To start with, it is necessary to review the situation in which the revolutionary left found itself on the eve of the presidential campaign, and the political choices it confronted.
From the standpoint of the growth of the revolutionary forces, the picture of the year 1985 had contradictory aspects. The New People's Army (NPA) continued to gain strength. The mass base of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) continued to widen both in the countryside and in the cities.
Although it had to work underground, the National Democratic Front (NDF) was preparing for the first time to intervene in a rather systematic way in all the electoral systematic way in all the electoral contests originally scheduled for 1986 - the local and regional elections.
This group of organizations is led by the CPP, which was founded in 1968. It represents the overwhelmingly dominant current on the revolutionary left. After difficult beginnings the CPP began to gain strength rapidly at the end of the 1970s. It has considerably widened its national base and its mass work.
Having set out on a course of prolonged guerrilla war in 1969, the CPP believes that it has entered the final phase of the first stage of people's war, the "advanced substage of the strategic defensive." It expects within a few years to reach a situation of an "equilibrium of forces" that will permit it to prepare the way for the "strategic offensive," the final stage of the struggle for power. The year 1985 marked a new advance on this road.
However, also in 1985, very sharp contradictions appeared in the CPP's united-front work. The launching of a new coalition, the Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, New Patriotic Alliance) illustrates the contradictory character of the developments in progress.
Originally, Bayan was intended to become the broadest coalition of mass organizations (unions, peasants' and people's associations), as well as of political groups (extending from the forces led by the underground CPP to a small bourgeois modernist formation, Manindigan.
As far as the mass movements went, Bayan unquestionably shaped up as a broader "alliance" than its predecessors. For the first time, it included a national organized grouping of peasant associations and agricul tural workers' unions, the KMP
On this subject, see the solidarity resolution adopted by the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International, published in 'International Viewpoint,' No. 94, March 10, 1986.
5 reassessment in the revolutionary left THE OVERTHROW of the Marcos dictatorship in February was a development of the greatest importance and merits the attention of every anti-imperialist and revolutionary activist. The Philippines is one of those countries in the world where mass struggles have advanced in a spectacular way, coming after Nicaragua and El Salvador and at the same time as South Africa.
This island chain inhabited by 54 million people has a key strategic importance. The United States' main overseas bases are located there, facing Vietnam and at the juncture between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. It is therefore urgent to step up active internationalist solidarity with the Philippines. (1)
There is another reason for interest in the country. The conditions in which the dictatorship was overthrown and the situation prevailing in the Philippines now pose many tion. A study of these problems aspects of revolutionary work today PAUL PETITJEAN
The debates among the various components of the anti-imperialist left in the Philippines touch on questions that are being discussed in many countries. They include the evaluation of the "February Revolution"; the assessment of positions advanced before the presidential election and Cory Aquino's campaign, which detonated the crisis; and the analysis of the present regime and the tasks of the revolutionary left.
These debates deserve attention. The lessons of the revolutionary struggles in the Philippines can help activists in other countries and promote political reflection based on international experience.
The overthrow of the dictatorship has created a very new situation.
International Viewpoint 2 June 1986 questions of analysis and orientacan, accordingly, clarify various • The features of the post-Marcos period are still not well defined. The developments under way are far from completed. That goes for both the Aquino regime and the Filipino left. Therefore, it is far too soon to draw a real balance sheet of the consequences of the "February revolution." In every area — economic, social and political - those outcomes remain to be determined by an often complex struggle. What is more, it is hard today to find all the documentation.
Nonetheless, it is possible to present some of the debates underway in the revolutionary left in the islands, although we will have to come back to this later when the documentation is more complete and the dis-
(Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, Peasant Movement of the Philippines).
Before the founding of the KMP in 1985, the Nationalist Alliance for Justice, Freedom and Democracy (NAJFD), a predecessor and today a component of Bayan, brought together local and regional peasant associations but not national ones. In February-March 1986, the KMP claimed 500,000 members and Bayan, 2.5 million.
