"PEOPLE'S POWER" IN CUBA
By Fred Denfert
In a transitional society, the masses have to be involved in the exercise of power on two levels. One is direct involvement in making policy decisions on all the central options in the building of a socialist society, including the formulation of the national economic plan. The other is effective monitoring of the administration of the various institutions and the management of enterprises as well as of the implementation of the plan.
The Soviet bureaucracy's ideologues generally pose mass participation in the exercise of power from the standpoint of "involvement in administration." Thus, in Victor Turovtsev's work People's Monitoring in the Socialist Society--which was distributed to the delegates to the 1975 congress of the Cuban Commuing is implemented through ine single bureaucratized party, which controls all the "responsible" posts (that is, the Nomenklatura).
Ihis role of the single party was codified in Article 126 of the Soviet constitution of 1936. It is deined even more clearly in the new Soviet constitution adopted in October 1977 (2).
THE LEADING ROLE OF THE
SINGLE PARTY
From a constitutional and institutional stendpoint, the Castroist conception of the participation of the masses in the exercise of power combiness traits similar to those of the system existing in the USSR, with some other very distinctive features of its own, in a context where the great majority of the people remain attached to their rethe party bases itself on the state, the mass organizations, and--if necessary -- on direct mobilization of the working masses (5)."
The role assigned to the party therefore requires that there be only one. The possibility of having more than one party, even parties that would defend the basic economic and social gains of the revolution, is never considered. Io the contrary, the official theory is that of a one-party state.
Of course, in a single-party system the problem of internal democracy within the single party takes on a great importance. Internal democracy would mean the possibility of expressing positions different from those of the leadership, being able to present these to the membership as a whole, to raise them in the leadership
Evolution and to its historic leadership. bodies if necessary, and finally being nist Party (CCP)--there is a long section on how to "involve the masses in the administration of the state. "Such considerations are a. clear reflection of the ideological contortions demanded of a bureaucracy that has expropriated all power from the workers but continues incessantly to proclaim the "leading role of the working class."
Turovtsev writes: "It is necessary to teach the workers the art of administration, to find the most practical ways for them to play a part in it and to exercise supervision over it.... The main thing is to assure that all levels of administration are open to monitoring by the people, and that every citizen is involved in one form or another in democratic inspection. But at the same time, interference cannot be permitted in administrative processes that demand a specific mandate and individual responsibility. To fail to understand this would result in undermining leadership, and tolerating disorder, indiscipline, and anarchistic methods. It would foster an attitude of irresponsibility cloaked in empty phrases about democratic and collective decision making (1)."
This notion of a "specific mandate and individual responsibility" expresses concretely the bureaucracy's monopolization of power and the exclusion of the masses from any real involvement in the exercise of power or monitoring of it. This monopoly of decision mak20
Thus, we find in the Cuban constitution of lebruary 1976, the following affirmation of the principle of the role of the single party: "The Communist Party of Cuba, the organized vanguard of the working class, is the supreme leading force in the society and the state, whose common efforts it directs toward the achievement of the lofty aims of building socialism and advancing toward the communist so-
This concept is not a new one in Castroist chinking. In 1961, Fidel Castro said: "I sincerely believe that of all the political systems conceived of by humanity throughof government is one based on a state directed by a democratic revolutionary party with a collective leadership (4). "
The Cuban constitution was largely modeled on the Soviet one, as Raul Castro clearly says: "We see for example in Article 126 of the 1936 constitution of the USSR that it states that the CP is the 'leading nucleus in all workers organizations, both social and governmental'.... This is another fundamental principle for us to observe today when we want to implement and institutionalize our dictatorship of the proletariat. That is, the principle of the leading role of the party in all governinental and social activities.... In order to exercise its I leading role throughout the society, able to form groupings around a political platform in order to be able to defend such divergent positions.
To be sure, there have been discussions running through the various leadership bodies of the CCP, especially after the turns carried out on both the domestic and international fronts. To be sure, the leadership has shown itself capable of making critical balance sheets of its activities and its options, of explaining these to the masses, and of mobilizing the masses.
