New confrontations between the government and the miners THE BOLIVIAN working class, most notably the miners who have historically been its vanguard, have energetically resisted attacks made over the last few months by the government of Victor Paz Estenssoro, helped along by American imperialism and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The most recent of these attacks took place this summer, culminating in the government's plan to restructure the nationalized mining industry, formalized eventually by decree on August 26. Under this viously thought that these increases were derisory.
In the same month of July, the political temperature of the country rose sharply following the anti-drug operation mounted by the Bolivian army together with United States troops, who raided clandestine cocaine installations. The presence of the US troops provoked strong reactions. It was seen as an infringement of national sovereignty, if not as a prelude who would be forced to give it u tary bases in the country. There were protests supported by the trade unions. These involved mainly peasants who cultivate cocaine and who would be forced to give it up without any guarantee of an alternative source of income.
Towards the end of July, 21,000 miners began a strike. This was the start of a new wave of workers' plan, most mines will be closed miners have already been sacked threatened. LIVIO MAITAN
It is too early to make a definitive assessment of recent events, in particular because the results negotiations between the government and the Bolivian Mineworkers' Confederation (FSTMB) are still not known. But it is clear that the struggles of the Bolivian masses are unfolding in more and more difficult conditions.
In July 1985 President Paz Estenssoro came to power following fraudulent elections and an agreement between his party, the Historical Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR-H) and Hugo Banzer's Democratic Nationalist Alliance (ADN). (1) Immediately after these elections, Paz Estenssoro decreed a new package of measures which enforced those adopted by the previous government. (2) He imposed a wage freeze, abolished state subsidies on basic goods and authorized a "free' floating of the peso against the US dollar. This was a new blow for the standard of living of the masses, which had already fallen considerably for some years. (3)
Initially, Estenssoro's policies had a measure of success, especially in respect of the rate of inflation which was more or less diminished. But this was an ephemeral result. Already, in December 1985, inflation began to climb again although it stayed below previous levels. Robert Gisbert, the finance minister, put forward a plan for an inflation rate of 36 per cent for 1986, which was to go hand in hand with a three per cent rise in 20 or privatized. Over seven thousand and the jobs of thousands more are the Gross National Product (GNP). However, the indicators of a new recession were already apparent in the first quarter of 1986 and the rate of inflation reached 50 per cent in June. Previously, the IMF had fixed a ceiling of 85 percent for the whole year.
These developments could do nothing but provoke struggles. In January 1985, the Bolivian Labour Confederation (COB) had already led a general strike to protest against the economic and social policies of the government. Two months later it was the turn of the teachers, who were on strike for more than a month. Their situation illustrates the living conditions of Bolivian workers. At the time of the strike, the teachers wage was around 30 million pesos a month, close to the minimum wage, and their demand was for 120 million pesos. (4) After the struggle had broken out, the government was willing to give the teachers a 100 per cent rise, recognizing by this token that they could not live on their existing wages. As far as the miners are concerned, they receive an average wage of less than 60 million pesos a month. A leader of the COB, Walter Delgadillo, calculates that they need double this simply to be able to live.
In July, President Estenssoro decided to put an end to the wages freeze. He announced that the monthly minimum wage would be increased from 30 to 40 million pesos, with 33 per cent rises in the public sector. Given that prices had already risen about 30 per cent, the COB obstruggles. On August 1, workers went on strike in the mining city of Oruro and in Potosi, including workers from the national airline company, LAB, and from the universities. At three days notice, the COB called a 48-hour general strike in solidarity with the miners for August 21 and 22.
Previously, on July 25, there had been a significant test of political forces when the COB had organized a referendum on two questions. Ninety-five per cent of the respondents were for the suspension of the payment of the external debt and against the government's tax reform - a generalized ten per cent value-added tax (VAT), which particularly hit the poor. The government, not at all appreciative of this initiative by the union confederation, denounced it as a fraud. (5)
1. The MNR-H is one of the parties come out of the MNR, which was brought to power by the 1952 revolution, and whose principal historic leader is Paz Estenssoro. The previous government was led by Hernan Siles Suazo, another historic leader of the MR. Today, Suazo is the head of the MR-I (MNRLeft).
Hugo Banzer, leader of the ADN, took power in a military coup in 1971 and remained in power until 1978.
On the situation under the previous government of Siles Suazo (1982-85), see in particular the following articles: "A new stage opens" by Livio Maitan 'International Viewpoint' No. 48, March 12, 1984; "The test of the March general strike", by Andre Dubois. "IV" No. 74, April 22, 1985.
3. According to estimates in the international press the income per head in Bolivia fell 30 per cent between 1980 and 1985. (See 'Latin America Regional Reports Andean' RA 86-01). This article has drawn mainly from this source, and from 'Latin America Weekly Report.
4. In July 1986, one US dollar equalled 1.9 million pesos. It will probably be at least equivalent to 2.3 million pesos by the end of this year.
5. According to some estimates, one and a half million people participated in the referendum ('Le Monde, August 30, 1986). But 'Latin America Weekly Report (86-30, August 7, 1986), gave the much lower figure of 300,000.
