BARSEBACK'S ROLE IN THE ANTINUCLEAR MOVEMENT Why has the opposition to Barseback assumed a special Danish and Swedish antinuclear move-
This power plant is located in cities-Malmo, the country's third largest city, Lund, Helsingborg, Landskrona. is also close to Demark and to Copenhagen, the country's capital and main population center. Because of this particularly bad location, Barseback is one of the world's most extensively studied nuclear plants. In 1977, an investigation carried out by the U.S. safety expert Robert Pollard showed that the second Barseback reactor would not have been allowed to begin operations in the U.S.A. Five of its vital systems failed to meet the standards of the American Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
On April 13, 1979, a generator at the plant broke down due to bad con-
This incident gave rise to a new investigation, in which, among other things, comparisons were made with the accident at the Three-Mile Island plant in
Improvements in safety were called for. These continual improvements are costly. At the same time, they reduce the accessibility of the nuclear reactors. Thus, they undermine the economic viability of the Barseback plant and of nuclear power in general in a twofold way. Swedish and Danish autorities to the Barseback question has been to try to cover up the problems. marked by secrecy and delaying tacties.
introduced a resolution that Demark ask the Swedish government to shut down Barseback. Before the debate and vote on this proposal, all the available facts on Barseback were supposed to be presented.
. co be three reports-one by a Der u-Swedish committee on safety in the plant, an emergency plan for Denmark, specially the Copenhapen region; an assessment of the consequences of a serious accident for Demark by a pollution-study group.
These three reports were later complemented in March 1982 by a report on meterological conditions and what effects these would have in the event of an acci-
The publication of the first three reports was delayed for a long When they did finally come out, the following conclusions were presented. On Security
1. The Three-Mile Island accident could not be repeated at Barseback because the reactors there are not steam driven but water driven, and that error that was made in the U.S. was easier to avoid.
2. That the safety measures taken by the Swedes were satisfactory.
3. Nonetheless, these safety measures had to be seen as elementary, since total safety could not be assured. On the Danish Contingency Plan
1. A revised emergency plan went into effect on October 1, 1981, based on the forces that already existed in the socity to deal with an emergency-the police, civil defense, etc. It was important to be prepared, the report said, but this plan could in no way guarantee total safety in the event of an accident.
Regarding the probability and consequences of a serious accident: There was one chance in six million every year of the worst conceivable accident. Such an accident, moreover, would not have
There would be a maximum 24,000 deaths from cancer in a thirty year period after the accident, 1,500 birth defects, and 19,000 other cases of "genetic damage." adjudged quite low, and could, moreover, be reduced by shielding against radioactishielding could not prevent all radioactive
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One of the professors who participated in the preparation of the pollution report reserved judgement about its conclusions. He argued that "on several points" the report represented "an underestimation of the environmental effects," that there was an attempt to minimize the problem.
The O0A also presented strong arguments that the report gave an overly optimistic picture, that Barseback represented a direct threat to all of Denmark. Every city in the country would be hit by radioactive fallout from an accident. Antinuclear power demonstration in Sweden (DR) While it has no nuclear power industry of its own, the country could be forced to evacuate its capital and leave it abandoned for years.
Taking 1 Rem per thirty years as the danger mark, the criterion established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Ageney, it is clear that sections of the population not only in Denmark but in Britain, France, Union, could be affected by an accident. In all, if the weather conditions were unfavorable, an area of 190,000 square kilometers could be hit.
The O0A argued that the Danish Emergency plan offered no guarantees that the "normal emergency facilities" could be put into operation in the event of an accident and function under those conditions. For example, in Copenhagen bus drivers and nursing personnel at the Royal Hospital have announced that they are not prepared to participate in an evacuation, because the protection for workers is inadequate. They are demanding that Barseback be shut down. In general, the evacuation plans are highly inadequate.
Finally, the OOA made the following general comment: In the two years of its existence, the Swedish-Danish Committee have juggled the facts presented in earlier reports, made a political judgment of them, and come to far more positive positions about Barseback and its safety conditions than the original reports. (The fact that this report was clearly political has not kept the Danish environmental authorities from saying whenever negative facts about Barseback come to light that it is not their job to make political assessments.)