However, as a united front of political organizations and personalities Bayan was a failure. The new allies included in this coalition broke with Still worse, figures that traditional Nationalist Kaakbay m it at the May congress. formations and political were among the CPP's allies and were in the Alliance (such as the ovement and the lawyer
Jose Diokno) also left Bayan in May-June. (2) Unity dynamic breaks down
On the political level, the new coalition marked a step backward from the previous experiences. More generally, the unity dynamic set in motion in the wake of the assassination in August 1983 of Benigno Aquino, husband of the present president, seemed to break down.
Moreover, activists associated with the National Democratic Front have been losing various elections, starting with those at the University of the Philippines.
There are several reasons for Bayan's failure as a broad front of political organizations. Some people at least saw it as a very ambitious project, perhaps overly so. It tried to offer a united framework all at once for the mass movements and the whole spectrum of progressive and revolutionary political formations, as well as for more problematic allies, such as the small bourgeois formations.
Only the strength of the CPP, by far the predominant force, could assure a temporary success for this operation, which was supported on the basis of the feeling that the crisis of the Marcos regime was worsening rapidly and that it was necessary to prepare to intevene rapidly on all levels, including the national political scene.
In fact, differences seem to have arisen within the CPP itself over the very objectives for which Bayan was launched, and to have had repercussions on the unity negotiations. Finding themselves suddenly on the sidelines, the groups less committed to a unity policy with the CPP broke
Early in 1986 the Bayan coalition claimed 2.5 million members (DR)
away first. It was then that the so-called social democratic current launched the Bandila (Flag) coalition. (3) In turn, other forces that were convinced of the need for a united front with the CPP also broke away seeing themselves as "used" and manipulated. They remained outside the two coalitions, Bayan and Bandila.
The failure of Bayan as a coalition of political organizations opened up a very important debate in the Philippine left on the conception and practice of the united front. This debate in fact had been brewing for a long time. But at the end of 1985 it assumed a new scope.
Various left groups took opposing positions, but it is likely that the debate is also going on in the major revolutionary formations, the CPP and the NDF.
This debate is a comprehensive one, touching on a series of very important questions, as attested by an issue of the bulletin The Longer View (published by an independent Marxist group) devoted to it.
Among the questions taken up are the following: notions of the "united front from below" (consi dered sectarian, a legacy of the ultraleft period of the Communist International that ended in 1935) and the "united front from above" (considered correct, a legacy of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International in 1935); the nature of social and political alliances that can be made in Third World countries with a very complex social structure; the existence of conflicting objectives
2. See Paul Petitjean, "Elections will not solve the crisis of the dictatorship," 'IV. No. 92, February 10, 1982.
On the "social democratic current", see Paul Paul Petitjean, "After the fall of the Marcos," 'IV,' No. 95, March 24, 1986.
International Viewpoint 2 June 1986
(building yourself and building the united front) that every party has to know how to balance in order to maintain unity; the importance given to political democracy in the revolutionary scheme for society and the attitude to be taken toward currents such as the so-called social democrats; and the Muslin question in the southern Philippines. (4)
my opinion, the person interviewed in The Longer View counterposes the "united front from below" and the "united front from above" in too mechanical a way. This statement gives a highly idealized view of the policy followed in the World War II period by the Communist International and later by the Soviet bloc. (5) But it certainly touches on a central question when it points up the danger that sectarianism poses for the revolutionary movement.
The danger of sectarianism is all the greater when one current, the one led by the CPP, generally enjoys an absolute majority in the united bodies (a majority won, it should be noted, thanks to the quality of its activist work).
After the assassination of Benigno Aquino, "one could not have looked for a more ideal situation for united front building. ... For a brief moment, it seemed as if the ghosts of past mistakes which have been haunting the movement for years would finally be laid to rest. In the end, however, sectarianism and distrust prevailed and minor points became major bones of contention. The dominant groups used their mechanical majority to resolve issues that came up. When this happened, the united front was doomed to suffer the same fate as its predecessors." (6)
It was in this context that the person interviewed pointed to the importance of the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan experiences.