International Viewpoint 29 September 1986
In this context Paz Estenssoro's government announced a radical restructuring project for the mining industry, heralding fresh attacks on the working class. A decree issued on August 26 announced that the head office of the nationalized Bolivian Mining Company (COMIBOL) would be closed. The Matilde zinc mine and the Corocoro tin mine in La Paz province were to be closed down for good. Nine other mines were to be sold into private ownership and a further thirteen managed by private cooperatives. However, five of these mines (San Jose, Bolivar, Huanuni, Unificado and Tasna) had already stopped production and another one, Catavi, was also a possible target for closure. The workforce would be reduced by nearly half, so between 12,000 and 13,000 workers were to lose their jobs and consequently their homes. In the eight months prior to August, there had already been between 7,000 and 8,000 redundancies. New test of strength
A new test of strength began. The miners had already organized a 150mile march from Oruro to La Paz beginning on August 21, to protest against the massive number of redundancies. More than 5,000 miners took part, often accompanied by their families and by other workers and students who marched with them in solidarity.
On August 26, 40 miles outside of the capital, La Paz, the marchers were stopped by the army. Under the pretext of an imaginary threat of insurrection, the government opted for open repression. The march leaders were arrested, and the rest of the marchers rounded up and dispersed in atrocious weather conditions, without medicines, money or food. It was another moving chapter to be inscribed on the record of the Bolivian working class, already one of the most glorious in the world.
The government proclaimed a state of seige on August 28, and proceeded to arrest labour, political and church leaders in La Paz and five other cities. Around 200 were removed to remote regions of the country. At the same time, La Paz airport was occupied by airforce units and the university was surrounded by the army to prevent students becoming centrally involved in the resistance, as they have in the past.
The day afterwards - August 29 - the COB called a 24-hour general strike in protest at the imposition of the state of siege, which saw the participation of large numbers of factory and building workers. Big demonstrations were held in several towns. For example, in Cochabamba — a town of 280,000 inhabitants -15,000 people marched on September 3.
However, the miners could not prolong their resistance. On August 29 the fighting stopped because of the government's preoccupation with opening negotiations with the trade unions rather than with repression. The miners were returned to their home towns from La Paz in army trucks. It is not excluded that the government slowed down the pace of the measures that they intended to impose, and even reduced them in scope somewhat. But it is undeniable that the miners and the working class have suffered a new setback.
The government's plan, insofar as it is realizable, will mean a deepening of current efforts to restructure the Bolivian economy. The mining sector, traditionally the backbone of the economy, has been in decline for many years following unfavourable developments in the world market, and also because of the more and more obsolete nature of Bolivia's productive apparatus. Now this crisis has reached a point of no return.
To give an idea of the extent of the problem, in 1980 the price of one pound of tin was 7.6 US dollars, while today it is less than three dollars. At the same time, the value of exports fell from 650 to 120 million US dollars. Production decreased six-fold compared to its 1976 level, and, in 1985, COMIBOL lost 250 US dollars.
If this collapse of the mining sector and the steady slide of the GNP for some years did not bring about a complete disintegration in the country, it was because of the existence of what is called the "informal sector"
Behind this euphemism is hidden the reality of the cultivation, processing and trade in cocaine, which plays an increasingly decisive role in Bolivia's economy. (6) Any statistics concerning Bolivia should be treated prudently (including those in this article on the "official" economy). This is even more true for the informal economy which is, by definition, underground and therefore the figures concerning it cannot be guaranteed to be accurate. But most sources coincide in their estimate that drug exports will bring in around 600 million US dollars this year (some say nearly a thousand million), while the value of official exports will only be 400 million dollars. The cocaine trade, therefore, accounts for 50 per cent of Bolivia's Gross National Product.
It is evident that such an economic evolution has serious consequences on a social level at a time when the traditional economy is in a state of freefall. Peasants realize that it is more advantageous for them to grow cocaine than other agricultural products. For workers, condemned to unemployment, they often have no other recourse but to attempt to integrate into the informal economy, including smuggling. Those who are lucky can change their lives. Some miners who work processing cocaine in one night can earn half the monthly wages they would get in the mines. (7)
As has already been said, it is not possible yet to draw a balance sheet of recent events in Bolivia, at least until the results of negotiations between the unions and the government are known. But it seems as though the government will not make an about-turn.
The mineworkers' confederation, the FSTMB, even before this recent crisis, had put forward an alternative plan for the mines composed essentially of the following points: the maintenance of jobs at the level of March 31, 1986 (i.e. 23,370 workers); a 42 per cent reduction in workers' social benefits; a 15 percent or so decrease in spending on energy; a 50 per cent reduction in technical services and in work contracted out to companies outside of COMIBOL; a massive reduction in general expenses; and a 20 per cent reduction in the costs of running the head office of COMIBOL in La Paz. This is evidently a strictly defensive plan whose eventual implementation would bring about no qualitiative changes in prospects.
The developments of the last two months and the blows suffered by the miners risk having very serious repercussions on the whole Bolivian workers' movement. The Latin American workers' movement may also pay a price. This is why solidarity with Bolivian workers must once again be at the top of the agenda.
6. On the decline of the traditional economy and the growth of the informal economy see - in addition to the sources already cited - articles in "Le Monde, August 30, 1986, and 'L'Unita, August 29, 1986.
7. The informal economy also had a blow last July following the military operation against drug-trafficking. It was reported that the price of a "carga" (50 kilos) of cocaine fell 75 per cent, and that 150,000 producers were without a means of support. (See 'El Pais, July 30, 1986). But there is no information to contradict the view that this trend, although strong, is only conjunctural.
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International Viewpoint 29 September 1986
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