International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

Chile: Interview with Gabriel Valdés, President of the Christian Democrats

International Viewpoint No. 120, 18 May 1987 · pp 22-23 · 1,269 words

Latin America Italy Armed forces and soldiers

«We are ready to come to an agreement" THIS INTERVIEW with Gabriel Valdès, president of the Christian Democracy, is from APSI, September, 1986. It summarizes perfectly the two political axes of Christian Democracy: negotiations with the armed forces and maximum isolation from the MDP. QUESTION. From the point of view VESTION. From the point of view

• of Christian Democracy, what is the only rational policy for the present situation in Chile?

Answer. There is no rational policy other than coming to an agreement with the military officers to get them to assume their responsibilities and demonstrate their political will to open up a process of transition. This is a government of the armed forces; they have conceived of it as such. They have promised to restore democratic constitutional rule to the country and have not done so. They must do this now before it is too late.

I. You are asking the military officers to assume their responsibilities. What does that mean for Pinochet?

A. It is clear that Pinochet is the obstacle, and we think he should step aside.

O. If that happened, and another officer took the head of a transitional government, would you support him?

A. Certainly.

I. What conditions would you advance?

A. We would support him, if his only objective was to lead a transitional government. We would give him our full support. I think that there are good reasons for thinking that it will, in fact, be a military man who will lead this process.

2. The National Party is seeking the formation of a center-right bloc to negotiate a solution with the government. This formula also seems to suit the US State Department. I would like to ask you if you would be ready to take the head of such a grouping?

A. No. We are not for forming a center-right bloc. We are an integral part of the Democratic Alliance. We want to pursue the possibility of a governmental accord with the National Party but also with left parties, notably the Socialist Party (Nuñez and Briona). Our objective is, therefore, not a centerright bloc. It is the broadest possible accord for a future government.

More precisely, we think that it is necessary to come to agreement on a constitutional proposal that would have the support of all Chileans.

Over and above this constitution, there needs to be the broadest possible governmental agreement and, finally, a political accord to support the transtional government and to present a governmental formula before the end of the transition.

The Christian Democracy is extremely interested in seeing the Socialist Party participate in this governmental formula. We think that cooperation between Chilean social democracy and Christian Democracy is the key to political stability and social progress for the coun try. This is our position.

We want MAPU and the Christian Left to participate, but we do not intend to be the core of any center-right schema. That would be too narrow a vision of things, and I think that it would make a future governmental pact untenable.

I. Who would such a pact include?

A. This pact should be made within the framework of the National Accord.

I. What is going to be your attitude toward the Communist Party? I ask you this question because, on the one hand, you cannot exclude it from the future democracy, but on the other, you cannot make a pact with it, because that would delay a possible solution to the present situation. A. We think that the CP must define itself once and for all. It must say whether it is and intends to remain a democratic party, or whether it wants to continue hunting with the hounds and running with the hares. On the one hand, it says that it wants to be consid. ered as what it has historically been — a democratic party — but on the other it supports violence. This facing in two directions does serious harm to the process of democratic reconstruction, and is giving Pinochet justifications for considering the CP a violent organization. The CP has to define itself, not only in words but also in deeds, with

regard to the violence and the terrorism.

Q. The last proposal made by the Alliance was received favorably by the MDP. What might the next step be?

A. The following stage consists of the armed forces studying and revising this proposal. When a proposal gets a favorable response, not only from the MDP but also from the forces of the center and the right, it has to be taken into consideration by the armed forces. They are not foreign. They are also made up of Chileans, and they have to realize that in acting as they are doing now, they are departing every day further from their professional responsibilities.

To preserve their professionalism, To preserve their professionalism they must come to an agreement with the civil society. This is how a democratic reconciliation could operate in Chile. If the military officers think that they can defeat the civilians, they are mistaken. By following that road, they can only isolate themselves further.

As for us, we do not want to defeat anybody. What we want is to come to an understanding with them, and the formula that we propose has been put in writing. It is the formula of the Democratic Alliance, and it cannot be anything else than coming as soon as possible to a vote, because neither we nor the military own this country. And Pinochet owns it still less. Like all dictators, he is coming to think that he is God. He believes that he represents the national feeling because his stooges and intimates applaud him. Batista, Somoza, Trujillo, Hitler and Mussolini were like that — they are all alike.

Q. Most people in Chile think that the situation is getting tenser by the day, and they are demanding that the political leaders come up with concrete solutions. What does the Christian Democracy propose?

A. For its part, the Christian Democracy is conscious of the fact that this situation has to end in order to get back to something very simple, practical and always valid — a plebiscite to find out what Chileans think; a plebiscite by means of a free vote and a secret ballot.

2. The only problem is that General Pinochet is never going to hold such a plebiscite. So, how do you think you can reach an agreement for this with the armed forces?

A. I have already said that General Pinochet was the obstacle, not only to a plebiscite but to a normal transition to democracy. With regard to what we intend to do, we will continue to stress verbally and in writing, in Chile and abroad, so that the armed forces will understand, that we are ready to come to

CHILE an agreement on a formula that includes responsibility, dates and objectives.

This is one point. Next, we are going to continue to promote mass mobilizations in which the society can express in a peaceful but concrete way its rejection of an institutionalization of the regime in power which, having no legitimacy, has lost its credibility.

Q. You want to reach an agreement The Comn with the armed forces. But what concrete proposal are you making to enable the military to define themselves?

A. So that the armed forces can define themselves and make their decisions, they have to know that there is a coalition of parties that are determined about being allies, that have clear ideas, concrete programs and personnel capable of assuming responsibility. nunist

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