However, it is equally true that the whole functioning of the party rests largely on a high concentration of basic decision-making at the top level, and on a very clear opposition to any concept of democratic centralism that would involve the right to form tendencies and factions. In substance, democratic centralism is seen as the loperation of criticism and self-criticism within the framework of a monolithic party (6).
The Cuban CP leadership has made a dogma out of the temporary ban on factions adopted by the Tenth Congress of the Bolshevik Party in March 1921. In Stalinist tradition, this decision became a rule of party functioning that forbids ideological tendencies as well asfactions.
So, in the Political Orientation Course for 1973-74, subtitled The Leninist Party, which was supposed to be the basis for preparing the cadres to participate in the First Congress of the CCP in 1975, it says:
"The Marxist-Leninist conception of party unity was most precisely formulated in the resolution adopted by the Tenth Congress of the CP (b) of Russia, which was written by Lenin in 1921. It notes that all conscious workers must understand clearly the harm done by all sorts of factional activity, which cannot be tolerated, since in practice they lead inevitably to undermining collective work (7)."
Further on, in order to clarify this point and to characterize anyone who might oppose these conceptions, it is explained: "In Russia, it was the Trotskyists, the right-wing capitulationists, and other enemies of Leninism who promoted the theory that it was possible for various currents and factions to coexist in the same party, and who tried to undermine the party in its struggle against the class enemy (8)."
In the Castroist conception, affirming the leading role of the party in all spheres does not mean that there is no recognition of the need for a division between the party and the state. The existence of the People's Power bodies reflects, to a certain extent, a partial separation, Raul Castro explained to the party cadres: "Never forget in your activities that the party does not administer, and that it must not in any case interfere in the day-to-day work of the organs of 'People's Power' and their administrative apparatuses (9)."
Nonetheless, this principle of separation is severely limited. Andre and Francine Demichel indicate (10): "If there are no party members in the trade-union leadership, the party can get itself invited to meetings of the union executive. Likewise, in administration for every institution there is a list of positions that the party must monitor. Party approval is necessary for all professors, researchers, and cadres concerned with teaching Marxism. "
in this regard, it should be noted that the preamble to the constitution states that "Cuban citizens are guided by the triumphant doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. "
Further on in their book, Andre and Francine Demichel write: "This relative osmosis between the party and the state is reflected also in the composition of the party. While the category 'workers carrying out tasks of administrative and political leadership' accounts for 7.7% of the employed population, it is 42. 1% for the party (11)."
THE MASS ORGANIZATIONS
All the mass organizations were set up during the period of large-scale mobilizations in 1959-62, which was marked by the growing over of the revolution into a socialist one and the defeat of imperialism in the attempted landing at Playa Giron (April 17, 1961).
In 1960, the Committees to Defend the Revolution (CDRs), the Cuban Federation of Women (FMC), the Association of Young Rebels (the future UJC-- Young Communist League) were founded. In 1961, the National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP) was set up. Only the Cuban Workers Confederation (CTC), the single labor confederation, predates the revolution, having been founded in 1929. But it played a leading role in the 1958 general strike.
The history of the Cuban mass organizations is inseparable from that of the mobilization of the workers and their allies and of the advances of the revolution. In every test, they have answered specific needs of the masses, not only as organs of defense and vigilance but also as instruments for social transformation. This is what has given them their legitimacy in the eyes of the masses. This characteristic differentiates them fundamentally from the "mass organizations" in the USSR, which are designed to be instruments of control over the masses in the context of the expropriation of political power by the Stalinist bureaucracy.
In Cuba, the mass organizations are frameworks for active participation, to varying degrees of course, in a great many areas of social life, such as vigilance, the management of social services, health and educational campaigns, and so on. Thus, by their very nature, they were acutely affected by the extreme administrative centralization of the mid-1960s. Most of them came out of this period in a weaker condition. One of the objectives set by Fidel in the aftermath of the ten-millionton zafra (1970)--this went hand in hand with denouncing the bureaucratic excesses--was to try to revitalize these organizations within the framework of "People's Power." But their functions were never extended to the point of making them into real organs of workers self-
Andre and Francine Demichel point out: "It is true that at the start, when neither the party nor the state were fully constituted, the mass organizations--especially the CDRs-played a particularly important role. But they never held 'People's Power.' It is also true that the consolidation of the party and then of the state have reduced the role of the mass organizations. In a nutshell, the mass organizations are not and have never been organs of self-managing democracy (12)."
