A year of debate in and alliances are tightly opposed regarding the USMD
[US-Marcos Dictatthe Communist orship] plan and are prepared to boycott the snap election.
Party
In the middle, the anti-fascist and liberal democratic organizations that are based in Metro-
DURING THE last year, International Viewpoint has
Manila are divided reported on the debates in the Filipino left.' The following on the issue of article reviews some fundamental discussions that participation
OI boycott."
emerged in 1986 in the Communist movement.
The formation of
It is based on many conversations with activists belonging the Corazon Aquino/ to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), and other Salvador Laurels cated by the party leadership and the unexpected fall of Marcos to extend the debate abruptly to the organization as a whole.
By the stubborn fight that it put up for nearly 15 years against the martial law regime, the CPP radical organizations. In addition, a certain number of CPP internal documents have become public over the past few months, thereby enabling us to comment on them.? We cannot claim to offer a complete and balanced picture of the positions expressed within the CPP. But the new information on the critical balance sheet drawn by the CPP of February 1986 merits taking another look at this question. A forthcoming article will look at the tandem "only shows the prevalence of conservative directions in the bourgeois oppositions' side." Nonetheless, "there is disagreement in the majority of the anti-fascist and progressive organizations of the middle forces in the law regime, ine urt did more than any other political formation to prepare the way for the anti-dictatorial uprising evolution of the debates in the Filipino left in 1987.
urban centers.... Despite the conviction of rightness and
DALI PETITJEAN
PAUL PETITJEAN morality of the boycott of the snap wanted to get a step ahead of the rapidly growing democratic movement. Tightly controlled by the dictatorship, these elections left no chance for the opposition, since martial law could always be imposed as a last resort.
The snap election was also an answer to American concerns: "It is clear that US imperialism backs up Marcos to stay in power until 1992....The bourgeois opposition is encouraged to take part in the election in order to legitimize it, and consequently, in order to continue to secure the cooperation of the reactionary anti-Marcos and bourgeois reformists in the plans and programs of US imperialism in the Philippines.
Differences within the legal opposition
"The US intention is to give a chance to Marcos' reactionary rivals to share in the power and privileges that have long been monopolized by the fascist camp....This way, the transition is neatly paved in the event that Marcos dies or is in the future expediently removed....
"The legal opposition is divided into three camps. The conservative bourgeois parties are in favor and are participating in the election. The foremost progressive mass organizations election, the majority [of them] have the apprehension that a boycott will result in...isolation from the masses. Because of this, [most of them] called for participation. There was also temporary hesitation on the side of the progressive mass organizations and alliances."
For several months, the snap election would dominate the political life of the country, the EC-CC noted. It 1. See Paul Petitjean, "After the election: reassessment in the revolutionary left," International Viewpoine 100, June 2, 1986; "The trajectory of the left forces that supported Cory Aquino's campaign," IV103, July 14, 1986; "Communist Party makes a self-criticism," IV 102, June 30, 1986.
All the themes taken up in that series of articles are not tackled again here, such as the very important one of the united front. We should note, however, that the discussion on this subject has continued in the Philippines and among Filipino emigrés, as attested by a virulent article by E. San Juan Jr., "New dangers, new opportunities, revolutionary struggle in the Philippines," Forward Motion, January-February 1987. 2. The documents referred to have either been rather widely disseminated outside the CPP or have already been quoted or presented in the legal or underground press. 3. The Political Bureau and the Executive Committee are two different bodies. The PB has perhaps three times more members than the EC. Both are responsible
1 to the Central Committee. The initials in Tagalog, the Filipino language, of the EC-CC are KT-KS, and are sometimes found in this form in documents in English. 4. This circular is in Tagalog. This is a non-official translation.
9 5. President Corazon Aquino was put up by the Laban (Combat) coalition originally launched by her deceased husband; while Vice-President Salvador Laurel was the candidate of the conservative coalition, UNIDO.
June 29, 1987 • International Viewpoint of February 1986. Nonetheless, while hundreds of thousands, then millions, of people were coming into the streets demanding the resignation of dictatorpresident Marcos, the party found itself pushed to the sidelines.
Call for an active boycott
In view of these events, the CPP leadership called on all the units of the party to discuss the reasons for this costly setback. Three months later, the CPP Political Bureau adopted an initial self-critical balance sheet of the policy that had been adopted in December 1985 in the name of the party by the Executive Committee of the Central Committee (EC-CC).3
The EC-CC had defined its position on the presidential elections in an internal circular addressed to "all party units" dated December 23, 1985.4 Calling for an active boycott, it responded to the arguments by the many people in the CPP warning the leadership against the danger of isolation. After the fall of Marcos, this document was at the center of the internal controversy in the party.
