Who are the
Mujahideen? IT DOES NOT say much for the "objectivity" and reliability of the media in the imperialist countries to see that they have glorified the "Afghan resistance," almost entirely passing over glaring facts. This is especially the case when they are so quick to point up the slightest in. discretion by the Communist guerrilla movement in the Philippines, to cite only one example.
Thus, the TV in Western countries have untiringly broadcast "sensational" reportage of the operations of the Mujahideen, which are all so many remakes on the same scenario. But only on the rarest occasions have they explored what lies behind the facade.
They show little interest in the extraordinary corruption of the bureaucracy of the parties in the Peshawar, the insolent luxury displayed by their leaders, the diversion of a part of the arms they get to the black market, their participation in the narcotics traffic. They overlook the atrocities commonly commited by the Mujahideen and the violent battles that often break out among them, which have aspects both of tribal and gang warfare. SALAH JABER
They also ignore the savage fanaticism of the fundamentalists, the extreme backwardness of the social and political mores in force in Peshawar, the medieval oppression of women and other aspects of reactionary Islamicism. These things draw the outraged spotlight of the media when they happen in Tehran. But they become harmless folklore, even an imminent withdrawal of a strong contingent of Soviet troops. According to the rumor, this would involve
50,000 troops, or about half of all those engaged in Afghanistan!
In any case, the more the Soviet military presence in the country is reduced, the less is capacity of the reactionary forces for mobilizing.
Their main argument has been, and continues to be, resistance to the shoravis ("Soviets," in the local language). The Mujahideen will certainly find less recruits for a jihad for their Islamic state than they have found until now for the fight to liberate Afghanistan from foreign troops. charming, when they happen in Peshawar or the Saudi kingdom.
Behind the myths, let us look more closely at the main organizations of the Mujahideen. Their only positive common denominator is their reference to Islam. It cannot be nationalism, given the ethnic heterogeneity of Afghan society, which does not constitute, properly speaking, a nation. Nor can it be any political ideology, since on this level the divergences are considerable, running from the Khomeinites on one side to the royalists on the other.
Islam as the sole unifying symbol is, by the way, a characteristic that the Mujahideen share with Pakistan. This helps to explain the ease with which Zia ul-Haq's regime, which is Islamic fundamentalist in its own way, was so quick to welcome them to its territory. It exploited their presence for its Islamicization drive, which is the only ideological justification for existence that it has. The common reference to religion, however, has not kept the Mujahideen from lining up according to the sect of Islam to which they belong. There are the Sunnis on one side, linked to Pakistan; and the Shiites on the other, linked to Iran. Two rival alliances fused
On the Pakiscans side there are the Sunni parties, which represent the great majority of the Mujahideen, since more than 80 per cent of Afghan society is Sunni. In April 1985, the seven main organizations based in Peshawar formed the Islamic Alliance of Afghan Mujahideen. Under the pressure of their patrons, they fused the two rival alliances that had coexisted rather badly up until then — the alliance of the fundamentalists, and the so-called moderate one, actually an alliance of the royalists. Caly all dullance of the royalsts. International Viewpoint 6 April 1987
The four fundamentalist organizaions are, overall, stronger than their ivals. But there is also a real rivalry mong them, and it is just as often bloody, as there is between the undamentalists and the traditionlists. Although the fundamentalist organizations are more "ideological," hey nonetheless rely for their recruitnent on ethnic, regional and tribal allegiances, to say nothing of the renality common to all the Peshawar parties. They are the following: 1) The Jamiat-e-Islami (Islamic Group) of Rabbani. Founded in the early 1960s by its present leader, a professor of theology, the Jamiat is he Afghan counterpart of the Pakisani Jama'at-e-Islami, the ultrareactionary fundamentalist organization that helped to overthrow Premier
Bhutto in 1977 and has supported the Islamic dictatorship of Zia ul-Haq.