Under the theme of the united front, two big problems reappear -the problem of social alliances, the foundation of which is the alliance of the workers, peasants and urban poor, which should also incorporate key sections of the urban petty-bourgeois layers; and the problem of political alliances with groups of differing orientation and program.
The CPP has at times recognized the importance of the latter aspect. In a statement adopted on the twelfth anniversary of the founding of the party, the Central Committee took note of the "development of other progressive organizations."
While maintaining that "from the beginning, the party has advocated and exerted efforts to achieve closer unity among all revolutionary and progressive forces in the country, progressive forces in the country,
International Viewpoint 2 June 1986 the Central Committee acknowledged that "our links with other independent organizations were limited until recently."
The conditions for achieving unity were now better (more experience, more forces in the CPP, the appearance of new activist groups).
"Overall, there is now a broader base and better conditions for extending and strengthening ties and forms of cooperation among the revolutionary forces in the countries. Actual and definite advances have been made in this respect." (7) A sectarian and dogmatic retreat
The resolution speaks in this context of the MNLF-BMA (Moro National Liberation Front - Bangsa Moro Army), the organization of the Muslim resistance in the south of the archipelago. It also addresses a range of "progressive independent organizations based in the cities, few of which have forces and activity in the coun tryside," in the Christian part of the archipelago. This includes the left "social democratic" current, left splits from the "old" Communist Party (the pro-Soviet PKP), such as the Marxist-Leninist Group that broke with the PKP in 1973 in protest against the leadership's capitulation to the Marcos regime, groups led by religious figures and other groups active in the liberal professions, the human rights movement, etc. [The quotations here are retranslated from French].
It was precisely with the bulk of these groups that breaks occured in 1985-86.
In fact, the CPP's general line, which underwent an initial enrichment in the pivotal years of 1974-
4. "The Longer View," Vol. 2, No. 2, October 1985.
5. It was in the name of an antifascist bloc that the Stalinist leadership sought - sometimes succeeding - to isolate and break the revolutionary struggles in the World War II period, in Spain, Greece, Yugoslavia, Vietnam and China.
6. The statement of the Executive *The Longer View,' op. cit., p. 5. Committee of the Central Committee on the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the Communist Party of the Philip pines. Ang Bayan' published by the Central Committee), special issue dated December 26, 1980, pp. 5-6. [These quotations have been retranslated from French.]
8. In 1974, Amado Guerrero published "Specific Characteristics of Our People's War," which analyzed the specific conditions of a people's war in the archipelago. In 1976, the Central Committee adopted a major resolution, "Our Urgent Tasks, " which drew a series of lessons from the difficulties with which the movement was confronted, of errors of orientation and internal debates. [Citations retranslated from French.J
9. In 1983, we find in Ang Bayan'
76 (8) was again enriched in the last years of the 1970s and the first years of the 1980s. It seems, however, that during 1982-84, there was a sectarian and dogmatic retreat in the following areas: international work in the solidarity movement, ideological references, trade-union work, the role of the party in intimate relationships among party members (9) and finally on the question of unity among revolutionary and progressive political forces.
In a general way, therefore, with regard to the united front the CPP focused on centralizing and coordinating its most cross-sectorial mass work and on forming a "democratic shield."
The image of a party that in one hand waved the sword of the armed forces (the NPA) and in the other held up the shield of the united front (the NDF) prevailed. But in its 'sectarian version, this image leaves little place for unity with other organized political forces.
The present debate on the united front, therefore, involved both prac tices (manipulative or not) and longterm conceptions (the role of unity among political forces).
When Marcos suddenly decided to move up the date for the presidential elections, the opposition forces were more politically fragmented than they had been at any time since August 1983. This is probably what convinced the dictator to play his electoral card immediately. In fact, both Marcos and Washington saw the presidential elections as an opportunity to give a new legitimacy to a regime that had been isolated up till then even with respect to bourgeois public opinion.