The calling of a snap presidential election was, the EC-CC said, "a new maneuver" by the regime. Marcos was trying to gain a new legitimacy, and
PHILIPPINES was "a good opportunity to thoroughly and effectively expound the Party's revolutionary program....The people will see the true nature of Marcos' rivals and the irrelevance of their promises and actions. The deceptions and antipeople objectives of US imperialism will be clearly exposed. On the other hand, there is also a big danger that a large number of people can be pulled over to bourgeois reformism, especially within the ranks of the middle forces in the urban centers.... "The election will only be a show"
"Considering all these elements, the Party's most suitable and correct tactic on the snap election is: to launch the strong boycott campaign....Combine this with other tactical political and economic struggles in order to orient all the facets of the people's struggle against the fascist dictatorship means of a boycott campaign, tactical sector and multi-sectoral struggles, urban and rural guerrilla warfare." (The document went on to specify that this did not include attacks on the polling stations on election day.)
There were four fundamental questions for this boycott tactic. First, participating would be playing into the hands of the regime's maneuver and fooling the people. Secondly, the dictatorship controlled the electoral game, and the revolutionary movement could not change it in any way. "Not one of the minimum demands for a 'clean and honest' election put forward by the progressive legal opposition was granted. This only goes to show that nothing can be expected of the election. The results are determined. The election will only be a show. No gain can be made by the people and the revolutionary movement by participating in this scheme.
"Third, not one of their candidates, nor parties of theirs carries a true program of national and democratic content. Marcos' reactionary rivals cannot be counted upon in promoting the fundamental national and democratic interests of the people. What they truly represent are their own reactionary and factional interests...and, if we participate together with them, we will only become mere supporters of the antiMarcos reactionaries in a revival of bourgeois reformism. In short, participation in the snap election is contrary to the fundamental interest of the peo2 ple and the revolution.
"Fourth, the fundamental and foremost duty of the revolutionary move0 ment is to enlighten the people and Cred ways to the show them the correct way of action and struggle. There is no basis to the fear held by a few, that we might be International Viewpoint • June 29, 1987 isolated from the people, as the majority will still vote, whatsoever we do....Even now the majority lof the people] can see through the true nature and aim of the snap election."
In these conditions, it was necessary to accept "the temporary alienation and separation of allies who take the side of participation and support for the conservative bourgeois opposition." The electoral period "is also a preparation for a broad anti-dictatorship protest and mass campaign after the snap election."
The EC-CC's position had the strength of coherence, and presented in an apparently rigorous way the revolutionary point of view against an election controlled by the dictatorship, manipulated by imperialism, and in which even the legal opposition camps were dominated by bourgeois forces. Nonetheless, none of the expectations voiced in this circular came to pass. The mobilization of the population behind democratic demands upset all the projected scenarios, and transformed the election campaign into a vast anti-dictatorial struggle.
Thus, far from giving the regime a "new mandate," the election exposed all the contradictions of the dictatorship and of American policy.
No one had really foreseen what was going to happen. But many people both inside and outside of the CPP had understood as early as the end of 1985 that the February 7, 1986, presidential election was not going to be any ordinary election, and that it was necessary to analyze it as an important phase in the fight against the dictatorship.
The political climate was explosive. Contrary to what the EC-CC affirmed, resistance to the boycott was expressed not only in Manila.
A substantial public self-criticism
The failure of the boycott campaign rapidly became so glaring that the regional leaderships de facto applied the policy advocated by the EC-CC in different ways in many places such as Negros, Mindanao, Cebu and Ilocos. In fact, it seems that in most cases it was precisely where the boycott campaign was most vigorously waged, as in Manila (where the mass organizations actively campaigned for the boycott, organizing street demonstrations and caravans of vehicles in the suburbs or of boats on the Pasig river°) that the isolation of the National Democratic forces was most serious.? It was a severe trial for a movement whose mass base is estimated in millions and not, as it was ten years ago, in thousands.