The only common denominator of the Mujahideen is Islam (DR)
The Afghan Jamiat began its armed of a national str activity after the "republican" coup forces pursuing ult d'etat by Prince Daud in 1973, jectives, opposed accusing him of being a Soviet agent. sivisim," native or f It is closely linked to the present intervention enablec Pakistani regime. their ranks in an
2) The Hezb-e-Islami (Islamic by diverting the n Party) of Hekmatyar. Founded in the Afghan masses 1968-69 in the university to oppose of their fundamental the growth of the left. Hekmatyar's The three traditi curriculum vitae includes the murder represent those n of a Maoist student in 1970. The Afghan monarchy. Hezb-e-Islami is related to the Muslim armed struggle U Brotherhood movement, the spearhead following Soviet ir of reaction in the Middle East. Follow- are the following: ing Daud's coup d'etat in 1973, it 1) The Harakatalso took up armed struggle against (Islamic Revolution the new regime. In fact Hekmatyar Mohammadi, a de was to ally himself closely with the former regime. It Pakistani regime of Bhutto and tion of Sunni mu then to his successors, who made it the traditionalist "cl their tool for combating the Pushtu 2) The Mah nationalism of Daud. After the PDPA (Islamic National I came to power, the Hezb-e-Islami A big landowner, diversified its sources of financing (holder, of the Pe and forged links both with the Saudis and former adviso and Khomeini's Iran. It is the most Shah, -Gailani is also fanatical and most sectarian party in dant of the Propl the Alliance. Sufi brotherhood a
3) The Hezb-e-Islami - Khales He in himself syn tendency. A split from the preceding former ruling class. group. It is led by a mullah, Khales, 3) The Jabhawho is also a tribal chief. Afghanistan (Afgh
4) The Ettehad-e-Islami (Islamic Liberation Front) Alliance) of Sayyaf, a professor of Although Islam d theology imprisoned in 1974 by the name of his mo Daud and released in 1980 - irony is himself a prof of fate - by Karmal. Named to chair and a member of the first version of the Alliance of the and most influent Mujahideen shortly after his release, the former regim Sayyaf became the agent of the with British supp Saudis, and notably, of the puritan the modernist Ki Wahabite sect dominant in the Arab 1929.
uggle but rather rareactionary obto all "progrespreign. The Soviet I them to increase unhoped-for way ational feeling of for the benefit ist program. onal organizations ostalgic for the
They took up nder Amin, or Itervention. They e-Engelab-e-Islami try Movement) of puty under the is an organizallahs representing ergy." az-e-Melli-ye-Islami "ront) of Gailani. big businessman ugeot concession) r of King Zaher , a sayed ("descennet"), chief of a nd a tribal leader. ibolizes the entire ye-Nejat-e-Melli-yelanistan National of Mujaddedi. es not figure in vement, Mujaddedi essor of theology one of the richest ial families under e, which helped, ort, to overthrow, ng Amanullah in
Shora (Council), representing an alliance of the mullahs (in particular, the sayyad, the "descendants of the Prophet") and the landlords. Parties and groups developed in the region. The main ones are the following:
1) The Harakat-e-Islami (Islamic Movement) of Ayatollah Mohseni, the only Shiite movement not exclusively Hazara (Mohseni himself is a Pushtu). It maintains good relations with the Peshawar parties and is on bad terms with Khomeini's Iran.
2) Nasr (Victory), of student origin, Khomeiniite.
3) The Sepah-ye-Pasdaran, which as its name indicates, is in fact an Afghan section of the Iranian pasdars (revolutionary guards), the militia of the Khomeini republic.
In 1982, a veritable civil war was to break out among the Shiites for control of the Hazarajat. There were bloody battles between the Shora on the one hand, and Nasr, the Sepah and other Khomeiniite groups, on the other. It ended in 1984 with the victory of the Khomeiniites, who lost no time in turning their guns on each other. An agreement was reached under Iranian aegis in 1985 to stabilize the situation, so that the Hazarajat today is under the sway of the Khomeiniites, who are themselves controlled by Iran.
Up until 1985, the Kabul government almost chose not to intervene in the Hazarajat in order not to get Iran on its back, but also because the Shite parties were more occupied in killing each other than in fighting the Soviet-Afghan troops. This policy gained the regime support among the Hazaras. However, owing to the cessation of the conflicts among the Shiite parties and Iran's desire to play a greater role in the Afghan crisis, the Hazarajat has, in turn, become another theater of clashes with the Soviet-Afghan army.
21 kingdom. These links gave him access The Hazarajat is the mountainto considerable funds, enabling him ous central region of Afghanistan. Its to maintain armed groups. It should Shiite population represents nearly be noted that the four organizations 15 per cent of the total population cited above all began their fight well of the country. From 1979 to 1982, before the PDPA took power. They the Hazarajat was run de facto by a are not therefore specific expressions sort of autonomous government, the
International Viewpoint 6 April 1987