The announcement of an early election caught the Filipino left short. Already divided, it was to respond to this unexpected test in a ragged way. (10). an article entitled "Proletarian Principles
Govern Party Marriages, " which announced, "The Central Committee recently issued a set of guidelines concerning party marriages, the final version of which was approved after a review of the original 1977 draft. The guidelines comprise definite policies that implement proletarian principles on marriage; the rights and duties of comrades during courtship, engagement and marriage, as well as those of the collective, are set down and explained in the prime, guidelines and the accompanying and the accompanying
This document reaffirms a basic •conception that was challenged in particular in the capital: "Now a single set of policies will be implemented" in all regions. I will come back later to this question, because it touches on very important matters, such the conception of "proletarian morality" and the role of the party, which here "represents society. " See 'Ang Bayan, Vol 15, No. 4, June 1983, pp. 9-11.
Here I will take up only the debate that unfolded in the Marxist and nationalalist-progressive left. I will come back to the policy of the Catholic hierarchy in a later article.
7
The CPP leadership decided rapidly on a boycott policy, based on the following argument: These elections are a maneuver by the US-Marcos dictatorship. They will be neither free nor democratic and cannot lead to an overthrow of the dictatorship. The opposition candidates (the CoryLaurel tandem) are not putting forward a consistent national democratic program. They retain a reactionary character. Participating in these elections, therefore, means creating illusions, pulling the mass movement backward, providing cover for the operation to "rehabilitate" the regime. Change would not come from elections
Of course some things were granted: "Mrs. Corazon Aquino has been carrying on a vigorous antifascist campaign, thus making valuable contributions to the people's overall antifascist struggles. . . . However, her campaign against the fascist puppet Marcos is flawed on several counts. ... She has abandoned her previous progressive stand on a number of vital issues. ... All this indicates that wellmeaning though she may be, either she is politically naive or she has not transcended her own compradorlandlord class background."
In any case, Marcos, with the support of the United States, would maintain control of the situation. Change would not come from elections organized by the dictatorship:
"The party has taken the position that boycott is the correct response to frustrate the antinational and antipeople objectives of the USMarcos dictatorship in this ruthless political swindel.... For all its meaninglessness as a means of overthrowing the hated US-Marcos dictatorship, the snap election will teach many more among our people a most valuable political lesson: that revolution, not a rigged election, is the correct path to change." (11)
Following the CPP, the NDF (12) and the mass organizations influenced by the party called for a boycott. In the case of Bayan, its coming out for a boycott provoked the departure of national and regional leaders (temporary in the case of former senator Lorenzo Tanada; definitive in the case of Ambrosio Padilla).
More generally, the CPP leadership's analysis was subjected to a series of criticisms in which the common point was the charge of abstractness and formalism.
In fact, there was a long debate in 1975-78 between the ManilaRizal region and the national leadership precisely on this question of participation in the elections. The as Aquino forces.
"When it comes to the hard revoluregional leadership proposed waging a common campaign with Benigno tionary organizations like the CPP
Aquino's new party (Laban). The or the NDF, they could never endorse any election staged by the national leadership defended the prin-
United States and Marcos. But they ciple of the boycott.
could have adopted fleximore
After the failure of the 1978 bility in the case of the 1986 elecelection campaign, the national tion because all the opposition parleadership strongly reaffirmed its posities and the electorate were enthution, which was maintained in 1981 siastically for participation in favor and 1984. So, the supporters of de of the Aquino/Laurel candidature. ...
facto participation were to stress the
"The problem with playing with in the situation between changes terms [like 'minimum boycott'] is
1981 and 1984, pointing to the importhat it can obfuscate the necessity tance of a "concrete analysis of the of critical analysis of concrete conconcrete situation"
in the definiditions. Revolutionaries should always tion of any electoral tactic.
be guided by how we can get the criticisms came
The converging people to a certain level and raise them from Filipino activists overseas, from up to higher levels of consciousness nationalist and progressive figures who and action. ...The more important had participated in the boycott thing is to look forward or decide campaign for the 1984 parliamentary what are the present tasks to take elections, from independent Marxist advantage of the new situation. I groups and from the CPP itself.
like to make use of this analogy:
The early existence of an opposi-
We planted a seed in 1968, to refer to tion to the "hard boycott" policy the party. The tree grew from year to in CPP circles themselves is strikingly year and each year bore fruit. Came attested by the position of Jose
1986, there was a bumper crop. What
Maria Sison. Called familiarly "Joma,"
was a very sorry result for us - other
Sison is the CPP's "historic figure."
people got most of the fruit.
