The effect of the
Common Market on a dependent economy
The recent Brussels summit of Common Market premiers was dominated by two questions - Britain's repayments and Irish opposition to the proposal to limit milk and dairy production.
The final resolution of the problem for Ireland was in the final deal that allowed a modest growth in Irish milk production of almost 5 per cent this year, although the overall aim is to limit production and impose penalties on countries or producers who exceed the quota.
The article below looks at the effects of EEC membership on the Irish economy, and explains why maintaining the dairy industry is top priority scale enterprises. But the piecemeal reforms imposed by Britain and the resistance of the mass of small farmers resulted in a hybrid system - a minority of large farms in a sea of small, mainly unviable farms.
Ireland's subsequent economic development was profoundly debilitated by this inherited nature of agricultural production and structural deformities of land tenure:
Extensive farming did not require a great deal of reinvestment. Big farm capitalists were conservative. Profits were deposited in the banks rather than put to further productive use.
ii) The profitability of extensive farmers depended on access to British markets. The capitalist farmers were ardent free traders. This had two consequences. Tariff protection was not available for infant Irish industry. Side by side with free trade went free mobility of capital. The banks invested the accumulating agricultural profits in safe British government securities. Irish industry was exposed to the full blast of competition from developed British industry and starved of capital. Indigenous industrial development was consequently very limited.
iii) The land tenure system created a hierarchical division of labour within agriculture whereby the small farmer was constrained to the arduous and meagre end of production (i.e. breeding and rearing) while the capitalist farmers monopolised the speedy and lucrative end (fattening and exporting). Under these conditions the cyclical crises of Irish agriculture tended to be more sudden and deeper. These crises also tended to fall more firmly on the small farmers.
iv) Extensive farming also implied the necessity to minimise the direct cost of land (and property) ownership. This dietated the need for an environment of minimal taxation. State involvement in the economy was initially restricted and the economy was initially restricted and when the level of taxation did begin to rise, its burden was shifted disproportionately onto an already impoverished population. Social needs became heavily dependent on private institutions (mainly religious) and politics took on a distinct clientelist colour.
The Irish economy in the first half of this century was therefore dominated by an elite capitalist farming sector which fed off small, semi-capitalist farming and depended on British markets; a prosperous (if unadventurous) financial sector integrated with the British capital market and with no investment in industry; a merchant sector also dependent on Britain; a small sector of industry consisting of diminutive enterprises catering for the domestic consumer market; and a small sector of exporting industries, based on food/drink, which was largely 1. After the Treaty of Independence the South became the Irish Free State, a Dominion in the British Commonwealth until 1949. The constitutional amendments of 1937, however, stripped this status of all but its most formal meaning. For example, Ireland remained neutral during the Second World War.
• 15 for the Irish government. Brendan KELLY
In May 1972 a referendum in Southern Ireland resoundingly endorsed a proposal to join the EEC. If recent opinion polls are anything to go by, then that initial euphoria has completely evaporated. The Irish population is now reputedly amongst the most discontented of any member state with the EEC.
The reason is not hard to see. The general living standards in the South are 30% below the EEC average. Irish workers, who put in the longest working hours (apart from Greece), are the lowest paid workers in the Community. And the small farmers who earn still less than workers are even worse off.
It is not simply low living standards which cause resentment but the ever increasing disparities in wealth and income distribution. A mere 5% of the population owns three-quarters of the private wealth while 10% of the population takes home a quarter of the national income. Grinding poverty stands in contrast everyInternational Viewpoint 23 April 1984 where to the sumptuous living of a tiny elite.
This picture become more revealing when put in the context of a relative worsening of Ireland's position vis-a-vis other European countries since EEC membership. The widening gap can be judged roughly by the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) index which fell a further 4% behind the EEC average between 1973-79. This trend points to the fact that EEC membership, rather than fostering modern capitalist development in Ireland, has in fact exacerbated the economic contradicitions left by Britain's previous imperialist exploitation. Heritage of the past
The Irish economy was moulded largely to agricultural production under British rule. (1) Moreover, agricultural activity was geared almost totally towards supplying the British market with cheap meat and dairy products. This kind of extensive farming implied the need for agrarian reform along the lines of large
foreign-owned or controlled.
This state of affairs led to repeated periods of stagnation culminating in a profound malaise during the 1950s. The alternative possibility of growth was to adopt a strategy of more comprehensive integration with international imperialism. This became all the more urgent in the 1950s because the possibility of Britain joining the EEC was mooted. In 1961 a decision to seek membership of the EEC was readily supported by the two major bourgeois parties, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael.
