of the bureaucracy. Nor can it be excluded that the new relationship of forces will be reflected in a large-scale situation of dual power. It is also possible that economic power -following the development of active strikes in a large number of plants — will pass into the hands of the working class and may institutionalized in the framework of a Self-Management Chamber Economic Chamber of the Diet, while at the same time political power remains in the hands of the bureaucracy. It is possible at the first only at the economic level through the growth of workers and social control in this sphere.
That is the minimum that we should seek in undertaking a general strike, that is in posing the question of power. Solidarity should fight for such control with the same energy, the same determination, the same assurance as it fights for the release of its activists, and for the reestablishment of trade-union rights.
We stress that this is the program necessary for undertaking the strike. But there is no reason why more advanced demands could not grow out of the strike itself. They could go beyond the call for workers and social control over the economy to calling for the immediate institution of workers and territorial self-management.
### SELF-DEFENCE, AGITATION
IN THE ARMY AND POLICE
FORCES, AND THE ACTIVE STRIKE
Let us now consider, apart from an action program corresponding to the laws of the general strike, what the other conditions are for the success of such a strike.
First of all, as the Solidarnosc regional leaders in Warsaw, Gdansk, and places have correctly stressed, during a organize self-defense in all the plants.
With respect to the factories affected by occupation strikes, Antonio Gramsci writes: "Military defense of the factory is the first and foremost problem confronting the citizens of the factory-state." At the same time, he noted: "The workers are prepared to accept self-defense as an obligation for all, and that is correct, but at the same time they have a tendency to think that this obligation should be met by everyone without exception and right away. This is already an error. Military defense has to be organized by special detachments (25)."
This is why the preparation for active self-defense has to go hand in hand with the setting up in the factories of detachments control of the union Solidarnoss latter must be prepared r defend the plants but to street demonstrations that ar to be staged during the strike i draw a section of the repressive forces away from the occupied factories.
During the period preparatory to the strike, the organization of the workers guards should take simple form; at least, that what is indicated experience of the workers This means small groups of three, five, or ten persons under the orders of a guard lutte pour l'autogestion des travailleurs. " Lodz. 1982, pp. 24-25. 22. Z. Zaremba, La commune de Varsovie, D. 41. 23. Leon Trotsky, op. cit., p. 77. 24.Ibid., p. 78. 25. Antonio Gramsci, op. cit., Pp. 384-385.
leader for the factory or neighbourhood and of a special cell of the Solidarnose regional or inter-enterprise committees.
Setting up company-size detachments (250 persons) will not as a general rule be possible before the strike if clandestinity is to be maintained. What is meant by clandestinity here, of course, is simply aspects of the workers guards will remain the other hand, a campaign for the formation of workers guards has to be waged openly in the union press, because both the slogan and the organizational principles and activity of the workers guards have to be known to the broad masses. During the strike, it will be necessary to form larger detachments, but it has to be kept in mind that in street confrontations groups of a limited size, ten to a hundred the latter may sometimes be grouped in battalions of around a thousand persons) are the
"The slogan calling for the formation of a workers militia, that is, self defense detachments, makes no sense in terms of a revolutionary struggle unless it means an armed militia," Trotsky wrote (26). Arming the workers guards can seem a very difficult task, but that is not so. It the consciousness is developed among the workers of the need to arm, if the urge is aroused in them to arm, a fierce determination to arm, then the conditions will be ripe for arming the workers guards.
This task, cannot, however, be left to the activists of this guard themselves. It workers guards is a task for the entire movement, because these units are just a part of the movement. The formation of the workers guards is a step toward arming the masses in general.
At the start, the workers guards will be armed in a makeshift or even primitive way. But even such crude forms of armament will be a means for acquiring real weapons when confrontation occurs with the repressive forces.
During the active defense of the enterprises that took place in some Silesian mines in December 1981, axes, swords, and pikes were made in the forges; the workers armed themselves with picks and clubs. Some of the ZOMO were killed, because the workers used fire extinguishers that propelled supercooled liquid and white-hot metal spears to defend the
The precondition for forming and arming workers guards is that the mass movement be ready to resort to force if necessary. Mass violence must not be confused with individual terrorism or the actions of small groups operating on the fringes of the mass movement or trying to substitute themselves for it.