Chair of the Central Committee,
"It is not true to say we got he was the party's ideologue. Under nothing. We got more civil liberties.
"Amado Guerrero," he the name
I got released, but we got little comdrafted the Filipino Maoist movepared to those who are now in the ment's main programmatic documents,
In the
Cory Aquino government. In
Philippine Society and including future years, we should make sure
Revolution.
we get more of the fruit." (13)
Arrested in 1977 and subsequently
In 1985, a certain number of jailed, he lost any official position
Marxist groups (often independent in the party. But he has remained a underground organizations), belonging very influential person, and, starting neither to the CPP nor to the old profrom before the elections, he declared
Moscow PKP came together. They that in his opinion it was necessary formed the Coalition of Marxist and to combine a principled position of
The first
Democratic Organizations.
"minimum boycott"
with practical issue of the bulletin New Direction work involving critical participation in contains a resolution adopted by
Cory's campaign.
their organizing committee, entitled
Since his release, he has returned
"Participation Without Illusions." The to this debate and to the failure quotation from Lenin used as an of the boycott policy advocated epigraph indicates this document's by Bayan. For example, he said the angle of attack:
following in a very interesting inter-
"The task of a truly revolutionary view giving to the Australian weekly party is not to declare an impossible
Direct Action: "I took a minimum renunciation of all compromise, but boycott stand together with a critical to be able while making compromises stand, which I think participation when they are unavoidable, to remain were complimentary with each other.
true to its principles, to its class, to
They placed Marcos in a no-win its revolutionary purposes, to situation. I was actually proposing task of paving the way for revolution a boycott; although it seemed there and educating the mass of the people was a decision to have a maximum for victory in the revolution." [Transboycott.
.. People were allowed lated from the French.] (14)
[by the New People's Army] to vote in peace. Of course, Aquino was able to reach out to millions of
11.
"Boycott the Snap Election,
Adpeople at
Luneta Park, whereas vance the Revolution,
'Ang Bavan' editorial
Bayan could get a few thousand, statement, special release,
January 15, 1986.
but that is very small. Really there
12.
Paul Petitjean,
"After the
See fall of Marcos," 'IV' No.
75, was some basis for the criticism
March 24,
1986.
that the left sort of cut itself off
13.
"Jose
Maria
Sison
Speaks,"
from the masses. The flexibility I
'Direct Action,' No. 561, April 2, 1986.
'Collected Works, Moscow,
14.
Lenin, wanted with the minimum boycott
Progress Publishers, Vol 25, p. 309,
"On included sharing the same platform compromises."
International Viewpoint 2 June 1986
The resolution notes: "Marxism, unlike pragmatism, firmly adheres to revolutionary principles. But it also takes issue with dogmatism when it comes to putting principles into practice. Principles are important in defining our line of march, in helping us distinguish friends from foes and when weighing short-term gains against their long-term costs. But we do not look at principles as recipes for all occasions. Their rigid and uncritical application can only end in disastrous results. Revolutionary struggles would be a thousand times simpler if each strategic and tactical problem could be resolved according to a set of ready-made doctrines. With the doctrinaire's all consuming faith in 'universal truth,' there would be no need for a 'concrete analysis of a concrete situation,' no need to reckon the probable consequences of alternative policies. Marxism itself would be rendered superfluous for it would then lose its primary function as a method of analysis. " (15)
In the recent past, the resolution points out, the boycott position was justified in 1981. It could still be considered correct in 1984 after Benigno Aquino's murder, when numerous opposition forces agreed on a boycott. However, now the massive participation of the population in the vote, even where the left had its greatest influence, has "proved us wrong."