EEC membership was sold to the Irish electorate on a number of economic grounds. It was argued that the contradictions of agriculture would be painlessly erased by substantially higher and stable prices; foreign capital would pour in and create a spin-off effect which would lead to a sound industrial base under native control; living standards would increase enormously and the creation of a comprehensive social welfare system would be possible. This was the promise of final de-colonisation. Ireland would at last 'take its place among the nations of the world'
EEC membership did indeed stimulate the Irish economy to some extent. But it could not overcome the forces of chaos which repeatedly created economic torpor and social blight. Agriculture-artificial growth
Within the agricultural sector, entry into the EEC gave rise to historically unprecedented levels of investment and output plus some dramatic windfalls in income. (2) Yet behind this apparant suc cess story lies a grim tale.
Initially price rises (up to 300%) sent Irish farmers into a flurry of modernisation and expansion. But given that the EEC is almost self-sufficient in beef and has a surplus of dairy products -which together constitute 68% of Irish agricultural output - the impact of the original price incentives was bound to be short-lived. From the mid 1970s prices began to level out.
This setback was compounded by a negative turn in the input-output price ratio. Despite a reduction in the use of inputs, this deteriorating ratio took significant bites out of farm profits.
After the initial hectic expansion, a new phase of crisis set in. For the past decade, as a whole, farm income in real terms has remained at the pre-entry level. Growth rates have tapered off and since 1978 have declined to an historic low. The nature of land tenure has remained the same and the variation in farm size has hardly changed at all. The composition of output and the division of labour between various groups of farms has stayed virtually as before. What has happened, however, is that the contradictions of agriculture have sharpened without any fundamental change in the structure of production. Insofar as the potential for such change did emerge, it has tended 16
Some farmers do well in the EEC (DR) towards wholesale disintegration rather than any long-term solution.
To get the full story it is necessary to penetrate beneath the surface veneer of success. During the period of EEC membership the artificial support system of European agricultural policy has intensified a number of distortions in Irish farming which are concealed by statistical averages.
Income. Agricultural income has been static in real terms over the past years. But within this context there have been striking changes. The two cattle crises of 1974 and 1978 played a major role in levelling out the overall returns to farmers. However, the EEC intervention support for beef ensured that the burden of these disasters would fall disproportionately on the breeders and rearers of cattle. The big capitalist farmers were able to sell their beef at guaranteed prices through EEC intervention while at the same time refusing to purchase any more young cattle for fattening. The bottom fell out of the market therefore only for the medium and, especially, small farmers. This left them overstocked with all the obvious consequences for the viability of their farms.
Today over half the income from agriculture accrues to one fifth of the farmers. *The fact that the average farm income is below the average industrial wage (one of the lowest in the EEC) gives an idea of the penury in which 80% of Irish farmers live.
Growth. Output fell dramatically to around 1% per annum after 1978. The main feature of this trough was a huge reduction in the national cattle herd which fell by several hundred thousand, back to its 1970 level. Parallel with this, there has been a shift by big farmers into dairying, having a greater concentration of cattle on small farms. Indeed, an increasing number of small farms produce nothing but cattle. The decline of the beef sector therefore means that the number of farms producing absolutely nothing is bound to grow.
The structural anomaly is worse than that however. The fortunes of beef and dairying are interrelated. An important part of the viability of dairying depends on the provision of cows to produce calves for beef output. The shift from beef to dairying therefore closes off a vicious circle rather than opens up new prospects.
This vicious circle has become more significant recently. The medium sized milk producers have received some relief from the crisis mainly through subsidies to calves for beef breeding — the aim is to support dairying while renewing the cattle herd. At times the prices for such calves have been astronomically high. But there is no likelihood of significant beef price increases in the foreseeable future. The market for calves is bound to collapse. This time there will be serious consequences not only for the small farmer purchasers but also for a large part of the dairying sector - this at a time when the milk Super Levy axe is about to fall.
Land tenure. Land continues to be as immobile as ever despite a rapid fall in prices which in the mid-1970s were the highest in Europe. Over the past decade the average size of holdings have increased by only 2 acres. The effects of EEC membership have intensified this problem.
On the one hand a high level of debt servicing and general uncertainty makes the big farmers reluctant to purchase. To meet this situation they are turning 2. Garret FitzGerald, leader of Fine Gael and prime minister, recently stated that he considered \the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as, 'one of the cornerstones of the Community. It is a lot more important for us, he continued, than for any other country. Participation in CAP has freed us from dependency on the policy on food prices practised by Great Britain, which had prevented the growth of our agriculture.' Le Monde, May 28, 1983.