In the Castroist conception, the mass organizations are intended to be transmission belts transmitting the authority of the party into the
They serve as a liaison between the party and the masses, and are subordinated to the party and to the state:
"The mass organizations are considered in a practice as 'transmission belts' for the party. This transmission is supposed to go in both directions. It is important to make the party aware of the needs and demands of the masses. Conversely, it is necessary to disseminate the party's slogans and orientations among the masses, to assure that the revolutionary ideology generated by the party is assimilated (13). The mass organizations cannot have a political line of their own that might differ from that of the party (14)." For this reason, one of the criteria that the mass organizations have to meet is to be sociologically as representative of the entire population as possible.
In 1975, the CDRs included 80% of the population over the age of fourteen (4,800, 000 persons) and the FMC 80% of the women (2, 127, 800 persons). The CTC, ANAP, the University Students Association, (FEU), and the High School Students Association (FEEM included almost everyone in their respective catego-
Since these mass organizations do not have an orientation of their own, the selection of their cadres is under the control of the CCP: "There is an appointments list of cadres chosen by the party (14)."
The theses of the First Congress of the CCP specify that the leading positions in the mass organizations are to be taken by party members at the various levels:
"It is necessary to establish a register of posts in every body and institution defining what basic positions must be filled by the party, both in the party bodies and in the UJC, the state and the mass organizations... It must be determined what posts have to be included on the Central Committee's nomenklatura, as well as those of the party's provincial and municipal committees. It is necessary to assure that the key posts in every body are filled from the party register at each corresponding level (15). "
Finally, it is important to note that the CTC shares the same characteristics as the other mass organizations. The workers do use it as an instrument for collective defense against the administration. The local delegates are, for the most part, elected by the ranks. The CT CTC also have a certain monitoring role with respect to the mana-
gement of the enterprises. But the union federation is constrained in its activity by the fact that it is closely associated with the overall management of the economy. It has to push the implementation of the plan, it has to strive to reduce absenteeism and increase productivity. In practice, this means that the union leaders and the plant managers work closely together constantly (16). On the ideological level, this is codified by the formulation that "the CTC and the unions have the task of teaching the workers the communist attitude to work and social property (17)."
The unions, thus, are not "self managed " and independent of the state and the party. They serve to a certain extent as transmission belts
The main lines of the constitution were laid down in 1974 by the Political Bureau of the CCP and the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers (CECM). On the basis of these, a first draft was prepared by a commission composed of members of the Central Committee and the government, presided over by
The first draft was rediscussed by the Political Bureau and the CECM before being published and discussed by the party, the UJC, and the mass organizations.
"Then in the party the amendments coming from the ranks were discussed and sifted. During the summer of 1975, the CCP's com -mission on consolidation and organization studied the amendments, and retained a certain number. Afthe final draft of the conboth the right to strike and the right to lockout (Article 71). It provided for elections and a multi-
Leaving aside the points already highlighted regarding the role of the party and the mass organizations, it must be noted that in the new constitution all democratic rights are made conditional on conformity to the objectives of the somention of the right to strike. In view of the role that is accorded to the single party, this constitution could only lead to a limited conception of "People's Power."
In his speech of September 28, 1971, Fidel Castro left no ambiguity about the nature of "People 8 Power", explaining that it was intended to "carry through a deepbetween the party, the masses. Nonetheless, capture the real activity of the masses, the demands that the workers _raise. And the union leaders in the December 27. party bodies further transmit these demands and concerns. There is not the division between the union organization and the masses that exists in the "People's Democracies."
At the beginning of the revolution, the mass organizations played a larger role than today. To a certain extent, "People's Power' has taken over their former functions.
### PEOPLE'S POWER
The failure of the campaign for the ten-million-ton zafra in 1970 revealed the explosive contradictions that had been built up by the hypercentraliza tion of the economy in the 1960s, the lack of central planning and the lack of organs of power enabling the masses to play a part in a series of important decisions. A grave economic crisis went hand in hand with rising mass discontent in the face of the emergence of a stratum of negligent functionaries and intermediary cadres, who abused their powers and enjoyed privileges.