The resolution does not question
International Viewpoint 2 June 1986
The US military passes unobtrusively through a small Filipino village (DR)
the intrinsic validity of the arguments put forward by proponents of the boycott: The elections were rigged; they would not make it possible to dismantle the dictatorial system and carry ovi structural changes; Cory and Laurel's program and its class character "separate them from the cause-oriented groups"; even the former senator Jovito Salonga demonstrated his opportunism by opening the door to Salvador Laurel; the United States continued to exercise a predominant weight. But all these arguments remained too general to be useful in determining an electoral tactic. If the opportunist politicians can hold the high ground, part of the blame fell on the left:
•The progressive movement shares part of the blame for this unhappy state of affairs. Had all the causeoriented groups been unified and together worked out a common strategic perspective, we could have intervened early enough to make sure that anti-imperialist issues would occupy center stage in the campaign."
But, "if the boycott flopped in 1984, it is certain to be a dismal failure in 1986.... Wrongly perhaps, people see in Ninoy's widow the best hope for immediate relief from material difficulties. In this highly charged atmosphere a unilateral call for boycott by the left is a formula for isolation from the very people we seek to mobilize for many battles ahead. It is a suicidal march into a trap laid out by Marcos and US imperialism."
Electoralist illusions did indeed exist among the masses. The only way to fight them was to go through the experience with the masses and rely on experience for "banishing illusions." How to banish electoralist illusions
The resolution concluded with a five-point decision: to support the candidacy of Corazon Aquino; to center the campaign on anti-imperialist and antifascist objectives; to make an explicit dissociation from the "minimum program" signed by UNIDO [United Nationalist Democratic Organisation] and Laban ng Bayan, as well as from Mrs. Aquino's reactionary and anti-Communist statements; to warn the people of the dangers to come; and the decision summed up in the following phrase: "We shall convey this message - the force that will oust Ferdinand Marcos is going to destroy Cory Aquino when she turns deaf to the pleas of the people and, like her predecessors, sells the country to US imperialism."
The supporters of the boycott, including the Bayan leadership, knew that the movement could find itself temporarily isolated, given the popu-
15. 'New Direction,' No. 1, January 17, 1986.
larity of Corazon Aquino's candidacy. But they were convinced that Marcos could keep control of the events.
In an issue of Sunday entirely devoted to the debate on the boycott, J. Virgilio Bautista, the director for the electoral struggles, acknowledged: "We know that boycott is very unpopular. But what may be popular may not be always right. We are not against elections per se. What we reject are electoral exercises that serve no end but further put a stamp of legitimacy on the dictatorship. We must first recall that it was Marcos who called for this election and has made sure that all the cards are in his favor. We have nothing against Mrs. Aquino. Definitely, she is a better alternative to Marcos, but sadly she has no fair chance of beating the dietator."
Bautista concluded: "Bayan is willing to risk temporary isolation." He pointed to the postwar nationalist figure, Don Claro M. Rector, whom history had finally "vindicated," noting: "We feel that we are in the same situation. Future events will prove us right." (16)
To this, Lorenzo Tanada, a highly respected left nationalist figure, the chair of Bayan on leave to campaign for Cory, replied: "The issue in 1984 and the issue in the coming elections are different. Even if the opposition is able to elect a majority in the Batasan [the National Assembly, which has now been dissolved], Marcos could repeal any law they pass or even dissolve the Batasan itself. If we win the elections on February 7, we can terminate the Marcos dictatorship." (17)
The Filipino left community in the United States was also caught up in the debate over "boycott or participation." In particular Walden Bello, codirector of the Philippine Support Committee, defended the boycott positon. And E. San Juan Jr., of the Philippine Research Center, supported the position of Jose Maria Sison. (18) As for the KDP, in its publication, Ang Patipunan, it called for voting for Cory on an independent and revolutionary basis.
The elections took place. They were not sufficient to oust Marcos. But by crystallizing the popular discontent, arousing hopes and indignation and revealing the nationwide scope of the opposition to the dictatorship, they gave impetus to one of the most powerful mass movements the Philippines has ever seen.
In turn, the mass movement brought considerable pressure to bear on Cory, obliging her to reject compromises, as well as on the church. At the same time, it pressed hard on the pro-Marcos forces, exacerbating the regime's internal divisions and tip10 OL ping the scales in the top circles of the US administration.