"The fear of being suspected of terrorist tendencies (and the regime's propagandists do everything possible to equate every instance of self-defense with terrorism) sometimes paralyzes critical thought," a clandestine bulletin explains. "Fear of the spectre of terrorism made it impossible before December 1981 to form workers guards. If such units had been formed and organized in time, the authorities would have had to think twice about launching a frontal attack on the union. An attack on the disarmed workers could succeed, but it would have been a different matter if the enterprises had been prepared to defend themselves
Speaking of the military crackdown, Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, a member of the Warsaw leadership, said: "At the time, I called on people not to defend themselves in an active way. Today, I think that the situation might have developed differently, if Silesia had not been the only place where the occupied prises were defended (28)"
Another bulletin says: "In the light of what happened in December 1981, there is reason to think that if the resistance had been more active mined on the mass scale, the action of the 'forces of order' would have ended in defeat for the Military Council for National Salvation (WRON). The strikes conducted then, especially in the big plants, had the character of isolated centers of passive resistance. In most cases, when they were attacked no attempt at active self-defense was made. In such a situation, it was not difficult to break them one after the other in a few days time.
"The examples of the Wujek mine and the street clashes in Gdansk show that where the resistance was active, it was not easy to break it (Wujek was not taken; left isolated, it surrendered). If the resistance had been everywhere, the military would not have had the forces to move in simultaneously in a number of places, and the attitude of the soldiers would also have been different.
"On the basis of the fragmentary information we have, it is clear that if the soldiers did not point their guns in the the way the situation developed, could this have been hoped for?), in many cases, nonetheless, soldiers and even officers expressed unhappiness about what was happening, WRON itself avoided using directly against the workers. things might have happened if there had been real confrontations on a mass scale
But would not active self-defense of the enterprises have provoked the repressive apparatus? A clandestine bulletin offers a good answer to this question: "Pogroms such as the slaugher of peaceful demonstrators in Cracow show in fact that the authorities have no need of pretexts to use physical terror. If they want, they create such pretexts themselves, without any help or prompting. To the contrary, in those places regime ran into a determined counter-attack (in particular in the big factories), there was little or no repression after the May 1982 demonstrations. The language of force is the only one the dictatoria regime understands (30)."
The argument of all those who think that armed workers guards should not be formed because they could not stand up against a modern army anyway is only pseudorealistic. In fact, the task of the workers guards is not to defeat the army, or even to repel its attacks on the occu-
The main enemy, 1981 repressive operations showed, are the ZOMO. They have been not only designed and specially trained for fighting the workers. Their task is also to separate the soldiers from the workers in every case where it becomes necessary to bring in the army in order to block any linkup between the soldiers and the workers.
As an advanced detachment of the mass movement and the entire working class, the workers guards have to be able to stand up to the ZOMO, to acquire modern weapons in the course of these and thereby keep the ZOMO from blocking fraternization Solidarnosc and the soldiers.
The guards have to appear as a fighting force that could be joined by units of the army. This process could begin with units refusing to fire on the workers. After that, they could come to realize the they could not go halfway but would have to active support to the fighting
Zbigniew Romaszewski is right when
"It is sufficient for a battalion to refuse to fire ... That is what happened in February 1917, when a small Cossack unit went over to the side of the demonstrators, and then, a month later, the czar was gone (31)."
The task of the workers guards is not - or at least not primarily - to fight against the army but, to the contrary, to
Another important precondition the success of the general strike, one intimately linked to that described previously, is to win over the army and the police through consistent agitation within their
Many things will be determined by the political work Solidarnose directs at the soldiers and police - how widespread the revolutionary ferment is in their ranks; the extent to which the ranks begin to waver between obeying the junta and falling in behind the mass movement; the likelihood of units going over to the agitation cannot be limited to convincing the soldiers and police what side of the barricades the children of the working people should be on. It must explain to the soldiers and police the aims, and action program of Solidarnosc. It must, impetus to the struggle within the army
"La guerre et la IVe Internationale," Oeuvres, t. IV, EDI, Paris, 1979, p. 78. 27. Druk, No. 13, June 19, 1982. 28. Tygodnik Mazowsze, No. 13. 29. Wolna Mysl, No. 4, 1982. 30. Druk, No. 13. 31. Tygodnik Mazowsze, No. 16.