The strength of the Castroist leadership was its ability to recognize the alarm signal given by the masses. It responded to this questioning of economic disorganization and of bureaucratic management by proposing a profound reshaping of the institutions of the workers state. The plan for this was worked out from 1970 to 1975, and tried out in Matanzas province. It was later extended to the rest of the country. The reform was called poder popular.
In 1976, a new constitution was adopted, replacing the Fundamental Law adopted in February 1959. It is worth taking some time to see how it was drawn up, and then ratified by the masses, as well as to point up the changes that it introduced with respect to the Fundamental Law.
stitution was drawn up at the First Congress of the CCP (December 17-22, 1975). It was published on
"The draft was finally sent to the dum was held on February 15, 1976. All citizens above the age of sixteen voted, There were 5,602,973 ballots cast, 98% of the number registered to vote. approved by 5,473,534 votes (97.7%) against 54,070 (1%). It was adopted on February 24, 1971 (18)."
In the absence of any extensive opportunity for public debate on the national level, this kind of democracy is quite formal. It is a good reflection of the paternalistic and didactic nature of the Castro leadership's relations with the masses. The balance sheet of the two-year long process by which the constitution was drawn up and adopted is in a) "By comparison with the first draft, the final one had relatively few changes, and those were essentially technical (19)."
b) "In a meeting of the twenty members of the editing committee, it was said that the hand and thinking of Fidel could be seen in almost all the articles of the first draft.... It was he who introduced the largest number of adjustments and modifications.... In fact, a third of the changes were results of proposals made by Comrade Fidel (20)."
The new constitution, however, contains a number of new elements that could have been the subject of a major national debate.
The Fundamental Law, adopted in the aftermath of the seizure of power, was a bourgeois democratic constitution. It proclaimed respect for private property (Article 24), and for freedom of the press, assembly, and association (Article 33). In particular, it recognized going administrative decentralization, to put under the control of the communities all those activities that, because of their regional nature, they can monitor, direct, and administer. " Article 102 of the constitution adopted four years later contains almost the same
However, it is probably in Fidel Castro's July 26, 1977, speech on "People's Power" that the definition is clearest, and it is worth quoting
"The key principle (of 'People's Power') is that every productive unit or service facility that provides goods or services to the community must be managed and monitored by the community. " This was to apply to the municipal, provincial, and national levels. "This means that the schools, treatment centers, stores, bars, factories, movie houses, leisure centers, and all other centers are and will continue to be managed and administered by the 'People's Power' body' in every locality. There will no longer be in Cuba a single movie house, store, or school managed centrally from Havana.... They will be monitored and managed by their own community.... will be certain activities and units which because they work for the entire country will be monitored centrally by the national 'People's Power'--the merchant marine, heavy industry, the banks, the fishing fleet, the railroads.... But all other activities will be run by the municipalities and the prov-
"This decentralization does not mean, however, that every community or province is going to be on its own.... They will have to follow certain norms in order to avoid inequalities and disparities from developing around the country. The
services offered have to be similar. A municipal hospital, for example, cannot do what it pleases; it will have to maintain standards similar to those in the rest of the country.. .. But aside from this, the local 'People's Power' will be the unit of government responsible for what goes on in this hospital, for the way in which it is run and the way its personnel responds to the needs expressed by the population.... The members of the community will be responsible for everything that happens in this hospital. In the previous period of the revolution, the community was served by the hospital or the polyclinic. But these facilities were administered by the Ministry of Health. Henceforth, they will be administered by the community (22)."
The "People's Power" thus represents administrative decentralization, putting activities of a regional character under the control of the communities. Up to the municipal level, the delegates are chosen and elected by the local population. They are subject to recall at all these levels.
But the decision-making process remains highly centralized and not subject to direct control by the masses, and the same goes for the management of enterprises of national importance, banks, and so forth.
The Theses of the First Congress of the CCP, clarify this latter aspect further: "The decentralization process involves transferring to the local organs of 'People's Power' activities, productive units and service facilities, as well as the creation of enterprises subject to local control. It must be accompanied by a reinforcement of the planning and systematic inspection functions that belong to the central organs of the state (23)."