It was the power of this mass mobilization, which was concentrated in Manila but which could have extended to the provinces at any moment, that explains the strange coalition of forces that finally put an end to Marcos' 20-year reign. An initial assessment of the left
Thus, it is possible to make an initial assessment of the debate in the Filipino left on the eve of the electoral test. It should, however, be stressed that judgements cannot be made from afar on exact tactics. To attempt that, one would have to have a very precise knowledge of the state of the organizations concerned, since, among other things, the choice of tactics depends on that factor. But the following four points can be noted:
1. The boycott policy as it was defined and defended by the CPP leadership in fact led the movement into political paralysis. The current that had probably done the most -through its educational, organizational and politicalizing work - over 20 years to prepare the way objectively for the "February Revolution" found itself relegated to the sidelines when the struggle spontaneously took an unexpected turn.
The movement [CPP-NDF] that paid dearly for its early involvement in the fight against the dictatorship is now often being denigrated. This is a bitter experience for those who have gone through it. But it can also be rich in lessons, if the causes of this error in orientation are really studied. (19)
The lessons of this experience are all the more important and interesting because they concern the policies of a party, the CPP, which is a genuine revolutionary party and which throughout its history has demonstrated very great capacities in political and practical work.
2. It was necessary to be with the masses in this election campaign in order to organize them from within and, in so doing, assure their independence from the parties that were officially conducting Corazon Aquino's campaign. This was necessary also to assure the independence of the masses later from an Aquino government, if Marcos were definitively ousted. That is, it was necessary to participate in the electoral mobilization on the basis of political independence, to promote the development of structures, of committees representing the mobilization itself.
3. The division of the forces of the anti-imperialist left before and during the election campaign was very costly. The party that led the main activist forces of the anti-imperialist left found itself politically paralyzed. On the other hand, the components of the left that were able to take political initiatives, the independent Marxists, had little organizational strength.
This division continues to undermine considerably the capacity of the people's forces for independent action, even if they are proving capable of pursuing activity. Some time may be necessary to overcome the divisions of 1985. But the question of unity of the anti-imperialist left forces will certainly remain a key one for the future. Here again the lessons drawn from the recent setbacks may be very valuable.
4. The events of February 1986 raised some general questions. They include the following: the evolution of the imperialist policy and its contradictions; the role of the governmental armed forces in periods of transition between dictatorships and bourgeois semi-democracy, or new coups d'etat; the role of the fight for political democracy in revolutionary struggle; and similar problems.
However, the February 1986 events also present a number of original features. They have to be analyzed in their specificity as a basis for discussing the orientations that were tested. But this is also necessary to understand the features of the new regime, the conflicts within it and the present tasks of the Filipino revolutionary and progressive forces.
In fact, there is no simple answer to these questions, if only because the situation varies greatly between the capital of Manila-Quezon City and the provinces and between the individual provinces. (20) Here again, the debates underway in the Filipino left illustrate the scope of the problems and the stakes.
16. 'Sunday,' weekly magazine of the daily, 'Malaya,' Vol. 2, No. 33, February 2, 1986, pp. 4-5. Senator Claro Mayo Recto (1890-1960), a member of the Spanish speaking elite, and anti-Communist, throughout the 1950s conducted a solitary crusade against US interference in the Philippines. He became an ardent advocate of national independence (political and economic) and of democracy. After his sudden death in Rome in 1960, the name "Recto the Nationalist" became the rallying cry of the radical student youth of which Jose Maria Sison himself was a part. A selection of his writings was reissued after his death: 'Recto Reader,' edited by Reato Constantino, Recto Memorial Foundation, Manila, 1965.
17. Ibid., p. 3
18. See the February 5 and 19 issues of The Guardian,' published in New York.
19. This is one of the aspects of the debate that is in progress now and to which I will return in another article.
20. See Paul Petitjean, "The decisive tests facing the Aquino government, *IV,' No. 97, April 21, 1986.
International Viewpoint 2 June 1986