Against the background of the three reports described above and a growing sensitivity of Danish public opinion on the question, Danish minister of the environment Erik Holst sent a written communication to the Swedish government in which he said that now that there had been a compilation of material about Barseback an assessment of it could be made.
Even if the likelihood of an accident is extremely small, Holst wrote, the impact of one would be very grave on public health and life in Copenhagen. Moreover, it would have both "material and psychological effects" on Danish food productions. So, continuing study of the plant was necessary. He proposed setting up a Swedish-Danish Commission, which would undertake a further evalua12 tion of the available material, on the basis of the guidelines laid down by the Scandinavian Environmental Convention.
On March 25, the OOA commented on Holst's action. "The environmental minister's letter is an important opening on the side of the Danish government, but there must be some guarantee that this will not be another coverup maneuver." But a coverup was precisely what it was, since there was no clarification of the commission's political objectives in Holst's letter. The OOA stressed that further technical research was unnecessary.
The fact that this letter was a cover-up maneuver was made even clearer in June when the Swedish government finally answered. The task of the commission was to be continued calculation of the risk ratio.
The OA's response to this was quite sharP «unacceptable and arrogant, Labor Minister Eliasson's answer was The Danish concerns, opinions, and pro. tests were ignored. Why investigate what has already been investigated? " Shut down Barseback now! Similar criticisms and arguments came from the Swedish Miljoforbund (Environmental Associa-
No matter how the Danish environminister's letter is evaluated, it represents about the strongest diplomatic move that can be made concerning the internal affairs of another country. Thus, it represents an important opening and more than sufficient reason for new initiatives in the fight against Barseback.
Are there grounds for taking up this question internationally?
"Considering the scope and geographical extent of the problems that would follow an accident at Barseback, it is clear that this question is not a Swedish domestic problem that has also aroused the concern of a lot of Danish citizens. The clearest example is the danger of early deaths among the populations of other countries and the possibilities that it might force the evacuation of large areas and cities. But the problems also involve judgments of what is an acceptable risk. As Goran Eklof, a leading antinuclear activist and leading member of the SP, said during the campaign for a "no" vote in the referendum on nuclear power:
"The Swedish authorities have up till now taken the position that the risks arising to the Swedish people from Barseback and other nuclear power plants are acceptable, in view of the advantages these power plants offer. This is already an imposition on the large section of the Swedish people that does not share this
But even if the Swedish people unanimously risks, the Swedish government does not have the right to decide for other peoples. Even if the Swedish referendum is taken to be a democratic expression of the people's will, the fact is that the majority of those who would be affected by an accident at Barseback, that is the population of the Copenhagen region, have no voice in the referendum. As long as the Swedish authorities reject the Environmental Protection Agency's norm that 1 Rem every thirty years is the maximum permissible dose for a population, and instead accept Rasmussen's maximum or another higher one, they are making decisions for the people in more than a dozen European countries. There is no reason to believe that these people accept a higher level of risks, especially since they get none of the benefits we see from nuclear power. Naturally it can be argued that these countries also threaten us by their nuclear power plants, but that does not hold in the case of Denmark, which has none and is most concerned."
But there are also totally "domes tic" reasons for the antinuclear movements in other countries to pay special attention to the Barseback question now.
SP members active in the Swedish Miljoforbund have made an assessment that the question of the future of nuclear power may be decided relatively soon, particularly in the case of Sweden but also internationally. The nuclear power programs of the various countries show a converging tendency. In some countries nuclear power is not working well, in others the development of it is slowing the resolution of a few pressing questions (which can be expected to be settled in the near future) can be decisive for the industry. Such questions are the French nuclear energy program and its final form and the question of Barseback. The nuclear power companies operate on an international scale. So, it is important for the antinuclear movement to as well.
The August 28 Barseback march was the first in a long time organized jointly by the Swedish and Danish environmental movements. It is essential to build wider and wider international opposition to the Barseback plant.
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