Centralization is assured by the structure of "People's Power." It consists of a series of municipal and provincial assemblies rising in a pyramid towards a National Agsembly, the "highest legislative body." This assembly names the Council of State, which has a chairman,Fidel Castro. He is also chairman of the supreme executive and administrative body, the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, whose members he nominates for ratification by the National Assembly.
"The successive delegations of authority from the National Assembly to the Council of State and from the Council of State to the chairman can lead to a concentration of powers, as is now the case, in the hands of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers. The latter body will probably be, as it is now, composed essentially of members of the Political Bureau of the Party (24)."
What is more: "All the members of the Council of Ministers, except the chairman, are named by the National Assembly of 'People's Power' on the recommendation of the chairman of the Council of Ministers elected by the Assembly. He accepts the resignation of members of the Council of Ministers and nominates their replacements for ratification by the Assembly or the Council of State (Articles 7 and 9)
Andre and Francine Demichel draw the conclusion: "In Cuba, there is a certain one-man rule--which might be considered a step backward--in the executive organs, sin since the chairman of the Council of State, who is also the chairman of the Council of Ministers, has powers detachable from the bodies over which he presides. From the standpoint of theory, cannot be justified, not even by the need to tailor the constitution to fit the special role played by Fidel Castro (26)."
The process of drawing up the plan illustrates this extreme concentration of decision-making power over which the masses have no conbut which is accompanied by an administrative decentralization that provides some room for real mass
All the basic decisions are made in the Political Bureau and Secretariat of the CCP, and then ratified by the congrzas of the CCP, following the same stages that proceeded the submission of the draft constitution to a national referendum.
On the basis of the general outline drawn up by the Political Bureau and Secretariat of the CCP, JUCEPLAN (the Central Planning Board), whose chairman is a member of the Council of Ministers, works out the first draft of the national development plan, after consulting with the plant managers, the mass organizations, groups of specialists, and so forth. This plan is then submitted to the National Assembly, which can amend it and, theoretically, either accept or reject it. Up until now, it has never rejected it, and it is hard to see how such a thing could happen since CP and UJC activists strongly predominate at all levels in the structure of "People's Power."
The delegates to "People's Power'' bodies are only nominated and elected directly up to the level of the municipal assemblies. Moreover, it is not the members of the municipa assemblies who choose the candidates for the provincial assemblies or for the National Assembly but a nominating commission presided over by a representative of the party.
The nominating commission can propose persons who have not been elected by popular vote for municipal assemblies. It is by this mechanism that representatives of the activists in trade unions and enterprises vital to the national interest that remain outside the sphere of the local "People's Power" bodies are included in the structure of "People's Power, " since the electoral unit is not the workplace or school but the neighborhood.
The filtering-out mechanism is thus extremely effective. It is so much so that in 1976, 72.2% of the locally elected delegates were members oí the CP or the UJC, and this percentage went up to 96.7% of the delegates to the National Assembly (91.7% were members of the CP and 5% of the UJC).
Since the party members have already approved the orientations in the CCP congress, their contributions are always limited to amendments of a technical order. This in fact is the reason why they are chosen. Because of the existence of a single party that does not recognize the right of factions and tendencies, there is no possibility of an alternative at the national level.
Nor does the control of the press by the party and the mass organizations linked to it leave any room for debating orientations and ideas. This deprives the masses of a fundamental tool of workers democracy. In fact, the delegates are not elected on the basis of their political positions but of their personal abilities to defend the key decisions and carry them out in practice. The National Assembly cannot therefore in reality play the role oi the supreme body of "People's Power. " Indeed, the network of "People's Power'' organs has a dual function:
--Firstly, to better adjust the central choices to possibilities and needs, because the delegates transmit innumerable and incessant complaints from the workers.
--Secondly, to curb bureaucratic tendencies and administrative red tape on the local level, that is, in the area that touches the masses directly and where they are rightly very sensitive.