International Viewpoint 23 April 1984
(albeit marginally) to a more intensive use of land rather than augmenting their holding. The problem of debt is the most immediate and fundamental cause of this. Farm indebtedness rose from 15% of total indebtedness in 1970 to a record 30% in 1980. Farm indebtedness represented 40% of farmers annual income in 1970 and had increased to 120% by 1980. This debt is spread across the whole farming population but is concentrated in the medium and big farmers.
Many medium and small farmers, on the other hand, are gravitating towards family subsistence farming. They are prepared to accept an income far inferior to the average wage. Changes in market prices for products or land do not exert substantial pressure on them to leave farming. Some 50% of farms, on one third of the land farmed, contribute nothing to growth of new output. The bulk of growth is produced by 20% of farmers. The 30% of borderline cases are particularly threatened by current EEC trends. There is a real possibility that 80% of farmers could end up in the subsistence/part-time category. This will, under conditions of family ownership of farms, intensify rather than ease the immobility of land.
Combined with this, the division of labour between big and small farmers is roughly defined on a regional basis. The consolidation of small and medium farms into viable enterprises would have to take place through a differentiation among small and medium farmers themselves. The deep depression in which these groups have languished, virtually rules out such a struggle. The structural contradictions involved in the division of labour and the nature of landholding is likely to remain unchanged for some considerable time to come. Fool's gold from multinationals
The implications of the situation in agriculture will be enormous for the Irish economy as a whole. At the economic level, agriculture employs directly or indirectly 30% of the national labour force, accounts for up to 45% of output in the goods sector, and represents 50% of net exports. At the social level, nearly half the population lives in rural areas and it is there that a considerable section of Ireland's poor is located.
Irish industry, particularly manufacturing, is supposedly one of the big success stories of EEC membership. During the 1970s manufacturing output grew at a rate of 4% per annum compared with the ½ % EEC average. But this growth exhibited a number of defects and has caused more problems than it solved.
Manufacturing has undoubtedly increased its weight within the economy. But much of the growth is superficial. Away and by far the most dynamic component of this sector has been the foreign multinationals. Throughout the 1970s Southern Ireland easily attracted more foreign firms (relative to population size) International Viewpoint 23 April 1984 compared with other EEC countries. These firms now employ over a third of the manufacturing workforce and account for 70% of exports. Indeed the significant growth of manufactured exports during the 1970s was almost exclusively generated by the overseas multinationals.
Nonetheless, this performance still does not give much hope for long-term development. The performance of the multinationals in Ireland is strikingly similar to that in other so-called 'developing' (i.e. neo-colonial) countries:
- Linkages with the rest of the economy are extremely low - only 16% of their inputs are purchased locally. In some branches, such as chemicals, only 3% of raw materials are purchased in Ireland.
- They are generally low skilled assembly operations and for the most part low-pay industries. h Their valueadded content is extremely low.
- They are generally small plants with restricted potential for employment - an average of 100 jobs per plant.
In addition to this very weak spinoff effect, the multinationals actually create barriers to growth:
- They supply only a third of the capital needed to set-up. Thus, they are in competition with local industry for the rest.
- 90% of their profits are tax-iree -ausing a multı-millon nole ın tax re enue.
The free trade environment which they dictate has caused a precipitous decine in the traditional industries. A quarter of the jobs which existed in indigenous industry in 1973 have now disappeared. Since this sector produces mainly for the domestic market the result is not only a decline in net job creation but also increased imports.
- These companies make huge profits. The US companies, according to the US Department of Commerce achieve a return of 30%, which is well above the performances in any other EEC country where the average is 13%. Reinvestment was initially high (70%). In the last few years this has changed drastically. In 1983 over IR£1,000 milllion (about half the balance of payments deficit) in unspecified outflows occured. It is believed by economists that IR£300 million of this was repatriated as multinational profits.