In May 1986, a public self-criticism appeared in Ang Bayan, the journal of the Central Committee of the CPP. The self-criticism was substantial: "in all those 17 years [since its creation], the Party and the revolutionary forces that it leads have contributed tremendously to exposing, isolating and weakening the regime, leading to its downfall. Yet, when the people saw in the February 7 snap presidential election a chance to deliver a crippling blow to the Marcos regime, a memorandum by the EC-CC saw it merely as a 'noisy and empty political battle' among factions in the ruling classes. And when the aroused and militant moved spontaneously but resolutely to oust the hated regime last February 2225, the Party and its forces were not there to lead them. In large measure the Party and its forces were on the sidelines, unable to lead or influence the hundreds of thousands of people who moved....This was because of the Party's official policy enunciated by the EC-CC to launch an active and vigorous boycott campaign [which] was based — as events showed — on an incorrect reading of the political situation. A recent assessment conducted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee characterized the boycott policy as a major tactical blunder.
struggle agains Marcos "Climax of the people's
The EC-CC, noted the Political Bureau, overestimated the Americans' capacity to control local politics, underestimated the determination of the bourgeois reformists, failed to realize the extent of the contradictions being expressed within the army and "above all these, misread the people's deep anti-fascist sentiments and readiness to go beyond the confines of the electoral process in their determination to end the fascist dictatorship. As practice subsequently showed...the election and the major events it unleashed constituted the climax of the people's long drawn out struggle against the Marcos regime....This being the case, it was tactically necessary for the revolution6. The national democratic movement did not manage to attract more than a few thousand activists to the demonstrations for the boycott (5-10,000 at most), while hundreds of thousands mobilized against the dictatorship and responded to appeals from Aquino. 7. The name "national democrat" is given to the legal, semi-legal, or clandestine movement that identifies with the program of national democratic revolution proposed by the CP. 8. "Party conduct assessment, says boycott policy was wrong," editorial in Ang Bayan, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, May 1986, pp. 1-3. This self-criticism was already presented in the July 30 issue of Insernational Viewpoine, before the full text of this document was available. 9. Ang Bayan, op. cil, p.1. The final words of this quotation are in fact "major political blunder," but a correction appeared in the following issue of Ang Bayan noting that there had been a translation error, and that in accordance with the Tagalog original it should have read "major tactical blunder."
ary forces to participate critically in the snap election in order to effectively combine and make use of all forms of struggle, march at the head of the politically active masses, and maintain flexibility and an active position • in the face of the fast-changing situation. Only by doing so could the revolutionary forces have maximized their political and military capability and reaped the optimum gains for the revolution under the prevailing circumstances.
"The boycott policy forfeited all these....This showed an insufficient understanding of the tasks of political leadership during such a time, as well as a lack of appreciation of the current level of mass participation in revolutionary struggles, and confusion regarding the actual needs of the revolutionary armed struggle...
"While we missed out on important political as well as military opportunities, and suffered other negative effects as a result of our erroneous boycott policy, the fact remains that the events of last February represented a great victory for our people and for their struggles towards genuine freedom and democracy."
While Ang Bayan's self-critical article ended on an optimistic note ("the future is bright"), it called for developing a "democratic spirit" in the party in order to carry forward the discussion. Debate had in fact already started in the ranks of the CPP in the aftermath of the February experience, but in a fragmented and localized way. In May, however, the first issue appeared of a very original discussion magazine, Praktika. It offered its readers a selection of articles from the CPP's internal discussion.
Debate on the boycott policy continues
This printed and rather widely circulated magazine is published under the auspices of a regular party body involved in urban work.1° The first issue, dated May 14, 1986, essentially reprinted documents written shortly after the overthrow of the dictatorship criticizing the boycott policy. It also included an interesting article on the lessons of the crisis of the Communist Party of Thailand. The second issue, dated August 1986, continued the debate on the boycott policy by publishing contradictory articles. In that issue, there was also the beginning of a discussion on the nature of the Aquino regime and an analysis of the Salvadorian experience.
Praktika was published with the agreement of the national leadership of the CPP. In its introduction to the first issue, the editorial board noted that it was necessary to freshen up the party's
PHILIPPINES
Reagan and Marcos (DR) theoretical thinking:
"Correct political alignments and correct tactics, and new tasks and new methods of work must be grasped. In order to win, therefore, revolutionary theory must always be apace with the fully and rapidly unfolding revolutionary situation. Such is the challenge facing the Party and the entire revolutionary movement at present."
The magazine is presented as a "school" of revolutionary theory, a "forum" open to debate, a "channel" for disseminating balance sheets of practical experiences, a "guide" for deepening the study of Marxist theory. It is directed at party members and cadres in the urban centers and "national democrats," people who are not party members but who are nonetheless interested in Marxism.