23
and police forces for demands specific to these bodies, with the aim of defending the rights, dignity, as well as the material and moral interests of those soldiers and police.
Such agitation promote the raising of demands within the repressive apparatus for progressive reforms in the system of defense and the upholding of public order. If such demands are put forward in the army and police Solidarnosc should actively support them and include them in its action program.
Finally, Solidarnose should call for the soldiers and councils as organs of struggle for rights of members of these forces and to coordinate the activity of the democratic movement within them. The union Solidarnosc such bodies. Today already, following the example of the URSUS tractor factory in Warsaw, it is necessary to form Solidarnosc worker-soldier commissions.
within the army and police forces. In 1981, for a few months, organizing committees for a policemen's union were already showing up. But what is needed now is just a resumption of the struggle these committees started. It is also necessary now to fight for the right of soldiers to organize in an independent union. There is nothing unusual about this. Such work is done in many Western armies and even coordinated internationally by those involved in it. Some workers unions support this activity. In fact, since 1966, a union has operated quite legally in the Dutch army, the National Soldiers Union (VVDM). Solidarnosc should introduce the democratic concept in Poland that soldiers have a right to organize in
The last precondition for a successful general strike that we want to discuss here is preparing the union to move on to an active strike. In no mass movement in history, probably, did the notion and tactic of the active strike have the sort of popularity it did in Solidarnose in the fall and the beginning of the winter of 1981. This represents considerable capital already accumulated by the Polish revolution, which cannot be left unutilized in the building of a general strike. Drawing on, and enriching the experience of a not number of Solidarnose plant organizations and some regional leaderships that were then beginning to make preparations for an active strike can offer a good point of departure today.
As we know an active strike involves the striking workers resuming production under the control or leadership of strike committees. The control these strike committees must not be conproduction but also extend to the distribution of the goods produced during the strike.
If the strike is to be really a general involved in it go over immediately to an active strike. In the event of a general
"exceptions" not contravene the principle that all
First Solidarnosc congress 1981 (DR) should strike, if the "exceptional" plants go on an active strike.
We have already had a partial active
August 1980, when certain plants that were in the MKS (Interenterprise Strike Committee) maintained production that was socially necessary useful for the needs of the strike itself. For this, they got special authorization from the MKS.
THE INTERNATIONAL IMPACT
OF THE POLISH GENERAL STRIKE
Like all workers revolutions, the Polish revolution is national in its international in its content. Consciousness of this has been developing in Solidarnose, as is shown by the tendency to assume the symbols of the international workers movement. long ago, Solidarnose reclaimed for itself
Polish working class, the May usurped for its own purposes for decades. "In Poland," a clandestine bulletin wrote, "the enemies of the people rule by cynically waving the red flag. All we have to do is take the red flag away from them and they were exposed for what they are -exploiters and tyrants (32)."
"From the outset, the Polish crisis has gone beyond the borders of Poland," another bulletin says. This is why the anonymous activist who wrote that says, "it was necessary from the beginning to clearly explain the meaning of our conflict and the goals of our struggle, which is the same struggle that was begun by the German workers in 1953, continued by
Hungarian workers 1956, which spread to Czechoslovakia in 1968, and which we waged in December 1970, June 1976, and August 1980
Another bulletin says:
"The most recent events in Poland have shown the context of a communist system [we would say a system of bureaucratic totalitarian rule] the correctness of Trotsky's maxim that the revolution cannot triumph in one country (and (any case not in one satellite country interpretation thinking has to be corrected. It is possible for a revolution to win in one country, although difficult. What is not possible is to complete the building of a self-
At the time of the general strike, consciousness of the international character of the Polish revolution will be more necessary than ever. In fact, such a strike will be a dramatic call to awaken the workers and the societies as a whole that are subject to the same totalitarian rule in the other East European countries and 32.Tygodnik Stanu Wojennego, No. 7, April
No. 1, April 19, 1982.
in the USSR, and it will become the model for the workers in the capitalist countries in their struggle to liberate
Solidarnose may still find itself waiting for the response of the workers in the East when it has already become an example for the workers in the West. In that case, it may appeal to the latter to respond to the general strike in Poland by stepping up and extending work that many of them are already doing, and to link this still more to their own struggle. In fact, international workers solidarity with the general strike of the Polish workers can prove to be an important factor in the success of such a strike.