These aspects of the multinationals makes it clear that a strategy of relying on foreign investment can make no headway in grappling with the macroeconomic problems which beset the Irish economy. Irish industry still has the lowest level of productivity in the EEC; there has been no net increase in manufacturing employment over 10 years; despite the fact that manufacturing greatly increased its factor share of GNP and exports, a structural balance of payments deficit (attenuated for the moment by a fall in imports caused by a general decrease in consumption) still exists. The latter problem is one of the major medium-term constraints to economic growth and it is ironic that the multinationals which dominate exports are a main contributor to it. Certainly in the short term, with the purchase of plant and material from capital snapped up in Ireland (two thirds of setting up capital) and importers of large initial stocks, they contribute heavily to the payments deficit. This is probably true in the long term as well, given a steady departure rate and the constantly high proportion of new companies in this sector. Huge borrowing
As for the rest of the manufacturing sector - indigenous companies - it contributes relatively to economic growth and is dependent largely on the domestic market. The only other significant sector of industry is building and construction. It usually employs 10% of the labour force and contributes output at around 20% of the GDP. Since this sector depends heavily on developments in industry and agriculture and on the level of consumer and government spending, it is hardly surprising that it is going through the worst crisis in forty years. At the moment nearly half the workforce is unemployed. b With over one million square feet of office space and three million square feet of factory space lying idle and with a thriving market in secondhand housing there is little hope of an early revival.
The most sobering aspect of the situation in industry is that a full reckoning with the results of reliance on foreign investment has still to be faced. A contraction of multinational operations is now underway. Most of the foreign owned plants in Ireland are subsidiaries of companies at the bottom end of the multinational spectrum (only a handful of the 800 firms figure in Fortune's top 500). At the best of times these firms had a redundancy rate of 30% over ten years. Now the rigours of recession and the general climate of depression is taking an even greater toll. A recent survey indicated that a quarter of Irish based foreign firms are already considering relocating elsewhere. On top of this, Ireland's share of outside investment coming to Europe has declined steadily over the past few years.
This process is likely to accelerate in the future. The long-term decline in the economies and labour costs of some of the advanced European countries -notably Britain - plus accession of Greece and Portugal to the EEC will stiffen competition for the location of multinational subsidiaries. Ireland long ago reached the bottom line in the package of grants and concessions it can offer. The creation of 80,000 multinational jobs has cost the Irish exchequer IR£6,000 million. There is no more scope for increasing the bidding.
Under the lengthening shadow of this impasse a major debate on reorientating industrial strategy is in progress. The consensus emerging from this debate is in
17
favour of turning Ireland into a base for the provision of international services. The latest ten year plan of the Industrial Development Authority (the government's chief "job creating agency') foresees no more than 10,000 manufacturing jobs being created over the next decade. The development of luxurious medicare facilities and banking enclaves is being canvassed as a way of generating wealth to create services-type jobs. The dream of industrialisation is being buried unceremoniously. The so-called "Telesis Report, which initiated the debate on new strategy, commented that previous economic policy had turned Ireland into a "small export haven'. For the Irish bourgeoisie the logical progression is to turn Ireland into a playground for the international jet set.
The way in which economic contradictions under conditions of EEC membership have sharpened is well illustrated in the dramatic growth of a crisis in public finances. Much of the controversy over government expenditure has focussed on current spending. The reason is obvious enough. The current budget has been rising steadily - from 30% of the GNP (Gross National Product) in the early 1970s to 40% in the 1980s. At the same time the current budget deficit has risen from zero in 1970 to 8% of the GNP by 1980.
However, at the same time Ireland has experienced a phenomenal growth in capital formation. In the 1960s it averaged 20% of the GNP and after EEC membership, it rose to over 30%. This growth has been motored by government growth has been motored by government expenditure. Throughout the past decade the public capital programme doubled its share of national capital formation and by the 1980s stood at 50% of the total.
Since the capital programme is financed largely through borrowing, the level of national debt has increased accordingly. It has risen from 66% of the GNP in the early 1970s to almost 100% of the GNP today. The fiscal logic behind this was the assumption that an increase in productivity would eventually produce a compensating flow of revenue.
In fact, public capital spending has risen faster than current expenditure. Furthermore, within the aggregate of capital spending the share going to manufacturing rose most rapidly. In sum, the aim of successive governments was to force march the pace of industrial development so as to sustain adequate expenditure on current services, etc.
It is precisely the failure of industrial strategy and not excessive growth of current outlays which is at the root of the disorders in public finances. Current spending increases were not exorbitant by EEC standards were necessary simply to prevent a worsening of already bad conditions. For example, social welfare was the fastest growing component of current spending but in the last five years some 40% of this growth was caused by an increase of recipients, due to higher unemployment and falling 18 incomes. The high level of expenditure on health reflects a costly and inefficient service with too many small and outdated hospitals (50% of health spending goes on hospitals). This situation is maintained largely at the behest of conservative pressure groups such as local bourgeois interests, religious orders and professionals.