In the second issue, an editorial entitled "Party Policy and Democracy" was published. The reception given to Praktika was very positive, the editors note, "however, several quarters have expressed concern over the current situation in the Party." Some people feared disunity at a time when reaction was doing everything possible to exploit the differences being expressed in the CPP.
While defending the necessary iron unity" of the party, the editorial stressed how important it was to cultivate internal democracy. In fact, until now "the Party's tradition in active and healthy ideological discussions and debates involving the majority of its membership has not fully developed."
There was a rich ideological life in every activist unit, but "the instruments of ideological struggle" were "grossly under-utilized" on the national level (that is, in exchanges between the national leadership and the membership, among the various party bodies, etc).
"In these areas, bureaucratism, sectarianism and commandism still hound the Party, most especially in the leadership at different levels and in the interactions of different committees."
There were historical reasons for that. The party's underground existence imposed the norms of functioning. In its 18-year history, the CP had not made any major error, and therefore the need for extensive ideological debate was not directly felt. In the past, internal political conflicts were badly handled, and no serious balance sheet was made in this regard. In fact, there was still a lot of theoretical work to be done. The lessons of very rich practical experiences have not been sufficiently reflected upon. So, it was necessary to take this opportunity for education.
"After all, this is the first major case of an error of policy that directly affected and animated the majority of the membership." While respecting party policy and centralism, it was necessary to develop internal democracy. It was necessary to learn to discuss the actual substance of the question and not supposed hidden intentions. It was necessary to understand how to carry on a discussion in a framework of mutual respect.
### Internal democracy becomes a sensitive issue
It is not surprising that the theme of internal democracy became so sensitive after the boycott campaign. Several proposals were put forward within the CPP leadership about the policy to be followed with respect to the presidential election. The body responsible for publishing Praktika itself presented an alternative tactical orientation combining a propagandistic (educational) campaign for a boycott with an active campaign against electoral fraud and terrorism." The (unitary and mass) "alliances" were to stick to unmasking electoral manipulation.
In this way, the revolutionary movement could support the democratic demands of the masses and preserve unity and cooperation with the other progressive organizations.
The EC-CC, a very narrow body, imposed an "active boycott" line that involved at least a temporary break with 10. The magazine Praktika is presented as the theoretical journal of the party in the national urban centers (Teoretikal na Dyornal ng Partido sa Pambansang Punong Lunsod"). According to Alex Magno, it represents the National Urban Commission of the CPP. (See his interesting article "CPP: rethinking the revolutionary process," Diliman Review, Vol. 34, No. 4, 1986, pp.17,20). 11. "The Editorial Board [of Praktika], in its official capacity as a commission of the party, sent an urgent appeal to the KT-KS (EC-CC] in the second week of 1 December 1985 proposing a multi-faced tactic instead of the singular policy of active boycott." "Some clarifications," Praktika, No. 2, August 1986, pp.111-2.
June 29, 1987• International Viewpoint
PHILIPPINES
TANTE
BOOT
OUT THE US. 7 FLEET
SUE OF the majority of the party's traditional allies. It did so by a one-vote majority alone, according to Alex Magno, against the advice of many leading bodies, which advocated for example a more flexible boycott "in principle." 12 That in part explains the violence of the reactions in the CPP once the failure of the line became evident, as well as the conclusions drawn about this by the Political Bureau: "The boycott policy erred...in its understanding and application of the Marxist-Leninist organizational principle of democratic centralism." 13 The debate over the CPP's election tactic before and after February 1986 did not bear on how much confidence could be placed in the Aquino leadership, but on how best revolutionists could respond to a situation at once complex and crucial. It was not a debate on the leading role of the "national bourgeoisie" in the "democratic stage" of the revolution.
Satur Ocampo, for example, one of the main representatives of the National Democratic Front during the ceasefire talks with the government, specified in an interview that participation in the elections behind the Aquino candidacy "would undoubtedly have made it possible to exacerbate the class conflicts," making it more difficult for US imperialism to co-opt the movement.!4
The former leaders of the CPP, political prisoners under Marcos, participated from their cells in the debates at the end of 1985 and the beginning of 1986. José Maria Sison — Joma — the historic leader of the CPP, called for a "limited boycott," and opposed the ECCC's orientation, even after it had been formally adopted. He is nonetheless one of the most intransigent critics of the Aquino regime.