"If there had been real mass struggles, a lot of things would have been possible. But the defeat of the junta would almost certainly have led to armed intervention by the Warsaw Pact forces. After a struggle whose duration is hard to predict the freedom movement would have drowned in blood (35)." This opinion is widespread in Solidarnosc. Here it relates to December 1981. But this same fear could come up in connection with a general strike involving active self-defense of the enterprises.
This, however, is a very one-sided way of looking at the problem. Even an erosion of bureaucratic power resulting from a prolonged "war of position" -assuming that that were really possible -could lead to Soviet military intervention. But, while a danger, such intervention cannot be considered certain for many reasons, including those cited by Zbigniew Romaszewski in an interview he gave on the preparations for the general strike. (36).
The problem has to be put in a different way. The bureaucratic regime is already threatened and will continue to be. In December 1981, it played its last domestic card, the repressive apparatus, without managing to stabilize its rule over the society. That is, it did not accomplish the task it set for itself and which had been set for it by its masters in the Kremlin.
If only for this reason, the danger of Soviet intervention has increased. The military dictatorship "now holds only one card. It can appeal for fraternal aid from the Soviet Union. But playing that card is not up to the junta alone. That decision is conditioned by the geo-political strategy of its *Big Brother' who, fortunately, at the moment has other things to think about (37)." These preoccupations of the Kremlin bureaucracy are both in the Soviet Union itself and in its camp. Internally, the difficulty is the growth of an economic and social crisis. But there also are external problems, to cite only Afghanistan, where the breadth of the resistance is forcing Moscow to commit a not inconsiderable military potential there.
Instead of hiding our heads in the sand, we must answer the question of whether the totalitarian bureaucracy of the USSR will decide to rescue the totalitarian bureaucracy in Poland if it finds
PETER GRAHAM
MEMORIAL LIBRARY itself facing a formidable adversary. What can neutralize or at least limit the threat of Soviet intervention?
Can this threat be warded off by a Solidarnosc that is powerful but has to take refuge in passive resistance? Or can by a Solidarnose more powerful because it would be prepared to occupy the factories in. a coordinated and organised way and to fight in the streets under the leadership of an armed workers guard, and prepared finally to mount a sustained campaign of intense agitation among the Soviet soldiers, who would have nothing to gain from such a war?
The more favorable relationship forces Solidarity achieves in the general strike, the more supporters it has in the workers movements of other countries — today in the West, tomorrow also in the East - the more the bureaucratic regimes in the USSR will hesitate before sending their armies against the mass movement in Poland. If Solidarnosc had been ready defend itself actively in December 1981 and to use force, as the bulletin we quoted above says, "the regime would have had to think twice before making a frontal attack on the union."
Today, it is possible to make the totalitarian regimes in the USSR and East Europe think twice before deciding to invade Poland. This can be done by improving the relationship of forces for Solidarnosc, by a general strike and by assembling all the preconditions to assure the success of such a strike, by appealing to the workers in the West to support the strike in Poland actively and the workers in the East to follow its example. Facing the sort of enemy these regimes represent, force is the most effective means of persuasion.
PREKOR
Dnr 5 The fifth issue of Polish Inprekor is now out! Available from: Inprekor, 2 rue Richard Lenoir, 93108 Montreuil, France. Cheques payable to PEC. Individual copies 1 US dollar, £0.50 Sterling. Yearly subscription: 12 US dollars, £6.00 Sterling. 35.Ibid. 36. Tygodnik Mazowsze. No. 16 37. Druk, No. 12, May 31, 1982
BUILDING THE
WORLD PARTY OF
SOCIALISTS