A temporary and fragile success for Cory THE FEBRUARY 2, 1987, constitutional referendum represented an undeniable political success for the Philippine president. With 80% of qualified voters voting, and 76% of those voting "yes," Corazon Aquino soared over the credibility threshold of 65%. The government is now going to use this new electoral legitimacy as a lever to pursue its stabilization plans and to increase the pressure on the revolutionary movement in the islands.
Spectacular as it was, this electoral success is still relative, temporary and fragile. The mass enthusiasm that followed the fall of the Marcos dictatorship a year ago has ebbed. The government has just used up one of its last resorts to stem the rising wave of disillusionment that began several months ago. The next tests, such as the spring legislative elections, threaten again to expose its weaknesses and its internal contradictions.
PHILIPPINES provocation, reminiscent of the kidnapping and murder of union leader Rolando Olalia in November.
The Mendiola massacre aroused intense feeling. Cardinal Sin, the archbishop of Manila, said that the failure to carry out a land reform was "in large measure" responsible for the slaughter. In a pastoral letter, Sin declared: "We ask our government, in the wake of this tragedy, to turn its attention to the issue of land reform and the concerns most closely related with it." (2)
On January 26, 30,000 demonstrators turned out in response to the call from the KMP and other left organizations to march in front of the presidential palace as a sign of protest.
However, on January 27, the capital became the theater of a new attempted coup d'etat, more serious than the previous one. The rebels attacked military camps and the Villamor airbase, which is close to the city center. In Hawaii, the Marcoses tried to hire a plane for the Philippines. The plot was exposed and then aborted. But, nonetheless, the mutineers occupied the right-wing TV station, GMA-7, for three days and got active support from civilians mobilized for the affair.
Later, 200 soldiers regrouped on a property belonging to the former dictator's son-in-law at Montalban, to the north of Manila, withdrew into the heights of the Sierra Madre, languidly pursued by government troops.
Finally, on January 31, there was a new bloody provocation. The army fired on demonstrators in Bataan, the site of the country's main "free zone," killing three KMU (May 1 Movement) strikers and wounding about 30 people. (3)
Until the eve of the vote, various factions of the armed forces maintained a climate of extreme tension. It is in this context that the results of the referendum should be analyzed. Shortly before the vote, the journalist Patrick Sabatier noted that "the succession of dramas in these last weeks ... probably favored a 'yes' vote. A lot of undecided probably
1. The Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), the Peasant Movement of the Philippines, today claims 750,000 members. The KMP takes part in the coalition of mass activist organizations known under the acronym of Bayan. The KMP's "Program for genuine land reform" was published in 'National Midweek' (Quezon City) of November 26 and December 3, 1986.
2. Cited by Keith Richburg, International Herald Tribune,' January 26, 1987.
Since January 26, following the massacre of the peasants on the Mendiola bridge, the Kilusang Mayo Union (KMU), the 600,000 strong militant trade-union confederation, held a 'welgang bayan' (people's strike) in the privince of Mariveles, located, where the "industrial free-zone" is where the "industrial free-zone"
PAUL PETITJEAN
The voting on February 2 was held in a calm unusual for major elections in the islands. Nonetheless, on the very eve of the referendum the most alarmist rumors were going around in the capital, Manila. Particularly grave events had in fact occurred in the two weeks preceding the vote.
On January 22, 1987, the KMP (Peasant Movement of the Philippines) organized a big peasant demonstration to demand the implementation of a real land reform. (1) On the Mendiola bridge that leads to the presidential palace, the army opened fire, killing about 20 people and wounding dozens of others.
Marines had been deployed behind the police cordons. The usual methods of controlling demonstrations (tear gas and so on) were neglected in favor of the means of war. It was an obvious
Poverty is still a way of life for many in the Philippines (DR)
International Viewpoint 23 February 1987
voted for Cory out of fear of disorder." (4) The victory of the "yes" vote - a vote of confidence in the president. - remained primarily a vote against the military right, an affirmation of democratic aspirations.
With the backing of this plebiscite, Corazon Aquino has promised to bring the rebel elements in the army to heel. General Ramos has announced that 400 soldiers and officers accused of having taken part in the January 27 coup d'etat will be brought before a court martial. It is, nonetheless, highly unlikely that the army will agree to return to its barracks.
The "no" votes won in North Ilocano, Ferdinand Marcos and Juan Ponce Enrile's home region, and in many military bases. The army voted against a constitution that seeks to ban it from interfering in political life and that puts the police under civilian authority (the country's main police force, the Philippine Constabulary, was a military body).