Barnabe Buscayno — Kumander Dante - the historic leader of the New People's Army (NPA), argued from prison for participating in the elections: "The people were in a revolutionary mood, an insurrectional mood. And that mood should have been guided by the party to a revolutionary change. But unfortunately the Party has failed in its role. "15 In this regard, the debate was above all over the choice of a tactic suited to the tasks of the moment. This could be summed up in the following terms:
Election was an opportunity for major battle
• For the supporters of practical, critical participation in the Aquino campaign (accompanied or not by a "propagandistic boycott" position), the presidential election was an opportunity for a real struggle against the dictatorship, a major battle. The February 1986 elections were of course an occasion for many maneuvers by the regime, the dissident faction of the army, the opposition bourgeoisie and Washington. 16 The complete history of the "February revolution" is, like that of any great historical event, very complex. But the election campaign was primarily a real test of strength, the culminating point of years of anti-dictatorial mobilizations. This was therefore the starting point for defining the CPP's policy. In this, it was necessary to take account of the profound originality of the situation with respect to pre-defined schemas: The fall of the dictatorship was possible, but not a direct conquest of state power by the toiling masses. The acute crisis of the Marcos regime did not coincide with a revolutionary crisis in the strict sense. If the situation had been genuinely revolutionary, the boycott tactic could
International Viewpoint • June 29, 1987
BOYCOTT SNAP POLL
MAKABAY**• have been the signal for an energetic offensive. But "in December 1985, the national capital region and towns were not ripe for a political uprising — at least not yet." You could not abstain, because a real struggle against the dictatorship was underway, nor could you simply call for a boycott because the situation was not yet ripe for this sort of direct offensive: "Precisely because of this, the proletarian revolutionaries should have made a detour, if they wanted to bring the masses in their millions to a more forward position in preparation for a direct and revolutionary assault against the fascist regime. But, unfortunately, they did not want to make the slightest detour — a short turn, a slight veer — toward the electoral path. They did not want to zigzag at all in the ascent toward the goal of mobilizing the people for direct revolutionary struggle to ultimately capture political power." " • The supporters of the active boycott policy - the conscious supporters of this policy, who knew that the masses would not follow them - wanted to keep the future road open by conceding no legitimacy to the "electoral road" and a bourgeois leadership (Aquino/Laurel). This position was still being defended in Praktika after the February experience by Sol del Pilar. It 12. Alex Magno, op. cit., p.18. 13. Ang Bayan, May 1986, p.1. 14. "Interview de Satur Ocampo," Philippines informations, No. 46, October 1986, p.4. 15. Bernabe Buscayno, AMPO, Vol. 18, No. 1. 16. A faction of the army, including the RAM (Reform the Armed Forces Movement) and the minister of defence had been preparing a coup d'etat for months. Since the plot had been exposed, they changed their plans (for a surprise attack on the presidential palace) at the last minute, going into open rebellion on February 22, 1986. See Al McCoy, Gwen Robinson and Marian Wilkinson, "How the February revolt was planned," Philippine Inquirer, October 5 and 12, 1986. 17. Editorial Board, "When a zigzag turn is shorter than a straight route," Praktika, No. 1, p.13.
was wrong to bend to the "election fever" that had gripped the masses. There were principled differences between Aquino and revolutionists (for example, as regards US imperialism): "There are basic principles, which we cannot compromise." And in this sphere, the struggle could not be cut up into separate pieces: "Comrades, the choice was not to concentrate on the anti-fascist struggle first to strengthen the anti-imperialist struggle later, but it was a question of compromising basic issues on the anti-imperialist struggle just to get rid of Marcos."
In these conditions, the unpopularity of the boycott policy could only be temporary. Revolutionary firmness would pay off in the relatively near future, when the masses lost their illusions:
"In conclusion, the boycott stand of the Party was the only appropriate and effective tactic, given the objective conditions as discussed above. We did not forsake the masses during the election, for we stood up for their right to vote and fought election terrorism. The masses have come to realize that even if we know that they are in error in judgement, we still defend their rights....To think that the Party has become alienated from its masses because it refused "to encourage the error of the latter is to denigrate the intelligence of the masses....The zig-zag road of participation for the national democrats, instead of being a detour towards the final emancipation of the majority classes, may turn out to be a longer route, if one does not get lost in the process."
