NICARAGUA The Central America peace accord THE HISTORY and context of the Central American peace accord, signed August 8 in Guatemala, are described in the following article from Panorama, a quarterly magazine published in Mexico City, which specializes in the affairs of the Central American and Caribbean region. ROBERTO BARDINI O N NOVEMBER 7, peace could be established in Central America if the weapons of dialogue get the upper hand over the dialogue of weapons. That is the day when the "Procedure for establishing a firm and durable peace" approved by the five Central American presidents at their second meeting in Esquipulas in Guatemala on August 7-8 is supposed to go into affect.
This accord - signed by Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala — provides that within 90 days a process of cease-fire, amnesty, suspension of foreign military aid and internal democratization is to take place within the region.
An international commission including representatives of the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela), the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations is to monitor compliance with the plan and its follow up.
Thus, the four years of diplomatic efforts by the Contadora Group seem to have borne fruit. This negotiating body was formed on the island of Panama on 17 January 1983, and during its 56 September 28, 1987 • International Viewpoint
NICARAGUA months of existence it has given impetuș to 30 meetings of Central American foreign ministers and deputy foreign ministers. In September 1985, it presented a "Treaty of Peace and Collaboration" for the region. Of the 100 points it contained, 97 were approved.
The three points left open dealt with the most controversial questions — arms reduction and inspection, the mechanisms for surveillance and following up on military maneuvers and political security.
During this time, the United States, the most notable absentee from the negotiating table and the main actor in the conflict, exercised an influence from a distance through El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica. In June 1985, the Contadora Group's diplomatic talks seemed to have reached an impasse. And in January 1987, the social-democratic president of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, proposed an alternative peace project, known as the "Arias Plan."
However, this latest proposal did not succeed. Initially, it provided for a summit meeting in Central America for June 25-26. But on the request of the Christian-democratic president of El Salvador, Jose Napoleon Duarte, this meeting was suspended.
On this question, Salvador Samoya, a representative of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and of the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) of El Salvador, told Panorama: "At the start, the Arias Plan was aimed against Nicaragua. It tried to open up a political space within the country for the contras at a time when the White House was going through the the arms sales to Iran scandal. But subsequently the game turned around, and the result was a symmetry that was not to the taste of the United States." Contradictions of US policy in Central America
Samoya continued: "What they wanted for Nicaragua — legalization of the contras within the country — they did not want for El Salvador with the FMLN-FDR. What they demanded from the Sandinista government — new elections — they did not want for the regime of Napoleon Duarte. And what they also wanted for Nicaragua, a ceasefire, did not suit them in El Salvador."
The symmetry between the contras and the FMLN obviously got in the way of Washington's plans. On July 19, on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the Sandinista revolution, President Daniel Ortega said: "The government of the United States has rejected Arias' proposal, which no one could call leftist. That gives you an idea of 18 Reagan's obsession — he does not 'want to move out of the White House International Viewpoint @ September 28, 1987
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NCY and leave a free Nicaragua behind him."
But if the Arias Plan did not suit Washington, the accord signed at Esquipulas II is still less to likely to. On August 16, Frank Carlucci, White House security advisor, announced that regardless of the Guatemala accords, the United States would continue its aid and support for the contras until they can "exchange their guns for ballots." The American government, Carlucci said, "has the goal of achieving the establishment of a genuine democracy in Nicaragua."
Two days later, the US ambassadors accredited to the five Central American countries concerned issued a communiqué expressing "the deep concern of the United States regarding the Guatemala accord." [Quotes re-translated from Spanish.] Before it could be applied, the US diplomats specified, Nicaragua would have to stop getting military aid from Cuba and the Soviet Union, put a stop to its "programs of subversion" in the region and set up a plan for "genuine and full democratization." In short, it was the same old line.
On August 19, a New York Times editorial indicated that "the new peace initiative in Central America obliges the Sandinista leaders and President Reagan to chose between the perspective of more fighting and the risks of peace: Mr. Reagan has every practical reason to choose the diplomatic road to peace." The paper even considered that the Guatemala accord could be "the last chance."
All the governments concerned with the conflict in Central America saw it that way. On August 20, the five ministers of foreign affairs held a two-day meeting after signing a seven-point accord that is to be the framework for implementing the initial stages of the regional peace treaty signed in Guatemala. The next meeting was to be held in Nicaragua on September 20.
On August 21, 13 Latin American ministers of foreign affairs (five from Central America, four from the Contadora Group and four from the Supporting Group) met in Caracas to draw up blueprints for monitoring the accords and inspecting compliance with them. These ministers had not met since June 1986.
But once again, diplomatic advances were obstructed by a new initiative by President Ronald Reagan, who, with the agreement of the Democratic Party, put forward a series of "nonnegotiable" points, which were outside the Esquipulas II accords and amounted to preconditions for applying these agreements, which were to go into force on November 7. These points were the following:
Any cease-fire in the region has to be acceptable to the contras, and "humanitarian aid" to the antiSandinistas will continue during the negotiations.
### "Soviet and Cuban presence"
• The "Soviet and Cuban presence" in Nicaragua will be considered as a "direct threat" to the national security of the United States.
• Democracy in Nicaragua is also linked to the security of the United States. Before 1990, there must be an electoral commission not controlled by the Sandinistas.
• The United States will gradually suspend "humanitarian aid" to the contras as they are integrated into Nicaraguan society.
• Any suspension of US military maneuvers in Central America has to be understood as "demonstration of good faith" to aid the process of negotiation.
As the White House sees it, any negotiations are the result of its own pressures. Sol Linowitz, former United States representative to the OAS, expressed clearly his view of the Latin American attitude toward Washington's policy. "There is a lot of scepticism about our intentions," he was to say. In fact, the history of Washington's interventions and its diplomatic prevarications speaks volumes, and these habits have not changed.
Some small comments are still more illustrative. In April 1985, when the US representative presented a "peace" plan for Nicaragua, the Nicaraguan minister of foreign affairs, Miguel d'Escoto was to say 24 hours later: "President Reagan has simply said, 'Either they die, or I'll kill them'." *