The pretext for the various strong-arm operations carried out by the "neo-fascists," as the Filipinos say, is anti-communism. "We are acting out of nationalism and anti-communism," Airforce Colonel Oscar Canlas declared during the occupation of the GMA-7 TV station. "For 11 months, we have seen this government rot under the influence of the communists. We have to act now. Afterwards it will be too late." There are real divergences over what policy to follow toward the popular insurrection. But behind these warlike statements lies a much more general dispute over the role of the armed forces: "We think that they have to play a political role," Colonel Canlas declared without mincing any words. (5)
The 700 or so military said to have been directly implicated in the recent attempted coup d'etat are only the tip of the iceberg. There are a lot of officers who do not conceal their sympathies for the mutineers, who, one such officer noted, "threw themselves into this operation to draw the attention of public opinion to the communist menace. We have to take into account the sincerity of their action." (6)
There are also a lot of Filipino officers who have taken the Thai army as their model, an army that has been in politics now for more than 50 years. In Thailand, military factions control certain parties. As a result, they are represented in the National Assembly. Nonetheless, the general staff's ideologues do not hesitate to challenge the authority of the legislature. The parties' Assembly, they say, does not represent the country but private interests, those of business circles (which is not false); the army, however, can speak in the name of the entire nation (which is certainly not true!) Music to the ears of the military
That tune is music to the ears of the Filipino military parvenus. They will find allies in the National Assembly that is to be elected in May, in particular among the right-wing Ilocano politicians (since nepotism was the rule in Marcos' time, a lot of higher officers belong to the same Ilocano "clans" as Marcos or Enrile). But they will not be directly represented in the parliament or the Senate. A real and enduring political-institutional conflict seems to be shaping up between the army and the parties of the regional big families, between the civilian power and the military power, a complex fracture running through the Aquino regime itself, as well as through the country's social elite.
The army has already let it be known that it is not satisfied with the government's shift to the right, which was carried out at the end of 1986 following the "recommendations" presented by General Ramos, the chief of the general staff, at the time of the November crisis. (7) "The government's problems with the army are not over," stressed Juan Ponce Enrile, former minister of defence and present leader of the right. (8)
The threat is clear, the pressure constant. While the army is divided into factions, it tends to close ranks against the civilian regime. At the time of the January 27-29 coup, General Ramos received a delegation of officers demanding clemency for the mutineers. He let it be understood that he himself was opposed to any overly severe penalties. While Aquino was already promising that the mutineers would be court-martialed, Colonel Canlas, one of their leaders, was able to participate in a press conference alongside Ramos and the defence minister, General Ileto, explaining to anyone who wanted to listen that the mutineers' abandonment of the occupation of the TV station GMA-7 should not be seen as a surrender.
The forces of the left divided over what policy to follow toward the referendum. In October, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) issued a call to "reject the pro-imperialist and anti-masses constitution" and to "carry forward the struggle for national democracy." The statement went on to say, "the reactionaries peddle 'peaceful processes' to divert the masses from the path of real social change. But history shows - and has proven in the previous antidictatorship struggle - that it is only
A sugar worker on the island of Negros (DR)
through direct struggles, armed and unarmed, that the people are able to achieve concrete victories." (9)
However, this position on the election was not automatically adopted by the other left organizations, including those belonging to the National Democratic current. The KMP and the national KMU, whose chairperson was struck down in November, also called for a "no" vote. On the island of Negros, the KMU called for a "critical yes" vote.
4. The Paris daily 'Liberation' of February 2, 1987.
5. Cited by Kim Gordon-Bates, 'Le Monde, January 29, 1987.
6. Cited by Philippe Pons in 'Le Monde, January 30, 1987.
See 'International Viewpoint, No. 112, January 26, 1987. tion, February 5, 1981 Ang Bayan, Vol Cited by Patrick Sabatier, 'Liberation, February 5, 1987.
Editorial XVIII, No. 8, October 1986, pp. 1-3.
International Viewpoint 23 February 1987
USSR
In December, when the mass coalition Bayan held a poll of its member organizations, the "critical yes" position won out by 96 votes against 75 for a "no" vote and 7 for an abstention. (10) Over January, the "no" camp gained strength, but Bayan, as a coalition, called for a "vote according to conscience," thereby leaving its members free to choose. The fartido ng Bayan, which was initially favorable to a "critical ves" vote, had to rediscuss its position on January 25. It demanded that the vote be postponed. About 50 left organizations called for a "critical yes" vote. (11)
These political differences have to be understood in the general context of the country. Revolutionary strug gles have been going on for years in the island; people's armed forces exist. But the political situation at