The way in which the masses have taken on the task of solving the immediate local problems posed for them through the organs of "People's Power, " and the struggle they are waging in the neighborhoods and municipalities against bureaucratic snarls are the best demonstration of their capacity for action
23
INTERNATIONAL VIEWPOINT and their devotion to the revolution. At the same time, this gives an indication of greater possibilities, if the masses had real organs of socialist democracy at the regional and national levels instead of the present bodies which serve only as a means for applying pressure and for expressing their feelings. The experience accumulated by the Cuban workers over these last twenty years of the revolution provides an important springboard for such a transformation. 1. Victor Turovtsev, El control popular en la sociedad socialista, 2. Article 6 of the Soviet constitution of 1977 says: "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is the force that directs and orients Soviet society, it is the central element in its political system and in all state and social organizations. The CPSU exists for the people and based on the people. Drawing its inspiration from Marxism-Leninism, the Communist Party sets the general perspectives of social development, the guidelines of the USSR's domestic and foreign policy. It directs the great creative activity of the Soviet people, and provides a planned and scientific basis for their struggle for the victory of communism."
This article is very similar to Article No. 5 of the Cuban constitution. By comparison with the Soviet constitution of 1936, it marks a reinforcement of the "leading role of the party." This is reflected, as in the Cuban constitution, by the fact that the "leading role of the party"
is put in the first chapter of the constitution and not as it was in 1936 in Chapter 10, which deals with the "Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens." Cf. Guy Desolre, Les Quatre Constitutions sovietiques--
Savelli, Paris, 1977. Patrice Gelabrol, "Cuba: le Processus d'institutionnalisation, " Notes et Etudes documentaires, February 15, 1977, p. 14. 4. Fidel Castro, la Revolution
Vol. 1, Maspero, Paris, 1969, p. 226. 5. Curso de orientacion politica 1973-74, El partido marxistaleninista, Departamento de orientacion del Comite Central del PCC, Havana, 1973, p. 73. 6. Ibid., p. 66. 7. Ibid., p. 8. Ibid., p. 79. In an explanatory note on "Trotskyist," the manual informs the reader as follows: "Trotskyism, an opportunist current in the RSDRP. It was defeated jected Lenin's doctrine on the possibility of building socialism in one country and opposed the party resolution that called for taking the road of building socialism in the USSR. I They underestimated the importance of the alliance of the workers with which they considered a reactionary force, sooner or later turn against the
With respect to internal party life, they were partisans of the rightto form factions and groupings." 9. Cited in la Nouvelle critique, Carlos Serrano. "L'experience de Matanzas, " April 1975. 10. Andre and Francine Demichel, Cuba, 419 pp. Librairie generale de droit et de jurisprudence (LGDJ, Vol. XXXI, Paris, 1979, pp. 120-121. These two authors are members of
SUBSCRIBE TO the French CP and avowed sympathizers of the Cuban revolution. In the introduction to this work, which investigates essentially the institutional and constitutional aspects, they say:
"This book is not neutral in the meaning given to the word in classical juridical and political ideology. We have taken up the study of Cuba with a feeling of great sympathy. But we never intended to make any systematic apology for Cuba, which would be neither scientific nor credible (p. 13)." On the basis that there was no "pluralist" tradition in
Andre and Francine Demichel defend the principle of the single party. Likewise, they echo the traditional thesis of the CPs about "democratic centralism." Il. Ibid, p. 128 and First Congress of the CCP, Tesis y resoluciones, Havana, pp. 19 and 23. 12. Andre and Francine Demichel, op. cit., p. 102. 13. Ibid., pp. 103-04. 15. First Congress of the CCP, op. cit, p. 77.
### Marta Harnecker, Los protagonistas de un nuevo poder. Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, Havana, 1979, p. 43. 17. First Congress of the CCP, op. cit., p. 245. 18. Andre and Francine Demichel, op. cit., p. 143. 19. Ibid., p. 145. 20. Harnacker, op. cit., p.94. 21. Patrice Gelabrol, op. cit., p. 12. 22. Fidel Castro, July 26, 1977, Speech, Granma, Havana. 23. First Congress of the CCP, op. cit., p. 181. 24. Patrice Gelarol, op. cit, p. 17 25. Ibid., p. 24. 26. Andre and Francine Demichel, op. cit., p. 291. •
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of the Workers and Liberation Movements
REACTION TO THE REPRESSION IN POLAND