Although the level of Irish public spending looks satisfactory compared to general EEC standards, it is far from adequate relative to the needs of the Irish people. Southern Ireland has:
The greatest proportion of poor in the EEC - a quarter of the population lives below the poverty line, which is defined as two thirds of the average income (which is, in turn, only two thirds of the EEC average).
- One of the highest ratios of pupils to teachers and one of the lowest levels of expenditure on education.
- Amongst the lowest use of such items as household electricity, private cars, telephones, televisions, etc.
One of the fastest growing populations and highest dependency ratios (over 40% of the population is either under the age of 14 years or over the age of 65 years).
- One of the highest rates of unemployment — at 19% it is greater than the entire manufacturing workforce.
The social situation in Ireland has not improved at all since EEC membership. A survey this year revealed that Ireland as a whole is the most disadvantaged country in the EEC and is only a hairsbreath ahead of regional blackspots such as Sardinia.
The failure of industrial strategy means that there is no economic dynamic which can pull the nation out of this social backwater in which it is now floundering. On the contrary, the crisis of public finances will aggravate the situation still further.
The staggering size of the nationa debt has produced two new problems: foreign indebtedness and punitive taxation.
As government borrowing increased, the liquidity of the financial sector seriously decreased, interest rates rose and credit became scarce. The private sector was in danger of grinding to a halt. Governments of the day then turned to international financial institutions. Suddenly, public foreign borrowing rose from practically nothing before EEC membership to over 40% of the GDP at present. Along with this, the servicing of foreign debt has grown to a dangerous level of 6.7% of the GDP. This level of external borrowing and debt servicing (equal to about two thirds of external reserves) could, if uncorrected, lead to a decline of confidence by Ireland's trade partners and consequent disruption of the whole economy.
Apart from borrowing, the only other source of finance available is tax revenue. Since EEC membership the level of taxation has risen steadily.
At the beginning of the 1970s Ireland's tax level was lower than any of
But small dairy farmers hard hit by EEC policy (DR)
International Viewpoint 23 April 1984
the existing EEC countries. Since then, taxes have risen from 27% of the GNP to 41% presently.
Within this overall rise, a consistent shifting of sections of society has occurred. Income tax (87% of which is paid from wages) has almost doubled since the early 1970s to 14% of the GDP today and indirect taxes on consumer goods increased in the same period from 10% to 18%. Thus, nearly four fifths of taxes fall mainly on the workers and poor.
The overall level of taxation, given the relative underdevelopment of Ireland, is punitively high and the share borne by workers and their allies almost unbearable. The latitude for extracting more revenue by means of taxation is, therefore, negligible.
With excessive foreign borrowing and excessive taxation, government fiscal policy is caught between two grinding stones. Any attempt to significantly reduce external debt would cause a spiralling deflation - deflation, erosion of tax base and external reserves and further deflation. As against this, to increase or even maintain the existing level of taxation would risk serious political unrest and damage Ireland's credit rating thereby activating the balance of payments constraint inherent in the foreign debt. The result would be equally deflationary.
The only way out is through a programme of massive cuts. There is a solid consensus between the two major bourgeois parties and the Labour Party on this. (3) But the type of deflation such a programme would necessitate, added to the social and economic crisis which already exists, has its own dangers.
Apart from the obvious economic dangers, there is a highly organised and combative working class to contend with -over 50% of Irish workers are unionised. What the workers lack most is a political awareness of their own strength. A full-scale attempt to dismantle state involvement in the economy would undoubtedly lead to a questioning of the delicate political consensus on which the state rests. That kind of fermentation in workers' consciousness is already apparent in the governmental instability which emerged from the last three general elections and in three massively supported national work stoppages against the tax system in 1979, 1980 and 1981. (4) None of the politicians want to cut too deeply, too quickly. None wants to be the first to feel the full might of workers' anger. So on top of economic instability, there is a growing political instability. 3. The Irish government is a coalition between Fine Gael and the Labour Party. The latter has 17 members in parliament, mainly from rural areas. Fianna Fail the more populist 'nationalist' of the bourgeois parties has a greater support among workers. Nevertheless, some unions, including the Irish Transport and General Workers Union, are affiliated to the Labour Party. 4. These were strikes by workers, who pay tax under the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) system, i.e., deduction from their wages. Tax rates are very high - partly to finance the inducements offered to multinationals to set up in Ireland. International Viewpoint 23 April 1984
NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS