The effects of the black gold rush on the African neocolonial economies
The OPEC special conference held in Vienna last March pointed up in particular the fragility of this cartel of producing countries in the face of the maneuvers of the big imperialist countries. The tactic of cutting back oil production somewhat in the attempt to hold up the sale price of crude and thereby maintain the currency income of the producing countries has only limited effectiveness.
This is first of all because the imperialist countries can buy from non-OPEC members (not all oil producers are members). But it is also because Saudi Arabia, one of the pillars of imperialist policy in the Middle East holds the top cards in OPEC. It produces by itself more than five times the amount of crude produced by the second largest exporter in OPEC, Venezuela, and nearly ten times more than Algeria and Libya.
This conference also revealed the extreme dependence of the Nigerian economy on the world market and the big imperialist companies. The competition of cheap NOrth Sea oil, and also doubtless the maneuvers of the oil comapnies, foreed a sharp cutback in Nigerian oil production (from 2,000,000 barrels a day in January 1981 to 700,000 in August of the same year).
Since Nigeria gets 90% of its export income and 80% of its domestic income from oil, any drop in oil production means grave consequences for the economy of the country. So, Nigeria's currency reserves dropped by two-thirds over 1981. The credits allocated to the Development Plan had to be cut by about 2.4 billion dollars. Thus, Nigeria's economic dependence on the world capitalist market is increasing.
On this occasion, OPEC managed to prevent a new cut in the price of Nigerian oil by granting the country a subsidy of a billion dollars paid by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which can only increase Nigeria's foreign debt, already 7 billion dollars. But this did not at all reduce the country's economic dependency.
So, this is what is left of the illusions that were entertained in Black Africa about the possibilities for "independent" develop ment offered by oil. Besides showing the emptiness of these illusions, the following article analyzes in detail the consequences of the economic differentiation created by oil among the various African countries. A distinct "oil producer model of industrialization" is now emerging which does not, however, represent a break in the structural economic dependence of these countries on the capitalist world market and imperialism.
Claude GABRIEL
The various stages in the pillage of Africa did not affect all the countries and regions of the continent evenly. The golden age of mining and colonial super-profits itself brought about a certain differentiation among the countries. Then, with the advent of decolonialization and, at the start of the 1970s, of industrialization schemes, the imperialists adopted the conscious aim of increasing the uneven development of the African countries.
For example, in the framework of the First Convention of Lome, which linked 44 African, Pacific, and Caribbean countries to the European Economic Community, the European International Trade Center (Centre europeen du commerce international-CECI) was set up. The chairman of this body, Olivier Giscard d'Estaing indicated quite clearly the policy of preferential treatment adopted by imperialist Europe. The tasks of the CECI, he said, were "to develop to the highest possible degree economic relations between a 'selected' group of countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, and European companies, with the aim of establishing profitable and enduring arrangements (1)."
This selectiveness by investorsbased on economic, social, and political criteria-has resulted in aggravating the disadvantages suffered by various coun tries, which originally arose because of such factors as isolation, insufficient resources, or the spread of deserts.
Because of the inequalities in the availability of commercial outlets and financing, the regional industrial schemes have generally favored one of the countries involved to the disadvantage of the others. 24
It was, to a certain extent, in an attempt to cover up this state of affairs that the concept of "the least advanced countries" was put forward. These countries, for reasons deliberately left obscure, are set apart as the poorest of the poor. Of the 31 countries put in this category, 21 are sub-Saharan African countries.
This unevenness has increased still more since the big oil price rises in 197374. Most of the countries in Black Africa produce little if any oil. Imported fuels account for between 13% and 15% of their total imports. The worst off in this respect are Zimbabwe (formally Rhodesia) and Uganda. Some 30% of their total imports are fuels.(2) In comparison, the four main oil countries in sub-Saharan Africa — Nigeria, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, and Angola - pay only 2% of their import bill for fuels.
The oil problem has steadily pushed up the foreign debt of the importing countries. The current accounts deficit of the African oil importing countries has gone from 1.5 billion dollars in 1970 to 8 billion in 1980 (3).
Moreover, above and beyond this foreign trade imbalance, the presence or absence of oil in Africa seems to be becoming additional basis for discriminatory investment policies.
Many African governments have started a frantic search for oil, while only a few years ago everyone seemed to have made up their minds that most of these countries had no petroleum resources.
The known reserves today are quite modest. The four countries currently producing oil hold the bulk of them (4). But obviously these figures have to be taken with a grain of salt. It can never be excluded that an unexpected find may put a country that now seems to lack commercially exploitable fields at the head of the pack. We also know that one day, for political reasons, the Western drilling companies may "discover" major reserves where they searched, apparently in vain, for years (5).
Next in order of importance after the four African oil exporters are some countries that still produce small and inadequate amounts of oil, even for their domestic market, but still enough to fire hopes of their governments and the interest of investors. This group is made up of the Cameroons, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Zaire.
This trend is beginning to take on considerable importance in the imperialists' plans, and obviously to have an effect on the chances that the various African countries have to interest investors.
A good example of this phenomenon is provided by the Congo-Brazzaville. Traditionally, this country has had only a very marginal attraction for French investors. Henceforth, they may find it much more interesting. It did give you a bit of a start to hear Robert Galley, then minister of cooperation in the Giscard-Barre government, say that the Congo could become a country with a future. Always before, this country's self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist junta was supposed to be a bugbear for French investors.
AFP, Abidjan, April 12, 1975. World Bank Report (the "Berg Report") "Indicative Action Program for Black Africa," 1981, p. 175. 3. Ibid., p. 21, in 1978 dollars. 4. For all Black Africa, reserves are estimated at a little more than 19 billion barrels. "Berg Report," p. 121. 5. For example, on several occasions the Congolese government has complained about the ELF-ERAP cutting back production on the pretext of insufficient reserves. Then when the across-the-board increases in the price of crude made Congolese offshore crude more profitable, this company "discovered" major reserves.
The presence of oil seems to have come to weigh more heavily in the balance than ideological facades. At least this seems to be what a director of the
SCOA trading and industrial company
(in which the Paribas Bank holds the majority interest) thought when he said that "it is not Beauce or Brie that give the franc zone its solidarity. It is the
French African Community franc, which has been strengthened in recent years by the volume of African oil surpluses (6)."
In other words, the French African
Community franc is nothing but the
"mother country's " currency issued under another name by the central banks located in the former French African colonies. No matter whether these countries are Gabon, which was long controlled by
Gaullist mercenaries, or the Congo, whose regime claims to be revolutionary and apes its Soviet "brother," the oil is pumped by French firms in the same currency area. This neo-colonial oil could not be any more French if it were pumped in the Paris basin itself.
If countries such as the Congo
Brazzaville are able to attract international finance thanks to their oil reserves, the hierarchy of uneven development in
Black Africa could easily be upset. Is the cIssification that Olivier Giscard d'Estaing made for his CECI in 1975 still valid in 1982?
Countries such as Senegal and Kenya, which seemed first in line for imperialist industrial projects, may lose a lot of their attraction if oil comes to play such a role.
While we have to be cautious about extrapolating possibilities in a sector like oil, and the past months have shown how unstable the oil market is, we should still consider the advantages that African crude could offer for the imperialists, and therefore the sort of structural role it could play for sub-Saharan economic projects.
### SCHEMES
In the first place, African crude, especially from Nigeria and Gabon, is regarded as high quality, light, and producing little pollution in the refinement process. Secondly, for political reasons not hard to understand, this oil is located in countries that can be controlled more easily than those in the Middle East.
The political weakness of the African ruling classes and regimes in general makes it possible for Western governments to keep a firm grip on sources of supply in these countries. Despite some tough-sounding positions toward South Africa, the Nigerian government has never dared to try to do what the Arab ruling classes did at the time of the 1973 war with Israel (7).
For both political and economic reasons, it does not seem either as if the Black African oil producers have any particular desire to join OPEC. Gabon and Nigeria are members. But the CongoBrazzaville and Angola are not. And the Cameroons and the Ivory Coast show
SHELL
91875 even less interest.
It is obviously out of the question that African oil will ever figure more importantly in Western imports than oil produced in the Arab countries or in Latin America. Such a possibility is not involved in the question of the importance of African oil. However, countries such as France or the U.S. do have an interest in diversifying their sources. That is the reason that France has gotten its hands so sticky in Gabonese or Congolese crude and the U.S. in Nigerian.
In reality, African oil seems to play a role mainly as regards the "model of development." Since it by itself attracts certain industrial and trading capital, it becomes the trigger of certain processes of development. Oil income changes political and economic behavior. Around the hopes fired by oil, schemes take form in other areas, including the social.
The basic scheme held in common by the imperialist governments and the African governments with respect to this oil can be summarized as follows-maximize oil income in order to promote the economic and social development of the countries concerned. At least, this is the publicly expressed political intent.
However, taking into account what was said above about the political weakness of the African regimes, the actual return per barrel of oil sold to their national incomes has varied greatly. The general increase in income that they expected has been far from realized everywhere. The actual increase has varied widely owing to the disparity of techniques for removing the oil, the multiplication of new types of drilling and pumping contracts, as well as big differences in the various fiscal systems.
In certain cases, the overwhelming political and economic power of one or another imperialist country, which
SPROFITS STANDAR ROBB could be the major buyer of oil and the holder of the oil concessions, 'has tended to push the local bourgeoisie virtually into a comprador status, despite its theoretical ownership of the petroleum reserves. This is certainly the case as regards the French role in Gabon. are "natural" in the aratest of the world capitalist economy, the growth of oil production in a country can have catastrophic effects, as the experts and the governments themselves have regularly pointed out but without anyone paying very much attention (8). A general study of the economies of Nigeria and
Gabon over the past ten years highlights the following structural effects.
-Flight from the land and mushrooming of cities; decline of agriculture and increased dependence on food imports.
—Stepped up inflationary tendencies.
-The development of industrial projects not related to the needs of the domestic market but inspired by the local energy resources.
THE EXAMPLE OF NIGERIA Nigeria is the leading African oil producer, out ahead of Libya and Algeria. In 1979, its income from oil amounted to 25 billion U.S. dollars (15 billion in 1978). The United States was the main buyer, taking 40.7 % of Nigerian production (9). 6. Le Matin de Paris, December 19, 1980. 7. In 1979, the Nigerian government decided to nationalise the assets of British Petroleum after denouncing the complicity of this company with South Africa. 8. See for example the documents of the "Seminario internacional sobre petroleo e desenvolvimento," Luanda, Angola, May 5-8, 1981, Ministerio dos Petroleos.
Nigeria Department of Information, Ambassade du Nigeria, Paris.
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In the 16 years between 1964 and 1980, Nigerian oil production increased from 6 million tons to 103 million tons. These few figures suffice to indicate the scope and dynamism of this industry in Nigeria.
Obviously, with such resources, it is not surprising that Nigeria is one of the few countries in Black Africa that do not have a deficit in their balance of payments. Despite this wealth, in fact we could say because of it, this country has the classical imbalance of foreign trade that marks neocolonial states. Oil accounts for 90% of the value of Nigerian exports. Its imports are essentially machinery and transportation equipment (43.7% of the total in 1978), manufactured goods, food, and chemical products. Stagnation or relative decline in the oil market would throw Nigeria into a grave financial crisis.
Without having to wait for that, the Nigerian economy is already suffering ill effects from this high oil income. Since 1977, the country has been importing more than a 100 tons of cereals per year. The avarage daily consumption of food has been declining, and for some years the urban population has been growing at a rate or 107o • in lace on nas been a a rate of 10% . In fact oil has been a disaster for the peasants. In 1968, agricultural products, including cotton, accounted for 62% of the income from exports. As early as 1974, they accounted for only 5% in a volume that had, to be sure, multiplied 15 times. But this relative decline was accompanied by a collapse of the market that ruined the peasants (10).
The food deficit has grown at the same rate as the increase in the population and the flight from the land. In 1960, 13% of the population lived in the capital, Lagos. In 1980, 17% did. But for the country as a whole, 58% of Nigerians now lived in the nine cities with a population of over 500,000, as against the 22% in the 1960 that lived in the two cities that at that time had reached that size (11).
This went along with the inflationary tendency of an economy centered around oil income. From 1970 to 1977, the consumer price index rose by 200%. Food prices increased by 500% (12).
Nigeria shows on a grand scale for Black Africa what happens in countries with large incomes from extractive industries, whether it be oil or other mining operations. A part of this income goes into the speculation and luxurious consumption of the ruling class, which, moreover, may grow rapidly under the cover of "Africanization" of the professional staffs and the management of companies.
The financial gains are not pumped back into the Nigerian market to the benefit of the majority of the population. The capitalist development of the country remains marked by the features of dependence, backwardness of the ruling layers, and weakness of the domestic market. 26
Po The oil income, moreover, increases the political and economic weight of the state. On a continent where the ruling classes remain so dependent on income from the state, it is not surprising that the growth of the state's revenue results in a growth of theirs.
In a country such as Nigeria where the regions and therefore the various petty-bourgeois groups and regional notables maintain a major weight, building a stable strong federal state is a key objective for a part of the bourgeoisie, the state butreaucracy, and the army.
The oil boom has made it possible to build up a federal army of more than 250,000 men. It has paved the way for an increasing meshing of this force with the machinery of the administrative apparatus. The military regime has increased the number of states in the federation, thereby moderating the polarization between the three big regional-ethnic blocks, the Hausa-Fulani in the North, the Ibo in the East, and the Yoruba in the West(14).
A NEW TÄRGET FOR IMPERIALISM
Even the enormous financial resources that oil has provided for Nigeria have not made it possible for the country to develop in an independent and sov10. Johny Egg."Un effet de la rente petroliere au Nigeria," le Monde diplomatique, May 1981. It can also be noted that sales of cacao dropped from 320,000 tons in 1965 to 152,000 tons in 1980. 11. The population of the capital. Lagos, has gone in twenty years from 1 million to 4.5 million under the combined effect of industrialization and the increase in the volume of money circulating in the urban milieu. For the sake of comparison, it can be noted that the industrialized African countries show an annual increase of 18% in the population of their main increase of 18% in the population of their main city. See the "Berg Report," p.203. 12. Le Monde diplomatique, November ereign way. The temporary drop in oil revenues in 1978, resulting from a decline in the demand for Nigerian light crude, revealed, moreover, how precarious these resources are in the context of intense international competition with North Sea oil. In the third quarter of 1981, Great Britain moved into the place that had been held by Nigeria in oil sales to the U.S.
This evolution is directly linked to wide fluctuations in the price of crude. The Americans shifted to the cheaper British oil. Thus, too in recent months, Nigeria has been obliged to lower the price of its oil, thereby reducing its financial resources (15).
This precariousness of the oil market has not kept the imperialists from making loans to economies centered around the miraculous black gold. In fact, the multinational corporations are in the best position to profit from the imbalances created by such polarized economies. To take the case of Nigeria again, the drop in cereals production opened up an important market for a company such as Flour Mills, which holds a virtual monopoly on imported grain and owns the only silos in the country (16).
The weapon of hunger, as the imperialist monopoly on cereals reserves has come to be called, is not the least of the 1980, p.27.
For example, we might mention copper in the case of Zaire and Zambia. 14. Le Monde diplomatique, November 1980. 15. It cannot be excluded that there was also a political basis for the choice the U.S. made. since Nigeria has already shown a desire to use its oil resources as a means of influencing Western policy toward South Africa. Washington in return can use its purchases in Nigeria as means of blackmail. 16. See Johny Egg, art. cit., le Monde diplomatique, May 1980.
05S Gulf advantages the capitalists have gained from the oil business. In time, it is not inconceivable that the food deficits will absorb a considerable part of the income from extractive industries.
The annual growth in the demand for food in Nigeria is 3.5%. But food production increases by only 1 %. On this basis, it can be estimated that in 1990, the food deficit will amount to 20 million tons of cereals. At present prices, 20 million tons of rice represents a cost of 10 billion dollars, that is, 50% of the country's oil income (17).
### DESTRUCTIVE CAPITALIST
DEVELOPMENT All the governments concernedthe Nigerian, the Gabonese, the Congolese, the Angolan, and that of the Ivory Coast-swear that they are going to plow back part of their oil profits into agriculture. Obviously it is a long way from words to deeds.
But it is perhaps more important to take a close look at what these agricultural projects involve. For example, the Gabonese "Interim Plan" for 198182 calls for transforming the traditional modes of agriculture in order to stop the flight from the land. But this objective is supposed to be achieved by the development of big agri-businesses (18).
Nigeria's "Fourth Development Plan" also calls for building up big agri-businesses in order to attract foreign investment. It says explicitly that it is unfortunate that in the past the planners were more concerned about increasing the area under cultivation than per-worker and per-unit productivity (19).
Such statements make it plain enough that these celebrated oil booms are going to open up the way for more brutal capitalist penetration into the countryside. Moreover, this is by no means going to stop the flight from the land. The big agri-businesses have very little interest in providing work for the rural population as a whole. And the growth of agri-business in the coun tryside is going to break down the village social structures at an increasing rate.
The cumulative effects of these changes will increase the stimulants for the youth to move to the cities, seeking crumbs of oil income in often marginal jobs working for the parasitic layers of the state apparatus.
In the Congo-Brazzaville, the northern part of the capital, the Bateke plateau, is already a virtual human dessert. And there is every reason to assume that
Mobil TEXACO at the same rate as the few families in power devour the oil income, the influx of youth from the land into Brazzaville to live off this artificial economy will continue to swell-(20).
It is not decisive, moreover, how big a share one or another government takes in the deals it makes with the imperialist countries. Zaire has taken 76% in its agreement with Gulf Oil and could claim, on this basis, to be more "progressive" than Angola, which has also entered into partnership with Gulf Oil in the Cabinda enclave.
Oil income for these African countries is like a magic potion that becomes a poison when misused.
Some 80% of Angola's income from exports comes from oil. It is not decisive whether it is the Angolan state or the companies that make the biggest profit. On the other hand, it is disturbing to see that an entire economy depends on the oil market.
No more than other commodities does oil represent a weapon for achieving economic independence. The producing countries do not wield monopoly control of this resource, despite all the attempts by OPEC since 1973.
The imperialists were able to turn the circulation of petro-dollars to their advantage, just as in the present situation of fluctuating prices they have been able to organize the market to maximize their profits.
Those governments that claimed that they were going to free themselves from imperialist domination without breaking with the laws of the market have been the first to fall into the trap. The Angolan government is clearly dependent on the oil market, rather than being able to control it. In the U.S. itself, certain circles see this quite clearly, and understand how to reinforce this situation and take advantage of it. Gulf Oil and Texaco did a lot of lobbying in 1981 to keep congress from repealing the Clark Amendment, which since 1976 has banned aid to the Angolan opposition movements without congressional approval (21). February 12, 1982. From 1970 to 1980 food Marches tropicaux et mediterraneens imports increased by 1,200%. 18. Ibid, November 27, 1981, p. 3137. 19. Ibid, February 12,1982, p. 369. 20. On the nature of the Congolese regime and its economy, see Claude Gabriel, "Un masque progressiste pour un Etat neocolonial," Inprecor, May 13. 1981. 21. Recently, David Rockefeller, former president of Chase Manhattan Bank said, referring to Angola, where this bank is active, that he thought African Marxism was more "a matter of labels and appearances, " than reality. Le Monde, March 6, 1982.
### AGGRAVATION OF UNEVEN
DEVELOPMENT In conclusion, we can predict that the African oil business is going to increase the uneveness of development in Black Africa in two ways. There will be a growing unevenness in the producing countries between a modern capitalist economy and a peasantry left out in the cold. There will be uneven development between the coun tries that export oil and the others.
The four countries most mentioned in this article will soon be joined by the Ivory Coast, which is expected to begin exporting oil in 1983, and later, perhaps, by the Cameroons.
There is more and more prospecting for oil in Mozambique, Mali, Senegal and other countries. According to a recent study published by the Italian oil company AGIP, the northern edges of the Gulf of Guinea may prove to be one of the seven largest Saudi-type oil fields in the world.
Between 1975 and 1979, the land leased in Africa to the twenty biggest international oil companies totalled 1.8 million square kilometers, or more than 52.2% of the total area leased for oil operations in the world in that period.(22)
Oil extraction in the Black African countries is a new outlet for the multinational companies. Since these coun tries have some other natural resources, and are also an important area for industial restructuring, imperialist interests may focus on these countries. The classical colonial superprofits are combining with an increasing inequality in the relations of trade. The industries that are growing up on the basis of oil production are appearing at an opportune time to meet the growing needs of the imperialist centers to export producers goods.
With the Ivory Coast already selling refined products to Mali and the Upper Volta and Nigeria doing the same to Benin and Ghana, we can see a new stage in the uneven development of Black Africa taking shape. Oil may thus become a trigger of a movement of capital toward a few countries to the ruin of the hopes of the others.
There is no doubt that the oil age in Black Africa will pose still more clearly the question of who profits from natural wealth (23). The graphs showing the growth of budgets and the means of payment do not take into account what is the essential factor for the African masses, that is, that the ruling classes are draining off the bulk of this income in a parasitic way. 22. Nicolas Sarkis' Center, director of the Arab Petroleum Research speech at the seminar in Luanda, May 1981. See footnote 8. 23. On two occasions, Nigeria has passed through traumas in which the oil question did not fail to play a role. The first was the Biafran secession during which the main imperialist countries tried to stabilize an Ibo state around the oil fields. The second was the Kano uprising in the North in October 1980, in which an Islamic sect launched a holy war, recruiting its followers among the masses marginalized by the oil boom. So, the advent of the oil bonanza has not failed to pose grave problems for the federal institutions.
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