CPP's marginalization had grave consequences
The importancé of this tactical debate was already stressed in articles in International Viewpoint in the spring of 1986. It is possible today to look at this question with the benefit of hindsight. It is more and more evident that the CPP's marginalization at the time of the February events has had grave and lasting consequences.
The active boycott policy had the paradoxical result, in view of the ECCC's aims, of considerably reinforcing rather than reducing the legitimacy of Corazon Aquino, who became the sole apparent representative of "people's power" and the "February revolution." She had free rein to exploit her personal image, which was endowed with religious connotations.
In view of the constant pressure of the military extreme-right, the democratic aspirations of broad sections of the masses — and not only the petty bourgeoisie - focused on the new president, despite the Aquino regime's bourgeois and pro-imperialist character, despite its failure to offer social and economic change, and despite also its sabotage of the peace negotiations, the proliferation of paramilitary groups and a repression that was sometimes bloody and always carried out with impunity.
The revolutionary movement has, to be sure, managed to make its voice heard on several occasions. It retains important resources in terms of activists and deep roots. But it has not to this day managed to regain the political initiative for any time. Corazon Aquino was able to reconsolidate her authority at the time of the vote on the constitution in February 1987 and in the legislative elections in May.
The new regime has proved incapable of seriously attacking the underlying evils from which the population is suffering. But nonetheless the presidential campaign represents an important turn in the political life of the country. The influence of the "February revolution" was not dissipated in a few months.
All of this confirms the central argument of those who criticized the active boycott line. The February 1986 presidential election was indeed a battle, a major political test. The revolutionary left should have taken its responsibility in this fight and asserted, in the arena of the electoral mobilization itself, its leadership of the democratic struggle. It could not do so by putting up its own candidates, without running the risk of further isolation, since such division would appear to be giving direct aid and comfort to the dictatorship.
A position of propagandist passivity (which is what the "active boycott" policy in fact led to) fell below the needs of the situation, as experience proved.
The task was not easy, because the situation was in fact complex, and in December 1985 the revolutionary left ind already ariel bost the paltical had already partially lost the politica choices — critical participation in the Aquino campaign, an "educational" boycott combined with active involvement in the electoral struggle — could only have been made without a precise knowledge of the relationship of forces and the situation of the organizations concerned.
However, the CPP, through its mass base and without setting itself against a united mobilization, could have organized the anti-dictatorial aspirations of the population by promoting the formation of real people's committees and thereby bringing back into the presi dential campaign the demands of the alador Lauri and the table to dave. toiling masses, which Corazon Aquino, Salvador Laurel and their political parties were unwilling and unable to do.
The CPP at the same time could have integrated itself into the electoral mo-
PHILIPPINES bilization, participated actively in the general battle against the dictatorship and challenged the monopoly that Corazon Aquino was trying to establish as a basis for her perspective of presidential rule.
"Politics is innovation"
The revolutionary left could only win out over Corazon Aquino's personal prestige by showing its capacity in those crucial months to take the initiative in practice, the leadership of the anti-dictatorial mass mobilization. In that way, the revolutionary movement and the people's committees would have been in a position to have an effect on the events that followed FebTuary 7.
After Marcos's fall, they would have embodied at least a part of the legitimacy of the "February revolution" - with all that that implied for carrying forward the people's struggles. It was necessary to find a response just as original as the situation it faced.
It is over this very important question of tactical choices that the CPP's debate have polarized. At the center of the polemics, we find the very Leninist theme of a concrete analysis of a concrete situation. The party's electoral policy should not have been mechanically deduced from a one-sided assessment of the test of the presidential election (a maneuver by the dictatorship) and general considerations of principle (the revolutionary project), but should have flowed from a profound understanding of the situation and of its originality.
"Politics is innovation," Ernesto Roque notes in the pages of Liberation, the official organ of the National Democratic Front. February 1986 "offers fresh evidence that real life is stranger than fiction and richer than even the most advanced theory....Few, if anyone at all, anticipated that the peoplepower uprising could have had such an impact so quickly and decisively....That some national democrats were stunned by events is understandable — but regrettable. It is now easy to talk, having the benefit of hindsight. Still, the direction of events — if not their precise form and pace — was predictable....Eyes were open, but they did not see what was happening. Which only corresponds to the biological fact that we do not see with our eyes but with our brain....Theory must constantly grapple with forces and events that do not fit familiar patterns. Politics is 3 innovation. Political leadership de18. After the crisis that marked the founding of the Bayan coalition in May 1985. June 29, 1987 • International Viewpoint